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1 May - 20 June
1956

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



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
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"So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote....the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being."

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



SIGNING THE SECOND FIVE YEAR PLAN, NEW DELHI, 14 MAY 1956

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Thirty Three

(1 May–20 June 1956)

**A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.


When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writing of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Indira" and the last name "Gandhi" written in a single, continuous stroke.

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

During the period from 1 May to 20 June 1956, covered by this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru devoted a great deal of attention to India's relations with its neighbours, especially Pakistan, and the Western countries. "The foreign policy of a country", he stated in early May 1956, "is not something that you bring out of a hat. It may be based on certain broad approaches, broad principles. But it has to be continually adapted to changing circumstances. In another sense, the foreign policy of a country is a collection of many foreign policies with different countries." Indeed, the first nineteen pages of this volume reflect this view. They also reveal Jawaharlal Nehru's understanding and analysis of foreign affairs. As ever, he supported the aspirations of the peoples of Asia and Africa for self-determination.

Jawaharlal Nehru addressed issues of India's progress and prosperity with his usual vigour and earnest commitment. Hence, his close and active interest in the formulation and implementation of the Second Five Year Plan which laid emphasis on much higher production targets, both in agriculture and industry, that would lead to an increase in employment opportunities. He also talked about cultivating plan-consciousness among the people.

Remarkably, India's first Prime Minister laid stress on the importance of science and technology in all his major public utterances. In the Lok Sabha debate, for example, he made it clear:

...when we talk of planning, more so, when we talk of anything else, we have to think in technological terms, because it is this growth of science and technology that has enabled man to produce wealth which nobody could ever dream of. It is that which has made other countries wealthy and prosperous, and it is only through the growth of this technological process that we shall grow and become a prosperous and wealthy nation; there is no other way. Of course, there are many other things to be done too. But I want to lay stress on this. This is basic.

To implement his blueprint of national reconstruction, he made strenuous efforts to reform and revitalize the existing administrative structures.

Despite his busy schedule, Jawaharlal Nehru engaged with the Union Minister for Food and Agriculture to study China's agrarian cooperatives so as to raise India's food production targets. He wanted a reconsideration of the question of exploration, mining, refining, pricing and distribution of oil in India. These concerns went hand-in hand with the initiatives to resolve outstanding

domestic issues, notably the stand off with the Nagas. He desired a long term political approach to resolve the Naga problem without disturbing their traditions and customs. He justified military intervention only because some Naga leaders adopted a violent course.

National reconciliation was the cornerstone of the Prime Minister's domestic policy. In consequence, he expressed his anxiety whenever ethnic, religious, caste, regional and linguistic tensions threatened to undermine his vision of a strong and united India. He said:

Do you remember that 2500 years ago Buddha had raised his voice against casteism? But we have not learnt a lesson even after 2500 years and continue to live in thousands of compartments of caste and regard one another as alien. There should be only one caste of all the people living in India and soon the time must come when there is one caste in the whole world. Only then can there be real progress in the world. At least let us root our casteism from our country and the violence which erupts over small issues.

In May 1956, the Railway employees in Kharagpur and Kalka went on strike. Working class discontent also simmered elsewhere. Jawaharlal Nehru responded with his characteristic promptness, and detailed his views on labour-management relations. This is what he wrote to the Indian National Trade Union Congress:

It seems to me that in this age, our conceptions of social relations and national and international affairs must necessarily undergo a change. That would apply to the relationship subsisting between labour and management, and there is undoubtedly today what is called class conflict. But it is out of date... Strikes and lockouts should no longer have any place in industrial relations. This means that the basic reasons for strikes or lockouts must disappear and that where there is such conflict there should be a fair and impartial method of resolving it peacefully.

Again, reacting to the strike in Kharagpur, he stated:

I am a little weary of hearing this word *satyagraha* hurled at me... When Gandhiji first used it and practised it, when the time came he told us that nobody in India is a *satyagrahi* except himself. He told us that, and quite rightly too. In spite of all our efforts, now everybody in India is a *satyagrahi*. Everybody who breaks law, everybody who breaks heads is a *satyagrahi*. Every stone-thrower in India is a *satyagrahi*. This is most extraordinary, where words are misused and abused. Well, if a person wants to break a head, if I can stop him, I will stop him. But I do hope that the word 'satyagraha' will not be used in that connection.

In his exchanges with friends and colleagues, Jawaharlal Nehru discussed scientific, cultural and educational matters with utmost clarity. Generally speaking, he is open-minded, liberal and eclectic in his approach. This is borne

out by two incidents. One relates to the objection raised by the Home Ministry to the inclusion of two distinguished writers on the Sahitya Akademi's Advisory Board because of their pro-communist proclivities. Nehru thought otherwise. "I think it would be unfortunate if we kept out of the Akademi distinguished writers merely because we do not agree with their political opinions." Again, when objections were raised to the screening of *Pather Panchali* at the National Theatre in London because of Satyajit Ray's portrayal of poverty, Nehru told the concerned Minister: "I do not agree with this viewpoint. We are a poor country and we should not be ashamed of it, except that we should get rid of poverty."

Nehru described the Hindu Succession Act, passed in this period, as a first step towards the economic freedom for women of India. The Act gave, for the first time, a share of father's property to a daughter and gave women absolute rights over self-acquired property. He said in the Lok Sabha:

I have no doubt in my mind that one of the basic things essential in India is the complete freedom, economic freedom—political freedom in a sense they have—of the women of India...there is no doubt about it that the women of India at the present moment, by and large, do not, and have not had, economic freedom. This Bill of yours will not give them economic freedom as such. But it is a step in that direction. Personally I am not very anxious for my daughter or anybody to have to rely upon me for maintenance and the like; I want her to stand on her own feet.

On Kashmir, Nehru reiterated his suggestion for a settlement along the ceasefire line, made originally in May 1955.

Documents in the volume also indicate Nehru's concern with the 'underlying unity' of India. He made strenuous efforts to preserve that unity by invoking both the historical and contemporary symbols of composite culture. He set forth his views at the shrine of the great Sufi poet, Amir Khusrau, a vibrant symbol of India's composite culture:

For a long, long time India has been after a dream, which has been realized at times and then slipped away. What is that dream? Many streams and rivers of ideas and languages and cultures have flowed into India from other countries and joined her vast cultural bloodstream. What was their place here? Were they to be assimilated into one or were they going to remain as separate little ponds?

For thousands of years, I would say, it has always been India's consistent effort to synthesize and adopt the thoughts and ideas that flowed in, and to change and be changed a little by them. The culture and civilization of India evolved in this way by a gradual process of synthesis, and continued to change because the doors of a living and growing nation should never be shut to outside influences. They should be wide open to

let in the fresh breeze of ideas and culture. What you adopt or assimilate from them is in your hands. But the moment you shut the doors, the nation stops growing and the air within, however good it may be, does not remain fresh if the doors and windows are not open.

As in other volumes, there are examples of Nehru intervening in cases where he felt that justice had not been done. Thus, he comments on the draconian evacuee property laws that deprived Muslims from getting back their properties after Partition, and the unauthorized occupation of *waqf* properties and mosques. In the case of Roshan Ara, a young girl who lost her family during the Partition riots, Jawaharlal Nehru—humane and caring—intervened to get her rehabilitated.

This volume also carries Jawaharlal Nehru's instructions to the Union Home Minister and the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir when Farooq Abdullah complained that he had been humiliated during a visit to his father, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah, at the jail in Kud.

It is our very pleasant duty to thank various individuals and institutions for their support and help in bringing out this volume. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi has graciously permitted us to consult the papers in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library has, as always, granted access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. The Secretariats of the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs, Sahitya Akademi, National Archives of India, All India Radio and the Press Information Bureau have allowed us to use relevant material in their possession. We wish to acknowledge, in particular, the permission given to us by All India Radio to use the tapes of Jawaharlal Nehru's speeches.

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Mushirul Hasan

May 2004

CONTENTS

1. General Perspectives

1	India and the International Situation	4 May	1956	3
2	The Way of the Buddha	24 May	1956	20
3	Unity and Development of India	20 June	1956	24

2. National Progress

I. Economy

(i) Planning

1	Basic Approach to Second Plan	1-2 May	1956	39
2	Encourage a Uniform Development	3 May	1956	53
3	Report on the Second Plan	15 May	1956	55
4	Timetable for Discussion on Second Plan	16 May	1956	64
5	Ceiling on Individual Income	18 May	1956	67
6	Approval of the Second Plan	23 May	1956	71
7	Resolution on Second Five Year Plan	25 May	1956	89

(ii) Food and Agriculture

1	To Ajit Prasad Jain	4 May	1956	111
2	To Ajit Prasad Jain	8 May	1956	111
3	To Ajit Prasad Jain	9 May	1956	112
4	To Shri Ram	25 May	1956	114
5	To Ajit Prasad Jain	2 June	1956	116
6	To Ajit Prasad Jain	9 June	1956	117

(iii) Industry

1	Inter-Ministerial Coordination on Petroleum	8 May	1956	118
---	---	-------	------	-----

2	To Swaran Singh	14 May	1956	120
3	Refining and Pricing of Petroleum	14 May	1956	122
4	Reply to B. Orchard Lisle	25 May	1956	123
5	To T.T. Krishnamachari	10 June	1956	124
6	To T.T. Krishnamachari	13 June	1956	125

(iv) Labour

1	Labour-Management Conflict and its Resolution	6 May	1956	126
2	Working Conditions in Defence Industries	18 May	1956	127
3	Railway Employees' Strike in Kharagpur	28 May	1956	128
4	To V.V. Giri	1 June	1956	136

(v) Transport

1	To Lal Bahadur Shastri	12 May	1956	137
2	To Jagjivan Ram	18 June	1956	138

(vi) Small Savings

1	Big Role of Small Savings	1 June	1956	139
---	---------------------------	--------	------	-----

II. Science

1	Policy and Programme for Atomic Energy	4 May	1956	141
2	On Proposed Nuclear Centre in the Philippines	5 May	1956	144
3	To C. Rajagopalachari	6 May	1956	148
4	International Nomenclature for Metric System	10 May	1956	149
5	Methods of Water Conservation	10 May	1956	150
6	To H. J. Bhabha	18 May	1956	152
7	Making Atomic Energy Commission a Statutory Body	12 June	1956	153
8	Effects of Nuclear Explosions	June	1956	154

III. Education and Culture

1	To Abul Kalam Azad	7 May	1956	156
2	To Sucheta Kripalani	7 May	1956	157
3	To Abul Kalam Azad	11 May	1956	158
4	Members of Advisory Board of Sahitya Akademi	17 May	1956	160
5	To Rana Jang Bahadur Singh	18 May	1956	160
6	Spreading Quality Education Fast	22 May	1956	161
7	Publication of Books at Cheap Price	24 May	1956	162
8	To B.V. Keskar	25 May	1956	163
9	Amir Khusrau—Symbol of India's Composite Culture	28 May	1956	164
10	To Swaran Singh	11 June	1956	166
11	To Abul Kalam Azad	13 June	1956	168

IV. Language Question

1	Encouragement for Urdu	8 May	1956	169
2	To G. B. Pant	12 June	1956	169

V Tribal Affairs

(i) The Nagas

1	To Bisnuram Medhi	13 May	1956	171
2	Broad Approach to Naga Problem	13 May	1956	174
3	To S. Fazl Ali	17 May	1956	177
4	Appraisal of the Naga Situation	19 May	1956	178
5	Question of Political Action in the Naga Hills	21 May	1956	181
6	Military Aspect Essential at Present	23 May	1956	182
7	To Bisnuram Medhi	28 May	1956	183
8	The Naga Resistance and the Government Actions	30 May	1956	185
9	To S. Fazl Ali	1 June	1956	190
10	To Bisnuram Medhi	5 June	1956	192
11	To S. Fazl Ali	5 June	1956	194
12	To Bisnuram Medhi	12 June	1956	196
13	No Scorched Earth Policy	12 June	1956	197
14	Use of Harvard Aircraft in Naga Operations	15 June	1956	198

15	To S. Fazl Ali	19 June	1956	198
16	Failure of Civil Administration	20 June	1956	200
17	Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi	22 June	1956	201

(ii) Others

1	On Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff	13 May	1956	202
2	Employing Hmar Tribal People	6 June	1956	204

VI. Social Welfare

1	To E.W. Aryanayakam	7 May	1956	205
2	To Abul Kalam Azad	8 June	1956	205
3	To Abul Kalam Azad	9 June	1956	208

VII. Health

1	To Gulzarilal Nanda	17 May	1956	209
2	Health Services for All	1 June	1956	209
3	To Chief Ministers	7 June	1956	213

VIII. Women

1	The Hindu Succession Bill	8 May	1956	214
2	Training Camp for Women	15 May	1956	222

IX. Children

1	Priorities in Child Welfare	9 May	1956	222
2	Joint Committee for Bal Bhavan and Children's Museum	25 May	1956	226

X. Evacuee Property

1	Dealing with the Evacuee Property	10 June	1956	228
2	The Case of Roshan Ara	11 June	1956	231
3	To Mehr Chand Khanna	11 June	1956	233
4	To G.B. Pant	11 June	1956	235
5	Property of Muslim Evacuees	11 June	1956	236

6	The Question of Moveable Evacuee Property	12 June	1956	237
7	To Mehr Chand Khanna	15 June	1956	237
8	To Mehr Chand Khanna	19 June	1956	239

3. Administrative Matters

1	Choosing the Right Intelligence Agents	1 May	1956	243
2	Selection of Delegation Going Abroad	15 May	1956	244
3	To G.B. Pant	17 May	1956	245
4	Leakage of Secret Documents	27 May	1956	246
5	To John Matthai	2 June	1956	247
6	To G.B. Pant	6 June	1956	249
7	To G.B. Pant	10 June	1956	250
8	Foreign Funding of Political Parties	10 June	1956	251
9	To B.V. Keskar	12 June	1956	253
10	To Swaran Singh	15 June	1956	254
11	To C.D. Deshmukh	19 June	1956	256

4. States

I. Punjab

1	To Tara Singh	2 May	1956	261
2	To G.B. Pant	2 May	1956	261
3	To G.B. Pant	3 May	1956	262
4	To Partap Singh Kairon	8 May	1956	263
5	To C.P.N. Singh	11 May	1956	264
6	To Partap Singh Kairon	15 May	1956	265
7	To Chaman Lall	17 May	1956	266
8	To C.P.N. Singh	17 May	1956	266
9	Linguism in Punjab	22 May	1956	268
10	To Partap Singh Kairon	26 May	1956	270
11	To C.P.N. Singh	27 May	1956	272

II. Hyderabad

1	To B. Ramakrishna Rao	4 June	1956	274
---	-----------------------	--------	------	-----

III. West Bengal

1	To B.C. Roy	23 May	1956	275
2	To B.C. Roy	13 June	1956	276

IV. Ajmer

1	To Haribhau Upadhyaya	16 May	1956	277
2	To Haribhau Upadhyaya	7 June	1956	278
3	To Bal Krishna Kaul	13 June	1956	279

V. Delhi

1	To Brahm Perkash	25 May	1956	280
---	------------------	--------	------	-----

VI. Madhya Bharat

1	To Gulzarilal Nanda	3 May	1956	281
2	To Narsingh Rao Dikshit	8 June	1956	282

VII. Rajasthan

1	Bhooswami Sangh Agitation	5 May	1956	283
2	To Mohanlal Sukhadia	9 May	1956	285
3	To U.N. Dhebar	11 May	1956	287
4	Withdrawal of Bhooswami Agitation	19 May	1956	288
5	Bhooswami Sangh Members in Pakistan	24 May	1956	290

VIII. Uttar Pradesh

1	To C.B. Gupta	2 May	1956	290
---	---------------	-------	------	-----

IX. Madras

1	To Sri Prakasa	12 June	1956	291
2	To T.T. Krishnamachari	18 June	1956	292
3	To K. Kamaraj	18 June	1956	294

5. Reorganization Of States

1	To D.K. Kunte	1 May	1956	297
2	To G.D. Patil	1 May	1956	298
3	To Lala Duni Chand	2 May	1956	299
4	To Harekrushna Mahtab	2 May	1956	300
5	To N.V. Gadgil	6 May	1956	301
6	To Kasturbhai Lalbhai	9 May	1956	302
7	To Sri Krishna Sinha	15 May	1956	304
8	To L.B. Bhingardev	6 June	1956	306
9	Reorganization of Bombay Region	8 June	1956	307
10	To Damodar M. Vagal	9 June	1956	308

6. Parliamentary Affairs

1	To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar	3 May	1956	313
2	To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar	16 May	1956	313
3	To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar	22 May	1956	314
4	To Ashok K. Chanda	26 May	1956	315

7. Indian National Congress

(i) Bombay Session of AICC

1	Strengths and Weaknesses of the Congress	2 May	1956	319
2	International Affairs	31 May	1956	322
3	Treaty of Cession of French Settlements	31 May	1956	323
4	Violence and Indiscipline in Public Life	1 June	1956	323
5	Portuguese Possessions in India	1 June	1956	326
6	Congress and the Second Plan	1 June	1956	327
7	Combat Violence, Come What May	2 June	1956	330
8	Second Plan—the Horoscope of India	3 June	1956	334
9	The Future of Bombay City	3 June	1956	338

(ii) Other Matters

1	To B. Ramakrishna Rao	2 May	1956	341
2	To Shriman Narayan	19 May	1956	342
3	To Gurmukh Singh Musafir	24 May	1956	343

4	To Sampurnanand	24 May	1956	344
5	India's Role in World Issues	29 May	1956	346
6	To C. Rajagopalachari	6 June	1956	359
7	To U.N. Dhebar	9 June	1956	360
8	To U.N. Dhebar	9 June	1956	362
9	Points of Fundamental Importance	16 June	1956	363
10	Reorient Congress Party	17 June	1956	371

8. Kashmir

1	To Jayaprakash Narayan	3 May	1956	377
2	To Hyder Husein	5 May	1956	378
3	To G.B. Pant	19 May	1956	379
4	To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad	26 May	1956	380
5	Accession of Chitral	26 May	1956	382
6	To C.C. Desai	27 May	1956	383
7	To Subhadra Joshi	27 May	1956	384
8	To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad	28 May	1956	385
9	Suzerainty Over Chitral	30 May	1956	386
10	Kashmir at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference	30 May	1956	387
11	To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad	3 June	1956	387
12	The Kashmir Issue	5 June	1956	388
13	Inclusion of Kashmiris in Services and Foreign Delegations	9 June	1956	389
14	To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad	20 June	1956	391

9. Defence

1	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	9 June	1956	395
2	Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit	13 June	1956	396

10. Foreign Possessions in India

1	To Morarji Desai	8 May	1956	399
2	To Morarji Desai	14 May	1956	399
3	To Morarji Desai	14 May	1956	400
4	The Case of Sudha Joshi	16 May	1956	401
5	Treaty of Cession of French Establishments	28 May	1956	402

6	French Territories in India	29 May	1956	404
7	Freedom of Goa	4 June	1956	405

11. Privy Purse

1	To K.C. Singh Mandhata	19 May	1956	423
2	Utility of Privy Purses	28 May	1956	424

12. External Affairs

I. Pakistan

1	To C.P.N. Singh	10 May	1956	427
2	Migrations from East Bengal	11 May	1956	428
3	Gift of Rice to East Pakistan	19 May	1956	429
4	To Surendra Mohanty	25 May	1956	430
5	To C.C. Desai	27 May	1956	432
6	Talks with World Bank on Indus Waters	29 May	1956	433
7	To Mohammad Ali	30 May	1956	434
8	To V.K.R.V. Rao	5 June	1956	437
9	To Mehr Chand Khanna	5 June	1956	438
10	To Mohammad Ali	10 June	1956	438
11	To Mouli Chandra Sharma	12 June	1956	440
12	Indus Waters Negotiations	14 June	1956	441
13	To Mohammad Ali	20 June	1956	443

II. Nepal

1	Conditions in Nepal	14 May	1956	444
---	---------------------	--------	------	-----

III. Myanmar

1	To U Nu	6 May	1956	447
2	Commercial Relations with Myanmar	16 May	1956	448
3	To U Nu	30 May	1956	449
4	Cable to R.K. Nehru	7 June	1956	451

IV. Sri Lanka

1	To Bernard Aluwihare	6 May	1956	452
---	----------------------	-------	------	-----

V. UK

1	To Hukam Singh	10 May	1956	453
2	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	22 May	1956	454
3	To Vijayalakshmi Pandit	5 June	1956	455

VI. USA

1	To Dorothy Norman	7 May	1956	456
2	Policy Regarding Purchase of Rice	10 May	1956	457
3	To Ajit Prasad Jain	11 May	1956	458
4	Agenda for Discussion with US President	11 June	1956	458
5	Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon	14 June	1956	460
6	Financing of Press by Foreign Sources	15 June	1956	461

VII. USSR

1	To T.T. Krishnamachari	11 May	1956	462
2	Debate in USSR on Stalin's Failings	15 May	1956	463

VIII. Indo-China And Korea

1	Development Relating to Indo-China	4 May	1956	464
2	To Pham Van Dong	9 May	1956	465
3	Message to Selwyn Lloyd	4 June	1956	466

IX. Sino-American Relations

1	Sino-US Deadlock	18 May	1956	467
2	Issue of Release of US and Chinese Prisoners	20 May	1956	468
3	Cable to R.K. Nehru	22 May	1956	469
4	Cable to R.K. Nehru	27 May	1956	471
5	Indian Ambassador's Talks with Chou En-lai	3 June	1956	472

6	Cable to R.K. Nehru	19 June	1956	472
---	---------------------	---------	------	-----

X. China And Tibet

1	Chinese Maps of the Frontier with India	6 May	1956	475
2	Countering Chinese Moves on the Frontier	12 May	1956	477
3	Cable to R.K. Nehru	19 May	1956	479

XI. The Algerian Question

1	The Asian-African Group in the UN	4 May	1956	480
2	Policy towards Algeria	22 May	1956	481
3	Message to U Nu	27 May	1956	484
4	Message to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike	28 May	1956	485
5	Message to H.S. Malik	2 June	1956	487
6	Recognizing Algeria's Distinctive Personality	16 June	1956	489

XII. Singapore

1	Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit	11 May	1956	490
2	David Marshall's Visit to New Delhi	21 May	1956	492
3	David Marshall's Proposed Visit to China	12 June	1956	493

XIII. Other Countries

1	Conversation with the Ethiopian Ambassador	7 May	1956	494
2	To Habib Bourguiba	13 May	1956	495
3	To Obafemi Awolowo	15 May	1956	496
4	Message to J.B. Tito	16 May	1956	497
5	To the King of Saudi Arabia	10 June	1956	498
6	Admission of Japan in the UN	15 June	1956	499

XIV. General

1	Invitations from Foreign Organizations to Individuals and Organizations in India	10 May	1956	500
2	To T.T. Krishnamachari	13 May	1956	501
3	To Mahavir Tyagi	17 May	1956	502
4	To Homi J. Bhabha	20 May	1956	503
5	Cultural Delegations to Foreign Countries	5 June	1956	503
6	Issue of Passports for Conferences	10 June	1956	505

13. Interviews

1	Remembering Motilal Nehru	6 May	1956	509
2	Interview with Michael Brecher-I	6 June	1956	512
3	Interview with Michael Brecher-II	13 June	1956	534

14. Letters to Chief Ministers

I		10 May	1956	559
II		15 June	1956	566

15. Miscellaneous

1	Help to Chandra Singh Garhwali	6 May	1956	577
2	Collections of an Australian Sculptor	13 May	1956	578
3	To Carl Sandburg	13 May	1956	579
4	To Pyarelal	15 May	1956	580
5	To K.M. Munshi	20 May	1956	581
6	K.M. Munshi's Book on Hyderabad	20 May	1956	583
7	Cable to B.R. Sen	21 May	1956	586
8	To U.M. Trivedi	27 May	1956	587
9	To Mahavir Tyagi	30 May	1956	589
10	To U.M. Trivedi	5 June	1956	590
11	Chinese Edition of <i>An Autobiography</i>	9 June	1956	590
12	Chinese Edition of <i>The Discovery Of India</i>	9 June	1956	591
13	To C.D. Deshmukh	12 June	1956	593

ILLUSTRATIONS

- Signing the Second Five Year Plan,
New Delhi, 14 May 1956 *frontispiece*
- Addressing a meeting of the National Development Council, New Delhi, 1 May 1956, and
the National Conference on Child Welfare,
New Delhi, 9 May 1956 *between pp.* 66-67
- Dastar-bandi* by Zamir Nizami, *Pir* of
Dargah Nizamuddin Auliya, at the 650th *Urs*
of Amir Khusrau, New Delhi, 28 May 1956
- Laying the foundation stone of a monument to
commemorate the 2500th anniversary of
the Buddha's *Parinirvana*,
New Delhi, 23 May 1956 82-83
- Watching President Rajendra Prasad receive an
album of Buddha Jayanti postage stamps,
New Delhi, 24 May 1956
- At the A.I.C.C. Session, Mumbai, 3 June 1956 322-323
Also seen sitting Satya Narayan Sinha (on left)
and A.K. Azad (on right)
- With U.N. Dhebar, at the A.I.C.C. Session,
Mumbai, 3 June 1956

At a meeting of the Presidents and Secretaries of
P.C.Cs, New Delhi, May 1956

338-339

With participants of a cultural presentation on
conclusion of a meeting of the Presidents
and Secretaries of P.C.Cs., New Delhi, May 1956

From *Shankar's Weekly*, 20 May 1956

530-531

From *Shankar's Weekly*, 10 June 1956

ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Anno Domini
AFPFL	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League
AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
AMU	Aligarh Muslim University
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPI	Communist Party of India
CRO	Central Recovery Organization
CSIR	Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
DMK	Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GOC	General Officer Commanding
IAF	Indian Air Force
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
I & B	Information and Broadcasting
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IFS	Indian Foreign Service
IIT	Indian Institute of Technology
INTUC	Indian National Trade Union Congress
JS	Joint Secretary
KMT	Kuomintang
LIC	Life Insurance Corporation
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs

MEP	Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MLC	Member of Legislative Council
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDC	National Development Council
NEFA	North East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum & Library
NNC	Naga National Council
NNSC	Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
NR & SR	Natural Resources and Scientific Research
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PA	Personal Assistant
PCC	Pradesh Congress Committee
PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PIB	Press Information Bureau
PM	Prime Minister
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PPS	Principal Private Secretary
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PWD	Public Works Department
RBI	Reserve Bank of India
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SBI	State Bank of India
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SRC	States Reorganization Commission
UK	United Kingdom
UN/UNO	United Nations Organization

UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNESCO	United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNP	United National Party
UP	Uttar Pradesh
UPI	United Press of India
US/USA	United States of America
USIS	United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO	World Health Organization

GENERAL PERSPECTIVES

1. India and the International Situation¹

Friends and Comrades,

... Well, it is a little difficult to know where to begin about international matters. They all have their roots in the past and they are continually changing. You read about odd events in the newspapers. And no doubt you connect them with something. The newspapers comment on them. It becomes a little difficult in this very complicated, changing world to understand the entire picture. Nor can I give you the entire picture. It is too big and too complicated. One only gradually get to know and understand it a little. The foreign policy of a country is not something that you bring out of a hat. It may be based on certain broad approaches, broad principles, but it has to be continually adapted to changing circumstances. In another sense, the foreign policy of a country is a collection of many foreign policies with different countries. It is not one whole although it should be integrated, of course. So, there are all these difficulties and above all, there is the difficulty of our living at a time when things are changing very rapidly.

As a matter of fact, this process of change started really with the World War I which brought about the end of a period, of what is called roughly the 19th century. In the 19th century, England was the dominant power in the world. There were other great powers—Germany, France, Japan had become a great power, Russia appeared to be a great power, Austria, and so on and so forth. America was a great power but it was rather an isolated power. Now, the World War I was the result of a cracking up of the long equilibrium of the 19th century. A conflict arose between Western powers—between Germany and England and France. But as a result of that major conflict, the whole structure of the 19th century was shaken up and many new things emerged. What emerged? The German empire fell. The Tsarist empire fell and a new Communist Government came in its place. And the Austrian empire fell. Three empires fell as a result of the World War I. But the very big change which came about after the First War was the emergence of the United States of America as a world power. It was strong even earlier, but it was not playing a

1. Speech at a conference of the Presidents and Secretaries of the Pradesh Congress Committees, New Delhi, 4 May 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. The conference, held from 2 to 4 May 1956, was presided over by U.N. Dhebar, the Congress President.

very big part in the world. Now, it became the big creditor country of the world. Everybody owed it money. Before the World War I, America owed money to England and to other countries. Now, everybody was a debtor and America was the creditor; and in a military sense too it was powerful. So both financially and militarily, it became powerful. Before World War I, throughout the 19th century, England had been called the workshop of the world. That is to say, it had achieved a greater degree of industrial development than any other country. London was the financial centre of the world. Everything went through London, wherever you sent money.

After World War I, all this began to change. The financial centre shifted to New York, not by any decree but by fact. It took some years to happen. America was the place where the money was. So you see this shift of power to America. Meanwhile, a Communist Government in Soviet Union came in. It took many years to establish itself, about ten years, you might say. There were wars of intervention, civil wars, famines, all kinds of internal conflicts. So, Soviet Russia did not play any important part in world affairs. It was too weak. But gradually from the end of twenties it began to strengthen itself economically.² The First Five Year Plan was launched, then the Second, and as a result, at an enormous cost, it did strengthen itself, industrially and economically. In those ten or twelve years from the end of the twenties to 1939, when the Second War came, it achieved a very great deal in building up its industries. In fact, it was that building up of industry that saved it in the War. Otherwise, there is no doubt Russia would have been defeated. It was near defeat as it was, but those twelve years of mighty effort were decisive. It involved a tremendous amount of hard work, and human suffering. They paid for it in lives, for millions of people died in the famine when they were extracting everything they could from the farmer, from the tiller of the soil, to build up their industry. Well, they did build up their industry but at terrific cost in suffering. However, it may be said that their policy justified itself in the sense that they saved themselves in the War. Otherwise, they would have been wiped out. They did survive the War and won it with the help of others.

Let me go back. World War I, as I told you, saw the end of the Russian empire, the German empire and the Austrian empire. It also saw the tremendous weakening of France. That was another great imperial power. After World War I, if you had looked at the picture, you would have said that France had

2. Soviet planning was based on public ownership in industry and trade, and on mixed public and collective ownership in agriculture. Their First Five Year Plan, drawn up by Gosplan (the State Planning Commission) in 1920, was inaugurated in 1928.

emerged from the War as a triumphant victor. It had a great army, it apparently had plenty of money and all that, but the fact was that France had been thoroughly weakened by the War. Its best human beings had been killed in the War. All its youth had been exterminated. Its resources had been spent. Remember, when you have a war you not only spend what you have got, you also spend what you are going to get tomorrow, and the day after, and the day after that. That is, you spend the future in protecting the present. People don't realize that. People think of the high profits and a few people make profits. But you are sacrificing a future generation, future incomes. So, France emerged from the War weak, thoroughly weak, but outwardly a powerful nation. You can see the weakness of France when you remember how quickly France collapsed before the German armies at the beginning of the Second World War. It collapsed in a few weeks. It was an amazing thing. A great army but it had no inner strength left. It is wrong and difficult to compare things. But at the end of World War II, in a sense to some extent, the same process of weakening applied to the British empire. Though England retained many of its great qualities—discipline, strength, ability, scientific knowledge, technological growth, capacity to hold together, etc., nevertheless, the Second World War exhausted them. They spent all their savings plus the future. Result, at the end of the Second World War, although they were a victorious power, they were weakened tremendously. Maybe that was one reason for the policy they adopted in India. There were other reasons too, no doubt.

So, at the end of the Second War, in effect, France had become a second-rate power, England had also weakened and Germany and Japan had been defeated. There were no other great powers left except America and Russia. America emerged from the War tremendously powerful. Russia emerged from the War in a broken-down condition. It had suffered tremendous damage. America had suffered no damage in the War. The War was outside America, the War took place in Russia, and Russia suffered tremendous damages and the loss that Russia suffered in manpower too was very, very great. Their people died by the million. Nevertheless, unlike France, Russia's resources in manpower and other matters were much greater. France's manpower was limited. Russia with its gritty peasant stock, had made good its population losses.

Immediately after the War, one would have said that the United States of America both from the point of view of military power and economic power, were the dominating power in the world. And Russia was a wounded giant. Germany, etc., were of course, all down and out too because of the War. Now, Russia performed a rather remarkable recovery and in the course of five

to eight years she built her economy again and repaired the war damage and so on. So, in effect we have in the world two mighty giants, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, other things have happened. While England is weak and France also is relatively weak, Germany in spite of defeat in War begins to build herself up—Western Germany. It has got an army etc., now, but because of its ability, its technology, in the course of five to eight years; industrially it is one of the great powers again. Japan, in spite of American occupation—America occupies Japan even now, mind you, it is not 100 per cent independent country—even so it has built itself up.

Now, apart from the other factors, we come to atomic energy. It appeared on the scene at the end of the last War. The atom bomb suddenly became a dominating factor in military strategy and later also in other matters. Now, here again, America and Russia are the two leading powers in the production of atomic energy and atomic weapons as well as the hydrogen bomb. We hear a great deal about the conflict between communism and anti-communism in the world. There is a conflict between those two ideologies of course, but those words rather confuse the issue and prevent us from thinking straight. The real conflict is a political conflict, not an ideological conflict. It is a conflict of great powers wanting to be more dominant in the world or not to be subservient to another. The real conflict is America fearing the great power of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union fearing the great power of the United States. This is a strange development. In the past, in the 19th century, Asia was all colonized by the colonial countries, but there was what was called a balance of power in Europe—between Germany and Austria on one side and France, England and Russia on the other side. They balanced each other. Now, that balancing has gone. Gradually, the smaller powers have been eliminated although they talk loudly. But really the two powers that count are America and Russia, and these two being hostile and inimical to each other, they try to gain friends in the rest of the world, both friends and territories, bases and so on. Normally, this would have led to war, resulting maybe in the dominance of one or in the equal destruction of both. But now we have the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb which have made clear that any great war in which atomic weapons are used may very well destroy half the world, maybe the whole world, nobody knows. For the first time in history, even a powerful nation cannot confidently rely on its armed might. People have been talking about disarmament for ages past. Why have they not succeeded? Because the powerful nation thinks that it can gain its ends with its power, by war or by threat of war. Therefore, it will not reduce its power. Now, a situation has arisen when the most powerful nation realizes that war may not lead to its

attaining its objectives. Indeed, it may lead to a tremendous injury to itself. It may destroy its enemy, but it will be destroyed also. Therefore, for the first time, there is a practical check on war apart from moral checks and others, and a fear of war. And war does not appear to be a means of gaining one's ends. Therefore for the first time, it may be said that there is some prospect of disarmament because of this, not because of moral approaches.

That is where we are. I should like to tell you, don't get mixed up with this talk of communism and anti-communism. Consider that separately as an ideological point. It is a conflict between great powers who want to dominate, or at any rate to have their influence felt in the rest of the world and not to be challenged by any other power in the world. And the only solution of this is when you see that neither can dominate over the other. Nor can war yield any result. What is the way out? The only way out is to tolerate each other. The only way out is what is called peaceful coexistence, recognizing that the world is big enough, and therefore we should not interfere with each other but let each power or a group of powers lead their own lives. That is *Panchsheel* or call it what you like. Everybody recognizes this, America, Russia, everybody else, because there is no other way. But by recognizing it, they do not act up to it because of these background of fear, suspicion, hatred, and all that. I suppose gradually they will have to adapt themselves to it.

Meanwhile, another development has taken place, slightly removed from the military field. The conflict is now going into the economic field because the Soviet Union appears on the world stage as a competitor in supplying economic help. Thus far it helped its own satellite countries. But it is now challenging the United States with the surplus industrial and scientific material that it produces. Oddly enough, this has frightened America and others even more than the military challenge, because they had thought that in that matter at least they could not be challenged. But the Soviet Union's industrial power has grown so much, and its scientific and technological capacity has advanced so far that after fulfilling their own needs they can supply others. They are today supplying China a tremendous deal of industrial help. They are helping some of the other communist countries too. And now they have helped India in various ways. We are not taking very much help from them. We have paid for what we got. Suppose they put up an iron and steel plant, then we will pay for it. They have also given us some help amounting to a few crore rupees, not very much in terms of international help.³ They are putting up now a very

3. The Soviet Union had given a long-term credit of Rs. 55 crores for the Bhilai Steel Works in Madhya Pradesh in April 1956.

big technological institute near Bombay through UNESCO.⁴ It will cost about a crore of rupees. They have given us agricultural machinery worth a crore of rupees.⁵ But the main thing is that they are prepared to give technical help to build machines and to train our people. And their conditions for training are preferable to the conditions available in the Western countries, in the sense that, in the western countries one has inevitably to go to private industry. Private industry does train but they have their secrets and patents. Now in the Soviet Union, everything is state. So there are no patents or secret devices etc. They may have some secret devices, of course, in their atomic energy. That they don't show to anybody. But broadly speaking, it is easier to get trained in technical processes there than elsewhere. Of course, there is a great disadvantage of language. If you go to a country where there is English, well you start training immediately. If you go to Russia or Japan or China or Germany, you have to learn the language for some time and that is a loss. But still there it is.

Now, the main thing therefore to realize is the emergence of these two giants. The others don't count really in the final sense. England still has colonies in various parts of the world. France has colonies, so has Portugal for the matter of that, but nobody calls Portugal a great power. There are only two great powers today.

Apart from these two countries, a country which is already a great power is China. It is not a great power in the sense of technical and industrial progress. Nevertheless, from the defence point of view it is a great power. There is no doubt that in 10 or 15 years' time, its strength will be very great indeed. If you look at the world, and if normal processes continue, the fourth country that has the potential to become big in this way is India. Big not in size, but big in industrial and technical and other power because only that constitutes power today. The only fourth country is India, apart from Russia, America and China. I don't mean to say other countries will be in any sense behindhand. But in the matter of potential we have everything. We have the mineral resources. We have a population which given the opportunity can do anything in technology.

4. As an outcome of discussions between the Government of India, the UNESCO and the USSR, the UNESCO agreed in 1954 to help found the IIT, Bombay, by directing the funds contributed by the USSR to the UN Technical Assistance Programme. UNESCO agreed to provide Rs.10.2 million for equipment and technical experts.
5. Regarding Soviet help, Nehru gave details of his talks with the Soviet leaders and subsequent developments during a Conference of Heads of Indian Missions during March-April 1956. This is printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 456-458.

They can become very firm engineers, technicians, scientists, this, that and other. It is only a question of time and joining them up and resources. So in the normal course, in another 15 years' time, I should imagine—if nothing happens to weaken us—that from the industrial, technological and other points of view we shall be in a pretty leading position. I dislike saying anywhere or anybody saying that India wants to be a leader of Asia or this or that. First of all it is a bad thing. It is just jingoism and pomposity. We do not want that. Secondly, it is a bad thing. You irritate and annoy other countries in Asia by saying this. Naturally, they are annoyed, they are a little jealous and they get angry, which is natural. This should never be said. But I am stating to you purely factually something that having regard to the resources and the apparent ability of the people in India, I have little doubt that India will advance fairly rapidly and in 15 or 20 years' time occupy a very high place from that point of view.

The only thing which is an uncertain factor in India, as in every country, is the internal factor, how far we can pull together, how far we can rise above our internal quarrels, internal jealousies, internal dislikes and work together for high ends. That is the decisive thing. Human capacity is there, resources are there, but the question is how far we can work hard. Russia worked very hard. China is working very hard. You cannot achieve anything without working very hard. America can achieve a great deal without working very hard because it has put in a great deal of hard work in the last hundred years. Do not imagine that countries in Europe have attained their position just by exploiting colonies and all that.

So, given hard work, given cohesion in India, and the capacity to look at big things and not get lost in small matters, India is bound to be among the first three or four nations of the world, not in the military sense, but from the point of view of what is power today. I will, for the moment, leave out a thing which we cannot measure—the power of the human spirit, which is very important really. And even in the most material country there is the power of the human spirit, that counts. But we cannot measure that. Apart from that, it is power that counts, not leading articles in newspapers, or slogans or speeches in Parliament. In a speech in Parliament, you may shout loudly about Pakistan or the Portuguese or this or that. Well, it has no meaning unless it has that requisite power behind it. The Portuguese are nobodies to us but behind the Portuguese there are a dozen big countries. And are we going to upset all our future plans and relations with other countries and take a step which might involve us in great risks? To do what? To get Goa. Of course, we will get Goa. Goa cannot run away from India. But because we are impatient and

because we are angry at what the Portuguese have done, are we going to plunge in and take those enormous risks and get into enormous difficulties? Well, that is not statesmanship, that is not wisdom. We shout in the market place, and march an army because the Portuguese Government has been insulting us or Pakistan has been insulting us. It is not wisdom. We have to bide our time; we have to build our strength.

Take India and Pakistan. The comparison between India and Pakistan in the last eight or nine years since Independence is very marked. That is what we have done and what they have not done. It is extraordinary, the difference between the two. And what is more, the world is beginning to realize it. Normally speaking, the rest of the world likes Pakistan and dislikes India. Why? They do not understand India. They do not understand all this business of the caste system, untouchability, touch me not, you cannot eat with them, you cannot join in their social life and so on. People in Pakistan eat, drink—whether they drink or not I do not know—on a level and they meet socially. Europe has been used to Islam for the last thousand years or more. They have fought Islam for hundreds of years. They have disliked each other and all that, but still they know each other. What is essentially basic Hindu civilization and culture and rather habits, I am not talking about philosophy, may be known to individuals in Europe and may be appreciated, but they are so utterly different from what they are used to, that they feel strange. They do not understand it. And what one does not understand one dislikes. Nobody in India realizes the amazement of a person outside India at the caste system. They do not understand it. It is not a question of disagreeing with something. A man saying that I will not eat with so and so, they just do not understand it, it is unknown in the world. The only people in the wide world who have some limitations in eating, etc., are the Jews. Nobody else has any limitations.

What I meant is, there is a natural inclination for them to understand Muslims in Pakistan more than they do us here in spite of a hundred years or more of the British being here. It is no good your taking out somebody, Max Muller,⁶ and quoting Max Muller, what he wrote about India or what somebody else wrote, some philosophers and others, in praise of Indian civilization or Indian culture. I am talking to you about national reactions. And they are there.

In addition to that, so far as England is concerned, and to some extent other countries, there is another factor. India became independent basically as

6. Friedrich Max Muller (1823-1900); born in Germany; philologist and orientalist; an influential comparative philologist at Oxford; prepared an edition of the *Rigveda* and edited the *Sacred Books of the East* (5 vols).

the result of a revolutionary movement led by the Congress and supported by the Indian people. And in the Indian people I include the people of Pakistan. They all joined with us. All of us were conditioned by that revolution. A revolution conditions a person, it forces him to think, it forces him to act and it is the strongest educating factor of a people. All of us were conditioned in that way, more or less.

Now, in Pakistan, although the people of Pakistan were also conditioned in the same way, the rulers of Pakistan came from the Muslim League which opposed the revolutionary movement, which sided with the British, which was helped by the British and subsequently, which took help from a large number of British officers who were pushed out of India. I mention this at a public meeting not to run down the Pakistani rulers, I should not do that, it is improper for me—but merely to point out the background. Here is a revolutionary background behind us. We may fail, we may be poor specimens as individuals, but as a nation we have gone through this revolution and the governments that we have produced are the outcome of that revolution. Whether the government is good or bad is another matter, still it is the outcome of that revolution. The government that Pakistan has produced is the outcome of opposition to a revolution, of helping the other side. There is that fundamental difference in outlook. That leads to our trying all the time, in so far as we can, to stand on our own feet, to be independent in our policy, domestic or foreign, to try to build ourselves up. We may fail or succeed but there is the effort there to build—build, whether it is the Five Year Plan, whether it is this, whether it is that, whatever it is, whether it is khadi, everything represents an effort to stand on our own feet, because we learnt that during our period of probation and revolutionary experience. See Pakistan—there is no such effort. It is all an outcome of weakness, and asking for help from America, from this, from that—with the result that whatever help they may get from there they grow in weakness, they do not grow in strength because strength comes from struggle, from effort, from hard work, from fighting adverse circumstances. That is how strength comes, not through soft living and getting things easily.

So, progressively in the last eight or nine years, regardless of what you may say at the top, India has gained strength, Pakistan has grown weaker. They may have more arms because America supplies them; they may put up an odd factory or two with American money or whatever it is; but basically Pakistan grows weaker. There is no stability there, political or economic. And then, there is this major problem of Pakistan, of East Pakistan, which is a unique thing, a country being divided by a thousand miles of foreign territory and East Pakistan being completely different in language, in thinking, in background, in

everything from West Pakistan and practically being, at present, a colony of West Pakistan. It is governed by West Pakistan almost as a colony. There is no integration between East and West, whatever they might say politically.

I am merely pointing out to you the growing weakness of Pakistan. It does not matter two pence to me how much money America throws in, they may get a stronger army than we do—it is possible—more arms and all that, but it is all a superstructure, a superficial structure. We can get as much money from America and more by a mere gesture, by the slightest hint of it we will get it. We do not get it because we think that will not help us, that will weaken us, and that will make us not only politically subservient but dependent in every way. I would rather face a hard time, because that builds up the character of a nation. Suppose we get money from America and build up a few factories or something else. Well, we may get employment for a few thousand men. But our problem is not a few thousand men. Our problem is, employment for many crores, thirty-five or thirty-six crores. You can never solve that problem by external help. It is an impossibility. You can only solve it by the crores of people themselves solving it and growing stronger. There is no other way. Ah, yes, it is true that external help can give a push here and there, can fill a gap here and there, when you need it. That is certainly possible. And we welcome external help. Every country that has advanced, including the United States of America, has received external help, money from England, money from Germany, money from other places. There is no harm in that. But the moment you rely on external help you are lost, you lose that essential dynamism which pushes you forward the urge to do things yourself. That is why I think that the gap between the capacity of India and the capacity of Pakistan is, according to my thinking, a growing gap. That is, we grow stronger and they grow weaker in spite of all the help they may get from outside.

Now, I am not thinking in military terms but in terms of, how a nation becomes strong essentially. The only thing that will make us weak, again, is not the lack of help from outside but dissensions amongst ourselves. That is the curse of the Indian people from the dawn of history; the way they have been unable to pull together; the way they have fallen out; the way our society is dominated by the caste system. One sees this danger in the linguistic provinces controversy, which is filling people with passion and fears and hatred and dislikes. Nothing that Pakistan or any foreign power can do, can come in our way. I am absolutely assured of that. I do not worry about that.

In this attempt to see the future you see, if nothing happens then India is well set on her road to both a measure of prosperity as well as power. By power I do not mean armed might, though armed might follow. Armed might

is a consequence of the other things that you have. If you have got industry, armed might can appear in a couple of years, just like Germany, a country which has been completely defeated, has become a great power in four or five years' time. China will take ten years, or fifteen years, because it has not got the background of industrial production to make it strong and to enable it to provide a well-being to her people. Therefore, the tests of our well-being and progress, according to modern standards are—how much iron and steel are you producing and how much hydroelectric power are you producing. If you are producing that much it means that plenty of hydroelectric power is being used for industry, and things are functioning.

Take another field which is very important and is likely to become more important, atomic energy. This is a new thing in the world but its progress in the last five or seven years has been very fast, remarkable and I think in just another ten years' time it will change the face of the world, just as the Industrial Revolution changed Europe. It is a new power of enormous dimensions. That power can be used for good purposes or bad. In regard to atomic energy, barring four or five countries in the world, we come more or less next. In Asia we are obviously the leading country although Japan is highly advanced and can become more advanced because of the background of her industrial, technical and scientific experience. But there is no country in Asia anywhere near us. There are very few countries even in Europe so advanced as we are. The big countries are, of course, America, Russia, England, Canada and France. The capacity to go ahead, of course, is there with Germany and Japan who have fine scientists. Our advance in atomic energy, is rather odd. It is out of keeping with our general backwardness in technology. It is a strange thing to advance at the top storey, you might say, without the middle storeys being built. But there it is. Apart from the fact that in five or six years' time it will pay us dividends in power for civil use, it is a potential strength for us even from the defence point of view. Not that we are going to use it that way. We are not going to make atom bombs. But the fact that we can make an atom bomb and do not use it will be a factor of strength which people realize.

So, all these are helpful factors for us if we look ahead a little, but all this depends on our internal mobilization and hard work. I would say that the Second Five Year Plan, covering the next five years is of basic importance to us. If we get over this period successfully then our foundations are strongly laid. I give ten years from now for this initial building up, the initial laying of strong foundations. We cannot do these things by merely passing laws and resolutions. Ten years from now we will be able to break completely the barrier which separates an underdeveloped economy from a developed economy.

What do I mean by breaking the barrier between the two? An underdeveloped economy has always to work in a vicious circle. That is to say, in order to develop, it wants resources, it wants surpluses for investment, but because of its very poverty it cannot find the surplus, or it might find very little of it. Meanwhile, all the time the population grows, the burden of feeding more people comes, the burden of clothing more people, will keep growing. The result is you just cannot get out of this vicious circle. America or Russia today are well out of that circle because their normal surplus is so big every year that they can throw it about. America throws it about all over the world. Mind you, America gives grants and moneys all over the world. I have no doubt that they do it with the best of intentions. But as a matter of fact, if they did not do so—it is odd for me to say so—their economy would crack up. Their economy is so strangely made up that unless they throw money about, it will crack up their economy. It is an extraordinary state of affairs. It is a wasteful economy. If in America almost everybody does not buy a new car every year, the automobile industry will stop. So, they buy a car and throw it away after a year or two, a new car, or exchange it, and so the automobile industry goes on. If too much wheat is produced, they throw it into the sea. It is a wasteful economy. Their production has become colossal, beyond imagination, because of their technological growth. Now, in a more sane world one could balance these, the starving people could have that production and help and all this, all kinds of things can happen; but this is not a very sane world.

So, I say that in ten years' time the barrier of underdevelopment will be broken down. Then will come a period of rapid progress when we have generated forces in our own economy which of their own momentum takes us ahead. China is trying its best. It has some advantages which we do not possess, we have some advantages which they do not possess. And, as I told you this morning, our position in many matters is so similar that, quite inevitably, the whole world is always comparing India and China. They may sympathize with India or China but everybody constantly compares how far the two have gone ahead in a given year and the next year.

To go back to international matters, I think, broadly speaking, one may say that a big war is very unlikely. But the conflict has shifted to the economic level to show which system can give higher results or higher dividends—the communist system, the American system, the British system or some in-between systems.

Why do we say that we want a socialist pattern of society? Well, partly because we have been conditioned to think so. If you ask people, they will say, 'Oh, because socialism is social justice and we want equality and not

these high disparities'. Social justice with complete poverty has no meaning. It means injustice to everybody, poverty for everybody. Social justice only comes in when there is some justice, some welfare to give to the people. Otherwise it does not come in. We talk of our aim being the socialist pattern of society because according to our thinking there is no other way for us to make rapid progress. Leave out justice and all that. That comes later. We cannot push our economy if we left it to private enterprise.

The other day I saw an article by an American professor who, is a great advocate of private enterprise. But he said that after studying the conditions in India he had come to the conclusion that private enterprise being what it is in India it could not just undertake the burden of any rapid advance.⁷ So the facts of the case, not merely theories or just emotions, make it clear that unless we proceed with all the strength of the state to push industry in a planned, organized way, we will not make progress fast enough. Further, the type of progress which we may make will be a progress which will be lopsided, which may bring a great deal of benefit to the top class and not have the slightest effect on the rest of the population. The differences become greater. It may do good to some odd corners of India here and there and the rest of the country is neglected. The private entrepreneur is interested, even the good man, putting up a factory which will yield dividends. He will put up the factory where it is easiest to get dividends. He will, first of all, choose the thing which is easy; secondly, which gives dividends quickly; thirdly, he will choose a place, etc., where it is easiest to succeed. The national factors which we have to think of do not concern him. He will never put up a factory which will yield dividends ten years later. He is not going to wait for ten years for dividends. The factory may be highly important from the State's point of view but he is not going to wait for ten years. First of all, the private enterprise man in India has not got the resources for the very big things that India wants. Secondly, as I said, their outlook is not to develop India as a whole but to develop this industry here, that industry there.

I would not go into that more now. I want you to appreciate that we have adopted the socialist pattern of society for a very practical consideration, for that is the only method by which we can advance rapidly. We have not done so

7. John Kenneth Galbraith, Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 1949-75, visited India in 1956. In an article entitled 'Rival Economic Theories in India', published in *Foreign Affairs*, (New York) in July 1958, Galbraith also expressed a similar view on the role of private enterprise.

just out of vague inclination "let us all be equal, let us cut off the heads of the tall poppies" and all that. It may satisfy the incompetent for the competent head to be cut off; but it is absurd. Let us recognize that our idea is 'equality in opportunity'—nobody can make people equal in ability, physical or mental or spiritual or anything. They will all continue to differ very much, but equality in opportunity is essential in order to give vast numbers of people the hope that they can develop and serve various causes in the country.

I started talking to you about international affairs and shifted into various other matters. What is the good of my talking to you about what is happening in Israel and in the Arab world. There is no doubt that it is the most dangerous spot in the world today from the point of view of the possibility of war. Passions between Israel and the Arab countries are running high. Then, there is the Far East. There is no immediate danger of war there, but it is one of the explosive spots: Formosa, Taiwan. Then, there is Indo-China where we are concerned because we are Chairman of the Commissions there.⁸ There are other difficult spots is North Africa, Algeria,⁹ where there is a violent rebellion against the French going on and the French, weak as they are, are exhausting themselves in suppressing it. They may suppress it. After all, they have an army with modern weapons but obviously they can never suppress it completely. Just like Indo-China drained the blood out of France and then they had to give it up, now they are facing the same situation in Algeria of being drained of the little blood they have got. I hope they will come to some terms as they came to terms in Morocco and Tunisia.¹⁰ In Europe, the major question is that of Germany, the unification of Germany. It is a complicated question and nothing is likely to happen in the near future because it can only be solved by some kind of a compromise and the compromise will not come until this fear of each other goes between the West and Russia. You see, the Soviet Union naturally does not like a rearmed, a strong Germany. Twice they have been invaded by Germany. They are not going to take the risk again. If Western Germany is going to arm, as the Atlantic powers have decided, why should they allow

8. Three international commissions, one each for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, with India as Chairman, were set up under the Geneva Agreement of 21 July 1954 and started functioning from 11 August 1954.

9. For the violent situation in Algeria, see *post*, p. 481.

10. France and Morocco reached an agreement on 2 March 1956 recognizing the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Morocco. On 20 March 1956, France recognized Tunisia's independence, its right to conduct foreign policy and raise its army. Both Governments agreed to discuss the details of their future cooperation, especially on defence and foreign affairs.

Eastern Germany to join in this? Let at least Eastern Germany be kept out of this. That is how the Soviet Union thinks. If they are assured that Western Germany will not become a great power to attack them, then it becomes easier for west and east to join. Otherwise they will never agree, for their own safety's sake. Apart from the tensions between the powers, there are racial questions in South Africa and elsewhere. So it is a difficult world, but gradually the drama goes on unfolding itself....

I had recently stated in Parliament and elsewhere that the possibility of plebiscite in Kashmir has become remote.¹¹ Some people say, that I have ruled out plebiscite in Kashmir. I have not said that. What I have said is that we have waited for these seven or eight years, and we have not found it possible to have a plebiscite or indeed to agree about the prerequisites of a plebiscite. If we have not agreed during these seven or eight years, there is little chance of our doing so now. But some new things have happened, which is an additional barrier. What are these new things? American aid to Pakistan, SEATO, Baghdad Pact, all these are additional barriers to any kind of a plebiscite. I made this proposal a year ago to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and others who came here, that we could take up the status quo and then discuss it and finalize it, subject to minor boundary changes.¹² They didn't accept it. They said, "If we accept this, we will be kicked out of our government" and "the people wouldn't have us" which is probably true because they have roused their people so much on this issue that it is difficult for them to go back on all they have said. I am quite convinced that there is no other way out. Now, some people, the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha shout loudly: "Oh! you have given up Indian territory to Pakistan". That is to say, the territory which is in the occupation of Pakistan today, I am prepared to give it up to them. There is no giving up, they have got it, they have had it for the last eight years. How can I get it back? The only possible way is a war in which I defeat Pakistan and lay down my terms. Well, I am not prepared to have a war for that. Apart from that, frankly speaking, I don't want a territory which contains people who do not want to be in the Indian Union, who will be a headache to us, who will not be happy and we won't be happy with them. Now, why should I invite trouble and headache and disruptive elements, just to

11. For Nehru's recent statement in Parliament on plebiscite in Kashmir, see *post*, p. 383.

12. On 4 May 1955, in the course of his talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza, Minister of the Interior, at New Delhi. Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 252-253, 257 and 260.

have a strip of territory here and there? That is not my approach to this question or any question. I don't want to go about conquering territory against the will of the people living there. My justification for being in Kashmir primarily is because the people of Kashmir or a great majority of them, the national leaders, invited us and because I think that a very large section of them want us to be there. If nobody wants us there in Kashmir, we shall have no place there. We can't keep an army of occupation in place there. So that, both for practical reasons and other reasons, the natural result is that we should seek a settlement of the Kashmir issue as it is today in the ceasefire line, subject to some changes here and there. There is no other way out. By my saying this rather frankly and publicly what I have previously said privately, I think, we have brought a sense of reality into this Kashmir dispute. We talking tall and they talking tall was unreal. And this reality has come which I believe has had a good deal of influence. Other countries realize too that this is a practical approach. I am afraid many people in America, many newspapers, and many in England, are constitutionally opposed to us. They dislike us or they want to pat Pakistan on the back. And they go on criticizing us. I do not know what to do about that. But I think that people are realizing that this is the only way. Nevertheless, I rather doubt if Pakistan is going to agree to it in the near or foreseeable future for the simple reason that by their own speeches and writings they have produced such an atmosphere in Pakistan that no government dare say that. I understand that probably this month or next month, this matter may be raised in the Security Council again. If it is raised, naturally we have to say whatever we have to say there. Some people say, "Why don't you withdraw it from the Security Council?" Legally, constitutionally, we can't. It is there. The Security Council is seized of a problem and we can't withdraw the problem. We can withdraw ourselves and have ex parte decree there if you like. If we withdraw and the other party is there, they carry the day. There is no question of withdrawing. You may ask, "why did you go there eight years ago?" Well, I think still that it was a good thing for us to go there. In the course of the eight years, we have made, well, many mistakes. They are minor ones, I think, in our desire to settle this. I don't think we have made major mistakes. You must remember that when we went to the Security Council, it was two or three months after Independence and Partition. It was a very difficult time for us. Our armies were split up, this and that. And it was a very strange predicament for us that as soon as we become independent, with all our background of peace and non-violence, we plunge into a war. It was a most amazing predicament. I was tremendously worried, as I have said even in public. I went to Gandhiji, greatly worried. I said, "It is not fair of me to put the

burden of any decision on this matter on you. I don't naturally do so. It is for us to decide and we will decide". Nevertheless, I pointed out to him the difficulties. And he didn't go into the question, of course, deeply but he said, "If Kashmir is in danger, it is your duty to protect it, even with arms." So naturally, even that vague statement of his encouraged me greatly. And if we had not done that, you see if we had not gone to the help of Kashmir then, there is no doubt in my mind that within two, three weeks, or a month, we would inevitably have been dragged into a war with Pakistan. In fact, if we had delayed by one day, possibly even six or seven hours, it might have been fatal, because when our people, troops, two or three hundred, arrived there, these tribal people or Pakistan levies were six miles from Srinagar.¹³ If they had occupied Srinagar and if they had occupied the air strip near Srinagar, we could not have landed there. There the matter ended. And I have no doubt that in Srinagar, there would have been the biggest massacre which you can imagine, the biggest looting. Kashmiris are poor people but Srinagar is a rich city—rich in its arts and crafts and all kinds of fine work which go all over the world. Now, there would have been a tremendous looting of this. There would have been a massacre of Hindus and Muslims. At that time there were 25,000 refugees from the Punjab—Hindu and Sikh refugees, they would have been massacred. It would have been the most ghastly thing and no Government of India could have remained quiet after that. They would have had to go to war.

So, by our going to help Kashmir, we avoided a major war at that time. When we went to the Security Council, it was partly because of our training and background, we wanted to avoid this major war and soon after Independence, it was not a thing which was welcome at that time.

There were other factors too. We had a little business to settle a little later in Hyderabad¹⁴ and here and there and getting involved all over. Well, it is easy to be wise after the event. There it is, we have to face the situation as it is. And I don't think there is any other reasonable way out except to accept the status quo in Kashmir now. We are proceeding on that basis and I don't think that even in Pakistan any thinking person imagines that there can be any other solution. They may shout in public. But they know they can't bring about any other solution.

13. Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar on 27 October 1947.

14. On 13 September 1948, the Government of India despatched troops against the Hyderabad State.

2. The Way of the Buddha¹

Mr President, honoured guests, sisters and brothers,

You see before you the glorious full moon of *Baisakhi*. It is a true symbol of hope for a world which is in the grip of an eclipse. Two thousand five hundred years ago, on this day, a great soul was born and lived and passed away on this very soil. A great deal has happened in the last two thousand five hundred years and his thoughts have had a tremendous impact on this country. But it seems almost as though we had forgotten him in the last few centuries. I should not say forgotten for he has continued to live on in some corner of our hearts but he did not occupy our thoughts. He has been revered more in other countries. Today, after centuries he is coming into his own once again, which is an event to be celebrated.

India was the home of the Buddha though in a sense his message embraced the whole world. We do not wish to deny the others their share but why must we not claim our own especially when he was one of the greatest sons of India? So, today he comes back to us, and we travel back in time and thought to those forgotten memories. People travel a great deal in India. But the real journey is of the mind and heart. Physical movement is a superficial thing. The question is how the mind and heart of India are moving and where the country is going.

Therefore today, Buddha Jayanti Day, is a special occasion to remind us where we are going. We often talk about great things and then forget about them. We take Mahatma Buddha's name but forget his teachings. We get caught in meaningless artificial rituals, or talk of non-violence and go to war.

Who was this man, Gautama Buddha? He was a human being, not a god or an incarnation. But he was greater than all the gods that we worship in temples and elsewhere and think that our duty is done. If we do not think about where our duty lies or how we lead our lives, what is the use of such worship? Some people go and bathe in the river and observe a fast when there is an eclipse. Fasting is a good thing and it is always beneficial. So is bathing in the Yamuna always good. But to bathe because there is an eclipse is wrong.

1. Speech at a public meeting on the occasion of the two thousand five hundredth birth anniversary of Gautama Buddha, New Delhi, 24 May 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi. Rajendra Prasad presided over the meeting and Radhakrishnan addressed the gathering.

It is a form of self-deception as also deceiving others, to think of the eclipse as Rahu having caught the Moon. Are we so foolish in this country as to believe in such things? We give it the name of religion too. It is precisely against such superstitions that Gautama Buddha protested and taught the people how they were degrading religion by such wrong beliefs. Dharma, religion, means high principles and moral values. It teaches good conduct and behaviour and does not advocate getting caught in such artificial things. You must remember that he stressed this again and again. The President and the Vice-President have already told you that Buddha did not call himself a god. He was certainly a very great man and he used to preach that the people should try to understand his teachings by practising them. Only then could there be true enlightenment. He said that there was no need to accept anything until you understood it properly and tested it by practical experience. This is what is known today as the scientific way of life. Science is not something which can be practised only in laboratories. There is a science of life, of the mind and heart, and there have been a number of seekers after these truths. Many have succeeded in attaining enlightenment too.

We must understand this because we have become used to observing superficial rituals in religion and fighting over them. Communalism, which means fighting in the name of religion is bad. This is not the right path, whatever slogans you may shout. This is not what any religion teaches, neither Hinduism nor Buddhism nor any other religion. But we often take to this wrong path.

In one sense, some of the other countries of the world have got out of the habit of fighting in the name of religion. But they have done so only to get caught up in another kind of warfare. They have got out of one kind of war to turn towards another, which has brought great ruin. Now, a strange situation has arisen when the world sees that the weapons of war have become so lethal that the aggressors will themselves become the victims and get swallowed up. Nobody knows what havoc the atom bomb will cause and people have woken up a little to the danger that threatens them. It is a fact that gradually the world is beginning to see new light due to the terrible threat posed by the possibility of a nuclear war. It is a matter of regret that this thinking arises not out of wisdom but out of fear and danger. If it had come out of understanding, it would have been stronger and more lasting. Anyhow, the world has now begun to realize that the atom bomb is not the solution to international problems for one bomb leads to more. It is certainly not the remedy for this disease.

Now, if you apply this principle in a wider sense, we come back to what Gautama Buddha preached. He preached that hatred cannot be removed by hatred but only by love and compassion. This is an old truth which other great

men in the world have also proclaimed. But we often tend to forget it and go on the path of ruin. Therefore, this day has a special significance for the whole world and especially for our country. We are engaged in great tasks in the country. Yesterday there was a debate in the Lok Sabha on the Five Year Plan—the draft which sets out policy directions to remove poverty and unemployment and make India a prosperous nation. I made a statement² you must have seen. The things that are essential have been set out in the document³ and were discussed at great length in the Lok Sabha. But there are a few things which are even more important that have not been written in the Plan Draft. They were not left out deliberately, nor have we forgotten them, but that was not the place. Even if we progress industrially and in every other way and the wealth of the nation increases, if we fail morally and spiritually and do the wrong thing or go to war or do not live in amity, where will the Five Year Plan take us? The strength that we acquire will be squandered in fighting. Therefore, it is fundamental to our progress to acquire stability. Otherwise, all our strength and prosperity will only equip us to kill others and bring ruin upon everyone. We must guard ourselves from this.

You are aware of the situation in the world. Many countries of the world have advanced tremendously during the last couple of centuries and become very wealthy and powerful. But they have used that strength to kill one another until today when the world is tottering on the brink of total disaster. We must learn a lesson from that when we implement the five year plan. We must march to our goal with clear minds and hearts with no intentions of fighting with one another in the name of religion or anything else and break down the barriers between us. We must understand all this if we want to progress. A nation does not progress if it is disunited or by believing in superstitions and magic or professing high principles while its intentions are evil. We will have to stand on our own feet and not depend on astrologers.

Gautama Buddha taught us that the path of true advancement lay in right knowledge, right action and love and compassion. If we are guided by his teachings, we may be able to influence the other countries also. If we are ourselves guilty of wrongdoing, how can we advise others? When we are in the right, it is bound to have a good influence on the others. It is better that our wrongdoing does not have an influence on anyone.

2. For Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on 23 May 1956, see *post*, pp. 71-89.
3. As Chairman of the Planning Commission, Nehru signed the *Second Five Year Plan* document in the Parliament House on 14 May 1956. He formally presented it to the Lok Sabha on 15 May.

These days there is a great deal of talk about *Panchsheel*. You may be aware that the word has its origins in Buddhist literature⁴ or perhaps even earlier—I do not know. It was used in the context of a code of conduct. Today we have given it an international garb. But the meaning remains the same as when it was applied to individual code of conduct. Now it is being applied to the behaviour of nations. As the President pointed out,⁵ this is gradually being accepted by some of the other countries, not because we have said it or someone else did, but because there is no other way open to the world. The deadly weapons which have come into the world have reduced all flexibility for no one can predict what will happen next. The whole world has in a sense become a hidden mine.

So, we must think about these things on this day and try to draw some guidelines from the past and fit them into the modern age. We have to do this in our individual as well as our national lives and realize that India can progress only by following broadly the principles of Gautama Buddha.

Do you remember that 2500 years ago Buddha had raised his voice against casteism? But we have not learnt a lesson even after 2500 years and continue to live in thousands of compartments of caste and regard one another as alien. There should be only one caste of all the people living in India and soon the time must come when there is one caste in the whole world. Only then can there be real progress in the world. At least let us root out casteism from our country and the violence which erupts over small issues. We call ourselves a democratic country and have a Parliament and Assemblies. But people express their opinions at the street corners by shouting and throwing stones. They want to solve all problems in this manner.

Gautama Buddha's principles were very high. Instead of trying to adopt them, what we are doing today is even against common principles of decency. How can we take the names of great men when we forget what they said. Today our country is branching out in new directions after being stagnant for a

4. About 2,500 years ago the Buddha first mentioned the 'five principles or rules of conduct'—called *Pansil*. If a man wanted to obtain release from the cycle of birth and death he must first follow eighteen positive injunctions and ten prohibitions. Of these, the five are for all. According to the *Tripitaka*, a sacred Buddhist canon, these are: (1) to refrain from injury to living things, (2) not to take that which is not given, (3) not to commit sexual immorality, (4) to refrain from falsehood, and (5) to refrain from liquors.
5. Rajendra Prasad hoped that various countries would resort to disarmament based on "the Buddha's incontrovertible tenet that non-violence, not violence, can end violence and aggression."

long time. People lived and died in the old way, the atom bomb and hydrogen bomb finish off the world in one day. There used to be no vitality in India which, I think, we have in abundant measure now, and the country is advancing. Therefore, it is even more essential to worry about following the right path.

All of us should think about these fundamental principles and forget about the petty things which bother us. Today, we pay homage to the memory of the greatest son of India, and we must remember his teachings not only now but every day of our lives. We must keep our minds and hearts open to the light that his teachings cast.

I said just now that the lunar eclipse is a symbol of today's world which is in the grip of fear and violence. But there is no doubt about it that the lunar eclipse is a temporary phenomenon which will clear up not because people are beating drums but because the shadow of the earth which is falling on the moon just now will go away. Similarly, if we follow the right path, the eclipse which is afflicting the world today will also disappear. *Jai Hind !*

3. Unity and Development of India¹

Sisters and brothers,

I have come here to address you because I am going out of India for five weeks.² Your good wishes make me feel lighter at heart and give me greater strength.

There are complex matters before us which we have to face at the moment. I shall be visiting a number of countries in the next five weeks. In many of them, I shall spend just a day or even half a day, meeting the leaders and elder statesmen and discussing international affairs. The most difficult thing often is attending the banquets which impose a great burden.

At a time when international affairs are getting extremely complex, it is a little difficult to know what to say. Passions are aroused and anger mounts among nations and calm discussions become almost impossible. It is not my intention to criticise anyone. It is also quite against our policy. We often differ

1. Speech at a public meeting, New Delhi, 20 June 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Nehru toured Europe and West Asia from 21 June to 22 July 1956. He attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London from 28 June to 6 July.

from other countries but even when we express our views, the effort is not to make any direct criticism because if the atmosphere gets vitiated and there is anger in people's hearts, then the doors to understanding are closed. You do not have to go very far to see this. You have ample evidence in our own country, of how, when passions are aroused, the mind refuses to function. Right now, there is one example of this in the Punjab.

I want to go as a messenger of a great and honoured country with a glorious message of peace and friendship. But I am painfully reminded by these events of the reality in India—how little we are able to practice what we preach. This weakens our position because the strength of anyone who goes as India's ambassador is related to the situation in the country. If there is tension or internal squabbles, one does not dare to talk of high principles. We have perforce to adopt silence.

It is not an easy matter to judge what has happened in the country in the last eight or nine years since we became free. People who live close to the events cannot be wholly objective. The picture is clearer to outsiders viewing from a distance. At close quarters molehills look like mountains and the mountains are hidden from view. There is no doubt about it that the general belief among nations, even in countries which are not particularly friendly to us, is that India has made great progress in the last few years and laid the firm foundation of future development. Some people have called our progress amazing and something which has very few parallels. They are profoundly impressed by it. At the same time they are surprised that some Indians are constantly carping and criticizing the government, for doing nothing and letting the country go to rack and ruin. They feel that the first lesson Indians should learn is to appreciate the progress that has taken place in India which is the reason for the respect that she enjoys in the world today. There is no doubt about it that India's voice is heard with great respect. It is possible that there is something in what we say that pulls at the people's heart-strings. It is possible, again, that they feel that at the pace the country is progressing, India is bound to be a great and powerful nation in the years to come. Well, whatever it is, it upsets me to think that on the one hand, we are doing great things and on the other we get bogged down by petty feuds.

You are aware of the unfortunate events that have happened in India in the last few months. We were faced with the question of states reorganization. It was a purely administrative problem. It is true that there are many things behind it like the question of language. When two or three principles clash with one another, some decision has to be taken which will be in favour of one side or the other. But suppose a wrong decision is taken which irks some people, it is

not such a great calamity, after all. It can be rectified later. It is not as if a part of India is being sliced off.

We talk about India's unity and cooperation. We draw up five year plans and are taking up big tasks all over the country. It does not make much difference if you draw a line here or there or if one district goes to this state or that. There is no restriction on movement, after all. You can go from one state to another freely. I agree that people's sentiments ought to be respected. But when there is a clash of sentiments, some compromise has to be found. I cannot understand why there should be such an uproar over these matters. Anyhow, the time has come to put an end to all this tension. The people who feel that there has been injustice should stop agitating about it. We can always reconsider the matter and make changes if necessary.

You know that we had gone to Bombay where the AICC session took place. Certain decisions were taken there and I made an announcement about the decision of the Government and the Congress regarding the city of Bombay.³ Some people objected to it and said that I had no right to do so because the decision had to be taken by Parliament. That is obvious and it is not my decision. However, it was not my right but my duty to apprise the Congress of what the Government was proposing to place before the Parliament. In fact, it had already been presented⁴ and it was proper that I should explain our position clearly. It was not right to allow speculations to grow and spread. Therefore, I explained what the point of view of the Government and the Congress was. Ultimately, the decision will be taken by Parliament.

What did I say exactly? I said that we were aware of the fact that the people of Maharashtra were very keen to have Bombay in their state for which they advanced many logical reasons and I accept them. Their reasons are not absurd. But it is difficult to judge the logic of their reasons in an atmosphere vitiated by the rioting and internal wranglings in Bombay. Neighbours are hostile to one another, people are beaten up – in short, they have made it impossible to come to a decision with calm minds and hearts. So I repeated the gist of the Bill that we had presented. It was nothing new. It is proposed to form a new state of Maharashtra, which will be a big one and keep Bombay

3. At the AICC meeting in Mumbai. Nehru spoke on the future of Mumbai on 3 June 1956. See *post*, pp. 338-341.

4. The Draft Bill on Reorganization of States was placed before both Houses of Parliament on 16 March 1956.

as a separate union territory like Delhi and later, after five years or so when passions have cooled down, the people of Bombay will be given an opportunity to decide for themselves. There will be no question of coercion.

Bombay is a very big city, and a first rate one at that. It is not only big in size but it has played a very important role in our freedom struggle. The people of Bombay are more politically conscious than those of other cities. We would have gladly given them an opportunity to decide the issue but the atmosphere was not right just yet and so it was decided to postpone it by five years or so when passions had cooled down somewhat. If they wish to join Maharashtra and that State wants Bombay, they are welcome to do so. To me, it makes no difference which state Bombay is in. So, I appealed to the people to stop all this fighting and rioting. I know that the people behind these activities are not responsible people. It is not our Congress leaders who do these things. In fact, I could say that the matter has gone beyond the control of the leaders. The atmosphere has become so vitiated that matters are uncontrollable. This has to gradually cool down for if it continues Bombay will be ruined, whichever state it joins. It is obvious that in a large industrial and business city like Bombay, if there are constant tensions, all work will come to a standstill. So I put it to them as I thought proper.

I can understand that this decision was not liked by many people because the people of Maharashtra are desperately keen to have Bombay. So they were upset. But as far as I and my colleagues in Government or in the Congress are concerned, we considered the matter at length and came to the decision as being the best solution. As I have told you, the decision is not forever. The people of Bombay will decide for themselves after a few years. After all, a few years is not too long in the life of a nation. So I would like to appeal to the people of Bombay and Maharashtra, especially the latter, to consider this matter with calm minds and realize that what they want cannot be done by fighting about it. If every issue in the country is to be decided by such methods, there will be no governance left. There will only be the rule of the lathi and the hooligans will take matters into their own hands. Nations cannot be run in this fashion, especially a great nation like ours.

So, I appeal to the men and women of Maharashtra especially those who have been hurt by this decision, to be far-sighted and think of the nation as well as Maharashtra and Bombay, and put an end to all this tension and rioting. They must make all possible efforts to let the matter cool down. Maharashtra is going to be a great state. It is going to consist of a large part of Hyderabad—the Marathi speaking region—and Vidarbha (Berar, Nagpur), etc. Therefore, it is going to be one of the biggest states in India. I agree that Bombay will not be

in it but even so it is going to be a very big state. And if things go smoothly and there is unity and friendship among the people, their job will become easier. If they try to browbeat the others or use threat, the section of people who are against them in Bombay will become more afraid and hostile. There will be no solution.

So, I appeal to everyone, the people of Maharashtra and especially our colleagues in the Congress, to show patience and good sense. I know that the Congress is facing great difficulties and sentiments have been aroused against them. They have been maligned but if we give in in a crisis or show weakness, we will never be able to come to a right decision. It will pave the way for the people to use threats and create fear to achieve their own ends. A country cannot be governed like this. So this is my appeal. Let us help to allow the matter to cool down and run the big state of Maharashtra. Bombay will be under the Central Government. But it is a grand city and it is obvious that whatever arrangements are made in connection with its administration will be done largely with the consent of the people of Bombay. There is no other way. You must remember that 43% or so people of Bombay are Maharashtrians. Therefore, their voice is bound to be powerful. So let us proceed along these lines and we can settle the matter later.

I mentioned the Punjab, Maharashtra and Bombay. But, this question of reorganization of states has affected everyone all over the country—Madras, Kerala, Travancore-Cochin, Karnataka which is going to be a new state, Mysore, Andhra and Hyderabad which are going to be split up, Bengal, Bihar, Punjab—wherever you look there have been tensions. But, in spite of this and in spite of all the emotions of the people, this question was solved peacefully everywhere, except for two or three places. It was not a small achievement and I should like to congratulate the people of all the states who have accepted the decisions even if many aspects were unpalatable to them. They did so in the larger interests of the country and refrained from further argument. This was a grand thing for it made the country stronger.

We had thought that the matter had been neatly solved in the Punjab. But there was an outburst of misdemeanour which still lingers. I am amazed. I can understand that there may be two opinions in the matter or that of we may have taken the wrong decision. But as far as the Punjab is concerned in my opinion it was a very fair and just decision, for it protects everyone's rights. So nobody should have any complaint that there has been injustice. It was amazing that the matter should have been raised at all and in the beginning I thought that there was a misunderstanding. I am convinced that most of the people who are raising a hue and cry have not gone through the trouble of finding out exactly

what they are protesting against. There is nothing to protest about. People are often saying things which have no relation to this issue and we have done everything on the basis of a principle which is being applied to the whole of India. We have not evolved a new principle for the Punjab. The same principle has been applied in exactly the same way to Telengana and Andhra.

What is the principle? If you have read the Report of the Commission, you will see that it is mentioned there that in large parts of India where one language is spoken by the majority of the people there will be one state. That is obvious. But there are many areas in India where two languages are spoken. In such cases of bilingual areas they have made a rule that both the languages should be given an opportunity. It is absolutely wrong thinking and fundamentally wrong in every way that people speaking one language should suppress the others.

You must remember that we have given the status of national language to the Indian languages and all of them enjoy equal rights. Then we decided to adopt one language as the official national language for conducting the work of the government. English is the language which is used by and large today. It is a good thing that people should learn English for it is one of the most important languages of the world and it is essential for us to learn foreign languages. That is all right. But it is obvious that the work of the nation cannot be conducted forever in a foreign language. Hindi is the language which is spoken by the majority of the people in India. It may be slightly different in Bihar or UP or Delhi, with a mixture of Urdu in some places. But basically it is the only language which is spoken by a large majority of the people and it is a fact that even in non-Hindi speaking areas, people often understand it. Therefore, it was the only language which could be adopted as the official language. People would gradually learn the language. So we took this decision. We gave the status of national languages to all the Indian languages and wherever there were two of them spoken, whether the ratio was 50-50 or 60-40, there was no question of one suppressing the other. Both are to be given an opportunity to grow and used for official purposes as well as medium of instruction in schools.

Let me tell you about another principle. It is that every child should learn its own mother tongue. What does that mean? If there are large numbers of Tamilians in Delhi they have the right to have a Tamil school to be opened by the municipality or the government. No child should be taught Hindi by force in the beginning. Later on, in class four or five, he can begin to learn Hindi. Hindi has to be taught because it is going to be the national language of India. In the corporation schools in Bombay all the fourteen languages of India are

taught because people of all the states live there. So, where is the question of a dispute over languages? It is essential to teach the people Hindi because the official work of the country is going to be conducted in it. Hindi has in a sense carved out a special place for itself by winning over everyone and not by suppressing the other languages.

Now, we applied the same principle in the Punjab as we did in Telengana and decided that it will continue to be one state with one Assembly and Cabinet, etc. But we also said that for purposes of discussions, we will consider it as two states—one where Punjabi is spoken by the majority of the people and the other where Hindi is spoken. Now, as you know there is no great difference between Hindi and Punjabi. The members of the Assembly are going to be allowed to form a committee to advance their suggestions on some particular issues. Now, what is so extraordinary about that? Why should the Hindus feel that the Sikhs will suppress them or vice versa?

Wherever Hindi is spoken, primary education will be in Hindi and later on the child will learn Punjabi and vice versa. I am talking about the government schools. Private schools have the right to do what they like. But the fact is that Punjab is a bilingual state and everyone will have to learn Hindi and Punjabi. There is no doubt about it that Punjabi is spoken in a large part of the Punjab. The argument is over the script to be used—Nagari or Gurmukhi. The fact is that it is the Urdu script that is used by and large. There is no reason why the Gurmukhi or the Nagari script should not be used. There is no obstacle to either. But I feel bad that Urdu will be suppressed in the process. Urdu is one of the Indian languages and is included in the Constitution. So it is not a question of learning Punjabi but of the script to be used. But if you do not know the Gurmukhi script that does not mean that you do not know Punjabi. The script can be learnt in a few days—it is an extremely easy one if you are familiar with the language. So it will be a small burden upon you. Why create a storm about it? And if anybody tells me that it is unfair to Hindi, I shall say that Hindi is the language which has conquered the whole of India and is unchallengeable. It is only when one language tries to suppress another that feelings of hostility are generated. A friendly language grows fast. So what is the point of all this hooliganism and rowdy behaviour? All right, even supposing that a mistake has been made—which I can assure you is not the case—does it mean that it should lead to violence and stone-throwing and rioting? Is this the way a civilized nation behaves? I just cannot understand it.

I am deeply perturbed by these developments. What is the matter with us? Have we become tired of following the path of non-violence and peace which we learnt under Mahatma Gandhi that we are so ready to raise our hands in

violence? A few days ago we got a report that in a big hospital near Calcutta, there was some delay in distributing milk to the patients—no one knows whose fault it was—and immediately the patients beat up the doctors.⁵ It is really strange. What is this new atmosphere in the country? In the AICC session at Bombay, we passed a resolution⁶ on this subject expressing sorrow and worry at this new phenomenon as to why people in India are leaning more and more towards violence, and warning people against it for it will lead the country to ruin. The resolution mentions the name of no party or organization. It was an appeal to all the people in India belonging to all the parties to control this tendency towards violence which is increasing in the country. In my opinion it was a very good resolution and something to which no individual could object, whatever his opinions on other matters might be. A few days later I was amazed to see that the Communist Party had raised an objection to that resolution.⁷ Considering the fact that there was no mention of the Communist Party in it, it appears to be a case of guilty conscience pricking. They may have felt that it was an attack upon them though many others too would be equally guilty. But it was strange to find the Communists asking why we were making so much about violence and maintaining that the violence only showed that the government was useless.

Now, we are hearing reports of happenings in the Soviet Union. Great changes are taking place and the people who were regarded as demigods and worshipped are now being debunked and criticized. Stalin is now being maligned. Now it is for them to judge whether what they are doing is right or wrong. They know the situation in their own country better. How can I advise them? But at least it would seem that the people in the Soviet Union are

5. On 4 June 1956, fifteen patients of Kanchrapara Tuberculosis Hospital refused to take their morning milk and midday meal because of delay in supplies reaching the hospital. While the reasons were being explained, some patients attacked the Hospital Superintendent and staff, including the nurses. On 5 June, the Director of Health Services, the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police, Nadia, visited the hospital and on the basis of their report, the Government posted police pickets in and around the hospital, removed twelve patients, declared fit for discharge, from the hospital and arrested them on 9 June.
6. The AICC meeting in Mumbai passed a resolution on 2 June 1956 on 'Condemnation of Violence'. Also see *post*, pp. 330-333 for Nehru's speech in support of the resolution.
7. The Politburo of the CPI in a statement issued on 6 June 1956 criticized the Congress resolution on violence and called upon "all democratic elements, including democratically minded Congressmen" to protest against it.

beginning to realize that they were on the wrong path so far and it had caused a great deal of harm to their country. Now, they are trying not only to control the situation within but taking many steps towards peace in the world. In their own country, many of the restrictions are gradually relaxed like the ban against free speech and free expression of opinion. If one thousandth of what is said in the newspapers or Parliament or elsewhere in India was ever murmured in the Soviet Union, that individual would have just disappeared. That was the position. These restrictions are gradually being relaxed, which is a very good thing and is bound to have a good effect on the world. The Soviet Union has made great progress but the restrictions on freedom, were not a good thing. Such things will never be tolerated by our people. You can see for yourselves what sort of things are written everyday in the newspapers in Delhi. Most of it is often wrong or completely false but freedom of expression is more precious to us than having restrictions.

To return to the Punjab. The Jana Sangh and the RSS are very active there in fomenting trouble and agitation. Well, at least we know what the Communist Party believes in, though even there vagueness is creeping in. They passed a resolution recently expressing their views on national issues. I do not know how many of you read it. It runs into 55 pages.⁸ If the Communist Party presents a kind of a witches' brew and calls it a resolution, it means that they themselves do not know what they are doing or saying. So far their path was clear because they used to praise anything that happened in the Soviet Union and accepted all their dictates without question. They did not have to exercise their brains. This is very much like our communalist brethren who look for all the answers in religion and do not bother to think for themselves.

Now, the dilemma before the Communists is that the Soviet line which, they had accepted without question, has now suddenly changed its tune and speaking with a new voice. So they are unable to decide which line to follow. At least they have some views on current issues, whether they are right or wrong. But I have not understood till today what the views of the Jana Sangh

8. The resolution, passed at the fourth congress of the CPI in Palghat on 29 April 1956, congratulated the people of various linguistic nationalities for their heroic struggle and successes in securing the establishment of linguistic states. The fourth congress warned the vested interests circulating mendacious propaganda to all minorities against linguistic states and creating an atmosphere of panic and suspicion. The congress also condemned the "repressive" measures of the Government against those struggling for linguistic states.

or the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh are on any issue. After all, there are economic, social and political problems in the country. For instance, the five year plans are an important factor in eradicating poverty. I have not seen so far what their views are on these matters. They keep harping on the *Hindu Rashtra*. Well, they are welcome to do so if it makes them happy. What does it mean? There can be only one meaning, that the influence of the Muslim League and Pakistan upon them is very strong. Whatever the Islamic Republic in Pakistan does, the RSS and the Jana Sangh want to do in India. They want to establish a Hindu Republic of India and "protect" the minorities as Pakistan declares that Hindus in that country are protected. It is strange that abandoning the principle that India stands for, they are identifying themselves with the principles of the Muslim League and others. Otherwise, the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha do not have any views on the current national and international issues. I am amazed that any thinking individual with even a little sense should adopt such attitudes which would lead to India being fragmented. They talk of *Akhand Bharat* and then follow a policy which will break up India into pieces.

Some days ago in Rohtak, I said something there which offended our newspapermen.⁹ Perhaps they did not understand fully what I had said. I had said that in the Punjab and Delhi and elsewhere some newspapers made trouble and in this they were aided by outside agencies. I did not mean foreign governments or countries. There is a great difference. I did not suggest that some foreign government was giving them money. There can be many outside agencies. I get reports about agencies of different types who are not connected with any one country. So it is possible that some newspapers also have such sources. This is what I had said. The Newspaper Editors, Guild passed a resolution demanding that I should identify those newspapers and the foreign agencies.¹⁰ These are complex matters. I come to know many things which I cannot talk about in public. We have taken action without fuss or publicity, and will do so again when the occasion demands. But I want to make one

9. In a speech (not printed) at a public meeting in Rohtak on 14 June 1956, Nehru said: "I do not wish to name anyone, but there is a great deal of foreign money floating about here. Foreign agencies back these newspapers with money. I am sure of this. The foreign agencies who wish to foment trouble in India give money in various ways to these newspapers We do not like this at all."
10. On 16 June 1956, the Standing Committee of the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference at Kolkata, noted with "utmost concern and gravity" the Prime Minister's statement and felt that, "in a matter of such gravity the names of newspapers should not be withheld both because of the nature of the charges and the reflection cast on the press as a whole."

thing clear that the newspapers have misunderstood what I said and I did not refer to any foreign government.

In another ten hours, I shall leave Delhi. I would like to tell you one more thing. The Delhi Congress Committee has asked people to go to Palam. Where is the sense in that when I am leaving at 6.30 in the morning? You will have to get up in the middle of the night and go through all sorts of trouble. So please do not bother.

So, I shall take leave of you now. I shall be visiting many countries. I saw the proofs of a book being published by the Government which should be ready in ten or twelve days.¹¹ It is about atomic energy and the likely consequences of the hydrogen bomb, etc. As everybody knows this is an extremely dangerous thing. The newspapers often talk about them. But as far as I know, there is no report about the consequences and dangers of the atom bomb. It is true that nobody knows fully what the consequences could be. Everyday new facts are coming to light and moreover, many of the known facts are kept secret by the advanced countries like the Soviet Union and the United States. Even so, we have learnt enough to know what the definite consequences are and what may be the likely danger. But much of it is still hidden. So a year ago I thought it was a good thing that a leaflet should be prepared on the subject and I asked our scientists who are connected with it to do so in simple language. The subject is so complex that if it is written in scientific jargon, nobody can understand it. We want a clear picture to emerge before the whole world through this leaflet. It has taken a long time but it is almost ready now. The difficulty is that even while it was being written, many new facts have come to light, outdating the rest. It is not a very big book and will not exceed 150 pages. First, it will be published in English and later hopefully in Hindi too. I want you to read it and try to understand the world that we are living in.

When I was looking at the proofs of the book, the thought crossed my mind that the atomic energy and the hydrogen bomb, etc., have in a sense, made the rest of our problems seem insignificant because they pose a threat to the very existence of human civilization. This is the most crucial question before all of us. The rest are all insignificant. Even major disputes between

11. A booklet entitled, *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*, prepared under the auspices of the Defence Services Organization, was issued in New Delhi in June 1956 by the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Prepared by D.S. Kothari in association with Homi J. Bhabha and V.R. Khanolkar, it carried Nehru's foreword which is printed on pp. 154-155.

two countries are small compared to this question. The internal squabbles will appear even more pointless. You may think that they are instruments of destruction, which is true, because one bomb can raze an entire city to the ground. But new angles are emerging everyday. There is the question of radioactive waves which can pollute the entire atmosphere in the world for years and produce all kinds of diseases in human beings which kill them slowly and painfully. Another fact which has not been fully proved but is fairly generally known is that it can destroy a nation in yet another way. It can damage the reproductive capacity of human beings or mutilate the genes in such a way that deformities in infants become common. You can imagine what a dangerous thing it is. The effect will not be felt immediately or all at once, but will linger on for generations to come. It is a terrible thing before which everything else fades into insignificance.

There is yet another angle to this issue. Nowadays, every two or three months, you read about nuclear test explosions which are said to be experimental in nature. Only recently there was one such report.¹² The United States and the Soviet Union and England are all undertaking these tests – the greatest number are by the first two and some by England. It is obvious that they are done with great care. Yet our scientists fear that these test explosions are bound to pollute the atmosphere. Some people say that they have an effect on the climate. There is no proof of this and perhaps they are wrong. But they do create some atmospheric pollution. It may not be immediately visible but if the tests are continued, it will undoubtedly affect all of us in the world. It may not kill us outright but it will weaken us and produce diseases. Therefore, for the last two years India has been making out a strong case for putting a stop to them. There is no need for any more of such tests, at least till more facts come to light about the possible consequences. The big nations of the world are playing with fire without knowing the full consequences. I think, when the first American test explosion took place in the Pacific,¹³ many fishermen who

12. The United States conducted a series of successful nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific at this time. The first took place on 5 May 1956 at Runit island in the Eniwetok atoll. The device detonated was known as "Lacrosse", described as a "pocket-size" hydrogen bomb and not a fission bomb. On 21 May, the first hydrogen bomb, dropped from the air, exploded over Namu island in the Bikini atoll. The "mushroom" cloud produced was estimated at about one hundred miles wide and twenty-five miles high, and the bomb had an energy force equivalent to "several million TNT"
13. The first hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb was exploded by the United States in 1952 at Eniwetok in the Pacific.

were far away from the site died, not immediately but months later, and extremely painfully. All this came to light later and even the Americans were amazed because they had no idea that such a thing could happen. This is an area of almost total darkness and nobody knows what the result will be. Therefore, we have laid great stress in the United Nations and elsewhere that these test explosions should be stopped. But they are not stopped because each power fears that if it stops, the others might go ahead. It is a strange game that is being played, while there is talk of peace.

Well, this is the kind of world into which I am stepping out leaving my own country. I shall meet people and talk to them and at least try, even though with some hesitation, to give them India's message of peace and if possible gradually reduce the tensions and fear which pervade the great powers today. Suppose, in your opinion, many wrongs have been committed in the Soviet Union—which even they are admitting—does that mean that we should become their enemies? Or, if we differ in our views from the United States, do we become hostile to them? The fact of the matter is that Americans are an extremely gentlemanly, hospitable and friendly people. So are the Russians. You must always remember that you may dislike two or three individuals in a nation but must not take to the people as a whole into dislike. People want to be friendly. They are not interested in wars. I have found especially in the United States and the Soviet Union an immense desire to make friends and extend hospitality. But unfortunately, they are both hostile to each other. If we are to live in this world of the atom bomb, there is only one way for there is no second course open to anyone. The atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb are such lethal weapons that they will vanquish the world. The only alternative is the 'One World' approach. There is no other way.

Give me leave to take this message on your behalf. *Jai Hind !*

NATIONAL PROGRESS

I. ECONOMY

(i) Planning

1. Basic Approach to Second Plan¹

The Chairman (Jawaharlal Nehru) in his opening remarks referred to the work on the Second Five Year Plan² which had been going on for the last two years.³ The Draft Outline of the Second Plan which was published in February 1956 had been commented upon and considered. After consideration by the National Development Council the Plan would be put up to Parliament for approval.

2. The Chairman observed that even though a great deal of labour and joint effort lay behind the document, whenever it was considered, fresh ideas and

1. Summary of the seventh meeting of the National Development Council held in New Delhi on 1 & 2 May 1956. File No.17(18)/56-PMS. Extracts.
2. Divided in 30 chapters and grouped into two parts, namely, Approach and Organization, and Programmes of Development, the Second Five Year Plan was presented to Parliament on 15 May 1956. Its objectives were: (i) an increase of 25 per cent in the national income; (ii) rapid industrialization with particular emphasis on the development of basic and heavy industries; (iii) large expansion of employment opportunities; and (iv) reduction of inequalities in income and wealth, and a more even distribution of economic power.
3. Work on the Second Plan began in April 1954 with the Planning Commission's request to the State Governments for preparing district and village plans—especially in relation to agricultural production, rural industries, and cooperation—to be incorporated into state plans, with National Extension Service and Community Project Schemes. The study of wider aspects of national planning also began in 1954 with the assistance of the Indian Statistical Institute. Mahalanobis's "Draft Recommendation for the Formulation of the Second Five Year Plan" also known as "plan-frame" was brought out in March 1955. "Tentative Framework for the Second Five Year Plan" was prepared by the Economic Divisions of the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission. By April 1955, these documents were studied by the Planning Commission's Panel of Economists, which drew up a "Memorandum on Basic Considerations Relating to Plan-Frame" apart from a number of studies on individual aspects. These documents were considered by the National Development Council in May 1955. A Draft Memorandum embodied the proposals which emerged out of the discussions held by Planning Commission with Central Ministries and State Governments between July and December 1955. Considered by NDC and the Consultative Committee of the MPs in January 1956, the Draft Outline was published in February 1956.

fresh criticism were forthcoming and it was difficult to say at any time that it had been finalized. That was the reason why even though the present draft had a certain measure of finality for the moment, it had to be considered as flexible, as something which could be improved upon with further experience.

3. The experience so far gained in planning had shown that the problems of India had to be solved by the efforts of the Indians themselves and that mere imitation of efforts made by other countries would not be appropriate. The Chairman added that advantage had been taken of consultations with many eminent foreign experts who had experience in planning and allied matters.⁴ While their advice had been helpful, it had been found that more and more the country had to draw upon its own resources, not only material resources but also mental and intellectual resources.

4. The Chairman referred to the Resolution of the Government of India dealing with the Industrial Policy which was placed before the Parliament on the 30th April 1956.⁵ The Policy laid down in that Resolution was the natural development from the experience and decisions taken during the last few years and, broadly speaking, industrial planning should be governed by the policy laid down in that Resolution.

5. The Draft Second Five Year Plan placed before the Council incorporated many changes from the Draft Outline, but they were not of a basic character. The basic decision was that the country should be industrialized as rapidly as possible, as it was felt that without industrialization there could be no real progress from the point of view of wealth formation and ultimately of employment, and even from the point of view of the country being able to maintain her freedom. For industrializing the country, it was necessary to lay the foundation by establishing heavy industries, such as, iron and steel, machine making etc. Then there was the vital and important question of employment. At times it might appear that there was some conflict between the emphasis on industrialization and the emphasis on employment. Ultimately, there should be no such conflict even though immediately there might appear to be some such conflict. In the previous discussions, it was mentioned that it might be possible more or less to solve the problems of employment in about ten years. The Chairman observed that it was difficult to be dogmatic about it. He felt that

4. Ronald Fisher, Simon Kuznets, Richard Stone, Frank Yates, Ragnar Frisch, Norbert Wiener, John Strachey, J.K. Galbraith, Nicholas Kaldor, A.N. Kolmogorov, J.B.S. Haldane, Paul A. Baran, Oscar Lange, Charles Bettelheim among others were consulted for the Second Five Year Plan.

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 72-79.

even though the problem might not be completely solved, they would have gone a long way in about ten years. It had been calculated that the Second Five Year Plan now under consideration would not touch the backlog of unemployment. In any case, an effort had to be made so that at the end of the Five Year period, the problem was under control so that in the subsequent period it might be possible to proceed at a faster pace. In fact, the whole purpose of planning was to increase the tempo of progress as the resources and employment increased.

6. Referring to the procedure to be adopted for considering the two volumes of the Draft Second Five Year Plan, the Chairman said that it was not perhaps necessary to consider Part II, which dealt with definite programmes, unless any member wanted to raise some points. The first three chapters of Part I dealt with the broad approach. For the purposes of discussion, the first three chapters might be taken up as a whole. It might not be necessary to discuss in detail the fourth chapter, which dealt with finance and foreign exchange. The next important chapters dealt with employment and administrative tasks and organization. Then came chapters IX, X and XI, which dealt with land reforms, development of cooperation and community development. He suggested that the whole of Part I might thus be divided into four or five groups for convenience of discussion.

7. The Chairman observed that the more one considered the complexity of the planning the greater was the fascination for it. The new problems which arose at every step gave confidence in ourselves and in the ability of the people to achieve development. The main problem which arose in respect of planning was the gap in the programme and specially the gap in regard to things to be got from outside involving foreign exchange. Nevertheless, the programme could not be based on the ability of the country to get foreign help. He was not opposed to foreign help at all; but the approach should not be that a particular programme could not be implemented without foreign aid.

8. The Chairman observed that he would like to emphasize the great importance of food production in regard to the Second Plan. In the First Five Year Plan, stress was laid on food production and the river valley schemes which were meant for production. In a sense, the whole plan depended upon food being relatively abundant and the price of it not being high. All planning would be affected if food became scarce and prices tended to go up. Increase in food production was, therefore, of the highest importance. It was not correct as had been mentioned in some sections of the press that there was a shortage of foodgrains. Foodgrains were being imported with a view to build up stocks. For the future, steps would have to be taken to ensure that

production of foodgrains was adequate and prices remained at a fair level. In this connection the Chairman pointed out the importance of the Community Projects and the National Extension Schemes which were changing the minds and to some extent the habits of the people in the rural areas, apart from the material benefits which they brought. In the Second Plan it was expected that almost the whole of the country would be covered by National Extension Service. He suggested that it would be a good thing if the Community Development and National Extension Service blocks were to devote greater attention to the production of more food. After all, that was the primary purpose for which they were started.

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42. The Chairman observed that the discussion might be confined to the principles stated in first two chapters of the Draft Plan. There was a reference in the Draft to perspective planning. Unless there was planning for a long time ahead, what was done now was not likely to be followed up. The Chairman remarked that ultimately, the development of railways depended on steel; construction of new lines would be facilitated by the stepping up of steel production.

43. The Chairman observed that a great deal of future development depended on the Second Five Year Plan and for the success of the Plan it was necessary to ensure adequate supplies of food at reasonable prices. In this connection, he referred to the fact that in China from 300 million acres under cultivation produced 165 million tons of foodgrains, whereas from the 270 million acres of cultivated area in India, only 75 million tons of foodgrains were produced. There was much more intensive cultivation in China than in India even though there was relatively much more irrigation in India than in China. The Chairman observed that it would be possible to produce much more food in India specially in irrigated areas and according to Deputy Chairman's⁶ estimates, food production should be increased by at least 40 per cent during the next five years. It had to be remembered that whatever be the rate of industrial production, the major part of production in India was obtained from land. He mentioned in this connection the importance of agricultural production, even in a country like Canada, which was going through a second industrial revolution as a result of the huge oil finds etc. The Chairman added that from the point of view of both utility and avoidance of inflation, the two important items were foodgrains and cloth. There should be adequate supplies of foodgrains and cloth and no risk could be taken about these two items.

6. V.T. Krishnamachari

44. The Chairman stated that the Council could now proceed to consider Chapter IV of the Draft Second Five Year Plan and Chapter III in so far as it related to Chapter IV.

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51. The Chairman observed that everybody realized the importance of laying stress on increased production, but it was now necessary to discuss the actual steps which had been taken in each state separately for achieving the increased production. He enquired whether it was possible to state broadly the increase of production per acre during the last five years. It was reported that rice production could be doubled by the Japanese method;⁷ there was no reason why if it could be done at one place, it could not be done everywhere.

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54. The Chairman observed that while talking about percentages, it should not be forgotten that in India the present level was very low. It was a question of increasing the percentage not of a good yield but of trying to increase the percentage of a very low yield. The rate of production of food in India was very low in comparison to other countries of Asia and Africa;⁸ it was perhaps the lowest in the world. It had been shown that by the adoption of Japanese method, etc., it was possible to increase production of rice in the country by 100 per cent or more. There was, therefore, no reason why food production in the country could not be increased by making use of the increased facilities, irrigation, fertilizers, etc., to the rate suggested by Shri V.T. Krishnamachari.

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64. The Chairman mentioned some of the important figures of agricultural production in China. According to Chou En-lai, production in 1955 was

7. First tried at Kosbad Agricultural School and Agricultural Research Station, Karjat, Bombay. By this method yield of paddy could be stepped up 2-3 times the yield obtained through local practice. The salient points of Japanese method of paddy cultivation are:- (1) growing seedling on raised seed-bed with the help of organic bulky manure and inorganic fertilizers, (2) using less seed per unit area to get healthy and vigorous seedlings, and grading and treating them with perenox, (3) application of bulky manures like compost and plant seedlings straight while transplanting, (4) application of heavy dose of fertilizers at proper time, (5) proper precautions against diseases and pests and treatment of crop with fungicides and pesticides, (6) to tie strings as support to standing crop.
8. In fact, according to *UN Statistical Year Book (1964)*, in 1955, India produced 9,042 thousand metric tons of wheat while Morocco, Algeria, United Arab Republic and Japan produced 1,031, 1,306, 1,451 and 1,486 thousand metric tons respectively. China (Mainland) produced 22,950 thousand metric tons of wheat in the same year.

182,500,000 tons. It was proposed to increase this production at the average rate of approximately 7.9 per cent per annum to 456 million tons by the end of 1967. Cotton production was to be increased at the average rate of about 9.6 per cent per annum from 1,500,000 tons in 1955 to 4,500,000 tons by the end of 1967. This was tremendous increase. Nevertheless, the forecast had been made with a great deal of confidence. The estimates were made for each region of production and practically every family or cooperative unit had a target of its own. Having regard to the experience in China, it was conceivably possible to raise agricultural production in India by about 40 per cent. This would involve intensive effort reaching down to each individual family and full utilization of suitable agencies, specially the Community Projects and the National Extension Service blocks.

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90. The Chairman observed that a number of important points were mentioned during the discussion.⁹ He stated that it was not actually intended that the notes of Shri Neogy¹⁰ and of the Deputy Chairman should be circulated to the Council; the proper course would have been, as observed by Shri Subramaniam,¹¹ for these to be considered fully by the Planning Commission and the Central Government. Nevertheless, it was good that the members of the Council had the various aspects of the questions placed before them so that they could think about them. The question of agricultural production should obviously be considered afresh and new targets laid down. The figure of 40 per cent increase mentioned by Deputy Chairman was not given casually, but after some consideration. The question of stepping up in a substantial measure the agricultural production in the country was mentioned in a communication sent to the states over a year ago. The Ministry of Food & Agriculture and the Planning Commission should now hold discussions with individual states and settle new targets of production.

91. With reference to the sales tax, the Chairman observed that a proposal regarding unification of sales tax and excise duty had been put forward by the Central Government, but it had not so far been accepted by all the states. The Central Government would naturally support the steps taken by the state Governments for raising resources for the Plan. The Chairman mentioned

9. Among other things, the Chief Ministers underlined the need for a balanced regional development during the Second Plan period.

10. K.C. Neogy, a member of the Planning Commission, had written a note of caution in regard to the size of the Plan.

11. C. Subramaniam, Finance Minister of Madras.

that one point had to be considered namely, the effect of sales tax on food prices. As a result of the imposition of sales tax, food prices would go up and then the Centre was expected to give subsidy to keep the prices down. This was an anomalous position.

92. The Chairman observed that overlapping and duplication should be avoided, and as far as possible, one agency should be responsible for the same work.

93. With reference to the point mentioned by Shri Ramakrishna Rao¹² that the representatives of the states were summoned too frequently, the Chairman observed that Central conferences were useful for coordinating and expediting work. It was perhaps true that people were summoned to Delhi on slight provocation. In many cases, it might not be necessary to summon everybody from all over India for everything.¹³ He suggested that some effort should be made to coordinate the conferences which every Ministry and sometimes the Planning Commission summoned. In other words, these conferences should not be called as routine matter by circulars addressed to all states. Only those who were really interested in the subject matter need be invited to come.

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2 May 1956

14. The Chairman observed that he agreed with the general policy laid down in the chapter on Land Reforms but with the problems facing the various states as they were constituted today, it was inevitable that the state governments should interpret these general policies and directions to a large extent according to their own capacity and the conditions prevailing in their respective states. The Chairman added that land policy could not really be isolated from the general approach to the entire programme. Obviously, anything relating to land was of the utmost significance because agriculture was still the basic industry of the country and affected the largest number of people. One of the basic approaches must be to increase agricultural production. It was through increased agricultural production that well-being was to come and the people would feel satisfied so that they might take a further step forward. The objectives of social justice can be fulfilled only in this context.

12. B. Ramakrishna Rao, Chief Minister of Hyderabad.

13. For example, Chief Commissioner of Kutch, S.A. Ghatge came to attend a conference convened by the Ministry of Agriculture soon after the Pakistani incursion in Chhad Bet in the Rann of Kutch. Nehru wrote a note to Cabinet Secretary on this subject on 23 February 1956. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 141-142.

15. The Chairman referred to the remarks of Shri Hanumanthaiya¹⁴ regarding the inequality between urban and rural areas. The inequality was there but it was not encouraged by Government. The whole object of the policy was to provide opportunities to a larger number of people. The Chairman mentioned that the talk about limits and ceilings were in a way artificial approaches, although they were good. The ultimate objective would be to afford opportunities to everybody by providing free education, free medical facilities etc.

16. There were certain advantages of large-scale production but to attain certain social objectives and to avoid social evils, the land area had to be limited. If this brought about a fall in production, the ultimate result is that the social evil is greater, not in inequality but in poverty. This cannot be allowed. The only ultimate solution, therefore, lay in cooperatives which were both socially right and at the same time enabled the people to produce to the best advantages. The Chairman agreed that the peasants could not be coerced into cooperatives. They have to be offered encouragement and an atmosphere created for inducing them to join cooperatives. The present regulations, laws, etc., relating to cooperatives were cumbersome; those who made such rules were not thinking in terms of producers' cooperatives. It was essential that every legal inducement and friendly pressure should be brought to bear on the peasants in order to win them over to producers' cooperatives.

17. The Chairman observed that the only country which was at all comparable to India was China. It was not correct to compare conditions in India with the United States or USSR where land was plentiful and population was less. China suffered a great deal on account of the Civil War, nevertheless agricultural production in China was impressive. Agricultural production in India, on the other hand, was very low. The Chairman stated that there was no reason why in India they should feel satisfied with only 15 per cent increase in agricultural production. There were difficulties but it was unrealistic to think of only about 15 per cent increase. The Chairman then read out the following extracts from a report on China's agriculture:

"Agricultural output increased in one year by as much as in the previous three years: in 1951 grain output was 158 million tons, in 1954, 170 million tons, in 1955, 182 million tons. And the response to Mao Tse-tung's demand for more rapid formation of agricultural producer cooperatives exceeded all expectations: at midsummer 14 per cent of peasant households were members of cooperatives, by December more than 60 per cent. These developments have made far

14. K. Hanumanthaiya, Chief Minister of Mysore.

more rapid economic progress possible, certainly in 1956 and, the Communists believe, in subsequent years."

"The most important, more or less fundamental situation is that the cooperatives have made or are making overall plans to develop production and that the production enthusiasm of the peasants is reaching an all time high level. The Draft Twelve Year Plan for agriculture is the result of this mood of extraordinary confidence."

"The Plan is much more than a programme of agricultural development: its aim is the transformation of rural society. Higher production is to be associated with the tremendous rise in living standards: the isolation of the countryside is to end and town and country are to be knitted into a single coherent economy. The price to be paid is the destruction of rural China as it has existed for centuries, the disappearance of the peasant farmer into the collective. The Plan is thus in part the straightforward application of Russian theory and practice to Chinese conditions. But in certain of its aspects it strikingly resembles the Indian Community Projects Programme. The emphasis on peasant self-help is very marked: so is the importance given to improvements which are small individually but add up to something enormous. There is the same method of approach, that is improving what exists rather than introducing some entirely new technique such as wholly mechanised farming. The technical means by which the plan is to be executed are simply the methods of the last five years writ large: there is no alteration save in scale and therefore the less likelihood of serious technical mistakes. In its approach to social welfare too, the Chinese plan resembles India's Community Projects with the vital difference that it will have behind it all the energy and authority that the State can command to galvanise the peasant into action."

"Grain yields per acre on land already cultivated are to be doubled in twelve years and cotton yields doubled or trebled according to local conditions. This is to be the chief method of raising China's agricultural output."

"Higher yields are to be secured by more intensive application of labour to land. Better seeds are to be used, animal husbandry is to be developed, small-scale irrigation extended and so forth. Local government enterprises are to provide greatly increased supplies of improved farm tools, horsedrawn farm machinery, pumps, waterwheels, etc. Local governments and the collectives themselves are to be chiefly responsible for securing increased supplies of manure.

State enterprises will continue to be responsible for the production of synthetic fertilisers and modern farm machinery; their output will largely be reserved for land reclamation projects. A greater proportion of the cultivated area is to be devoted to high yielding crops—rice, maize and potatoes. A special campaign, on the lines of the successful campaign to eliminate flies from the cities, will be launched to wipe out the four evils—rats, sparrows, flies and mosquitoes.”

“Collectivization will make possible the cultivation of boundary strips, separating one man’s land from another’s; this is expected to increase the cultivated area by 5 per cent or 5.3 million hectares.”

“They are also chasing the unemployed out of the cities into the countryside to reclaim wasteland and expect to set one million of them to this task in five to seven years.”

“It has been assumed that major increases in Chinese agricultural output could not be secured, at least in so short a period, from land already cultivated; intensive farming has long been practised in China and yields are high by Asian standards, twice as high as in India for example. On the other hand, they are far below Japanese yields, particularly for rice and wheat. Japanese farmers have one great technical advantage over the Chinese in an assured supply of large quantities of chemical fertilizers. This, China cannot hope to command. On present plans it will hardly have enough to supply poor newly reclaimed land, let alone the more fertile long cultivated areas. Against this weakness may be set the improvement in yields to be derived from flood control, irrigation and the development of animal husbandry if the targets for these items under the plan are met. They should be sufficient to balance Japan’s advantage in fertilizer supplies. It seems possible therefore that Chinese yields per acre of some major crops—rice, wheat, potatoes and rapeseed—could be raised by at least 50 per cent though hardly by 100 per cent without a technical revolution in farming.”

“Half fulfilment, however, could be achieved and it would mean the solution of China’s worst economic problem—how to feed the growing population and yet secure a sufficient agricultural surplus to pay for industrial development. Population is growing by two per cent annually; if the Twelve Year Plan were half fulfilled, grain output would grow by something over six per cent annually or about 12 million tons, exactly the increase registered in 1955 when the weather was exceptionally favourable but also when less effort was being put into agriculture than is to be put into it in any of the next twelve years. The

degree of success achieved in carrying out the Plan is going to be the most important single factor in the development of China's economy. The lack of a firm basis in agriculture for the planned development of industry has been until now the most serious weakness of Chinese economic planning; this the Communists intend to rectify. The effectiveness of their efforts depends primarily on the weather, than on the energy of the peasants themselves, on the work of rural party cadres and on weather. Sufficient agricultural technicians can be trained to keep things moving. With luck, enough of the Plan can be fulfilled to transform the Chinese economy."

18. The Chairman referred to the observations made by some of the Chief Ministers the previous day regarding the Social Welfare Board. It was mentioned in particular that there was not enough coordination and that there was duplication and overlapping of activities. A further point was made that the Central Social Welfare Board was not in intimate touch with the state governments and their activities. Instances of extravagance like the distribution of jeeps were also mentioned.

19. The Chairman observed that even though he was not in continuous touch with the Social Welfare Board, he had been much impressed by the good work done by that body. The work in the states was done by the Board through local boards set up, largely, by the state governments themselves. There was no reason why the Chief Ministers should not take the initiative and keep in touch with the state boards and guide them in their work.

20. The Chairman observed that the Social Welfare Board dealt with social service organizations in the states and helped them with grants where they were doing good work. The state governments came into the picture by contributing to the finances of the Board. The Board could also assist by keeping a check over the activities of certain types of organizations. There were instances where institutions recommended by officers of the state governments were found on enquiry to be bogus institutions engaged in exploitation of women. The Chairman referred in this connection to the facts brought out in the report of the Rama Rau Committee.¹⁵

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15. In December 1954, the Central Social Welfare Board appointed an Advisory Committee on Social and Moral Hygiene under the chairmanship of Dhanvanthi Rama Rau. Its report, submitted in October 1955, stated that the orphanages and women's homes run and administered by Christian missionaries were usually well kept, but not those connected with the Arya Samaj and many other Hindu organizations. Nehru cautioned the Board to take care while extending financial or other assistance to them.

22. The Chairman observed that the Planning Commission and the state governments might examine any instances of duplication or overlapping. His own advice to the Central Social Welfare Board would be not to expand too fast. In expanding too fast, the basis might sometimes become weak. Steps should also be taken to ensure that there was no overlapping. There should be close coordination between the Central Welfare Board and the Community Projects Administration. The Chairman mentioned that according to his information, the Social Welfare Board provided *dais* only in those villages where they were not posted by any other agency. The Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission mentioned that this particular question was considered at a meeting between the Health Ministry and the Community Projects Administration and the Planning Commission satisfied itself that the work that was being done by Central Social Welfare Board was supplementary to the work of the health units established in Community Projects and National Extension Service areas. The Chief Minister, Mysore mentioned that in Mysore, midwives etc. in the villages were provided by the state health units.

23. The Minister of Planning (Gulzarilal Nanda) observed that there were a large number of institutions engaged in social welfare activities and more people were offering voluntary services. A specialised organization was, therefore, needed to get the work done in a systematic way. It was with a view to meeting this need that the Central Social Welfare Board was set up.

24. The Chairman observed that the basic work of the Central Social Welfare Board was improvement work, i.e., reaching social service organizations and health units etc., to places where no other work was being done. It also brought women to work in such organizations. There was, however, likely to be some overlapping and wastage which could be looked into. He would request the Chief Ministers to take interest in the work of the Social Welfare Board and direct their representatives on the State Boards to ensure that there was no overlapping.

25. The Chairman mentioned that he had recently sent to the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir a note written by a foreign expert who went to Kashmir and was impressed by the beautiful handicrafts in the State but deplored the exploitation of the craftsmen and the intolerably low wages given to the boys and girls who worked in the establishments producing these handicrafts...

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32. The Chairman observed that at the last stage of the consideration of the First Five Year Plan, the National Development Council passed a resolution placing on record the Council's approval and acceptance of the objectives, priorities and programme embodied in the Plan and called upon all citizens to

work wholeheartedly for the realization of the tasks set in the Plan. It would be desirable to pass a similar Resolution about the Second Five Year Plan. After a brief discussion, the Chairman read out the following Resolution which, he said, was drafted in the form of the resolutions of the United Nations:-

Having considered the Draft Second Five Year Plan;

The National Development Council places on record its general approval and acceptance of the objectives, priorities and programmes embodied in the Plan; and

Relying on the enthusiasm and support of the people;

Affirms the common determination of the Central Government and the Governments of all the States of the Union of India to carry out the Plan, and to improve upon the targets set out in it; and

Calls upon all the citizens of India to work wholeheartedly for the full and timely realizations of the tasks, targets and aims of the Second Five Year Plan.

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36. The Chairman observed that there was not one person, including some members of the Planning Commission, who did not have their own points of view in regard to some matters contained in the Draft Second Five Year Plan. The Resolution merely put on record the general approval and acceptance of the objectives, priorities and programmes.

After a brief discussion it was agreed that it was not necessary to say anything in the Resolution itself about the observations made by Shri Hanumanthaiya.¹⁶ The Chairman then announced that the Resolution has been passed by the Council, one member voting against it.

37. In his concluding remarks, the Chairman observed that the questions raised in the Report on the Second Five Year Plan were important questions affecting almost every sector of activity in India. He did not know whether the Ministers of Central Government and of the State Governments were big enough for the task. The task was big not only because of the bigness of the

16. Hanumanthaiya, the Chief Minister of Mysore, pointed out that ceiling on agricultural holdings would lead to migration from the rural to the urban areas. In his opinion, cooperative farming was against individual incentive. He favoured for compost-making in every village. Hanumanthaiya also suggested that farmers and other taxpayers might be encouraged to buy bonds whose interest might be adjusted towards the taxes they owed to the Government.

country, but also because of the fact that the start was from a very low level. Something worthwhile was done in the First Five Year Plan but that was hardly a beginning. The Second Five Year Plan was the real beginning. The Chairman observed that until after the completion of the Second and third five year plans, it could not be stated that the country's economy had reached a momentum when it could go ahead self-propelled. After that the progress would be continuous. Potentially speaking, India has greater resources than probably any country excepting three or four countries—resources in capacity, human beings, in materials and other matters. The capacity of the country to view the problem of development as a whole was important. The National Development Council should think of problems concerning India as a whole. The Report now approved by the Council was the result of great effort and of widespread and long consultations. It represented a great deal of concentrated labour not merely of the Planning Commission but of the state governments and of the Central Ministries at various levels. The advice of people from outside was also taken but essentially it was the result of the labour of a vast number of people in India. The Report should not be looked at from individual points of views. The essence of democracy was the joint working of a common plan. When a country was put on war footing it really meant that apart from the necessity of active cooperation the war became the dominant feature and everything was subordinated to success in war. In doing so, many things were sacrificed; apart from material sacrifices even opinions and convictions were to some extent sacrificed. In dealing with the problem of development two attitudes of mind had to be developed, one of giving supreme importance to the coordinated approach to the Plan and second of being courageous enough to suppress individual selves for the wider good. The Chairman expressed his gratefulness to all members and requested them to realize that this was not the end of a journey but the beginning of a difficult and tremendous journey. He wished them all well in this journey.¹⁷

17. The Council decided to set up a "Plan Economy and Efficiency Promotion Committee" (PEEP) for securing maximum possible economy and avoiding wastage owing to delays and inefficiency. The Committee would consist of Union Minister for Home Affairs as Chairman and Union Minister for Finance, Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission, and two Chief Ministers of States proposed by the Prime Minister, and the Union Minister concerned with the project or classes of projects under investigation as members.

2. Encourage a Uniform Development¹

We have many conferences for which Ministers or officials gather together from the four corners of India. Sometimes, I have pointed out that perhaps we have too many conferences, but the fact is that it is important for people from the different states to meet together frequently to discuss their common problems. India is a big country, and its problems have both a certain unity and a diversity. It is, therefore, important that all these problems should be viewed in perspective and in the context of India as a whole. Our objective is to encourage a uniform development of India and not to increase the disparities that already exist in various areas.

Among these many conferences, the Conference of Development Commissioners for Community Projects² is of special importance. This is so because our Community Projects and National Extension Service have become of the highest importance to us. Conceived originally in a relatively small way, they grew rapidly and became something in the nature of a revolutionary force changing the face of rural India. That itself showed that they answered an urgent need of the time. They have made not only a difference in India and put a new life in the areas where they have functioned, but they have also attracted widespread attention from beyond the borders of India.

The success of these Community Programmes is partly due to the fact that they are not mere imitations of something happening elsewhere, but have grown out of the soil of India, and in line with the needs of today. Therefore, they are realistic and practical, in addition to being idealistic.

We have decided on developing a socialist pattern of society in India, and the Second Five Year Plan provides a foundation for this on which we shall have to build in the future. The Community Development Programme and the National Extension Service should form the essential ingredients of this foundation. To a large extent, these Community Programmes have put new

1. Message to the Fifth All India Development Commissioners, Conference, New Delhi, 3 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. The two-day Conference, held on 5 & 6 May 1956 at Naini Tal, reviewed the scope and pace of Community Projects and National Extension Service Programme in the context of the revised financial allocation.

life in the countryside. The time now is for sustained and intensive work. This work must be directed more specially to –

- (1) increased production in agriculture, and
- (2) growth of village industries, which should progressively be organized as producers' cooperatives.

It must always be remembered that our production from land is exceedingly low, lower almost than that of any other country. All our future progress depends on increasing this production and going far beyond even the mark set for it in the Second Five Year Plan. If other countries, similarly situated, can increase their food production rapidly, there is no reason why we should not do so. This means essentially intensive cultivation, better seeds, better techniques, fertilizers, etc. It does not mean the introduction of any large-scale machinery. In this work, our *Gram Sevaks* and others should take an important part. Our Development Commissioners must realize that our success in this matter will largely be the measure of our success not only in the community schemes but in the Second Five Year Plan itself.

The Community Programme should necessarily keep in line with the Village Panchayats and Cooperatives. We should develop the people's initiative in all these matters, so that they may rely upon themselves far more than on governmental agencies.

The target set in the Second Five Year Plan for the Community Programme is to cover the entire country. That is a big and worthwhile task, and it will require hard work from everyone. It will require the training of technical personnel. Above all, it will require faith and enthusiasm and the capacity to cooperate.

I send my good wishes to the Development Commissioners' Conference which is being held at Naini Tal. I hope they will succeed in combining idealism with realism and both with faith and capacity for work before which the biggest tasks become easy to accomplish.

3. Report on the Second Plan¹

The Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru): Mr Chairman, I have the honour to present the Report of the Planning Commission on the Second Five Year Plan.

Slightly over three and a half years ago, I had the privilege to present the Report of the First Five Year Plan to this House.² At that time, the First Plan had already been functioning for about a year and a half by the time that Report was ready and was presented to Parliament. Now, we have come to this House soon after the Second Five Year Plan is supposed to have begun; that began on the 1st April. These dates are convenient to consider these matters but, of course, there is no break between the First and the Second and the third. Planning is continuous; the implementation of a Plan is continuous just as the life and activities of the country are continuous. Nevertheless, it is helpful to see in these periods of time as to how far we have gone and what we have achieved, and to decide what to do in the future.

Honourable Members will get this rather bulky volume containing the Report from the Notice Office today. They will also probably get summaries of it, cyclostyled, I think, for the present but they will be printed very soon and circulated to Members. In addition to this, the Planning Commission proposes to issue, as soon as possible, bigger summaries, in printed book form, not only in English but also in the various Indian languages, sections of the book separately printed, and also other material dealing with this.

I understand that it has been decided that Joint Committees of this House and of the Lok Sabha should consider this Report from today onwards,³ and sometime today the Chairmen of those four Committees will meet the Members and the Minister for Planning to decide on their procedure, and they will consider this for about a week. Those Committees will be divided up taking four groups of subjects, one Committee A—considering the plan outlay and allocations;

1. Speech in the Rajya Sabha, 15 May 1956, *Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha)*, *Official Report*, Vol. XIII, cols. 2170-2183. Nehru presented this Report in the Lok Sabha on the same day.
2. Nehru presented the Report in the Council of States and in the House of the People on 8 December 1952. For the latter see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 51-52.
3. On the proposal of the Business Advisory Committee of the Lok Sabha, it was decided to form four Joint Committees of both Houses to consider the subjects divided into four groups.

the second Committee B—industry, minerals, transport and communications; Committee C—land reform, agriculture and irrigation and power; and Committee D, the fourth Committee—social services and labour policy.

Roughly speaking, this Report can be divided up into two parts, the second part dealing with the detailed programme and projects and the first part with the broader issues. Members will no doubt be interested in both parts, more especially in so far as the detailed programme applies to their own areas, but probably the first part containing the broad policies, approach, etc., will be more important from the point of view of this House because it is from that that the rest follows and I imagine that when the time comes, as it will in about a week's time or so, for this House to debate on this Report, more attention will be paid to the first part containing the principles etc. In regard to the details it would be more convenient for them to be considered whenever necessary not in a debate in this House but by honourable Members meeting the Minister for Planning or other representatives of the Planning Commission and discussing them with them. Now, Sir, I do not wish at this stage—of course, this matter will again come up before this House—I do not wish to say much about this Report except this that, as we have proceeded with our business of planning, naturally our experience has increased; to some extent our vision has widened; to some extent the material we play with, statistics, information, etc., is much greater than it was. It is by no means enough even now, but when we started with the First Five Year Plan we were conditioned and limited in many ways. We had very little data, very little statistics and such statistics as were supplied to us were often very unreliable being based usually on some *patwari* statement in a village about agricultural production. Also, we were tied up at the time when the First Five Year Plan began, with a number of major schemes, which we could not and did not want to leave. Now, those major schemes absorbed a great part of our resources and we had not too much left for our other plans. That was one reason why the actual Report, the First Five Year Plan Report, came up before this House a year and a half after the Plan was supposed to begin functioning. Well, since then we have had this Five Year Plan and we have had reports about the measure of success it has achieved. I think, it is justifiable for us to say that the First Five Year Plan, by and large, was a success. In some matters it was a great success. In some matters it was not such a great success but it fulfilled anticipations, but taking it all in all the Five Year Plan succeeded and succeeded in two ways. One was the fact of reaching the targets aimed at and going beyond them in regard to food, in regard to cloth, in regard to several other things but something that is much more important really, that is, in creating a hopeful atmosphere in the

country, that is to say, our people became planning-conscious. Our people realized that by this method of planning we were advancing, we were making good on the food front to some extent; in regard to certain industries also our production rose. I do not mean to say that in the context of the enormous and difficult problems that we are facing in India, the Five Year Plan succeeded in solving any of those vast problems—of course not, but it did succeed in a greater measure than was anticipated by many of us in this country and many outside this country, who take an interest, friendly or unfriendly, in our activities and we succeeded in creating that basic atmosphere of hope and success following the effort which is so necessary to every kind of organized effort at planning. Now, we started with this great advantage on this occasion, which we did not have previously, because today everybody in India—perhaps I exaggerate—at least very large numbers of people in India talk of planning, think of planning, and discuss planning, even in our villages; may be their idea of planning is somewhat limited, but that does not matter; it is bound to be so, and people realize that it is by this planned approach that we are likely to succeed in solving our great problems. That has been a great advantage to us. The second advantage has been, as I said that we have some more statistics, some more experience, but with the greater experience and with the greater knowledge that we have now, also has come an appreciation of the greater difficulties that we have to face. The problems which were vague become more concrete and in becoming more concrete we realize how big they are. Perhaps, many people in this country who talk rather vaguely about the solution of our problems would get this appreciation of the bigness and complexity of those problems if they sat down and considered them in that intensive way that the Planning Commission had to do. Anyhow it is good that we have a greater sense of reality of the difficulty of the great work we have undertaken and at the same time of our own capacity to overcome those difficulties.

Now, even while the First Five Year Plan was functioning, work on the Second Plan began. It began, broadly speaking, two years ago. Of course, in a sense it was always there, always thinking of the next step, but two years ago it began in a more precise way, and during these two years we have gone through innumerable processes of consultation and discussion amongst all manner of groups in this country. We tried to go right down to the village to find out the needs of the village and from the village to the district. We came to the conclusion that the district was in a sense the pivot of planning. Of course, the district is too small for any major scheme, that is true, but still just as in the apparatus of administration, we gave the district a certain importance; then we came to the state level and the states, I should like to say, in this matter

of planning not only cooperated fully with the Planning Commission and the Government of India, but did so with an enthusiasm and with a backing of hard work that was most heartening.

This Plan could never have been made or produced here without this great effort of cooperation and goodwill that we have had from all sections of the community. There were the various organizations, the state governments, etc.

Then you go into a different field, that is, we consult specialists; we consult economists, statisticians, engineers, educationists, various panels of the Planning Commission dealing with specialized subjects. We consult of course, all the time the various Ministries of the Government of India. We consult quite a number of foreign specialists; not for our detailed Plan—that is our business—but nevertheless to get ideas from them and we have had in the course of the last two to three years any number of very eminent foreign experts on planning, statistics, economics and like subjects in India who had produced vast numbers of specialized papers on these subjects which have been considered. It does not mean that we have adopted all that they have said. Indeed, they have often said things contradicting each other. So there is no question of adopting everything they said. But even those who came from abroad or here, even when they differed basically about the approach to the problem of planning, it was quite extraordinary that a very large measure of agreement came out in regard to the problems of India.

Now, one fact stood out and that was, while we should learn and learn a great deal from the experience of other countries, where they have planned and where they have not planned—from both places we must learn—nevertheless, we have to think out and fashion out our own line of action basing it on the particular conditions in India and not on the conditions existing somewhere else. That is to say, we have to rely on our own application of whether it is economics or anything else to the problems of India—not because those who came from abroad were people not capable of doing this but firstly because most of these people who come from abroad come from countries which are industrialized, which have gone through this process of industrialization. The economic problems they have to face are different from ours, are different from that of a country which is underdeveloped, which wants to industrialize itself rapidly maintaining and preserving the democratic structure of our Constitution and of our society. In fact, this particular problem had not been faced anywhere before in any country. Other countries had industrialized themselves in the course of generations and attained a high position and their problems were entirely different because they had the apparatus of

industrialism with them. Sometimes they did not function; sometimes they created difficulties but the apparatus was there; the foundation was there. Some countries, as the House will know, have industrialized themselves rapidly, fairly rapidly, in the course of the last, say, 30 or 40 years. I may point out even that rapid industrialization has taken 20, 30, 40 years. People may forget and imagine that these things can be done as if by some jugglery in the course of a few years. Even the most rapid approach takes generations. Now, those countries which had done so rapidly were obviously important for us to consider; we could learn much from them because they had passed through the stage of underindustrialization, underdevelopment, almost before our eyes, while other countries had taken 100 to 150 years over it. But then of course, conditions differed greatly between those countries and ours as they always do between two countries going through these processes. The political structure and the rest were different too. Also, the unfortunate fact stares us that we have started in this country at an almost lower level than any country. We are very proud of our country as we should be, but from an economic point of view, in any statistical analysis of income etc., India occupies almost the bottom place.⁴ One has to remember that, how we have to start from scratch and we have to lift ourselves up almost by our boot laces. It is not an easy task and yet it can be done. It is beginning to be done and I have no doubt that it will be done, but one must realize this point. Therefore, we took advantage of advice from every quarter in India, expert, inexpert, political, geographical, all over from village upwards to the state and from foreign experts too. A little over a year ago, about a year and a half ago, we asked the Indian Statistical Institute to consider certain specific problems, that we placed before them, statistically. The problem we put to them at that time was, if we want to put an end to unemployment in India within a stated period, what investment was necessary, apart from other things, whatever the period might be. Of course, the investment might be completely outside our capacity but we wanted to find out. We said, 'let us say roughly ten years' time; what investment would be necessary to finish unemployment?' Well, they set about thinking about this matter and in doing so they covered a much wider field really because it was no good saying that the investment would be so many crores or so many thousands of crores. That was no good; they had to work it out as to how that investment would produce employment and they had to work it out with not

4. The *UN Statistical Year Book (1964)* had listed the national income for the year 1955 for India as 99.8 (1000 million Rs.), for Communist China as 78 (1000 million Yuan), for USSR as 94 (1000 million new Roubles).

adequate data before them. Anyhow, the House may remember that ultimately a memorandum was produced which was called a Draft Outline or some such thing and subsequently it came to be known as the Plan-frame. It was pointed out later that many of the figures in this Plan-frame were not correct, because more correct figures came in and they had to be substituted for incorrect ones. But the value of that Plan-frame was that it was an organized logical approach to a difficult problem of how to spread out our investment in various ways in various activities and produce employment and produce goods, of course, naturally. So regardless of the actual figures that they had given, it was the approach that was important. That Plan-frame was considered by the Economic Section of the Planning Commission, by the Economic Section of the Finance Ministry and they produced a document which, broadly speaking, was in agreement with the approach of the Plan-frame. Maybe, here and there the figures were different. Then we convened the Panel of Economists which the Planning Commission constituted and which contained all the most eminent economists in India. They came and sat for a few days to discuss these papers, the Plan-frame and the other documents, and they produced a third document of weight. Also, they did not go into the details. They, being cautious folk, did not wish to take responsibility for everything but broadly speaking, they agreed with that approach and pointed out something that should be done. Now, this again, all these three papers and more were put before the National Development Council which the House knows consists of Chief Ministers from all the states plus the Central Ministers plus the Planning Commission. The National Development Council generally and broadly approved of that approach of Plan-frame and the panel of economists and the rest, not in detail, but broadly and asked us to go ahead. In particular, they approved of the target or the objective laid down. I think, it was 25 per cent increase in the national income in five years and that ten to twelve million jobs should be found for the working population, new and old. That was the broad approach. Even then the National Development Council realized that a 25 per cent increase, which meant five per cent per annum, was not an easy task. Naturally, we want to give as high a figure as possible, but the point is we have to achieve it. And broadly speaking, every one per cent per annum that you wish to add—say instead of five per cent you wish to say six per cent—represented one thousand crores rupees more investment. It was a big sum, in the five year period, I mean. Nevertheless, we felt we could not go below this 25 per cent, because it was just keeping our head above water. We have to go faster than the increase in population and all that. So, we agreed to that. This was just about a year ago.

Then, on the basis of that, more definite and precise work started for the preparation of the Second Plan. A memorandum was prepared. The memorandum was considered and a draft outline was then prepared. Again, there were numerous consultations between each state government and the Planning Commission. Now, we were coming down to—if I may use a colloquial phrase—brass tacks and we had to deal with actual things and actual schemes, apart from the big policies. The big policies were being considered also at the same time. The House may remember that at one stage my colleague, the Minister for Planning, and other colleagues met—and to some extent I also was present—many Members of Parliament who formed the Consultative Committee of Parliament for Planning and had very useful discussions for several days. All this helped in making that Draft Plan and ultimately the Draft Plan was produced, rather this Draft Outline; I think, in February last after much effort. This was published, distributed widely, comments invited, again a series of discussions on that took place and finally we came to the Draft Outline being revised repeatedly in the course of those discussions, considered ultimately by the Cabinet and finally by the National Development Council which met some days ago and passed certain resolutions⁵ which I shall read out to the House. Now, in the course of all these discussions, all kinds of new avenues of thinking opened out for us. I am not quite sure that we have all succeeded in digesting all those ideas, but our minds are full. The whole process has been, speaking for myself—being not an expert in these fields—a most profitable experience in educating myself. And if I may venture to say so, to some extent in the course of these years of planning, we have been educating not only ourselves but the nation in various degrees.

So, in considering all these matters we saw that on the one hand there were so many uncertainties about our resources, about the various things that we were going to do. Let us say that we were laying down a rigid plan for five years, or perhaps not rigid. There should be no rigidity about it. Some of us felt that perhaps we were aiming too high and we should be in a position to revise it, if necessary. Others felt that we were not aiming high enough and we should do much more than we say. Anyhow, it was no good putting down in the Plan all our wishful thinking. But what emerged from all this was that we put down our present estimate of our resources, of what we propose to do, of what we intend to do, but that we should revise this annually. That is, there should be annual plans. Naturally, many of the things that we undertake we shall have to finish. We cannot go half way and stop something which will

5. See *ante*, p. 51.

last for several years. But broadly speaking, we should have, in addition to this Five Year Plan, more precise and definite annual plans, so that we can consider the position from year to year. Secondly, while the five-year period is, in a sense, too long a period for us to be rigid about, it is much too short a period for us to plan, because many things go over the five years and we must know where exactly the five year plan itself is leading to. It is not merely a question of putting up a factory here or something else there. That is a minor thing. The main thing is how our whole production apparatus is functioning, what is consumed, what is the surplus left over, how many unemployed are getting jobs, how unemployment vanishes, how living standards rise and all that. It is a terribly complicated process, because it is not merely the thousand or the ten thousand machines or factories that may be working in India or whatever it is. But, in effect we have to think in terms of 360 million machines working in this country, that is, the human beings in this country, how they work, how they get the work, how they produce, how they consume. So, it becomes a most intricate and fascinating work. Therefore, you require what is called long-term planning, perspective planning over more than five years, to go ahead, look ahead ten years, fifteen years, may be twenty years. Not rigidly—of course, you cannot—but broadly have some idea of the picture of society and the structure in India—industrial, agricultural, social—that you are aiming at. Now, we were helped in this business in a sense when it came to be clearly decided by Government and by Parliament that we should aim at a socialist structure of society. Those terms are not precise, but they are precise enough to indicate the direction in which we are going. That was helpful and that had to be considered then in terms of our planning. It is true that even in the First Five Year Plan, many of us—though we may not have said so—thought more or less on those lines and that was reflected somewhat in the First Five Year Plan. But, now we have the authority of Parliament to say that this is the picture that we want to produce; an attempt was made, therefore, to bring that in here. Not—let me make it quite clear—that I claim or anybody claims that the Second Five Year Plan is going to produce a socialist structure of society in India. Let there be no mistake about it. It will take many five year plans before we can have that structure of society in this country. We can proceed, we can go along those lines and step by step we shall advance and get nearer to that and new problems will arise. Anyhow, we must have that picture before us. Therefore, in addition to flexibility that we should have in our Plan, we have to have this larger perspective which becomes important. In fact, in some countries which have been planning for a long, long time, they have divided up their planning commissions into two parts—the current planning which they call and the perspective planning. There are two planning

commissions almost. One thinks in long terms of 15 or 20 years and the other in terms of one year and five years. So, this Plan, after these various processes, ultimately reached the National Development Council and the National Development Council passed a Resolution which I shall venture to place before you. The Plan was considered and approved by the National Development Council which passed the following Resolution on the 2nd May 1956:-

Having considered the draft Second Five Year Plan, the National Development Council places on record its general approval and acceptance of the objectives, priorities and programmes embodied in the Plan and relying on the enthusiasm and support of the people, affirms the common determination of the Central Government and the Governments of all the States of the Union of India to carry out the Plan; and to improve upon the targets set out in it; and calls upon all the citizens of India to work wholeheartedly for the full and timely realization of the tasks, targets and aims of the Second Five Year Plan.

I may now read some extracts from the introduction which we have given to this Second Five Year Plan:-

The beginning and the end of a Five Year Plan are vital dates in the nation's history. Each Five Year Plan is both an assessment of the past and a call for the future. It seeks to translate into practical action the aspirations and ideals of the millions in the country and gives to each of us the opportunity of service in the common cause of eliminating poverty and raising standards of living.

The First Five Year Plan ended in March 1956. Its approach and outlook are part of our common thinking. It has laid the foundations for achieving the socialist pattern of society—a social and economic order based upon the values of freedom and democracy, without caste, class and privilege, in which there will be a substantial rise in employment and production and the largest measure of social justice attainable.

Our Second Five Year Plan seeks to rebuild rural India, to lay the foundations of industrial progress, and to secure to the greatest extent feasible opportunities for weaker and under-privileged sections of our people and the balanced development of all parts of the country. For a country whose economic development was long retarded, these are difficult tasks but, given the effort and the sacrifice, they are well within our capacity to achieve.

The Plan which is now presented to Government for submission to Parliament is a result of the labours of large numbers of persons in the Central Government, in the States at various levels and leaders of thought and opinion in every part of the country. In its preparation men and women in all walks of life have given generously of their time and experience. The enthusiasm and the widespread participation which have gone into the making of the Second Five Year Plan are the best augury for its fulfilment.

4. Timetable for Discussion on Second Plan¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Government are anxious that this House should give the fullest consideration to this important report of the Planning Commission. At the same time, I would like to point out that though this Report was presented to Parliament only yesterday,² yet for the last two or three months, the essential features of the report in the form of Draft Outline had been before the House and the country. So, it is nothing very novel. But I need not go into this matter.

I would like to inform the House of what happened yesterday, to which Dr Lanka Sundaram has just drawn attention.³ Yesterday, a meeting of the Chairmen of these four Committees was being held under the chairmanship of the Deputy Speaker.⁴ When this question arose about the postponement of this discussion, I was summoned, and I was glad to go there and to discuss this matter with the Members present.

As a result of that discussion, we arrived at this conclusion that we should have this discussion here in this House as arranged, from the 23rd of May onwards, for two or three days, as long as it lasts, that is, not exceeding three

1. 16 May 1956, *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, Part. II, cols. 8503-8506.
2. A.K. Gopalan of the CPI had said that the Plan document covering 641 pages was made available to MPs only a day before, but in order to make an effective contribution to the discussion, the document needed to be studied and digested.
3. Lanka Sundaram, an Independent Member from Vishakhapatnam, had said that at a meeting of the panel of chairmen of the various committees it was recommended that the first seven chapters of the Plan would be discussed; that they would be processed by all the four committees together in a joint session beginning 16 June; and that the debate would be carried over to the next session.
4. Hukam Singh.

days—if it finishes a little earlier, well, it does not matter—and that this discussion should be largely confined to the first seven or eight—I forget now the numbers—chapters, that is, the general chapters of this Report, dealing with the broad policies, the financial aspects, the structure of the Plan etc., and that the discussion should not be concluded during this session but carried over to the next session. I cannot yet give the exact date for the next session. I pointed out that the next session was likely to be a very crowded one, and we would have a very heavy work to face. So, the only way to give some time to this debate during the next session is to fix a date three days before the normal date which we might have otherwise fixed, and reserve those three days for this discussion. That is the position. And I think that this is a good understanding and compromise because I do think it is important that the discussion on this Report should take place—it need not be completed—in this session. The country is seized of this Report at present. They are reading it, and they would like to know what the Members of this House think of the principles.

What Shri A.K. Gopalan said in his note was that the discussion would largely concern itself about the projects. Well, it is open to honourable Members to speak about any project....

A.K. Gopalan: I did not say, projects. I said, broad principles.

JN: This is what he has said:

“At this stage, the discussion has got to be on concrete proposals”.

I am sorry. He did not say, projects. He said that the principles have been discussed already, and now we have to discuss concrete proposals.

Undoubtedly, it is open to the House, if it chooses, to discuss anything. But obviously, it seems to me not very much worthwhile for concrete proposals, in the sense of projects, to be discussed—not that I say they need not be discussed—because we shall rather be lost in each individual Member bringing in and saying something about a project, and attention being diverted from the basic approaches of this Report.

I would invite any honourable Member or any group of honourable Members who are interested in discussing concrete projects etc., to discuss them separately with our Planning Minister, with the Planning Commission and with any of us. We shall give fuller attention to it.

But, in so far as the discussion here is concerned, I should respectfully suggest that it should concern itself not only with the principles, but with the basic approach, and certainly the financial aspect, as the honourable Member opposite said, and other aspects, because although we have discussed these

principles, and we have put them down, the more we think about these matters, the more we find that we have to think more, and the more we find how far-reaching everything is and how everything leads to something else, and how complicated all this business is. It is an odd thing that the more our capacity to plan increases, the more the complexities of planning appear. That is inevitable because we have to deal with, if I may use the word, 360 million or so machines, human machines in this country, apart from the machines of metal and other things. We have discussed these principles with others, with experts from all manner of countries, men with great experience in their own countries, of planning or other matters. Those discussions have been very worthwhile and enlightening, not directly; they did not give a direct answer to our questions, because they could not. It is up to us to find our answer to our questions. But they gave us of their experience, and we came to certain conclusions, that while we can learn a great deal from abroad and while we should learn a great deal from abroad, we cannot answer our questions in terms of any other country. We have to find our own answers to those questions by the facts, statistics, appreciation and appraisals of things in this country.

My point is that these discussions are very helpful, and I am quite sure that a discussion in this House of the basic principles—approaches—will be helpful to all of us in our understanding of this problem. It will help the Planning Commission. As I mentioned rather briefly yesterday, the plan is a Five Year Plan. Yet we have laid stress on its being a flexible Plan. We shall have annual plans. Obviously, some things have to be started now which will take five years to complete, or may be six years or seven years. But apart from that, we want to revise our Plan every year to see what we have done, what we have left undone, the difficulties, our resources and all that so that we may keep in touch with reality. That is one aspect.

The other aspect is the long perspective planning which goes beyond five years, maybe to ten or fifteen years. I think we have made great progress in the country all over in developing a consciousness, a mentality of planning, even if I may say so, from the village upwards. In the villages, it is slightly limited of course. But the broad consciousness of planning has been a great gain. Many people are thinking; experts, engineers, educationists, economists, statisticians and all kinds of people are thinking in their own terms, and we have to coordinate all that. Here in this House, people representing different viewpoints, different degrees of expert knowledge can help a great deal in throwing light on these broad principles.

So, Sir, I would suggest that the arrangement agreed to yesterday at the meeting of Chairmen of those Committees might be accepted by this House.



ADDRESSING A MEETING OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, NEW DELHI, 1 MAY 1956



SPEAKING AT THE INAUGURAL SESSION OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CHILD WELFARE,
NEW DELHI, 9 MAY 1956



DASTAR-BANDI BY ZAMIR NIZAMI, PIR OF DARGAH
NIZAMUDDIN AULIYA, AT THE 650TH *URS* OF AMIR KHUSRAU,
NEW DELHI, 28 MAY 1956

5. Ceiling on Individual Income¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Chairman, my coming here at the present moment was not premeditated as I was not quite aware that this subject was being discussed.² But having come here, I am naturally greatly interested in the subject, and I have some views on it.

Now, Sir, there are various approaches to this. One is the use of the word 'socialism' repeatedly to justify many of the proposals and the suggestions that are made, as if 'socialism' means cutting off everybody's head who is above a certain height, or may be, who is a little more intelligent and who uses his intelligence or his capacity to work, or whatever it is. That is one aspect. The other is the aspect of really the simple liver who does not approve of standards of luxury. Now, there is a great deal of truth in both those approaches. That is true in the sense that nobody, I hope, likes people to flaunt luxury in a rather anti-social manner. Nobody wants obviously these great disparities which exist in India perhaps even more than in most countries of the world. So, it is common ground that we want to reduce these disparities; it is common ground also, I believe, that we want as far as possible to do away with the vulgarity of wealth as well as the power that wealth gives in regard to social purposes, social undertakings and the like, but when it is suggested to do this kind of thing by legislation, I think that possibly it means a great deal of wishful thinking and no attempt to realize how far such an attempt will be successful, in fact, how far that attempt, instead of being successful, may do a great deal of injury. Socialism, I take it, is not something which can be defined as a dead level of poverty. I do not think socialism can be equated with poverty. You may have a dead level of poor persons in a country but that is not an ideal to be aimed at. Socialism only becomes socialism when there is something worthwhile to socialize, when there is wealth to socialize, when the productive apparatus of a country is functioning well so that it produces wealth, which should not be concentrated in the hands of a few but which should percolate to the people and thus raise their standards. Therefore, it becomes quite essential for a

1. 18 May 1956. *Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha)*, Official Report, Volume XIII, cols. 2561-2567.
2. Discussion was taken up on a Congress Member from UP, B.K. Mukherjee's resolution, moved on 4 May, regarding fixation of a ceiling for individual income at Rs. 25,000/- per year.

country like ours, for any undeveloped country, where the level of wealth is very low, to produce more wealth and secondly, to see that that wealth is properly distributed. The most important thing is the production of wealth and everything else is secondary and tertiary to that. If you do not produce wealth properly, then you have little to distribute. The whole object of socialization is that the nation's resources should be utilized for wealth production more and more and then to provide for proper wealth distribution. Now, resolutions or proposals like this do not take into consideration this dynamic aspect of a nation's life but think only in terms of trying to introduce some artificial equality, if you like, or lessening disparities. Perhaps, all honourable Members have not read yet what has been said in the Report on the Second Five Year Plan by the Planning Commission, because there some very interesting things connected with this particular matter have been discussed and discussed, I think, rather well. Even though I am one of the signatories of this Report, I can say that, because I did not really write it. Other people did it. I would commend the House to read that part, because that puts this in the right perspective. We want to reduce disparities. We want ultimately, however long it may take, to produce a society where every person has absolutely equal opportunities to develop; how far one develops depends on many factors, on one's own ability, mental, physical, spiritual, etc. But everyone must have an equal opportunity.

That is the most that you can give a person. Well, it is perfectly true that you do not give equal opportunity and the great majority of the people in India are very far from having an equal opportunity. Even our children have not got it, millions and millions of them. They have not got enough food, enough clothing, even a proper shelter. How can we give them equality of opportunity? Take a simple thing like education. Now, most of us, all of us, are in favour of basic education. It has been calculated that to give a really good class basic education, with good teachers, properly paid, with proper equipment, etc., without any luxury—I do not remember the exact figure—it costs more than the annual revenues of India at the present moment. What are we to do about it? We are struggling with poverty all the time, and we have to increase wealth in this country. It is not done by merely economizing. We should economize, of course, where there is waste, but it is not by economizing that you increase the real wealth of a country. You may save a little here and there. You may save a few lakhs or a crore which we should always, but it is no solution of the problem. Therefore, we discuss in this Report how to increase the wealth of the country, by industrialization, by greater food production, by all kinds of things. That is wealth. I heard—I was not here—that Prof. Malkani talked

about money in depreciating terms.³ Well, of course, if a person thinks that money is everything, it is wrong of course.

N.R. Malkani: I said we are giving too much importance to it at present.

JN: I do not quite understand what is meant by it. If the honourable Member says that the kind of status that people should get should have nothing to do with their money, I entirely agree with him. I agree with him that the question of salary should confer no status on an individual. A person may get for reasons within or without our control a high salary. If I want a first-class man, a first-class engineer, it is absolutely no use my passing a law about it. People have talked about lawyers and doctors. When you come to the technical field today, it is very difficult to get a high class technical man. I am not even talking about very high salaries. Sometimes, suppose we want a foreign expert, I will have to pay fantastic salaries, and yet these salaries are cheap from the point of view of the work done. We spend on Bhakra Nangal Rs.8 lakhs a day in salaries and wages. Though this is a big scheme, it is a big sum. But the slightest improvement or speeding of the process means our saving vast sums of money, and the slightest delay—may be at this end in Delhi, some person or somebody in Delhi delaying a certain paper—means a substantial increase in the cost. We are thinking of small things here and there forgetting where major lapses may occur. Money, as such, of course, is a social problem. The prestige that money gives should not be there. Naturally, let us think in terms of goods. We want goods in this country. We want production in this country. We want goods so that the goods may go to the people of the country, to the common men. You have to give them good houses, good clothing, good schools. All these are goods. How are we to produce these things? Now, the first thing is, as I said, higher production and partly the removal of disabilities. There are two ways of doing it, raising the people at the bottom, i.e., raising the living standards of million and hundreds of millions of people; reducing the income, if you like, or the standards of a few people at the top. Both processes have to continue, because lowering down a few people at the top is psychologically satisfying, I agree, sometimes, but it does not make any difference. It may be psychologically satisfying to see that some people who flaunt their wealth in a vulgar manner do not do it, but you have to raise the level of the people as a whole, and you can do it only by much greater production

3. While approving the principle behind the resolution on ceiling on income, N.R. Malkani, a nominated member, said that differences arose about the approach to narrow down the existing wide disparities.

of wealth in the country. But every process of development does tend to increase the wealth, well, in that part of the country which is developed, in that group which is working more. It has a tendency, unless controlled and diverted to right ends, for a certain part to develop more or a certain group to develop more than the others. If we have Community Projects—we have many—where the Community Projects tend to develop more, naturally those areas develop more than where they do not. We do not want that to happen and show favouritism but one cannot help. You want Community Projects and National Extension Services all over the country but you have to begin somewhere. Where you begin, that develops more and certain disparity tends to come in which you can check otherwise. If you have factories, something comes. Our factory worker today—not that he is paid terribly well—but many of them are relatively better off than agricultural labour and the disparity comes in; but would you ask me to reduce the factory wages? Of course, you will not because he does not get too much but nevertheless he is somewhat better off than the poor man. These disparities are all there and you can only get rid of them by an organized approach for production and raising the level. Supposing we could do or the State could do or provide adequate food to every child clothing, good housing, health and good education and subsequent opportunity for work, well, you have done something very big and you have at least raised the level of the people and given them all this chance to go ahead after proper training and education. Take health. We talk about doctors. I entirely agree with my colleague who said that we should have a socialized system of medicine, everybody having full opportunity for free treatment by the ablest men—not only the rich.⁴ All these are approaches which can only be given effect to if you have enough wherewithal to do so, otherwise you cannot. Therefore, one must always think in terms of production. Why I am laying stress on this is because, any step that we might take should be judged from that point of view. If we take a step which can in theory, be justified because it tends to equalize or remove the disparity but it also upsets the machinery of production or lowers that or produces a certain lack of harmony in all this, then we have lost in the main thing. Whatever psychological satisfaction you have had, really the main thing, that is, increased production, we have lost; but in increasing production we must certainly bear in mind that

4. Lakshmi Menon of the Congress had said: "We must have socialized medicine in our country, and we must also have some strict control put on the legal profession, so that these two services which have received so much of the wealth of the people, and which have exploited the poor and the suffering may be socialized."

this does not result in monopolies, in accumulation of wealth as far as possible in certain hands or certain groups or individuals. Now, there are various ways of tackling this problem—fiscal and the rest. The whole tax system can be considered. We have a very heavy income tax and supertax. So has England. But many people think that these very heavy income taxes really do not bring about the result you aim at. There are too many loopholes—legal and illegal loopholes. There may be other approaches—that is a separate thing. But the approach, I say, of talking about a ceiling on income is not the right approach. In fact, it is an approach which you cannot give effect to. You may satisfy yourself psychologically just as you may satisfy yourself that we have put income tax or supertax on 90 per cent of income. The fact is—I am not talking of India, I am talking about any country—the fact is, this does not... I shall conclude, but have one word more and that is in regard to our services.

I do think that it is an extraordinary proposition to ask, to begin this lopping off of heads by cutting these salaries of the services. I know that some services are rather heavily paid but the great majority, I don't think, are heavily paid at all. Taking the world as it is, they are rather less paid than people of their qualifications in some countries. So, I submit that this is not the right approach.

6. Approval of the Second Plan¹

Mr Deputy Speaker, Sir, some days ago, I had the honour of presenting to the House the Report of the Planning Commission on the Second Five Year Plan.² I presume that many Members have read or at any rate partially read this Report since then.

I have now the honour to move the following Resolution:

“This House records its general approval of the principles, objectives and programmes of development contained in the Second Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission”.

1. Speech in the Lok Sabha, 23 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 9383-9405.

2. See *ante*, pp. 55-63.

It has been agreed informally that this debate on this very important subject should continue in the next session, because we are anxious that the House should be given the fullest opportunity of expressing its views on this Report on the Second Five Year Plan. It is also generally agreed that on this occasion, during the next two or three days, whatever the period might be, attention may be more specially paid to the general principles, to the approach, etc., as contained in the first eight chapters of this Report. Therefore, this debate will not end during this session, but will probably continue at the beginning of the next session of the Lok Sabha.

Those honourable Members who have read this Report will probably not find it very light reading. A Report of this type can hardly be termed light reading although I believe there are many parts of it which are exciting reading. Few of us can say that we agree with every single word in this Report, with every single proposal. A Report of this type is the product of a great deal of labour of a great many persons, not only Members of the Planning Commission, but the vast number of other people who have been consulted, experts of our own country and from foreign countries, various groups, representatives of various interests and professions. In fact, it is the product of the joint labour and thinking of a very large number of people in this country. As with all joint products, there is an attempt to meet various viewpoints. It may be that somebody may say this is not exactly what I thought about this matter. That is natural. Nevertheless, I would venture to say that this Report represents a certain unity of approach. In any event, I hope that this House will view this Report as a whole and from the point of view of this unity of approach, objectives, methods and principles underlying it and not so much in regard to certain detailed programmes and the rest. It is open, of course, to any honourable Member to criticize or to make suggestions about any part of the Report whether it relates to principles or to details. But I submit that the important thing is to get hold of the main principles. I propose, therefore, to deal with certain broad principles only.

What does this Report mean? It may be light reading for some. It may be heavy reading for others. But, the subject which concerns this Report is obviously not only of the highest importance but something that produces in me very great excitement. It is an exciting subject because it deals with the future of 360 millions of people, and, to some extent, that future will affect the future of other countries and even of the rest of the world. Therefore, it becomes an enthralling and exciting subject. We read the history of India. We have a long history with many ups and downs. Now, we are concerned with the writing of our history. Now, we are concerned with the shaping of the future

of India. Surely, there could be fewer more exciting subjects than this. It is, therefore, with a sense of the burden of history upon me, upon us, upon this House, that I face this problem. It is also with a great sense of humility because, however great, however competent we may consider ourselves, we are small in relation to this mighty theme, that is, the building up of India, taking this country and its millions of people forward during the next five years.

Five years, I say. That five years is only some kind of a period that we fix for our convenience, because there are no periods in the march of a nation. It is a continuous march. We must really think in terms of even larger periods, one, two, three, four five year plans. This is the Second. Nobody thinks that at the end of the Second Plan, we shall have been at the end of our journey. There is no end of a journey when a nation is marching. Nevertheless, leaving out the final ends, even such ends as we envisage, the objective that we have, the objective of a socialist pattern of society, we are not going to achieve at the end of the First Five Year Plan or the Second. It may require three, four five year plan periods before we can say with some confidence that we have very largely achieved it. Therefore, we must keep this larger perspective in view. In planning, especially, we are apt perhaps sometimes to forget the larger perspective and lose ourselves in details, lose ourselves in some particular aspect of it which is of importance and yet which may very well come in the way of the larger perspective that we have. The question arises—important question—of regional development. Now, we are all agreed that there should be an even development all over India, even regional development. We are all agreed that the disparities, not only as between individuals in regard to income, but in regard to the various areas in India should be removed, that there should be equality of growth and opportunity all over India. That is true. But, if we start applying that principle regardless of the other objectives and perspective, you may spoil the whole Plan. We may not have very much to give to any region. Therefore, in looking at this Five Year Plan, we have to think really of several five year plans. That is why it is becoming more and more important, in addition to the period we are dealing with, to have a longer perspective in view.

Now, this Five Year Plan necessarily deals with, broadly speaking, what might be called material objectives. They are very important, because, it is on the basis of certain material achievements that you build other achievements. It deals, to some extent, no doubt, with culture and like matters. Nevertheless, it confines itself chiefly to material advances. That does not mean that we in this House attach no importance to other aspects of human life. Indeed, all the material advances that we may achieve may perhaps be worth nothing at all

and may avail us little if we forget the other aspects of human life, moral, spiritual and other aspects. I mention this merely because we have always to keep that in view unless somebody should say, here is your Five Year Plan and you talk only about material advances and not about other matters. It is not because we do not attach value to these other matters, but because we have to deal with these in a certain compass. The others have to be kept in view. It is right at any time that we should keep in mind these moral and spiritual values. Perhaps, it is even more appropriate on this occasion today when we are on the eve of the celebration of a very great anniversary of a very great man, a great son of India,³ that we should remember those moral and spiritual values, which ultimately give content to the life of an individual as to that of a nation.

Now, coming to this particular Report, the first thing I should like this House to consider for a few seconds, and the Report speaks perhaps a little about it, is the present day world. We stand or we sit as the case may be, in this middle of the twentieth century, and this middle of the twentieth century has brought about tremendous changes all over the world. These changes are due to many factors. There have been wars, great wars, revolutions and the like. Anyhow, the world has greatly changed, and what is more important, is continually and greatly changing. The pace, the tempo of change is tremendous. Any such plan that we make like this Five Year Plan is subject always to the great changes, political, technological and the like, that we are having.

I shall not refer to the political changes, but the principal thing, the most revolutionary thing, in the wide world, that we have seen is the technological change that has come about, and which has really in the last few generations changed the world. Now, everybody knows that. But there is one aspect of this vast technological change which perhaps is not always present to our minds.

All of us, who think of these problems or any problem, probably have some kind of ideology, some kind of philosophy of life. We may not be philosophers, but without some kind of philosophical or ideological approach we would have no yardstick to measure things by. And yet, one aspect stares us, namely that the ideologies and the philosophies of life that we adhere to somehow do not fit in with this middle of the twentieth century, whatever they were. It may be, of course, that though facts change and circumstances become different, we still hold to the lines of thinking that we previously had, because the human mind is a singularly conservative thing, and it does not easily change.

3. The birth anniversary of Gautama Buddha was celebrated on 23 May 1956 which was also the beginning of the year-long celebration of 2500th anniversary of his *Parinirvana*.

It is a remarkable thing that today when almost every single ideological approach which had a great deal of truth in it—and many of them—does not quite fit in with the present day, we ignore what is happening in the present day, and still hold on to some, if I may venture to say so, rather out-of-date philosophical or ideological approach. Take something; take the question of war. Many people say that because of various developments in the world, war has become or ought to become out of the question, because war does not achieve the thing you aim at. War was useful—whether it is good or bad—if it helped you to realize your objective. When it does not do that, when in fact it does something that is the reverse of that, then no person, however inclined he might be, is likely to indulge in the war.

I should like to extend that parallel a little further. If a war, atomic or other, is now something that can only be considered excessively foolish, the cold war becomes more and more equally absurd; it exists, it goes on but really, analyzed in the circumstances of today, it has little meaning. It only makes matters worse; it does not help us to solve any problem.

If I did, I can understand it. And I am not talking in terms of the merit of this or that, the problem, but I am saying that a certain method of approach has become out of date, whether it is so-called shooting or atomic war or the cold war.

I gave those examples in order to state the second fact that the other approaches—apart from war—the other economic approaches, even the other ideological approaches, which are very useful and which have a great deal of truth just do not fit in today with circumstances as they are.

The major fact of the last many years or few years, and the major fact of today, is the stupendous advance of technology. Everything flows from it, whether it is in a sense the atomic bomb or the tremendous colossal growth in production and everything, which is greater than was envisaged by any person previously, and because it was not envisaged previously, it is wrong for us to ask somebody who had not envisaged it, to give us an answer to today's problems.

So, here is this patent fact of this tremendous growth of technology, the tremendous growth of the productive apparatus of society, the tremendous power that human beings possess and are likely to possess, atomic power, energy etc. These things are not quantitative changes, but they bring about qualitative changes in society. And, the previous theories we had in regard to them, therefore, have to be considered from this qualitatively changed point of view. I do not mean to say that we should upset everything that we thought previously, but that we have to shape it and vary it to fit in with these changes.

Of course, in India, where we have not been very powerfully affected by the technological process, but only slightly, we have read about it, and we

have no real sensation of these tremendous technological revolutions, it is a little more difficult for us to appreciate this great revolution. But it is the basic fact, and when we talk of planning, more so, when we talk of anything else, we have to think in technological terms, because it is this growth of science and technology that has enabled man to produce wealth which nobody could ever dream of. It is that which has made other countries wealthy and prosperous, and it is only through the growth of this technological process that we shall grow and become a prosperous and wealthy nation; there is no other way. Of course, there are many other things to be done too. But I want to lay stress on this. This is basic.

Now, if you look at the picture of India—and that would apply to many other countries under the colonial rule—ten years ago or twelve years ago, or leaving out the last few years, in the previous two decades, you will find a static, even a stagnant society. Yes, some big cities grew up, Calcutta, Bombay and other cities grew up. But taking the country as a whole, it was a static and stagnant society, where instead of making progress, either we remained where we were or sometimes we even went backwards. Take even the small figures. In spite of this big War that happened, where moneys appeared to flow about a great deal, and some people no doubt made large sums of money, the fact is that even in the post-War years, we saw that the general condition of the country had gone down slowly. It was stagnant. It did not profit by all that.

I should like to mention a few figures. Take, for instance, this post-War period. In 1948-49, the national income was Rs.8,650 crores, and the per capita income Rs.246.9. In the next year, the national income was Rs.8,820 crores, and the per capita income Rs.248.6. In the next year, that is, 1950, that is, just before the First Five Year Plan, the national income was Rs.8,850 crores, and per capita income Rs.240—that is it has even slightly come down from Rs.248. You see the national income more or less the same, very slightly creeping up, and the per capita income remaining the same or going down. Meanwhile, of course, the population grows, and went on growing.

Now, this was the state of affairs for quite a lengthy period before the First Five Year Plan started functioning—for several decades. At the end of the First Five Year Plan we have—remember, at the beginning the figure of national income was Rs.8,850 crores—a national income of Rs.10,800 crores. Nothing very remarkable, but nevertheless significant. The per capita income has gone up from Rs.246 to Rs.281 at the end of the First Five Year Plan period.

As I said, there have been far greater increases in other countries; the pace of increase has been greater. Nevertheless, the First Five Year Plan made a significant change in that nature of our static and stagnant economy. It broke

that barrier of poverty and of being underdeveloped, which curses a poor country, out of which it can hardly grow, because poverty breeds poverty; poverty does not lead to anything; it is a horrid thing. If we have to get out of that, we have to break that barrier which holds us down. The First Five Year Plan—I do not say it has broken down the entire barrier—made the first effective breach in that barrier in regard to national income and in regard to per capita income.

Now, in the Second Plan, we have to make a bigger breach. In other countries, it so happens, of course, that the old rule prevails, unto those that have got, more shall be given, and from those that have not got, perhaps even what they have got might be taken away. So the poor countries remain poor and the rich countries become richer and richer, more surpluses, more investment, more production. So it goes on. If you compare the rate of progress of some countries, it may be five per cent per annum, six per cent, or even 10 per cent or 11 per cent or more—from reports that we see.

For us, now we have aimed at five per cent in this Plan, and five per cent is going to be a hard job for us to achieve. We will have to work very hard, because we started at such a low level, with such low surpluses. India is almost at the lowest rung of the income ladder. Even China, I believe, is a little higher. Take even Russia at the time of the Revolution; it was much higher than India is today—leave out what the Revolution has done to Russia. So we have to start with that main difficulty; we have to start at a low level.

Now, the First Five Year Plan has, I think, made a significant breach in this barrier which prevents a poor country from going ahead. I should just like to read to you something that is in the Report, how we envisage, how the Planning Commission thinks of the future. Naturally, it is a guess work, an estimate; nevertheless, it is not purely guess work; it is based on such thinking and statistics as we possess. I have just told you that at the end of the First Five Year Plan period, the national income is Rs. 10,800 crores. Now, at the end of the Second Plan period, we expect it to reach Rs. 13,480 crores; so also the per capita income to go up from Rs.281 to Rs.331. For the Third Plan period, we envisage national income to go up to Rs.17,260 crores and per capita income to Rs.396. For the Fourth Plan—that will take us to 1971—the national income is expected to go up to Rs.21,680 crores and per capita income, to Rs.466. Finally, at the end of the Fifth Plan—up to 1976 the national income is expected to be Rs.27,270 crores and per capita income Rs.546. This is during the next 20-year period. This is some kind of a rough estimate of what we think the progress of India might be.

Now, as I said, this depends on so many factors that are more or less uncertain. This whole idea of the Planning Commission may be upset to our

advantage by new developments in science and technology. The Planning Commission cannot tell us merely what scientific and technological developments will come about. Therefore, we may go faster ahead. On the other hand, if by some misfortune, we cannot, well, work as hard, as we hope the country will, we may not achieve our target.

Here, I might say that we have often repeated that this Plan is a flexible Plan. What does that mean? It does not mean that it is just a vague Plan for us to change about and throw about, if we cannot achieve this, well put a lower target or extend the period by another year or two. It does not mean that. Naturally, if by force majeure or something it becomes absolutely impossible for us to do something, there it is. But I do not mean by its being flexible that these targets that we have laid down are loose targets. We want to achieve them; we are going to try to achieve them, and sometimes we shall go ahead.

I may tell the House that even after the preparation of this Report there was a change. While it was being considered by the National Development Council, just previous to printing it, it refused to accept one of the main targets that we had laid down, something of vast importance to us, the target for production of foodgrains. The National Development Council refused to accept the target laid down. It thought it was too low a target. It directed that it must be raised, not raised by a little or double or treble. The figure that is given in the book, I believe, is 15 per cent additional food production in the next five years. The National Development Council, I am very glad to say, said that this was totally inadequate and we must try to achieve 40 per cent or at least 35 to 40 per cent. It is a tremendous change from 15 to 40 per cent. Were we just engaged in wishful thinking or what? I do not think it is wishful thinking. I think, it is possible that we can reach 40 per cent, achieve nearly 40 per cent increase, and if not 40 per cent, something like 35 per cent. Anyway, it is far more than 15 per cent.

So the House will see that even as the Report is prepared, and even as we, here in Parliament, are considering it, our minds go further. We think afresh, we think more and more, we want to vary it here and there, change it for the better, I hope, always. In that sense, it is flexible. We shall consider it every year, the targets etc., and if we think it right, vary them.

During the next session, I hope to present to this House a report of the Annual Plan, because we are now going to have annual plans. I hope to place a report of the Annual Plan of the first year of the Second Five Year Plan before this House probably during the next session. So every year, a report of the Annual Plan will be placed here which may give a more precise indication of the targets for that year.

Now, we have said that our objective is a socialist pattern of society. I do not propose to define precisely what socialism in this context means, because we wish to avoid any doctrinaire thinking, any rigid thinking, because even in my life I have seen the world change so much, and I have seen so many other changes that I do not want to confine my mind to any rigid dogma. But broadly speaking, what do we mean when we say "socialist pattern of life"? Surely we mean a society in which there is social cohesion without classes, equality of opportunities and the possibilities for everyone to live a good life. Obviously, this cannot be attained unless we produce the wherewithal to have these standards and lead that good life. So, we have to lay great stress on equality, on the removal of disparities, and it has to be remembered always that socialism is not the spreading out of poverty. The essential thing is that there must be wealth and production. There is a good deal of talk about ceilings, and it is a talk with which naturally one tends to agree because you want to remove disparities. But one has always to remember that the primary function of a growing society is to produce more wealth; otherwise it will grow, and you will have nothing to distribute. If in the process of your fixation of ceilings or in any other process or methods of producing some kind of equality which is so necessary and at which we are aiming, you stop this process of growth and wealth accumulation, then you fail in your objective. Therefore, whether it is in industry or in agriculture, the one and the primary test is whether in your process you are going in for the wealth of the country, for increasing the production of the country or not. If not, you become stagnant in that field or your progress is much more limited, that is to say, that in order to reach equality, in order to reach, as I hope you will some time or other, an automatic ceiling with everybody having equal opportunities, the road to it is not by some artificial fixation but by a hundred paths which gradually bring that about. Certainly, the result will be the same, but an artificial attempt at it may prevent it from reaching it and meanwhile reduce the rate of your progress and your growth. Remember this that while we plan, while we work, we grow in population also. It is estimated—I believe I gave the House just now the estimated figure of our national income in the next 20 years—that in the next 20 years the population of India will be round about 500 millions. Please remember the rate of our population growth is not very great; it is far smaller than in many countries in Europe and elsewhere. It is not that the rate is very big, but when a big population grows, naturally the result is that it becomes large, 70 millions more or some such thing. Therefore, always there is the question of population pressure, and all that you produce has to be produced not only for those who are today but for those who are added on to us by the

millions. Therefore, the rate of our economic development will depend obviously on the growth of the population, the proportion of investment or the proportion of the current income of the country devoted to capital formation and the return by way of additional production from the undertaking. Obviously, the most important factor is the amount that you invest in relation to the national income. That percentage is always a small percentage in underdeveloped countries. It is a big percentage in a country which is fully industrialized and developed. Yet, we have to increase it, we have to look at this problem in a balanced way so that the development in the different fields keeps pace and does not become lopsided development. We have to keep these long-range perspectives in view.

It is obvious that one of the major problems we have to face is that of unemployment. It is a terrific problem, a human problem, which we cannot ignore whatever else we may do. Yet, in looking at it, it has to be remembered that merely giving some kind of occupation to a large number of persons does not ultimately increase employment or lessen unemployment. We delude ourselves if we think so. An honourable Member of this House made a remark one day, not in the House, I believe, but, outside, and said something like this: How would it be, to give employment to a large number of people, if the railways were abolished? Probably, there will be some kind of hand-carts, many people will be pushing the hand-carts and some no doubt will be sitting in them? That is a completely wrong approach to this problem. Employment comes by newer and more effective means of wealth production, and you can get that—the whole experience and history of the past for the last 200 years shows that—by the growth of technological methods. It is true that you cannot merely think of technological growth, that just for the moment it leads to human misery. That is a different matter, provided for that. Do not imagine that minus technological progress, we are going to deal with the problem of unemployment. You cannot. Every country which boasts of full employment today is a country which is technologically advanced. Every country which is not technologically advanced has unemployment or under-employment.

Therefore, if India is to advance, India must advance in science and technology, and India must use the latest techniques, always keeping in view, no doubt, that in doing so, the intervening period, which always occurs, must not cause unhappiness or misery. We have to provide for that even at the cost of progress which brings sufferings and misery in its train. But the fact is that our poverty is due to our backwardness in science and technology and by the measure that we remedy that backwardness, we create not only wealth but also employment.

Now, we have been planning more or less methodically for the last seven years or so, that is, about two years before the First Plan came on. As we have tried to plan, we have, if I may say so with all respect, grow a little more expert in planning—not much but a little. Naturally, we are getting more educated in this process. We have had the advantage of discussing these matters with real experts in India and elsewhere, realizing that the problems will have to be solved by us, not by the experts elsewhere or from here. But the experts throw light on different aspects of the problems and make us think, and they point out many mistakes that we make or might make.

So, gradually, through painful processes of thought we have proceeded along this path of planning. And I have no doubt that we should continue this and learn more and more, and often make mistakes, nevertheless, growing progressively a little more expert at this business of planning. Because, we want to arrive at a stage when we can assess accurately, or more or less accurately, what the next stage is going to be and to provide for it and to visualize our problems in advance, to take appropriate action before events force our hands. That is, after all, the object of planning. And people who do not believe in planning—progressively they are fewer in the world—people who believe in what is called free enterprise, even they are gradually realizing the limitations of free enterprise. Of course, in a country like India, situated as we are, there is, or there can be, no question of free enterprise in that sense. We just could not make any progress if we do that; it is not for me to advise any other country in different circumstances, it is for them to decide; but circumstanced as we are, I am quite certain that an unplanned approach according to what is called free enterprise would not make us progress at all, or, if it makes us progress, it will be a lop-sided progress. Of course, we can put up factories here and there, there may be monopolies created, riches here and greater poverty there. That is not what India aims at. Even so the total wealth production of the country will not be as much as through planned effort. That is a patent thing requiring no proof. The essence of planning is the best way to utilize your resources in men and money and everything; and the essence of free enterprise is to leave these things more or less to chance. Well, if chance is a more satisfactory way of dealing with the problems of life than carefully thought out methods, I do not quite know why there should be planning or anything at all. It means trusting to luck or it is only a different way of putting, I suppose, the old idea of kismet or fate. That, of course, is no good.


Therefore, all over the world the idea of planning is becoming more appreciated. But what is certainly appreciated by almost everybody is this, that for an underdeveloped country, planning is essential. In a developed country

it may not be so necessary, you can perhaps do without it, you may have wealth and you may be able to do it by other ways; but there is no other way but planning in an underdeveloped country like ours. And when I say planning I mean planning, not in the limited sense of priorities and the rest, but having the full picture and almost every human activity that you indulge in, because each affects the other.

Now, again we plan for India. India is part of a region, South Asia or a good part of Asia which is more or less undeveloped. As a matter of fact, even the progress and development of India necessitates the development of other countries round about India. I do not mean to say that we cannot develop without those countries developing, or that we should interfere in other countries. That is not my point. My point is that it is to our interests that other countries develop also. It is a completely wrong idea and an exploded notion that if other countries develop, it comes in your way. That is applied only in a colonial pattern of society where you want to buy cheap raw materials from a country under your influence and impose your goods in a protected market. That does not apply to free countries. So it is to our interest that other countries in Asia and Africa also develop. Of course, politically it has been to our interest, but I venture to say economically it is to our interest. We cannot, unfortunately, help them much, because our resources are limited. But the House knows that even with our limited resources we have done what little we could to help our neighbour countries or other countries in Asia and Africa.

Now, I just mentioned to the House that we intend raising the target of our agricultural production. This is not only because we want more food, an adequate supply of food in this country, but because we want more food even for export. Let that be understood. We talk about our resources and, as in the Plan, there is a big gap. How are we to cover that gap? It is a big gap, and for the moment there is no obvious way of covering it. One may well criticize us by saying that we have indulged in some pious hopes in leaving the plan as it is, with that big gap. Well, there are so many uncertainties about human life and planning in a great country. For my part I do not think that it is very difficult—it is difficult—but I do not think it is beyond our capacity to fill that gap and go beyond that.

Now, one of the chief things is foreign exchange. How are we to get foreign exchange? Well, the normal way to get foreign exchange is to export goods. We cannot live in expectation of the bounties of others. If somebody helps us; we welcome it thankfully, but we do not plan merely in the expectation of others being bountiful. Therefore, it becomes essential for us to export, whether it is foodgrains or industrial products or machines or whatever we



LAYING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF A MONUMENT TO COMMEMORATE THE 2500TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE BUDDHA'S *PARINIRVANA*, NEW DELHI, 23 MAY 1956



WATCHING PRESIDENT RAJENDRA PRASAD RECEIVE AN ALBUM OF BUDDHA JAYANTI POSTAGE STAMPS,
NEW DELHI, 24 MAY 1956

may have. And, we have to think more and more in terms of exporting, so as to import what we want. Otherwise, there is no other way out of it. I believe that if we pay enough attention to this export business, we can go much further than has thus far been envisaged.

The other day my colleague, the Minister for Commerce and Industry, laid stress on this necessity of export. I wish this House to realize that, and I wish it to realize also that if we are going to export in a big way, we shall have to import also. One cannot have a one-sided affair; one has to balance these things. Otherwise, one cannot simply send out things without getting something in exchange.

And let it not be thought that it is going to be a burden on us, because that would ultimately increase—apart from getting us foreign exchange—it will increase our wealth producing capacity in this country. Therefore, we should certainly think in terms of more and more exports and build up markets, and build them up more and more in terms of State trading so that we could profit by it more for purposes of future expansion.

Now, agricultural production has a very special importance. First of all, there can be no real stable industrial economy in this country without a stable agricultural basis. We thought of that in the First Five Year Plan, and we paid considerable attention to agricultural production and we made more progress than we had expected. In fact, that gave us confidence for the future. Nevertheless, we have to do a great deal more. And when I said that we intend to have another forty per cent increase, that is a great deal. And, we can do that, because our agricultural production today is almost the lowest in the world. And, we have shown in parts of India that we can increase it by a hundredfold. It is true that it is difficult to treat the whole of India on the basis of a model farm, but nevertheless, if we can increase it a hundred or hundred and fifty-fold—now we want to increase it by 40 or 50 per cent on an average—and no doubt we can do it if we can apply enough thought and energy to it, that again, I think, is one of the things that should be made the special work of our Community Schemes. Our Community Projects and National Extension Service Schemes do cover already about 130,000 villages in India and they will cover about 50,000 more every year, may be more. As the House knows very well, these Community Schemes of India are something rather unique in the way they have functioned. They are something that have grown out of the soil of India. We have learned from others certainly, but they have grown out of the soil of India and therefore they are peculiarly adapted to India. I do not believe in imitating or copying other countries regardless of conditions in India. Therefore, something which grows in India, may be learning from others, is far more effective than something foreign which we impose on the soil of

India. These Community Projects and National Extension Service Schemes have, I think, created a revolutionary atmosphere in our countryside wherever they have gone. I use the word 'revolutionary' in the true sense of the word and not in the bogus sense. That is, it has changed the thinking and the activities of the people there. It is pulling them out of the rut of passivity and stagnation in which our villages live.

Thus far, these Community Projects and others have aimed at, what might be called 'amenities' like roads, tanks, wells, school buildings and so on and so forth. Perhaps, it was right, because we have to create that atmosphere. People should see that what they do, produces results. Still, some attention was paid to food production and in all the Community Project areas the percentage of increase in food production there is from 20 to 25 per cent in the last three years, which is really considerable. And this, when they were not paying very special attention to it; they were paying some attention but they were paying more attention to other matters.

Now, we want them to pay special attention to food production and to the growth of small-scale and cottage industries. That means two things, production industrially and agriculturally. I have no doubt that in those areas certainly our agricultural production should increase rapidly, and reach at least the 40 per cent mark that we propose to lay down for the next five years.

Therefore, this question of food production may also be viewed from the point of view of the gap in this Plan. If we increase our food production by 40 per cent your gap is filled or more or less filled, not the foreign exchange, that is export of food. We may export food if we had enough of it even today. Therefore, all this revolves round production, how much we can produce in our country.

Now, I shall refer to one or two matters—they are very important—but I cannot possibly deal with all the important things in this Report. They are questions of administration and organization, more particularly the matter of management of public enterprises, because the public sector is growing and will grow. Here, may I say, that while I am for the public sector growing, I do not understand, or, at any rate, I do not appreciate, the condemnation of the private sector. The whole philosophy lying behind this Plan is to take advantage of every possible way of growth and not by doing something which fits in some doctrinaire theory and imagine we have grown because we have satisfied some text-book maxim of a hundred years ago. We talk about nationalization as if nationalization was some kind of a magic remedy to every ill. I believe that the means of production will be owned by the nation: I believe that ultimately all the principal means of production will be owned by the nation, but I just do not see why I should do something today which fixes my progress,

my increasing production, simply to satisfy some theoretical urge. I have no doubt that at the present stage in India the private sector has a very important task to fulfil provided always that it works within the confines laid down, provided always that it does not lead to the creation of monopolies and the other evils that the accumulation of wealth gives rise to. I think, we have enough power in our laws, in our rules, etc., to keep the private sector in check. We are not afraid of nationalizing anything. The House knows that even during the last few months we have taken some big steps. Only just a little while ago, the House was dealing with the Bill concerning insurance.⁴ These are all big mighty steps that we have taken and we are not afraid of taking them, but we do not propose to take any such step merely to nationalize, unless we think it is profitable to the nation. On the other hand, we will much rather build up national industries, new ones, rather than pay compensation to all and sometimes rather decrepit industries in order to take charge of them. Why should we, in this growing age, in the changing technology and changing techniques, take possession of any old technique? I must rather have the latest technique and have new factories or new plants and not an old plant unless that old plant happens to serve some strategic purpose, which is a different matter; and in that case I do it because I want to hold the strategic points in our economy. Therefore, I should like the House to appreciate that the philosophy behind this Report is, the public sector and the private sector are made to cooperate within the terms and limitations of this Plan.

Therefore, while the public sector obviously will grow—and even now it has grown both absolutely and relatively—the private sector is not something unimportant; it will play an important role and no doubt gradually; ultimately it will fade away.

Renu Chakravarti (CPI, Basirhat): Will the philosophy be that the public sector will control all the strategic heights?

JN: Quite so; that is what I said. The public sector will control and should control all the strategic points in our economy. The private sector, as we have stated in the Industrial Policy Resolution,⁵ will be given a fairly wide field

4. The process of nationalization of insurance started with the President's promulgation of an Ordinance of 19 January 1956 bringing all life insurance companies under Government management. On 23 May 1956, the Lok Sabha passed the Life Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 1956. After the Rajya Sabha's approval, the Life Insurance Corporation Act came into force on 1 July 1956.

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp.72-79.

subject to the limitations, etc., which are there, and it is for us, from time to time, to decide how to deal with that sector in the future.

But the point is that the field for advance is so vast. We are an under-developed country. The field for industrialization is so vast. It is occupied by nobody. Let us advance; let the public sector advance. Why should we spend time and energy over acquiring some old factory and an old plant? I do not just understand it. We are thinking in terms of big things.

Now, let us take oil. Oil, everyone knows, is of vast importance in the world today. A country that does not have its own oil, does not produce its own oil, is in a weak position, apart from losing money and apart from the amount of money that goes out in foreign exchange in respect of oil which is terrific. From the point of view of defence, the absence of oil is a fatal weakness. We want to develop it. The House knows that we have proposed to do it and we are doing it in fact. I cannot guarantee how much oil we will have to refine in India. All I can say is that the prospects appear to be favourable. If the prospects are favourable in ten places, and if in seven or eight of them we get nothing and if we get something out of the two or three, those two or three will bring us enough returns to cover all the failures and much more. Therefore, the prospects are favourable. We have to spend money on these things. It is not a particularly easy matter to find more money. But we have to spend it because it is of vital importance.

There may be other matters which are important from the point of view, not only of developing our basic industries, but also from the point of view of certain essential commodities. Of course, the machine making industry is of basic importance. Out of it everything else comes. It is quite essential that we should develop the machine making industry as early as possible. It takes time. We are considering how far we can go, how fast we can go in establishing big chemical plants and drug making plants, all in the public sector. These are all things of advance. I want this House to realize how this vast, unexplored, at least unoccupied field lies there for the public sector to advance, and the public sector is advancing. We do not mind if the private sector advances also, provided that in regard to the major basic things, in the strategic things the public sector holds the field.

There has been some criticism⁶ and even in the National Development

6. During the discussion in the NDC on 1 May, some members including the Chief Ministers of Mysore and Hyderabad, said that the areas between Bombay and Cape Comorin had not received proper attention in the Plan in the matter of railway expansion.

Council, one solitary voice was raised criticizing this Plan because, it was said that it was unfair to certain regions, because some railway had not been built in some part of the country, or some factory had not been put up in some other part. This morning, in answering questions in the other House, this question was raised too and I could not answer that. But, I should like to say this. First of all, it is admitted that there should be every attempt to make every region, every part of India develop equally in so far as it can, and that we should remove the disparities that exist in India. There are some tremendous disparities. Some of our provinces, I would not name them, are very very poor. They do not deserve poverty. In the British days, other parts were developed. Great cities grew up, not so much as industrial centres, but as ports for exports to go and other reasons. We want to remove these disparities. We cannot do it suddenly. It takes time. If in the process of trying to remove that disparity suddenly, we really do something which is uneconomic, then, we are merely adding to our burden. There are some plants which can only be started in particular environments. We cannot have an iron and steel plant except where there is iron ore or coal. There is no help for that. We cannot have something else unless some other raw material is present, or unless transport facilities are there. These have to be considered. In regard to most of our major plants, we have appointed committees consisting of our own experts and sometimes foreign experts. They have gone about visiting 20 or 30 places and they have recommended some places. We have tried our utmost to allot that plant to an area where there are perhaps fewer industries. But, by and large, we have been unable to ignore the other factors which will make that plant an economic proposition for that area. If we put it in a wrong place, the plant cannot be an economic proposition. We cannot put it up there. This has to be considered. Ultimately, some friends complained, you have put it up in one state and not put it up in another state. Their complaint is justified in the sense that we have to develop that state. We cannot just help it. We cannot help putting up a plant in a place where it will be most successful, because success comes in production. If it is not successful, the public sector is criticized and otherwise, for we create a wrong psychology.

Now, referring to the public sector, the question often comes up in this House for discussion, criticisms of the public sector, something wrong that happened—and many wrong things happen naturally in big undertakings. Another question comes up. How can Parliament control the public sector? Well, one can very well understand the desirability and even the necessity of proper controls, of checks and controls over these vast undertakings where hundreds of crores of rupees are spent. But there is one other aspect of this

question which I should like to lay before the House.

The way a government functions is not exactly the way that normally businesses and enterprises function. A government rightly has all kinds of checks, as it deals with public money, and perhaps, normally speaking, it has time to apply those checks. But when one deals with a plant and an enterprise, where quick decisions are necessary, which may make a difference of large sums of money, which may be a difference between success and failure, the way a government functions is not a suitable way for it. And I have no doubt that the normal governmental functioning applied to a public enterprise of this kind will ensure the failure of that public enterprise, because of the delays, because of the other limitations of working.

Therefore, we have to evolve a system for working public enterprises, where on the one hand there are adequate checks and protections—that is inevitable—and on the other there is enough freedom given to that enterprise to work quickly without delay. Ultimately judge it by the results. You cannot judge a government by the results; you cannot judge in that sense—I mean financially—because it is a very mixed affair. Therefore, in government, you have to be careful about the pennies, because if you are not careful about the pennies, the pounds and the rupees and what not will go wrong.

But in judging a big enterprise, you have to judge by the final results. Suppose a mistake is made. Today, a thing may be a mistake. Today, a step is taken which causes loss. Somebody in Parliament, will raise the question, who took that step? Why was there loss of lakhs of rupees or whatever it is. Well, the executive in that plant will never take a step afterwards. He will say, 'I will be hauled up before Parliament, so that there will be no spirit of enterprise left there, no experimentation, and he will work cautiously.

R. Velayudhan (Independent, Quilon cum Mavelikkara—Reserved—Sch. Castes): Change the personnel.

JN: But the other persons also will be afraid of the same thing.

It is interesting to see countries where there are public enterprises and everything is a public enterprise, and there they have arrived at this conclusion that you must give freedom to the man, to the executive, in charge. Tremendous freedom is given there. Of course, if there is a major loss, if the whole thing goes to pieces, then the man in charge will suffer no doubt. But the point is he is given responsibility.

Every person who has advised us, whether it is an American like Prof. Galbraith, or a great Russian leader like Mr Mikoyan, has told us, do not interfere with your enterprises, give them responsibility, give your executive responsibility, do not interfere. Mr Mikoyan came to me—you know they are putting up the

steel plant, it is only at the initial stage yet, but in discussing it he said, 'You do not mind my saying this. But if you do not trust your executive, do not give him much fuller responsibility, the work will be delayed, and will suffer'. He said, 'we have come to the conclusion after considerable experience that we must trust our executives and allow them to go ahead'.⁷ Of course, there are checks and all that, but checks come afterwards—checks and audit and all that. But the chief man there must be able to do what he wants to do quickly.

If we are to go in for public enterprises in future in a big way, we must realize this fact. We cannot sit down every day and control public enterprises from Parliament. It cannot be done. Sometimes, it may be useful; you save some money, but you will lose a great deal of money and the thing will not function rapidly at all, and it will develop a kind of static atmosphere, which is worse for a growing industry.

I am afraid what I have said has been somewhat disjointed, drawing attention to some aspects of this Plan. But again, I would remind the House that this book may be good reading or rather dull reading, but the subject of the book is not a dull one; it is an exciting one; it is a vast one, for it means the future of India.

7. For Nehru's talks with Mikoyan, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 397-407.

7. Resolution on Second Five Year Plan¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Deputy Chairman,² Sir, I beg to move that:

"This House records its general approval of the principles, objectives and programme of development contained in the Second Five Year Plan as prepared by the Planning Commission."

A few days ago I had the honour of presenting the Report of the Planning Commission on the Second Five Year Plan to this House.³ On that occasion,

1. Speech in the Rajya Sabha, 25 May 1956. *Parliamentary Debates (Rajya Sabha), Official Report*, Vol. XIII, cols. 3298-3328.

2. S. Radhakrishnan.

3. See *ante*, pp. 55-63.

I said something about the preparation of this Report during the last two years and more. The Report is a fairly formidable volume to look at but perhaps, if all the papers that were prepared in connection with this Report during the last two years were piled together, they would be something in the nature of a hundred times this volume. That of course, does not mean that the quality of the work must necessarily be high, but I mention this fact merely to indicate to the House how much labour had gone, how much discussion had taken place before this Report reached its more or less final stage. In a subject like planning, I do not know what honourable Members of this House think, but to me, who is no expert, who has been connected with thinking and discussion about planning for the last many years, I found my own mind expanding and always fresh avenues coming into view, and there is no end to the process and therefore, when I present this Report to this House, I would call it in no sense a final Report but a Report of the work done thus far. The work continues like the whole question of planning continues, like indeed the vast and varied activity of the nation continues. The book deals in the ultimate analysis not with some theory, but with the activities of hundreds of millions of people in this country, and that is a tremendous theme to think about, and it is a difficult thing and it has so many uncertainties about it because, fortunately, human beings are not made after the same model. Each human being is an individual who thinks, who acts somewhat differently from others. We are not like an engineer to measure the amount of steel or the amount of cement or something else that goes towards the making of a bridge or some other building. One can weigh and say exactly what the tensions and the strengths are. Human beings being different—we cannot lay down any hard and fast rule about it—that a hundred or a thousand human beings will produce this or that result and therefore this uncertain and fascinating factor comes in which makes human beings more important than other things in this world. But that makes planning also difficult with a large number of uncertainties about it. That would be so at any stage but more so at this stage in our country and in the world when everyone who looks around is conscious of revolutionary happenings, changes continuously taking place almost in any respect but, if I may say so, most of all in regard to technology, the changes in technology, and technology ultimately affects human occupations, human life, the social structure. Now, it is obvious that the pace of change in technology has been tremendous and stupendous. That pace has not affected us very much in India thus far, now it is affecting us more and more. Even so, our lives in this country are governed so much by the consequences of science and technological growth. Most things that we do are somehow concerned with them. Now, they are concerned with them.

Therefore, they will be concerned even more by the changes in technological growth. Everybody knows how these changes in technological growth are advancing and affecting, if I may say so, the science of war. We have to deal with atomic energy, the atom bomb, the hydrogen bomb, etc. One does not realize that even in peaceful avocations the changes are progressively almost as big. They do not create such a bang as that atom bomb does, but in effect the coming of atomic energy is likely to produce enormous changes, that is, it will bring in all kinds of new supplies of power which will make a great difference to any problem that we may face, but apart from atomic energy the other changes in technology are very great and they are continuous, in affecting anything that we need. If we have a machine made, any big machine by the time it is slightly out of date; something else has taken place, which is a little more advanced, a little more effective. Because of this anything that we may plan is likely to be obviously affected by these changes and other matters, long before the period of the plan is over. That is one major uncertainty.

Then of course, there are the uncertainties about our own resources, about the capacity of the human beings in this country, as to whether we can devote our energies to this great and mighty task or fritter them away in arguing or in disputing or in quarrelling about smaller things in this country. There is presumably a certain maximum quantum of national energy available. It may grow. Now, how much of that can we devote to this task of implementing a plan? How much of it will we spend in other ways, which are not fruitful, how much of it in destructive ways and disruptive ways? All these are uncertainties, and we have seen even in the past few months enough of national energy being, if I may say so with all respect, not only wasted but doing a great deal of harm to the sense of national unity, national purpose, of working together. I am not going into the question of the merits of any matter, but it is obvious that we have to undertake a very great task because we start from somewhere near the bottom level of economic advance. We have to realize where we are. Ours is a country which, in terms of the average person or per capita income is a very low down in the scale of other countries. We have certainly also evidence of technical achievements and there are many great schemes at work and there are great cities and there are great factories that are being built. All that is good, but if you measure this from the point of view of per capita income in the country, we are at a low level and we will have to measure it in future from the point of view of per capita income, not the income of a few persons. Apart from the fact that we want as great a measure of help as possible coming in, we have to pull ourselves from that low standard, and the difficulty comes in that at that low standard there is not much surplus

energy left for progress or surplus money raised by investment and we have to somehow find out that even at the cost of austerity, or a little more difficult living or whatever the source may be. We may look abroad for some kind of assistance and if it comes, well and good, but obviously even if somebody helps us from abroad, it can only be in a small measure compared to what is necessary for us. It is obvious that the burden must fall on us, our people and all of us. It may be lightened a little here and there by help; whether it is financial help, whether it is technical help or any other help, if that help comes to us in a fair way without any conditions, well, we accept it with gratitude. But I want to make it clear right at the outset that we have to rely on ourselves not only principally but almost entirely, and any help that may come is a fractional thing. And if we plan we must plan accordingly, realizing that the burden will have to be carried by our own people. Now, it is open to any honourable Member to make an estimate of what we have today. The Planning Commission has made various estimates about our resources and they are based on a great deal of thinking and calculation. Nevertheless, they depend on so many uncertain factors. A person who is more optimistically inclined may make a better estimate, better in the sense of more hopeful estimate while a pessimist may make a less hopeful estimate; nobody can challenge it. For my part I have an invincible feeling that in the final analysis the resources of India are considerable in our people's capacity, ability and energy and the question arises to how to reach them, how to tap them to the best advantage. I think, this can be done—naturally it can only be done—by the realization by the people themselves that it is worth while doing so, by their full cooperation and the like. It can never be done by Government or by an order from above. Therefore, it becomes important that our people should realize and understand fully what this process of planning is. Therefore, we tried to a considerable extent to get the cooperation of as many people as possible even at the district level, apart from large number of groups of various kinds. And I think, it may be well said that India is very conscious of planning today. I was reading a foreigner's book the other day, just come out, in which he says that in India you cannot get away from this planning business. He had written it in slight irritation. Whatever you talk about somehow they lead you to the question of planning as though everything depended on planning everywhere. Well, whether his irritation was justified or not, I was glad to read that a person with no great sympathy for what we were doing felt enveloped by some kind of an atmosphere of planning. Everybody can talk of planning. Of course, everybody who talks of planning may know very little about planning. That is not the point but it is true that India is very much planning-conscious and I think, it is a great gain. When I say planning-conscious, I mean of course planning-conscious in the democratic structure

that we possess. That is, we are proceeding with democratic planning. I am not criticizing any country that may not plan or any country that plans in some other way—authoritarian or some other way. It is none of my business to criticize other countries. They have to meet their problems and it is up to them to decide how to meet them. They can judge their own people. But so far as we are concerned, in this country people, I believe, if not unanimously, almost unanimously believe that we should endeavour to plan by the democratic method. Planning in a small way has often been done and is often done elsewhere. Planning in a really big way has thus far only been done more or less by the authoritarian approach and the question arises how far a non-authoritarian and democratic approach can succeed in this kind of planning. I believe it can; and not only that, I believe it can ultimately succeed better, not perhaps in yielding such great results quickly, but in laying a surer foundation and more effective foundation, not only for planned growth but for the type of society which we wish to develop in this country.

Now, we talk about the future in terms of socialist pattern of society and that can be interpreted in a variety of ways. I would beg this House to try to consider these great problems, without using, as far as possible, words which have an emotional connotation because then it becomes a little difficult for us to argue about the real thing. We start arguing about the meanings of words. We used the word 'socialism' deliberately; nevertheless, we have not used it in any narrow or doctrinaire sense of the word. We want a society in this country which is largely egalitarian, where there is equality, where there is social cohesion, where there are no firm classes separated from each other and where there is opportunity for every single individual. Naturally, how far an individual takes advantage of that opportunity depends a great deal on that individual, on his physical or mental or spiritual, or whatever it is, make-up because everybody is not alike. It is obvious that everybody is not either mentally or physically alike but we should ensure the same measure of opportunity to everyone. Now, it is not enough to say that we shall ensure the same measure of opportunity if the measure of opportunity is so dead low that there is practically no opportunity. It then does little good to say that everybody is getting the same measure of opportunity. It is not much good saying that everybody has the same measure of opportunity on poverty level because that means lack of opportunity to everybody. Therefore, in order to give that opportunity we have to have something to give. That is to say, we have to get out of this morass of poverty and lack of opportunity; we have to produce wealth because only out of that can we produce the things that are necessary for people to have that opportunity we crave for. So, it comes round to our producing the things that we require.

When we use the word 'wealth' of course, there is no significance except in regard to the physical things that we require, whatever we may require, whether it is food or clothing or housing or a hundreds and thousands of other things that are necessary. Education, health and all that are the things that we require and that we want to place before everyone. How do we do that?

There was considerable argument about a year ago about what was called physical planning and financial planning as if there was an inherent contradiction between the two. Many people thought that the use of this term 'physical planning' was dangerous and was meant to turn our approach in a wrong and harmful direction. Now, I do not understand how there can be any planning of any kind without physical planning. Obviously, whatever you may plan, you have to plan for the goods. If it is for food, you have to plan that so much food is necessary in the country for every individual to have, if you like, so many calories or whatever it is. If you plan for clothing, you plan that so much cloth is necessary in whatever way you produce it, by the charkha or by the mill. So physical planning comes in at every stage and I will make this assertion that there can be no planning without physical planning. At the same time, obviously you cannot plan in the air, physically in the air. You have to plan keeping your resources in view. You have to consider the financial aspect of it. It is equally important. Otherwise, your planning will be just wishful planning. Therefore, both aspects have to be kept in mind—the physical aspect of planning and the financial or resources aspect of planning. Of course, the resources aspect, again, can be divided up in many ways and there are the known resources. There may be other resources which we have not tapped, because our thinking has been along some groove of thought, some line and we may discover quite new resources. Ultimately, we cannot go within the country beyond what you might say the total resources of the country. They are limiting factors and we can only gradually go on building more and more wealth or resources in the country. In fact, the whole process of planning is to build more and more. Now, as you build more and more, add to the resources of the country, you have to face a problem. On the one hand, naturally you want the people of the country to profit by the new wealth that you are creating. Their standards may go up. That is the whole object of our planning obviously. On the other hand, if whatever you have you use up in consumption and raising standards, you have little left for the progress of tomorrow or for investment, because if you broadly consider your progress and planning comes from the amount you invest, from your surplus, out of what you produce. If you invested all that will be good for tomorrow. But then today you have to live the hard life. If you want

a few more amenities today, then you have less for tomorrow to advance further. Well, obviously one has to strike a balance between the two. One has to give some visible increase in amenities to our people who are so devoid of them. At the same time, we have to remember that the whole pace of progress will depend on how much surplus we create for investment and how much goods we produce out of that surplus. Now, broadly speaking, therefore, we have to consider the question of planning from these two or three points of view.

We start, as I said, more or less at the bottom of the scale—not quite perhaps—we are better off than many countries, but that is not saying much. Looking at the various figures collected by our statisticians in our reports, one sees that for the first time we appear to have created a breach in that barrier of poverty which oppresses an undeveloped country and which prevents it from making progress. For the first time, we appear to have made a breach in it during our First Five Year Plan. Previously, we were continuing to live in a stagnant economy. No doubt, factories went up here and there. No doubt, in Bombay or Ahmedabad or Kanpur or Calcutta, big factories and big buildings and other things went up, but taking India as a whole our per capita income was steady. Our total production in India went up by very little. Meanwhile, of course, the population was increasing all the time. So that even what little increase there was in India was swallowed up by the increase in population and we did not get out of that. Now, in the First Five Year Plan we did make a breach and we did go—not a very big jump but anyhow a few steps forward. That is, we went further than the increase in population. We got a little more surplus, a little more per capita income. And, therefore, that was a healthy sign, because the main thing is to break through this barrier of an undeveloped country. We have not broken through it yet. We have made a breach in it and we hope to make a major breach in it in the Second Five Year Plan. And, when you have broken down that barrier you have arrived at a stage when one might almost say that progress of this kind is almost automatic. That is, surpluses are created and this spontaneous creation of investment surpluses, etc.,—not quite spontaneous, of course, but more or less, and this grows. The more you have, the more you have to invest, the higher standards you get. That is why countries like the United States of America—which have developed an enormous capacity, a stupendous capacity for production, colossal—though they may go through a major war, yet have in a sense, surpluses over—extraordinary capacity. It just shows their productive capacity. Or, take other countries in Europe—either the communist countries or the non-communist countries. They vary. But all of them have arrived at a stage where they can produce

considerable surpluses for investment, some more than others. Some go up to as much as eleven or twelve per cent per annum, which is very, very high; others five or six per cent. Now, we have aimed in this Five Year Plan on the growth of national income, at about twenty-five per cent in the five years, that is, five per cent per annum. That is a fairly difficult task, by no means easy, and depends on how much energy, how much money you can put in. Anyhow, what I was pointing out to the House was that the only possible way to break up this terrible steel case that surrounds the poor country is this. It cannot get to the root of it because it cannot get enough surpluses for investment which creates not only more wealth, but creates more surplus for the future. To do that one has to reach a certain stage. We have not reached that stage yet, but the first effective step was the First Five Year Plan. It was not a very big step. Yet, it was the first effective step after generations, remember that, generations of stagnant economy, of what is normally called a colonial economy. Now, in this Second Five Year Plan we have to take some other major steps. I believe they are major. They are major in two ways—agricultural and industrial. Industry is given far greater emphasis in this Plan than in the First Plan. Now, it is obvious that without real industrial growth we cannot build up our country. If we want industrial growth, then we have to lay the basis of industrial growth, that is, heavy industry, not light industry. Light industry is good in its way. But we must have heavy industry. We must have, in fact, the machine-making industry, the iron and steel industry and what are called basic industries, because out of those other industries flow. The House knows that we are having three major iron and steel plants, in addition to expanding our existing plants. We are in effect, I think, going to increase our iron and steel production by 400 per cent by the end of this period. Shri Gulzarilal Nanda⁴ says, “A little less than 400 per cent.” We will call it 350 per cent. At the present moment, it is less than a million and a half tons and we hope to reach six million tons. I call it 400 per cent.

Bhupesh Gupta (CPI, West Bengal): 4.3.

JN: Now, that is a terrific burden on us—this building three or four major steel plants involving vast sums of money and it is quite essential. And, I shall frankly confess to this House that one of our errors of omission was not to start these steel plants earlier in the First Five Year Plan. One of them at least would have made a great difference, if we had started one plant earlier. Of course, how it would have been done with our resources is another matter.

4. Union Minister for Planning, and Irrigation and Power.

But if we delay this now, it will delay the whole process of industrialization going ahead.

In the same way the machine-making industry. It is of the utmost importance that we should build up this machine-making industry because it takes years to build. It is not one single big factory. And, we are anxious, in the course of this Second Five Year Plan, to build these—it may not be 100 per cent built, but I do hope that it will be, let us say, 80 to 85 per cent. And, we can finish it a little later. There is, of course, no final finishing of this. Of course, they go on growing and even if we have a machine-making plant, it is quite conceivable that, for the sake of convenience, we can still import some special types of machines which are not worth making. We can buy them. But the point is that we should be in a position to make everything. Being in a position to make everything, we can buy some more things from abroad when it is more economical or more suitable. But if we are not in a position to make vital things, then we get into difficulties when supplies become difficult to obtain when something happens, when some emergency occurs. Therefore, we must be in a position to produce our own heavy machines and, of course, our own light machines. Once we are in a position to do that, then we might say, we are well on the road to industrialization and no external factor can come in our way. Today, it can.

There are, of course, other things—power resources. Well, we are increasing our power resources. Ultimately, very much depends upon power—heavy industry plus power, whether we are developing our hydro-electric power, thermal power and other kinds of power. I do not know when. We have no doubt—not in this five-year period, but not very long after—that we might be using atomic power. I am afraid we cannot plan for that yet. But I think, we ought to keep it in mind because atomic power would be peculiarly useful and important for India or for any underdeveloped country. It is not so important for a country like the United States of America which has a great deal of power already. They have an abundance of power. Of course, if they have atomic power, they will have more. They can do without it. But for a country which is deficient in power, it will make a very great difference when atomic power is available.

Then, there is the question of oil. At the present moment, all that can be said is that we are living in high expectations. I can say no more because still we cannot be certain that it is there and if it is there, what quantity is there. But broadly speaking, recent enquiries through very eminent oil engineers from many countries, in the main from the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Holland—I believe one or two others also—have led us to believe that there is one area in India—north, north-east, etc.,—which is considered very favourable

for oil. There is another area which is considered favourable—not very, that much I can say. And, we are starting this oil exploration and drilling and we hope to achieve some results. Normally, what happens is that, out of ten efforts, well, it is exceedingly likely that at least seven or eight will fail completely. But even if two or three succeed, that success is very much worthwhile and it covers up all the losses and opens out a new future. Now, I hope that, perhaps, in the course of a year or two, we might be in a position to say, first of all, that we are producing enough oil for our own purposes and we need not depend on imports from outside and a little later, I hope, that we are in a position, if necessary, to export oil. But all that I say is on the realm of expectation.

Now, these are broad outlooks in regard to the major advances that we hope to make.

I have mentioned agriculture. Now, in regard to agriculture, this bulky Five Year Plan Report most unfortunately gives a target of 15 per cent increase in foodgrains in the five years. Even while being drafted, we discarded that target. We thought it too inadequate—and not merely as a matter of wishful thinking. But we felt that we could increase it much more and we propose to aim at the very minimum of 30 per cent and we hope, if possible, to go beyond that. In agriculture, in a sense, one can say almost definitely that we can increase our yield in any particular area that we take in hand. The point is that it is not particularly easy to take the whole of India in hand in that way. In the areas under the Community Projects Administration, the normal increase in yield has been 20 to 25 per cent in the First Five Year Plan period and that has been achieved without any very great intensity of effort. It is almost automatic because of the normal effort put in by our workers. If that effort could be increased, I am sure the 20 or 25 per cent would go up to whatever it may be, to 40 per cent at least; may be more. But then that refers to selected areas. The selected areas have increased because, now, our Community Projects Administration and the National Extension blocs cover about 130 thousand villages in the country. And, by the end of this Five Year Plan, it is proposed to cover nearly the whole country. So, it should not be very difficult for us to increase our food production. Now, we want that increase not only to be dead sure about our own food supplies for the country and not only to be sure that even if a calamity in the shape of floods or drought occurs, we have quite enough, but also to export foodgrains. After all, the wealth produced in the country by, let us say, a 25 per cent increase in our foodgrains production is very great—hundreds of millions of the tons of foodgrains. In terms of money, it is a large sum. That money, no doubt, will spread all over the country on a good thing. That is, the total wealth producing capacity of the country increases

very greatly by increasing our food production. And that will lead not only to better living conditions in the country, but that will also reduce ultimately any gap that there might be in our resources position. Quite apart from the increase in our population, we find that the people eat a little more and a little better food. I cannot say, of course, about everybody. But I am merely mentioning the fact that the average person eats a little better food. He used to eat some coarser grain, but he has changed now to wheat or to rice, or whatever it is. Now, that of course, is a good sign. It is a sign of slightly better living conditions. But that puts strain on our food position immediately, because if fifty million people or a hundred million people eat a little more, it makes a great difference. Therefore, there is great room for improvement in our food production. I say this, because there is an apparent contradiction in our saying that we have solved the food problem to a large extent. There has been some anxiety about our having to import food, and some anxiety about the future. It is true that in the First Five Year Plan period, we did far better than we expected, and we even exceeded the targets in regard to our food production.⁵ And that had a very good effect in raising our morale, that is we could achieve more in that respect and in improving the food situation of the country. But in spite of that, we are not in a position to say that we are quite safe even if something happens in the country. As a matter of fact, the House will remember that just a little less than a year ago, we had the most tremendous floods all over North India, East India, and North-East India. They were floods, the like of which this country had not seen for a century. They caused enormous loss to the country in the matter of foodgrains, apart from other losses.⁶ Yet, at no time were we reduced to dire straits for lack of food. Because we were in such a good position in regard to our food production, we could face that terrible calamity last year without any terrible effect. But that did reduce our reserves considerably, and because of that we are importing, at the present moment, some wheat, and we have just come to an agreement with Burma, a five-year agreement, for rice to the extent of two million tons. Do not imagine that we are suddenly short of rice, when you see that figure of two million tons of rice being purchased from

5. As against First Plan target of 65.2 million tons of foodgrains the realized production of foodgrains was 65.8 million tons in 1955-56.
6. Large parts of Assam, West Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were inundated during July-August 1954 flooding an area of 22,600 square miles and seriously damaging millions of acres of crops. Though various flood control measures were taken by the Government, floods occurred in UP, Assam, Orissa, Bihar, Punjab and Pepsu during monsoon in 1955.

Burma. We are not suddenly short of rice. We have got enough rice for months. But this supply has been spread over five years. We will also be importing some wheat, because we want to build up these big stocks of wheat and rice, which will be useful at any time of emergency, and also to prevent, of course, some anti-social elements from hoarding and from profiteering. So, so far as our agricultural production is concerned, it is of the highest importance that we should increase it. And so far our industrial production is concerned it is of the greatest importance that we should set up these basic industries—iron and steel and other basic industries—and build up gradually the machine-making industry itself. These are the basic conditions of our growth. All the rest has got to fit itself into these things, and there is plenty of scope for that. I do not propose to go into all these matters, because the honourable Members will read this Report, and will no doubt criticize it.

It was decided that the present discussion, before this session closes, should largely consist of the main principles of, and the main approaches to, planning as contained in the first preliminary chapters of the Report. Of course, it is a Report of the Planning Commission. It is not, if I may say so, something which can be amended. The Government cannot amend it. The Planning Commission has presented its Report to the Government to accept it or not to accept it. But we consider the whole Report as something which we ourselves, i.e., the Planning Commission itself, can vary it from time to time. We have given the broad outlines; we have worked out the details too. We do not want you to consider it as a tentative thing, but as something which we are going to work upon. Nevertheless, it is flexible enough for us to vary it from year to year. We should like to have your suggestions and your advice, not only in this debate, but later also, because with experience we come to know more and more about this subject, and we can adapt ourselves to changing conditions. It is proposed to issue annual plans and detailed plans. The first annual plan will probably, I hope, be presented to this House during the next session, and the next annual plan the next year, so that Parliament can keep itself in close touch not only with the main approach to planning, but also with the detailed projects and plans that are functioning in the country.

Now, there is one thing more, and that is about agriculture. I should like to mention that we are anxious to promote agrarian cooperatives. We feel that in a country like India, where there are vast numbers of small holdings, the only efficient way of cultivation would be the cooperative way, i.e., cooperation not only in marketing and the rest, but cooperation in all the processes, from cultivation onwards. Now, we cannot impose this on our people. We have to get them to agree, and we can only get them to agree when they see for

themselves that agrarian cooperatives are successful. The farmer sometimes is called a very conservative person. Well, he is no doubt conservative, but he is not at all conservative when he sees something yielding good results. For instance, if he sees with his own eyes some good method of sowing some particular seeds, or for that matter, if he sees the Japanese method of rice cultivation, he at once becomes anxious to adopt such new methods. So also it is going to be in regard to these agrarian cooperatives. In fact, one of our main approaches is going to be the setting up of a very large number of demonstration farms all over the country, may be, tens of thousands of them, so that the farmers can see for themselves these new methods of cultivation etc., copy them, and profit by them. A beginning will be made with these agrarian cooperatives. Now, there has been a great deal of thought about having ceilings on agricultural holdings, and ceilings on incomes, and naturally, I suppose most of the Members of this House are attracted intellectually and emotionally to this idea of ceilings, because after all, we are going towards a certain measure of equality, and we must remove these inequalities. But on a much closer examination of this question, a number of difficulties arise, not in keeping that objective in view, because the objective no doubt is good, but in trying to bring it about by some legislative measure rather suddenly. The first consideration always has to be, whether it is industry or agriculture, as to whether the step that we take will add to the productive apparatus of the country or perhaps come in the way of production, because everything that lessens production is bad for us from that point of view, and we cannot take any risks at the present time. Everything that adds to production is good, provided that does not create any harmful results like monopolies and the like, which we must avoid at all costs. Therefore, broadly speaking, we have felt that we should go rather cautiously and approach this question of ceiling from a number of points of view, from a number of avenues, so that in the end, the result is there and not merely the initial legislative results which might very upset the productive apparatus. The other day in answering a question here, an honourable Member opposite—he is not very wide awake at the present moment—repeatedly put me questions about the various regions being dealt with equally, that is, to remove regional disparities, and it was quite impossible for me, in answer to questions, to deal with this matter, and I then said that this question, if the House so liked, could be dealt with in the course of the debate on the Second Five Year Plan. Now, we all agree that every part of India must be made to advance, must be given an equal opportunity to advance. We all agree further those that are backward should be given greater opportunity to advance so that they may come up. That is true, but there are a number of

limiting factors. For instance, obviously, an area which has iron ore and coal is likely to advance industrially more rapidly—in regard to big industries I mean—than other areas. We have no choice in the matter. Take Europe, take England. England started her industrial advance because of the Manchester-Liverpool area. In Germany, the Ruhr was very famous. The same in Poland. Previously, in Austria, there was Silesia. These are concentrated iron ore and coal areas and they inevitably advance industrially. Our major area is that triangle Bihar—Bengal—and bits of Orissa, and I have no doubt that that area will advance inevitably into a big industrial area and probably also become a highly ugly and horrible area. I don't see how that can be avoided. Apart from that, there are many areas in India which are rich in minerals, and I have no doubt that they will profit by that....

H.D. Rajah: (Republican Party of India, Madras): What about the beautiful areas of the South?

JN:so that in considering major industries and lack of major industries, there are these limiting factors. Climate too. If I may mention it here without impropriety, the other day we were discussing the location of a heavy electrical plant. First of all a committee of experts was appointed. In that committee there were a number of foreign experts too who were going to build that plant for us and also a larger number of our own experts. They visited twenty-five possible sites in the whole of India, one in almost every state, sometimes two in one state, which the states had suggested, and they went very thoroughly into the advantages and disadvantages of every site. Huge charts and diagrams were made. It took them months, and then they presented their report and mentioned that three fulfilled the qualifications that they had laid down, and these three gave in a certain order of priority; they preferred the first better than the others. We considered their report and discussed it for a long time, looking at the maps and charts, and if I may say so, even in our Cabinet naturally sometimes people's sympathies are with their own states, and if somebody comes from Mysore, he would like to have it in Mysore, and if somebody comes from Travancore-Cochin, he would like to have it there.

Jaspat Roy Kapoor (Congress, Uttar Pradesh): Only UP is an exception perhaps.

JN: As a matter of fact, in this particular case, there was some advocacy for UP. Naini was the place which was suggested. By a process of elimination we just arrived at one or two places and ultimately at one, and it is now impossible for any of us to go about telling the long months of labour that went into the selection of that site, and the long hours of discussion amongst ourselves over every aspect. It is possible, of course, that somebody else may have come to a

slightly different conclusion, but there is not much room for movement. We are faced with many factors, physical, geographical, climate, etc. All kinds of factors have to be taken together, and we are driven to one place. It is also an unfortunate fact that places which have already developed, have some advantages as compared to places which have not developed, and the result is that a developed place gets more and more and an undeveloped place is left behind more and more, which is very unfortunate, and we have to fight against this tendency, because we have to develop other places too, but where there are certain practical advantages in regard to location, then we cannot ignore them, because in these very big concerns we are anxious obviously to make them successful, to make them an economic success. If for some reason for a major plant that we put up, let us say, transport facilities are not adequate, then that plant will be uneconomic; it will not fail, but it will not be a success, and everybody in the country will criticize, "Here is your public sector or your big plant. We are not reaping the profit out of it" and so on. Therefore, all these limiting factors are coming in, and they come in a little more at this stage than they will at a later stage. Well, we want electric power for a factory. We cannot really wait for electric power in large quantities to be produced in a place where there is no electric power and then put up the factory. That will mean a delay of five or six years. We are, for instance, putting up a factory for heavy water which is required for the production of atomic energy. Now, the production of heavy water requires a tremendous quantity of electric power. There are only a few places where electric power is available and you can put up a factory. There is no choice or else we will have to wait till electric power is available somewhere else, and there may be a delay of ten years, I do not know how long. So, we are having this factory, as the House probably knows, in Bhakra-Nangal. In fact, we are trying it with the fertilizer factory which we are building there. The production of heavy water and fertilizers will come more or less from the same factory as by-products of each other. So, because of our uneven development in the country, we don't have that much choice at the present moment about these specific industries. The lighter industries, of course, can be placed anywhere. The point is really to give these basic things like electric power. Wherever there is electric power, there are greater chances of industrial development. Let us provide electric power elsewhere. Let us provide the other necessities elsewhere.

A criticism has been made that there has been no construction of railways in the Second Five Year Plan in the South of India.⁷ Perfectly correct. I don't

7. See *anti*, p. 86.

think that statement is 100 per cent correct. Broadly speaking, it is correct that Travancore-Cochin has been neglected. The fact is that much against our will, we have had to come to the conclusion that no building of railways to be undertaken except where new industries compel us to build them for their own purposes. We just have not got the resources to build them. We have not got the iron and steel. The only railways that are being built up, at any rate that have been provided for, are in connection with the major iron and steel plants and some other major plants because without some railway connection to them, we just cannot take the raw materials or take away the fresh steel. It is quite essential. Apart from that, so far as I remember, there is hardly anything. In some cases, there is some doubling of track, again, to facilitate movement of goods, somewhere a little bit in Central India or little bit in South India or a little bit in Bengal-Bihar section. It is not that any place has been favoured or the North has been favoured. It is true, I think, broadly speaking, that so far as railways are concerned, the North was favoured in the British times and it was favoured for the obvious reason that the British thought that the North is a strategic area—entirely from a militaristic point of view, not for the love of the North or for the love of the South because it was, for them, a strategic area. Therefore, they built certain system of network of railways right upto the Frontier Province. It was a heavy liability—the Frontier Province Railway. They built it purely for military reasons. There they are and we have to develop railways all over.

Now, one of the most important places, I think, which requires development is connecting Assam with the rest of India. It is connected by what is called the Assam Link. But every year during the flood it is swept away and it is very hard luck for the people and the Government of Assam to have to face this difficulty every year. We are having, to give you an instance, some military operations now in certain hill districts of Assam, and they are to depend upon this narrow Assam Link to carry the materials etc. Of course, the operations are not on such a big scale but I am merely mentioning how we have to depend on that thin line to feed NEFA—North East Frontier Agency, Assam and those areas, and yet, in spite of this urgency, my friend, the Railway Minister, has been unable to include even that there. But I may tell you that this Report is not absolutely final for the five years. I do hope that in the course of this period, it may be possible to add various other constructional activities here and there.

Now, all this planning requires personnel more especially the public sector. We talk about the public sector, and the private sector and some people seem to think that the easiest way to advance would be to put an end to the private sector and call everything the public sector. I think that this would be a most

impractical and an unprofitable approach. I am looking at it purely from the point of view of the benefits derived. Because in such matters, there is no question of some kind of theory which we may apply. We want socialism in this country. If we could, by an Act of Parliament, produce socialism, well, we can pass the Act. But everyone knows that it is not a process of statute making but changing the whole structure—social, economic and living structure of the country. Then it is a living growth—not something imposed from above and called socialism. We have enormous difficulties to face. Even our social habits of living, even our caste system—everything—they are obviously antagonistic to any idea such as we have of socialism. We have to put an end to the caste system before we can talk of a socialist system in this country. We have to put an end to so many divisions in our society, quite apart from the economic part of it—deep cleavages and divisions—and only then can you call yourself a truly democratic country. We talk glibly of democracy and socialism. Very often in our own lives we live in a way which is entirely opposed to the conception of democracy or socialism in our social life; so this is something which grows. Even from the purely economic point of view, it takes time and I mentioned in the other House the other day that I should imagine that at least three more plan periods are necessary, that is to say, 15 years from now or may be 20 years but let us say, 15 years, before I can see any real establishment of socialism in this country, relatively high standards and equality of opportunities being available to all. That is the approach. You may, of course, perhaps expedite the changeover slightly. Instead of four plan periods, it may become three or two and a half if you like. I cannot say; but you cannot automatically do it. You have to grow into it. Therefore, I say, the primary thing at present is production, because you have nothing. You will have no content to your socialism unless you produce and you have something to give the people and if it is imagined that by getting something from the handful of rich people in India and distributing it in some way to the others that you get socialism, that is a completely mistaken notion. Psychologically, it may be satisfying but actually you don't get much and in terms of the people of India, there is precious little to distribute. It is they who have to produce things. What is the best way to energize the productive apparatus of India? I have not a shadow of doubt that if we suddenly lop off the private sector and put an end to it, we cannot replace it adequately. We have not got the resources to replace it and the result would be that our productive apparatus will suffer and why should we do it? I just don't understand it. We have got to develop our industries—heavy, light, medium—whatever they are. There is a vast field for us to work in. Let the state go on building its own, put up its buildings and build its industries as far

as its resources will permit it. It is a tremendous thing. It goes on doing it. Why should it fritter away its energies in pushing out somebody else who is doing it in the private sector? Oh! yes, I recall. There is no reason at all except that the private sector people might be building up monopolies, might be building up economic power to come in the way of your growth. I can understand that. Prevent that, control that, plan for that but when there is such a vast field to cover, there is absolutely no reason—it is a foolish policy—to take charge of the whole field when you are totally incapable of using that huge area by yourself—by the public sector. Therefore, you must not only permit the private sector but I say, encourage it in its own field because there is no point in having something and then discouraging it. It is neither here nor there. Better to put an end to it. Give it its field. Limit it in various ways such as in regard to dividends or in regard to whatever you like, to prevent it getting or producing that kind of monopoly; but having done that give it freedom to function and encourage it because you want it to produce, just as we want the public sector to produce. The whole process, you will notice, is one of the public sector becoming both absolutely and relatively bigger and bigger. How does it become bigger and bigger? Because it fills that vacuum that exists today. The average idea of, well, some people apparently, is that the whole function of the Government should be for them to seize hold of the private sector factories, with or without compensation, and having done so, well, we have gained socialism, and there the matter ends. That, if I may say so, is a primitive and infantile notion. I am surprised that any person, at all conversant with the modern world, can think in those terms. In India today there is a vacuum where industries should be. Here and there in a corner of this desert, you might say, there is a bit of the private sector, and here and there there are bits of the public sector, the rest is vacant, it is vacant land or call it what you like. Now, instead of the public sector filling that vacant spot, utilising it to the best advantage, should it go round trying to put an end to the little bit that the private sector is doing in its corner? Well, that is not good sense. Therefore, the process is going to be one, I hope, of the public sector and the private sector existing and trying to function in the Plan, naturally with the public sector dominating the field and the public sector growing bigger and bigger, bigger in actual terms and bigger in relative terms also, and thereby controlling and dominating the country's economy more and more. That is the process. At what pace should it be etc., we judge every few years, every year. But we have already made some significant advances in regard to the public sector, in regard to not only the big plants etc., but what is much more important—the services—whether it is the banking service, whether it is the insurance service,

and these are tremendous achievements which give you control of strategical points. So this, more or less, is the approach to these questions, the broad approach.

I just mentioned the question of personnel which is of high importance, because the world functions today because of expert persons. With the deepest respect, if I may say so, it does not function because of Parliaments, it functions because of experts working in factories or wherever it is. If the experts were not there, the law-makers' ability to get things done will be very very limited. Therefore, it is very necessary to have experts in a hundred fields, because modern life is very complicated. And, the experts means technical experts, as well as to some extent, of course, if you like, managerial and administrative, but essentially technical experts of all types. Honourable Members may see sometimes figures in the newspapers about the number of engineers produced by the USA every year, or the Soviet Union. They are astonishing figures, 100,000 engineers every year being trained out in each country. And more and more, about 100,000 geologists being produced in each country. That is why these countries are progressing and we shall have to do that. As I ventured to say, in this country, though no doubt we require the BAs and the MAs, we shall require them less and less. We want geologists, overseers and technicians of all kinds and more or less the educational apparatus is thinking in these terms also. So, we want these technicians and we have to train them. And it takes time to train them, three, four or five years. Unless they are there, we have either to employ foreign technicians or go without them. Fortunately, we are not so bad. In regard to high-class technicians we have got enough. It is odd. We have got quite enough at the top, not enough, but good people we have, but we lack people in the middle stages and at the bottom rungs of the ladder, overseers and the like. But we shall produce them.

Then, there is this very important aspect to this question which relates to the management of public enterprises. We have to be clear about them. We decided some time ago to have public, what you call, corporations. We had public corporations, like the Damodar Valley Corporation or some others. Then some of them were made into private companies, that is to say, they were not private, but they were Government-owned completely, but under the law of private companies they were registered. I am not sure if our minds are quite clear yet as to the best way of running them. We are experimenting, some here, some there. But our minds are completely clear about one matter, that these big public enterprises cannot be run by Government departments. And they cannot be run if there is constant interference in their running, by outside agencies or authorities, whether they be Government departments or Parliament,

because this simply paralyses the functioning of these public enterprises. And the persons who are there, the chief persons who are there, they are so frightened of getting into trouble that they never take risks. Now, a business, a private business, let us say, will never prosper and no real business or real industry can prosper unless there is enterprise, unless it can take risks. Not major risks of course, but some risk it must take. Every step forward is a risk. Either you sit down and function in the old ruts, you get a little dividend and play safe, or you take risks which may sometimes cause you loss. You write off the loss. And then when the risk comes off, then you make a lot of profit. That applies to private business and it applies to public business and to public enterprises also. If you want that to flourish, you must give it an opportunity to take risks, to make mistakes, if you like, provided they are bona fide mistakes. But what happens in regard to public enterprises is—and one can well understand it—that at the slightest mistake which leads to some loss of money, there is a great deal of criticism and condemnation in Parliament or in the Public Accounts Committee or in some other committees, and commissions are appointed and committees are appointed. I am not complaining of that. We should appoint them when necessary. But I wish the House to consider that too much of this kind of thing paralyses the executive who are functioning in the public enterprises. That is the result arrived at in most countries which have developed public enterprises, almost everywhere. That is the case even in a capitalist country like the United States of America because, even there they have big public enterprises, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the rest, or in the Soviet Union where it is all public enterprise, whichever it is. After much experience of external interference, etc., they have all come to the conclusion that the public enterprise must be given some freedom to function, that is, the man who is the boss of it—call him the general manager or whatever it is—or the directors whom you appoint or whatever they are, they should be made responsible. If they make a mess of things, well, it is all up to you to punish them, but you must judge them by results, not by individual errors, etc., which they may make. That, of course, applies more and more to all the work that we do, that is, giving responsibility. I am afraid, we here still are far too apprehensive of giving this responsibility, and in so many matters the smallest references have to be made to Government departments here. There is that man, the poor engineer 500 miles away wanting something very urgently and he just cannot get it because the reference has to be made here to one Ministry and that Ministry has to refer to the Finance Ministry, and so on. All this time there is that group of engineers just sitting there doing nothing, waiting, waiting for some bit of a machine to come or something else and they have to wait and

money is being lost because nothing is more expensive than time wasted. When you are putting in Rs.50 crores in a plan, well, every day's delay means loss of money. So, I should like this House to appreciate that in public enterprises we must hand over responsibility a good deal, decentralize authority. Finally, of course, you have your audits; you have your checks and any major things you always can check and you can punish those who go wrong. That is a different matter, but you cannot keep him in fear all the time, nag at him all the time. It unnerves our officers to be in fear all the time and they lose interest in their work. I can tell you that our young men, our young engineers or young scientists, men and women—I come in contact with them a good deal—are a fine lot; I am proud of them. Even our young men in our Administrative Service, who are coming, our young officers in the Army—I am not so frightfully enamoured of some of the older men—the young men are full of enthusiasm and great in ability but, sometimes they feel frustrated for various reasons and among those reasons is this reason that they dare not do something for fear of consequences, that they may be hauled up before the Public Accounts Committee or before somebody else. Now, I am not criticizing by any means the Public Accounts Committee. I want you to feel that it is quite impossible even to carry on a private enterprise under those conditions and if you judge a public undertaking give them a fair deal and opportunity to work instead of creating an atmosphere of terror around them under which it can hardly function.

S. Mohanty (Congress, Orissa): This is exaggerated.

JN: There is one thing more and then I shall finish. I have referred briefly to the Community Projects and the National Extension Service, which have already spread to about 130 or 140 thousand villages in this country. Now, I have often said that these Community Schemes have produced really and are producing a revolutionary change in our countryside—I am much impressed by it—that is, they are changing the people, and that is the vital thing. I am not talking about a road made or a building made or a well dug or something like that—that is of course interesting. We are not proceeding on the line of creating a model village to serve as a showpiece. That is no good. The real thing is changing the people, make them more dynamic, more vital, more capable of standing on their own feet, do things for themselves. That is what has happened and is happening and I am glad to say that it is bringing about the removal of that old barrier which separated and still separates often enough the official from the non-official. There is advantage in an official and there is advantage in a non-official, but the real advantage is if you can bring together the virtues of both. The official virtues are a certain discipline—at least there ought to be a certain discipline in working—and certain habits of work that he has developed

in his official career, a certain method in working, not casual working; but his disadvantages often are that having worked in a rut too long he remains in the rut and cannot bring out the enthusiasm by which to move people. The non-officials of course, and we are all non-officials, we are presumed to have, that is, if we can do our work, a certain vitality and a certain capacity to push ourselves and push others in some work, to create enthusiasm and all that. Sometimes the non-official lacks that sense of discipline, the method of work. We get too used to our idea of work, to deliver speeches, which is useful of course but, after all, speeches by themselves do not create things.....

S.Mohanty: It creates an atmosphere.

JN: One has to work otherwise too. So, the Community Projects Administration has brought the non-official worker and the official much closer to each other because the official has to function in the same field with the non-officials and the non-official with the official begins to function more methodically and in a disciplined way. By and large, I should say there has been a good deal of cooperation. I do not say it is so everywhere in these 140,000 villages. Of course, no general remark would be true but, broadly speaking, this has been so, and I do believe that in India one of the most helpful and heartening things has been the growth of these Community Schemes from which I expect a very great deal, not only in regard to production, not only in regard to cottage industries and the like but essentially in creating a slightly new type of human being with more vigour, more life in him, more sense of cooperative purpose and less dependence upon others. That is a tremendous factor.

So, I beg to commend this Resolution and I should like to point out what this Resolution is. It is seeking the general approval of the House in regard to the objectives, principles, programmes, etc. I would not dare to ask this House or anyone anywhere to accept every line and every little thing in this fat book. Nobody can do it if we are asked to do it. I am not quite sure if the Secretary has read everything that is in the book. But I do agree with all its main approaches, many other things and I accept the other fact about which I may have some doubt because one has to proceed in this way and not argue indefinitely about every one little point which one may accept or not accept. Therefore, it is that in regard to the broad principles and programmes and targets we seek the approval and agreement of this House.

(ii) Food and Agriculture

1. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi

4 May 1956

My dear Ajit,

Your letter of May 4.² It has already been decided to send a team of officers and others to China to study agrarian cooperatives.³ I take it that that team could study other aspects of food production also. To send another delegation more or less overlapping with the other would hardly be worthwhile. If you think it necessary, you could add someone to that delegation. You might talk to V.T. Krishnamachari about it.

Later, that is after this delegation comes back, we can consider sending another one to study other aspects of food production.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(24)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. A.P. Jain, Union Minister for Food and Agriculture, proposed that a delegation of specialists from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Planning Commission should be sent to China to study their schemes and programmes for stepping up agricultural production by eight per cent per annum.
3. A delegation led by R.K. Patil, who had resigned from the Indian Civil Service to work in the field of agriculture, visited China in August 1956 to enquire into the rapid growth of cooperatives there.

2. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi

8 May 1956

My dear Ajit,

There has been much talk of the Chinese 12-Year National Programme for

1. A.P. Jain Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

Agriculture² and I quoted from it at the meeting of the National Development Council.³ I am sending you the full text of it.

We talk a great deal about the large sums involved in the Second Five Year Plan. We are scared by the thousands of crores, and yet if we place this on the basis of agricultural production, it takes a different shape. In other words if we begin to think more in terms of agricultural economy instead of rupee economy, it would be more realistic and probably more understood by the people.

I remember St. Laurent, the Prime Minister of Canada, telling me that all the tremendous industrial development they had made recently, which is tantamount to a new industrial revolution, was worth much less to them than the wheat they grew in the province of Manitoba.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. A 12 year agricultural development plan, covering the years 1956-1967, was published in Beijing on 26 January 1956. The main provisions of the plan, aiming at complete collectivization of agriculture, were: (1) an overall expansion in grain output by raising the yield per hectare; (2) similar increases in the area devoted to multiple and industrial crops with a maximum increase of 260 per cent; (3) an increase of 71 to 185 per cent, depending on local conditions, in the average annual yield of ginned cotton; (4) complete socialization of agriculture by 1959 or 1960, when the individual peasant economy would have disappeared.
3. The NDC met in New Delhi on 1 and 2 May 1956. For a summary record of their seventh meeting see *ante*, pp. 39-52. On 2 May 1956, Nehru read out extracts from a report on agriculture in China.

3. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
9 May 1956

My dear Ajit,

I do not know if you have come across Sardar Santokh Singh. He is some kind of an adviser on agriculture in the Planning Commission. That simply means

1. A.P. Jain Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

that he is occasionally consulted. The man struck me as able, enthusiastic and very knowledgeable about agriculture. He took his Cambridge degree and had a very large estate in Pakistan and looked after it himself. He was keen on agriculture and had a considerable income. All this, of course, he lost in Partition. But he is very well off still as far as I know.

He has come to me off and on during the last three or four years and has always talked very intelligently. It seems to me that he is not being adequately utilized and that men like him with both theoretical and practical knowledge are not easy to find. Most of our experts are servicemen who are good in their own way but perhaps lack that practical touch which comes from actual farming. Now that we are laying particular stress on intensive cultivation and have come to realize that this is the only way for agricultural progress in India, it is the practical man with intellectual background that is likely to be most helpful. I want you, therefore, to think how far you can utilize Santokh Singh. He is 52 years old now. He is not after a job but he is anxious to do some worthwhile work.

It might be worthwhile also to think of him as a member of the delegation you are thinking of sending to China. With his practical experience he will be able to profit by the Chinese example.

It seems to me that the only way to get our agriculturists to take up new and intensive methods of cultivation is to have a large number of demonstration farms. A farmer is more influenced by visible evidence of progress than any number of theoretical considerations. We have these demonstration farms but they are special and spread out. I think that every Community Project and National Extension Service area should have some such farm. This need not be very big. This will be specially desirable in areas which are irrigated. In such farms, proper record should be kept about costing etc., so that we may know the economic results of intensive cultivation and can explain them to the farmers.

The second matter which we should keep in view is that all land is properly utilized. If a person does not use his land it should be taken away from him and he might be given some kind of rent for it. This presumably will require law.

A proprietor of a very big Japanese newspaper with a circulation of five to six million a day came to see me this morning. He said he was surprised to hear a talk of India being overpopulated. Japan was much smaller in area than Uttar Pradesh and yet it had a population of 90 million, that is, 50 per cent more than that of the UP.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

You wrote to me some time ago about the big farm which you are going to start with Soviet machinery. I hope you will keep me informed about this.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 15 May 1956, A.P. Jain informed Nehru that a site for an agricultural farm with Soviet machinery had been selected in Rajasthan in consultation with Soviet agronomists. The site was to be taken on lease for 15 years after which the farm would be passed on to the State Government. A major portion of the machinery had arrived and the technicians to put it in order were expected.

4. To Shri Ram¹

New Delhi
25 May 1956

My dear Shri Ramji,²

Your letter of May 25th.³ Thank you for it. Any suggestions coming from a person of your experience are always welcome.

I shall not deal with the various points raised in your letter at any length. I should like to say, however, that we are very conscious of the food and cloth position in the country.

So far as foodgrains are concerned, we are making every effort to build up large stocks both of wheat and rice.⁴ You must have seen in the newspapers

1. File No. 31(25)56-64-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Shri Ram (1884-1963); a pioneering industrialist of India; Chief Executive Officer, Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Jay Engineering Works and Bengal Potteries; founder chairman, Industrial Finance Corporation of India; chairman, Sindri Fertilizers and Chemicals; director, Central and Local Boards of Reserve Bank of India, 1935-61; philanthropist closely associated with many educational and research institutions like Indraprastha College, Shri Ram College of Commerce, and Shri Ram Institute of Industrial Research.
3. Emphasizing that the economics of agriculture were different from the economics of industry, Shri Ram suggested dumping of "plenty of food in the country at whatever cost", if the price situation was to be kept under control. As the farmer had already disposed of his 'Rabi' crop, any fall in prices would not drastically affect him; he would put in greater efforts ensuring a more plentiful of food, as the time for sowing the 'Kharif' crop was near.
4. On 23 May 1956, M.A. Raschid and A.P. Jain agreed to the supply of two million tons of rice by Myanmar over a five year period.

about a recent agreement with Burma for the purchase of two million tons of rice in the course of the next five years.⁵ Some part of this, we are getting very soon. As for wheat, we are getting wheat from abroad also. I do not quite know the quantity. Anyhow, the point is that we wish to take no risks about foodgrains. Personally, I think that our production can increase very considerably and I think will increase. As compared to the time when we started Grow More Food campaigns etc., we are much better organized to deal with this matter. We have built up our Community Project and National Extension Service organization in over a quarter of rural India, and it is spreading fast. This organization is not by any means a loose one. It is connected by various links from the cultivator in the field to the Ministries at the top. Any decision made, therefore, has much greater chance of speedy implementation.

Thus far, the Community Projects and NES paid greater attention to amenities like building of roads, schoolhouses, wells, etc. This was good as it made the people concerned more interested and enthusiastic. In fact, it changed the atmosphere in many of these areas. Some attention was, of course, paid to food production and, in fact, in these areas, there was an increase of twenty to twenty-five per cent during the First Five Year Plan. With greater attention and over a wider area, I have no doubt that the increase will also be greater.

I entirely agree with you about subsidiary foods.⁶ I think that we have not paid enough attention to them. I shall draw the attention of the Food Ministry to this aspect. Indeed, I shall send a copy of your letter to them.

As regards cotton textiles, I am in broad agreement with you.⁷ We should not calculate at a target of eighteen yards. I myself think that this will go up to at least twenty. We should also take no risk whatever to be in short supply. I

5. Shri Ram had written about the need for fundamental change in the policy of the Second Plan in regard to food and cotton textiles.
6. Shri Ram suggested that India's problem of balanced food could be solved by high-yielding root crops and increasing of the area under oil seeds. Also, the Food Ministry might work on the existing information regarding the food value per acre in bananas, papayas, guavas and a dozen root crops.
7. Shri Ram wrote that the target of eighteen yards per capita for cotton textiles fixed by the Planning Commission was "very much on the low side" and a target of twenty-two yards would "not be an over-estimate." The prices of cotton textiles had gone up appreciably and stocks were at the lowest level. The margin of profits from exports was much less as compared to the sales within and India's foreign markets might be lost. Therefore, 20,000 looms might be installed straightaway to meet the increased demands for cotton textiles. Government might protect the handloom weavers (i) by increasing the excise duty, and (ii) if necessary, by sealing a percentage of looms.

think, our Minister for Commerce & Industry is fully seized of these aspects. I shall send him also a copy of your letter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

Camp: Bombay
2 June 1956

My dear Ajit,

You know that our Food Laboratory in Mysore² is producing, or has arranged to produce, some multi-purpose foods and biscuits. We have tried these and they are very good. I think, they are ideal for children in schools. Where experiments have been made at a school, there has immediately been an improvement in health. Four biscuits a day for a child are considered enough to supply vitamins etc.

I have been trying to push the Food Research Institute to go ahead with larger-scale manufacture. They hesitated and were afraid of not having a demand for them. I promised to buy Rs 100,000/- worth immediately for relief work in some parts of India.

But the larger question remains. I think that your Ministry should take up, at any rate, the distribution of it. This distribution should be chiefly to children in schools and more especially in scarcity areas. Normally, it should be done through the state government or through some recognized agency. I am, for the present, sending some to the West Bengal Government for relief in the cyclone affected areas. I shall also send some to the Orissa Government where there is always some scarcity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. The Central Food Technological Research Institute was established on 21 October 1950.

6. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
9 June 1956

My dear Ajit,

Some time ago Dr Mandal,² a Member of the Lok Sabha from West Bengal, sent me a number of papers containing proposals to make wells in a particular way. He said that this had met with great success in his town of Bankura.³ I sent these papers, I think, to the Planning Commission. Maybe, I might have sent them to your Ministry. The Planning Commission officials had long talks with Dr Mandal and apparently they were not quite satisfied with the scheme.

Dr Mandal came to see me today with an ICS Officer, Iyengar,⁴ who was some time ago the Deputy Commissioner of Bankura District. It was Iyengar who had started this scheme in Bankura and built a well of the new type. Mandal and Iyengar talked to me with great enthusiasm about their proposals and gave me many papers which went into figures of cost and production etc. It was obviously not possible for me to grasp this scheme in this way. I think, however, that it is desirable for us to have this scheme thoroughly examined, even though the Planning Commission officials have not thus far approved of it. There is something in this scheme. I gather that in Bankura many of the agriculturists have offered free sites for these wells.

I am sending you a bundle of papers in this connection. I would suggest to you to do two things:

- (i) To see Mandal and Iyengar soon and get some broad idea of their proposals;
- (ii) To ask a number of experts and the like to examine it fully and report to you. Among these experts you could have one or two persons from outside your Ministry who might be available.

1. File No. 31(32)/56-58-PMS.

2. Pashupati Mandal (1909-1987); Congressman and medical practitioner; President, Chingani Union Board, 1945-52; organized rural cooperative societies; member, Scheduled Caste Association, Bankura district; Congress Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-72.

3. The same day Nehru wrote to B.C. Roy that many experimental wells were started in Bankura district "as part of distress relief work. But when distress relief was stopped, the work on these wells was also stopped and they lie now in a half-finished state...." He advised B.C. Roy to get these completed and find out the economics of the wells.

4. M.A.T. Iyengar (b. 1907); joined ICS, 1931; served in West Bengal in various capacities.

The whole thing should not take more than two or three days.

Further, I think that it would be worthwhile to experiment a little. That is, we could have, let us say, four or five such wells made and then work out the economics.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

(iii) Industry

1. Inter-Ministerial Coordination on Petroleum¹

Some time ago, the Minister of Works, Housing & Supply² wrote to me. He pointed out that at present petroleum products are dealt with in their various aspects by various Ministries. There is the NR & SR Ministry which deals with the exploration aspect as well as to some extent with mining. The refinery of the Assam Oil Company is the concern of the Works, Housing & Supply Ministry, which is also responsible for the procurement of petroleum products for Government (including Defence) and quasi-Government bodies. It is also responsible for determining retail prices for the public. The three new refineries are the charge of the Production Ministry.

2. The Ministry of NR & SR is pursuing actively the exploration of oil. Recently this Ministry was also made responsible for the setting up of a new oil refinery that may be formed for the development of new oil bearing areas in Assam.

3. All this appears to lead to some overlapping and some way out should be found to avoid this.

4. Meanwhile, our attention has been drawn by the Ministry of Production to the colonial profits being made in the new refineries. From the audited accounts of the refinery put up by the Standard Vacuum Oil Co., it appears that

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon, 8 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Swaran Singh.

the profits for 1954 were 58.5 per cent. For 1955 they are estimated to be about 52 per cent. Further information that we have received indicates that these figures shown in their balance sheets are only a small part of the total profits gained by various transactions.

5. These are staggering figures and they show how money is drained out of our country by these huge oil combines. The agreements we entered into with them were obviously very advantageous to them.³ Perhaps, we had no choice at the time and our experience was limited. There is no reason, however, why we should not profit by the experience we now possess as well as try to get independent advice. We are naturally much concerned about our resources for the Second Five Year Plan. And yet we allow these huge sums to be taken away from us. In this matter at least the advantage of the public sector is obvious. We may not function as efficiently to begin with as these great combines. But initial lack of efficiency can be remedied and it should not be difficult for us to obtain competent technicians and advisers.

6. The purpose of my writing this note is that we must consider this whole question of oil exploration, mining, development, refining and distribution as well as pricing and try to evolve some better methods than are at present employed. We have to keep in mind that there is every likelihood of discoveries of oil fields in India. We must go ahead with these explorations and tests. Even a partial success may mean a great gain to us, apart from making us more or less self-sufficient in oil.

7. For the moment, I am circulating this note to some of my colleagues. At a later stage, the matter should be considered by the Cabinet, but it is not ripe for that yet. It would be desirable for an informal meeting to take place and for us to discuss these various aspects. This informal meeting should consist of, apart from myself, the Home Minister,⁴ the Finance Minister,⁵ the Minister for Commerce & Industry, the Minister of Works, Housing & Supply, the Minister of Production,⁶ the Minister without Portfolio (Shri Krishna

3. For instance, in accordance with the agreements signed by the Government of India in November-December 1951, Burmah Shell, Caltex and Standard Vacuum oil companies were granted exemption from nationalization for twenty-five years; duty-free import of crude from their own sources; and exemption from certain provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

4. G.B. Pant.

5. C.D. Deshmukh.

6. K.C. Reddy.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Menon), the Minister of NR & SR⁷ and the Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission. As Shri N.R.Pillai,⁸ Secretary-General, has been concerned with oil transactions, his presence is necessary. Cabinet Secretary⁹ should also be there.

7. Abul Kalam Azad.

8. Earlier as Cabinet Secretary, Pillai was chairman of a Negotiating Committee, formed in October 1951, to work out agreements with foreign oil companies wanting to set up refineries in India.

9. Y.N. Sukthankar.

2. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi

14 May 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,

We have been talking rather vaguely about oil and its various aspects and there is a general impression that a very great deal of money is being made by the foreign oil companies in India. This is done in a variety of ways. The refineries have shown what tremendous profits they make and it is pretty obvious now that our contract with them was very much to their advantage. We shall be considering this matter further. Meanwhile, I think, we might give thought to certain aspects of it.

When you wrote to me about this, you pointed out overlapping of the work of several Ministries in regard to oil exploration, mining, refineries, pricing, distribution, etc. There is no doubt that there is this overlapping and we should endeavour to clear it up.

But one of the most important aspects of this business is the pricing of petroleum in India. We have often discussed this matter in the past but we really had no adequate and expert knowledge of this subject and so we were always at a disadvantage, in dealing with the oil companies. Perhaps, we have some more knowledge now. That knowledge has indicated that oil is the biggest

1. File No. 17(205)/56-66-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

racket of our times. I gather that the price of motor gasoline, tax-free at present, is as follows:-

London	1	shilling	7	pence
Singapore	1	"	8	"
Karachi	1	"	8	"
Colombo	1	"	8	"
Bombay	1	"	10	"

Thus, the price is the highest in Bombay. Why it should be higher than in Singapore, Karachi or Colombo is not clear to me. We are told something about the Gulf price.² First of all, there is no reason why we should accept the Gulf price simply because the company has laid it down. Secondly, even according to them, why it should be cheaper in Karachi or Singapore than in Bombay.

I am told that the un-taxed current airfield price of aviation gasoline per imperial gallon is as follows:-

London	26.50	pence
Singapore	26.60	"
Bangkok	27.48	"
Karachi	28.69	"
Bombay	32.63	"

Here again there is a big rise for Bombay, nearly four pence above Karachi. When we remember what large quantities of gasoline are consumed in India, these differences mount up to crores of rupees which the Government and the public have to pay.

I am told that India agreed to what is called Valued Stock Account³ in regard to pricing of oil products plus 10 per cent expenses. I gather that no other country has agreed to this and even Pakistan has done better.

2. The foreign refinery companies calculated the c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) prices of refined products in India on the f.o.b. (free on board) Mexican Gulf prices plus ocean freight from Ras Tanura in Saudi Arabia to any Indian port and insurance thereon. The companies brought the high Mexican Gulf prices into calculation even though India's crude supplies came from the cheaper Persian Gulf sources.
3. The prices of petroleum products came to be governed by the VSA, a formula evolved by the Government of India and Burmah Shell, and effective from April 1950. Other foreign owned oil companies and the general trade also followed the VSA which was primarily meant for government purchases.

I am not here referring to the refineries and many other aspects of this oil racket. For the present, I should like your Ministry to study and prepare a full note on this subject of price of gasoline for motor and aviation.

Because of the importance of petroleum and the wide use of it, we should think of reconstituting our Petroleum Division and have some high-class experts with knowledge and experience attached to it.

Ultimately, it may be necessary for us to give notice to the oil companies for a revision of these prices and the Valued Stock Account system.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Refining and Pricing of Petroleum¹

The note of the Finance Ministry certainly makes a big difference. I think it will be desirable for the substance of this note to be sent to Mr Chopra, the auditor, and his comments asked for.

2. We have always considered this matter in the past on the assumption that the only suppliers of oil and the only persons who could put up refineries were these big foreign combines. Naturally, if there was this monopoly, we had little choice in the matter. As a matter of fact, there is considerable choice. There is no doubt that the Russians can put up good refineries and so can the Rumanians. I am told that even the Italians can put them up, and there are several relatively small American companies outside the big combines. I am sure that if the big combines knew that we were going outside their domain, they would think differently and be more amenable. I have no doubt that, even now, we can have a refinery put up here through the Russians on very reasonable terms.

3. One of the main items of excessive profit is the price of gasoline both for motors and for aviation in India. Whenever we raise this question, we are told that this is the Gulf price. Why the Gulf price is something sacred which cannot be discussed or varied, is not clear to me. As it is, the price of gasoline in Bombay is considerably more than in London, Singapore, Colombo or

1. Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, 14 May 1956. JN Collection.

Karachi. I see no justification for this. Considering the large quantity of petrol that we use here as well as aviation spirit, this itself draws away enormous sums of money from our country. I have written to the Minister of WH & S to look into this matter and have a note prepared so that we can consider it more fully in the Cabinet.

4. This question of petrol price has, of course, nothing to do with the profit of the refineries, except for the protection of two annas per gallon which we agreed to.

5. I suggest, therefore, that a substance of the Finance Ministry's note be sent to Mr Chopra.

4. Reply to B. Orchard Lisle¹

I suppose the original of the letter from the *The Oil Forum* is somewhere on its way up to me. It is curious that I should get a copy from another Ministry² and the original should not have reached me yet.

In any event, please reply as follows to Mr B. Orchard Lisle, publisher of the *The Oil Forum*:-

Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister is in receipt of your letter of May 14th, 1956, and he thanks you for it.

Statements on the Government of India's policy in regard to industrial matters have been made in our Parliament here. Statements have also been made from time to time about the policy we are pursuing in regard to the exploration and exploitation of our oil resources. Our broad policy is to have basic industries in the public sector. But we are encouraging the private sector also and, in fact, we expect the public sector and the private sector to cooperate

1. Note to Private Secretary, 25 May 1956. File No. 17(204)/56-66-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. K.D. Malaviya, Minister for Natural Resources, had forwarded a letter addressed to Nehru by B. Orchard Lisle, joint publisher of *The Oil Forum*, a publication of the oil industry in the USA, offering editorial facilities for a discussion of India's long-range petroleum policy. Malaviya offered to write a straightforward article on oil exploration in India by the foreign companies, and a statement on India's future oil policy. Nehru asked him not to "enter into any controversy with these private vested interests".

with each other. As you know perhaps, the Government of India has many agreements with private oil interests who are functioning in India and recently big refineries have been put up by these interests. Broadly speaking, however, future developments will be largely under State control in accordance with the policy to which reference has been made above. In developing these oil resources in the public sector, the Government of India will gladly welcome technical and other cooperation.

5. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
10 June 1956

My dear T.T.,

I enclose a note which Dr Husain Zaheer² has sent me. This is about the production of aviation gasoline. There is no doubt about the importance of our producing this from our Defence point of view. We have been talking about producing synthetic oil from coal for a long time, but the cost of it rather frightened me. Also, I thought that we might discover oil in our own country, as indeed we are likely to. There is another aspect of synthetic oil plant³ which is important, that is, from the chemical point of view. But as far as I remember, the cost ran into one hundred crores or more. So I gave no further thought in spite of the insistence of many of our scientists.

But whatever oil we may produce here, the production of aviation gasoline probably still remains outside our reach. Therefore, the importance of this particular subject, which is far less expensive.

For the moment I am sending this paper to you for you to have it briefly examined. Whether we can afford it or not is another matter.

I have asked Husain Zaheer to send you a copy of it separately also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Syed Husain Zaheer, Director, Regional Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, 1948-62.
3. In May 1954, the Government of India set up a committee which recommended on 2 January 1955 the construction of a synthetic oil plant with an annual manufacturing capacity of 2,50,000-3,00,000 tons.

6. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
13 June 1956

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 12th June.²

There is no harm in a British team coming here to consider the prospects of heavy engineering industry being started here. I feel, however, that it is not particularly easy to deal with a group of firms in such matters. However, it might be worthwhile to find out what they say. The scheme³ they are developing for the manufacture of heavy industry will no doubt have to be looked as a whole and coordinated. In England, these industries have grown up in the course of years separately.

I might tell you that Oliver Lyttleton, now Lord Chandos,⁴ is one of the very few persons in England whom we find it difficult to get on with. He is one of the diehard Tories. He was in charge of the Colonial Office throughout the worst period in Kenya.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(172)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Krishnamachari wrote that though a Russian team was coming, "it was safe to have more than one string in your bow." Therefore, on his advice Swaminathan, Minister (Commercial) in London, tried to interest the Federation of British Industries to sponsor a team to come to India and advise the Government on heavy engineering subjects.
3. Krishnamachari also wrote "we might allow" a scheme of collaboration between the A.C.C., and Vicker's-Babcock & Wilcox, both engineering firms on the condition that whatever was produced in India "should be capable of being exported."
4. A former Conservative Member of Parliament, and Secretary of State for Colonies from 1951-54, Lord Chandos was Chairman of Associated Electrical Industries Ltd., and subsidiaries from 1954-63.

(iv) Labour

1. Labour-Management Conflict and its Resolution¹

The past few years have been years of marked change both in India and the world. Sometimes we refer to this period as the beginning of the atomic era. The use of atomic energy is still in its early stages, but there can be little doubt that it will have a powerful effect on human relations in the future.

What has this got to do with the INTUC or with the future of labour in India? I think, it has a great deal to do with it. All of us are apt to limit our thinking to the past. It is a little difficult even to catch up to the present, much less can we adapt ourselves to the future that gradually takes shape.

It seems to me that in this age, our conceptions of social relations and national and international affairs must necessarily undergo a change. That would apply to the relationship subsisting between labour and management, and there is undoubtedly today what is called class conflict. But it is out of date. I realize that many things that are out of date continue to exist and we have even to fight against them. But the fact remains that we have to consider these questions in a new context and try to adapt ourselves to this. Strikes and lockouts should no longer have any place in industrial relations. This means that the basic reasons for strikes or lockouts must disappear and that where there is such conflict there should be a fair and impartial method of resolving it peacefully.

From the national point of view, increasing production is of the greatest importance. Ultimately, the well-being of labour depends upon it. Progressively, labour should be associated with management till really there is no difference between these two.

This leads also to the conclusion that as far as possible there should not be internal conflicts within the ranks of labour. There should be as large a measure of cooperation as possible. Unfortunately, today, there are different labour organizations often with conflicting ideologies. If any ideology is based on violence, then obviously we can have nothing to do with it. If labour is exploited

1. Message for the eighth annual convention of the Indian National Trade Union Congress, Surat, 6 May 1956. From the Press Information Bureau.

for political ends, then also we should have nothing to do with it. But where these two are avoided, then there should be a large field for cooperation. A great deal of our energy is wasted in internal conflicts. We should avoid it.

The INTUC has done good work in organizing labour on right lines. I hope that it will adhere to its ideals and at the same time offer cooperation to others who are in broad agreement with it.

My good wishes to the Conference.

2. Working Conditions in Defence Industries¹

The Prime Minister gave a patient hearing to the arguments advanced by the President of the Federation. He said that it was not possible to indicate the time when the work of the Liaison Officers will be over. Government were anxious to avoid, as far as possible, retrenchment. It was obvious, however, that no factory could function efficiently with surplus labour. Where ultimately surplus labour was found, every effort should be made to find other employment for it. This might be in the same establishment or any other place. Even if no fresh employment was immediately found, the names of those whom it became necessary to retrench would be kept in view for employment as soon as feasible. In an expanding economy, fresh opportunities of employment will no doubt arise, and it was in the interest not only of the workers themselves, but of the Government, to find employment.

The Prime Minister said that every opportunity should be given to workers to make suggestions for greater efficiency as well as for assessment of workload. In this matter, as in others, there should be consultation and cooperation.

As regards the disparity in the service conditions between industrial and non-industrial workers, the officials of the Defence Ministry stated that a Committee had been sitting for the purpose and it was hoped that this problem would be solved within the next six months.

The Prime Minister said that it was essential for full cooperation between the management and the workers. Both the Government, as employer, and

1. Note dictated by Jawaharlal Nehru after meeting the President, All India Defence Employees' Federations, on 18 May 1956, JN Collection.

trade unions should get out of the old ruts and should think in terms of cooperation for their mutual advantage. As had been stated in the Second Five Year Plan, we should aim at progressive participation of workers in the management. This may take some time, but we should aim in that direction.

3. Railway Employees' Strike in Kharagpur¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am glad that this matter has come up for discussion before the House² because it is not only serious in itself but also significant of the type of things that is developing in this country.

The honourable Member who has just spoken said a great deal about our not condemning the working class or the labour movement.³ Of course, I entirely agree with it, but one factor seems to be forgotten in this incident,⁴ that is, the people who had suffered are workers. Who were the engine driver and the fireman that were thrown out of the railway engine? Who were the persons in the railway train behind them who were injured? They were workers. So, the talk about something being against the working class is completely beside the mark. As a matter of fact, what has pained me most in this matter is how injury is being done to the working class and the trade union movement in this

1. Speech in the Lok Sabha on 28 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, Pt. II, cols. 9819-9827. Feroze Gandhi had given notice for a discussion on the situation in Kharagpur.
2. The stay-in-strike of about one hundred brush-hand painters of the Kharagpur workshop started on 1 March 1956, the demand being that their work of marking rolling stock with stencils should be considered as a 'skilled work'. In sympathy with these strikers about 11,000 other workers of the same workshop went on strike on 8 May.
3. In fact, H.N. Mukerjee, the Communist Party member from West Bengal had said that Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Minister of Railways and Transport, had adopted an adamant attitude towards the striking workers, and instead of persuading them, adopted repressive measures and condemned the trade union movement.
4. On 26 May 1956, a train carrying workers from Midnapore halted near the outer signal at Kharagpur to pick up the workshop employees. Strikers surrounded the engine, forcibly pulled out the crew, beat them up, opened the steam regulator of the engine and set the train in motion without the engine crew. The driverless train entered the platform, dashed against the buffer, mounted the platform and smashed against the station building. Sixty-three persons were injured, fourteen of them seriously. The strike was unconditionally called off on 29 May 1956.

country. I believe in the trade union movement in this country. I think that it is essential that the trade union movement should develop on sound and healthy lines and be strong, and, if I may say so even as Prime Minister, strike when necessary. I am not against strikes although I do think that in the modern age, it is a sign of extreme maladjustment for strikes and lockouts to occur. But there it is. I do not wish to deprive the workers of their ultimate weapon of strike till some better method is evolved to settle all their disputes. I am worried and distressed at the way the working class movement and the trade unions are being pushed sometimes in the wrong direction, much to their discredit. I speak without accurate knowledge, but I think that the trade union movement may be, said to have started, some of the unions started previously, but in an organized way, nearly 40 years ago in India, I think, round about the First World War. After that, it had begun to take shape. Naturally, when a trade union movement starts, it takes some time to become mature, to organize, to function peacefully and achieve strength. One can forgive a movement like this in its early days to be disorganized, to indulge in what may be called lightning strikes and the like. In fact, in the early days of the trade union movement, really they did not work in the shape of trade unions; they were strike unions, people striking and calling themselves a union, not organized, regular trade union working. One can understand that in the early days. Gradually, the trade union movement in this country grew and in a large measure became mature. I say in a large measure because in a measure it did not become mature, and I do not blame the workers for that. But I do think that some of those who led those trade unions, directed them, put them in the wrong path, put them in the path of the kind of lightning strike or repeated strike, trouble or something of violence, with the result that if sometimes they gained something, more often they lost, as was inevitable.

I believe firmly in the rule of life, that if one takes wrong action, wrong results flow from it. I have no doubt about it. That is a law of nature. It represents some of the results to come, the results you see in India even today. I am not referring to any particular group of unions or organizations. But one sees mature trade unions, strong trade unions, trade unions which have protected the interests of the workers and advanced them, and themselves through their efforts collected and given so many facilities to their members, whose organization and peaceful strength are respected, whose words carry weight. On the other hand, this type of union which indulges in lightning strikes, as they are called is also there. What do we see? Suddenly, without any previous intimation or notice, one sees in the newspaper that there is a lightning strike there. Then, a little later, some people want to make others not to work. They

throw stones at them. Police come into the picture. Then honourable Members opposite get telegrams of police atrocities. It is a regular succession. The honourable Member, Shri Nambiar,⁵ showed a sheaf of telegrams. It is quite easy to send them, but whether they represent facts or not, it is impossible to say. But a regular succession of events we see—a lightning strike, something happens, workers prevent others from going to work, terrorize them, threaten them and sometimes completely prevent them from working. When the police come to protect the people, it is called police atrocities; police gets into the neck. If it does not come, you cannot stop the strike. If it comes and tries to do something, then also it is blamed. I have not heard anybody bringing in an adjournment motion or drawing attention to the violent activities, to the stone-throwing, etc., that have become almost a common feature in this country. I am not talking about the workers only but even in public meetings and the rest, it is becoming a regular feature—throwing stones, hurting policemen, hurting them badly, apart from the members of the public. Where are we going to? It is not a democratic method, whatever it maybe, and obviously, it has nothing to do with what we might call the Indian method of dealing with things—we have to deal with things in the Indian method, of approaching things peacefully. What exactly are we doing? I am worried about it; I am exceedingly distressed about it.

This matter, I do submit, has absolutely nothing to do with the merits or demerits of a claim. It can be examined separately; certainly it should be examined. It is a bad method and I say even with a hundred per cent right demand, if this method is employed, it is a bad method; it is an evil method and a method that should not be tolerated and that should be suppressed. I am not for the moment dealing with the merits of the question. I know nothing about the merits of this particular matter.

I have listened to Shri Nambiar. A strike occurs. Lightning strike, it is called. It is a small strike, apparently for some simple reason. He has given certain dates. I do not know what dates the Railway Minister would give. Two days afterwards they met together and sent some kind of a long communication which had not reached Delhi yet. They have posted it; it has not reached here. It might have reached the railway headquarters in Calcutta or whatever it is.

5. K. Ananda Nambiar (1918-1991); General Secretary, South Indian Railway Labour Union, since 1942; Communist member, Legislative Assembly of Madras, 1946-51; arrested in a nationwide round up of Communists in 1949 and detained for about two years; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-56, 1962-72.

There were the statements and demands etc. There was no doubt reference to police *zulum*. It is a constant factor that is brought in everywhere because it is expected that everybody will immediately accept any charge of misbehaviour by the police. The poor police is so used to be kicked and cuffed like that and always condemned. It is easy to make a charge against the police.

I am not here to defend the police but I know the thing. It is becoming intolerable always for this poor policemen to be condemned for trying to do his duty in the most difficult of circumstances. Let us punish the policeman when he is guilty or anybody else when he is guilty. But the stone-thrower becomes a hero and is taken out in procession—maybe—and the poor policeman who gets the stone on his head is a person who is guilty of *zulum* and atrocities. I leave that out. We have to consider this larger question. Two or three questions, I should like the House to consider—broad questions. We must, as I said, stop this creeping in of violence in our public activities—not only strikes and the like but in other activities.

What has been happening recently in the Punjab?⁶ It is astonishing that any organization that claims to be an organization, should not only encourage but deliberately organize this breaking up of public meetings and throwing of stones, etc., and also shout from housetops: "We will not allow these persons; we dislike their speech." When the other party, finding that something has to be done, comes into the picture and tries to restrain these persons who throw stones, there are telegrams—police *zulum* and this *zulum*. It is really astonishing. Have we lost all standards? Have words ceased to have any meaning? Where are we drifting? I say: no government—I do not care what party governs—can tolerate this kind of thing wherever it comes from, whatever part of India it comes from, whatever party it comes from. I would invite every party and group here to state publicly, here or elsewhere, how they stand about this matter because, I do submit, it is to their interest and to everybody's interest to be clear on this issue, to be clear that there must be no violence.

Let us have the fullest freedom of expression. It does not matter what it is. But there must be no violence. That must be the basic thing which all of us agree. In theory we agree. I say, in practice we must agree. It is no good defending people who have committed violence. It is no good trying to find excuse for them. There is no excuse, I say, for a person who commits violence. I can even find an excuse for a murderer but not for any person who throws

6. See *post*, p. 265.

stones. A person, in a fit of passion, may commit a murder. I have lived with many murderers in the prison—rather I got to like them. But, I have no sympathy for the stone-thrower. I believe he is a mean and despicable person and we have no sympathy for him.

Let us be clear about this matter and let us lay down that where stone-throwing comes in, it must be stopped. Every party must stop it, condemn it and make that man or group of persons who throw stones or otherwise misbehave, pariahs of society.⁷ It is disgraceful, despicable and contemptible to do so. It is not going to be tolerated by society in India, whatever it may be for. That is a broad issue.

Then we come, more specially, to the strikes and the rest. Of course, that is covered, partly, by this broader issue. I am interested, as I said right at the beginning, in the good of the working class as such, in the trade union being built up because it is necessary to have strong trade unions, disciplined trade unions acting with strength but not in this way. How can a trade union grow up like this? It was years and years before a trade union movement in this country functioned with any kind of mature strength. These things happen simply because the leaders of these trade unions in some parts of the country encourage them to go in for these so-called lightning strikes.

There is another place where trade union movement got into a completely different direction. It was in Ahmedabad under Gandhiji with the result that, I imagine, the strongest and the best knit trade union grew up in those areas.⁸ It

7. On seeing criticism of the use of the word "pariah" in the newspapers by two Members of Parliament—A Jayaraman and V. Veeraswamy, Nehru on 5 June asked his PS to inform them that he was very sorry that this should have been understood to mean any reflection on any group of persons. He had used the word regardless of its caste meaning in the normal way it had come to the English language to indicate some people being kept outside a social group.
8. Following a dispute over bonus with the mill-owners, the workers of the textile mills of Ahmedabad went on a lockout strike on 22 February 1918. On 12 March, mill-owners offered to take back workers who accepted an increase of twenty per cent instead of fifty per cent in wages, replacing the bonus. On 15 March, Gandhiji decided to fast in support of strikers. On 18 March, mill-owners agreed to Gandhiji's compromise of thirty-five per cent increase. As part of the settlement, mill-owners agreed to setting up a permanent board of arbitration and recognized the Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association. Gandhiji had agreed to intervene and use his own authority on the following conditions: (i) there was to be no violence, (ii) strikers were forbidden from molesting any strike-breakers, (iii) strikers were not to beg or seek alms but only earn a living by honest labour and, (iv) they were to remain firm however long the strike lasted.

indulged in strikes; it did not rule out strikes but so far as I know, never in the lightning strikes. Always, when there was a conflict between them and the employers, they proceeded with strength and told them; went through all the processes and tried to come to terms. If they did not, ultimately they went on strike and on a complete strike—disciplined and organized strike. The result? If you have registers somewhere, which I have not got—I think you will find that the action that the Ahmedabad workers took after due deliberation was a much more powerful action, and much more conducive to obtaining the results than these lightning strike elsewhere.

Sometimes, a lightning strike may succeed, especially if it deals with any kind of service which is essential to the community. You may hold up society or community to ransom. It means that. What does it mean? It does not mean that you are dealing with the merits of the question nor does it show the organized strength of labour. It is holding up of the community to ransom, with this weighty revolver over its head.

The whole of the trade union movement, in spite of its mistakes and errors must gradually grow. I am glad it is growing. I want it to grow in India. But, I do wish this House to consider, how this trade union movement—looking at it strictly from the point of view of the workers leaving out the others—can grow much more and become mature in action in the way it behaves, in the way it organizes so that it keeps certain standards of behaviour of peaceful action, organized action, action after full thought, full notice, full attempt to come to and arrive at a settlement. If not, well, then there it is; you have the strike. Have it by all means. But what is this kind of thing—this kind of lightning strike?

For me to be told that it has become so intolerable that one strikes in this way? Well, I am prepared to agree that conditions in India, in many places, are intolerable. I am not quite sure how I would behave if I were subjected to those conditions. That is a different matter. But I say: because conditions are intolerable, it does not mean that a wrong action and wicked action should be indulged in because it does really harm and injures the group and the individual. And, you get into a vicious circle from which you cannot come out. That is not the way for either trade unions or working class movements to grow in any event. These are broad generalizations that I am putting before the House.

But this particular instance, I would remind you again, it has nothing to do with your condemning the working class or the trade union movement because the persons who suffered here are the workers. It is the railwaymen who have suffered. They have been kicked out and they have been injured. Nobody else has been injured. I think, it is monstrous for people to go in like this. It is a

sheer chance that these 63 or 64 persons did not die. Just look at it; first of all going in and throwing out the engine driver and the firemen—whoever it was—and then accelerating the engine and getting out of it. I cannot conceive of a more monstrous attempt to murder; nothing short of it. It is a sheer chance that nobody has actually died; some may die in hospital now. And, against whom? Against the workers and not against anybody else. Against the workers who refused to be terrorized into not going. Remember this. The honourable Member⁹ opposite said: see the strong feelings of these workers when out of 12,000 only—to begin with a relatively smaller number went to work—476 or something like that, went to work. But I should like to know, I should like to find out under what pressure people did not go, because the pressures are very great preventing the people to go. One may think of the pressure inducing them to go, but there are pressures on the other side too. A handful of people who are prepared to threaten and coerce can prevent others from going and one can see this.

Now, suppose this has happened—before this of course there was stone throwing—and another strike occurs there naturally, people will be afraid or may be afraid that they might be killed, when this kind of thing has been done. The result is that, willy nilly, whether they want to or not, they are threatened and coerced into not going. If they try to go, a handful of people may throw stones at them. Therefore, a handful of people can coerce a great majority.

Of course, this cannot be done if they are well organized into good unions. It only happens where there is utter lack of organization and a number of completely irresponsible people are there to twist the workers this way or that way. A handful of people can make a difference in these circumstances.

Take again this question. Why was this railway business done? Probably—I am guessing—because nearly 4,000 workers had gone back and this no doubt irritated the organizers of the strike and they wanted to do something to frighten them even more. Stones were not enough. They had used stones previously. So, they did this trick of getting on a railway engine, pushing out the driver and the firemen and accelerating it and jumping out, with all those workers in it who were going to the factory to work, sending them almost to certain disaster. It is a monstrous thing.

Are you going to build up your working class movement, your trade union movement in this way? I know nothing about the union that functions there. There are only two explanations of that union to me. Either it is directly or

9. K. Ananda Nambiar, the Communist Party member from Madras.

indirectly responsible for all that has happened, or it is completely incompetent, because there is no third explanation to it. Then that has no business to come to me and talk to me about terms, this and that. When they cannot control the labour, they have no business to be there. With whom am I to talk to. If they are directly or indirectly responsible for all that has happened then they ought to be punished with the rest of them. Where does that union come?

I am all for trade unionism, I repeat, but I do not wish trade unionism in India to be dragged into the mire by some people who are always making use of it to indulge in these evil and wicked practices. Whether it is a trade union, whether it is any other union or whether it is any other group of community, it is not going to prosper by these attempts of violence and coercion, because, if there is violence, violence breeds violence; there is no doubt about it. And, the result in the ultimate analysis is all kinds of petty or big violence taking place all over the country, conflict in the final analysis, or if you will put it as big as you like, civil war in the country, because the community is not going to be coerced. If you like you may coerce here and there, for a short while or a short period, but where this becomes a method to be employed to coerce the community, then the community reacts to it and sometimes reacts wrongly to it. Then you have this vicious circle of evil leading to evil, violence leading to violence and ultimately, I suppose, somehow or other, by sheer exhaustion or sheer disgust, it may stop in this process.

Therefore, I submit that this kind of thing must be considered by us in its larger context. What is the good of my condemning those poor persons who have been guilty of this? But, certainly if they are found guilty, they should be punished certainly and punished heavily. Yet, I am not so very angry with them, if I may say so. They are poor ignorant people. Who has set them to do this? Who has led them down a path which inevitably led to this? That is what my concern is. Why do we produce these incidents? Why do we produce the atmosphere which produces them? It is only six weeks ago that I was in Kharagpur—maybe, two months ago, I forget. I had gone there for some other function in the Technological Institute.¹⁰ But I passed through Kharagpur twice, coming and going, and large crowd of these railway workers there gave me a very very friendly welcome, which I appreciated greatly. They were good people. They were friendly people, nice people and it hurts me to think that these friendly and nice people should be misled in this way.

10. Nehru delivered the first convocation address at the Indian Institute of Technology in Kharagpur on 21 April 1956. For Nehru's speech on the occasion see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 32-38.

As the House probably knows, in Kharagpur there is a very mixed crowd of workers. By 'mixed' I mean, people from all over India. There are relatively very few Bengalis. There are a good number of people from Andhra and from other places. That is one reason, I fear, why no real organized trade union has grown up there, because of this mixed crowd which cannot coalesce easily into a trade union, which in moments of excitement may be made to behave in a particular way. It is unfortunate. But, that means the leaders of any union that is being formed there should be more careful, should all the more act in a responsible way and not in this way.

Then again, I am a little weary of hearing this word *satyagraha* hurled at me, and having heard this word many times in different contexts previously. When Gandhiji first used it and practised it, when the time came he told us that nobody in India is a *satyagrahi* except himself. He told us that, and quite rightly too. In spite of all our efforts, now everybody in India is a *satyagrahi*. Everybody who breaks law, everybody who breaks heads is a *satyagrahi*. Every stone-thrower in India is a *satyagrahi*. This is most extraordinary, where words are misused and abused. Well, if a person wants to break a head, if I can stop him, I will stop him. But I do hope that the word '*satyagraha*' will not be used in that connection.

4. To V.V. Giri¹

Camp: Bombay
1 June 1956

My dear Giri,²

Your letter of the 30th May.

I am prepared to accept that our officials are often rigid and lacking in tact, although I have no personal knowledge of this. My own general impression, from such personal acquaintance of them as I possess, is that they are more flexible than they used to be in the past.

1. JN Collection.

2. Well known trade union leader. One of the founders of All-India Railwaymen's Federation.

However this might be, I view with very considerable concern the tendency to violence and misbehaviour among railway workers. The Kharagpur incident was disgraceful beyond measure and has brought down the reputation of railwaymen greatly. I am afraid, it will take some time for them to live this down. I am amazed at the utter irresponsibility shown there and elsewhere. I do not think any Government in the wide world can tolerate this kind of thing.

The principles you have laid down are excellent, but there will be an end of all joint consultations and cooperative working if there continues to be this gross indiscipline and continued violence. It would be almost better to stop the railways or make some other arrangements for running them than to have these constant threats. If, however, this is recognized fully, there will be every attempt to cooperate and remove grievances.

I am sending your letter to Lal Bahadur Shastri.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Union Minister for Railways and Transport.

(v) Transport

1. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
12 May 1956

My dear Lal Bahadur,

I wonder if your Railway Board knows anything about the monorail. From time to time, there has been reference to this in foreign countries, and it has been used, I believe, in some places like Germany. It is much cheaper than the normal railway and is especially useful for transport of freight. It is said that, because it came in the way of vested interests of the big railways, they came in the way of its development.

1. File No. 17(158)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

I think, it would be desirable to make enquiries about this. In some places in India, this may prove very suitable for us, for instance, for the transport of iron ore or coal or, indeed, anything.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Jagjivan Ram¹

New Delhi
18 June 1956

My dear Jagjivan Ram,²

I asked T.T. Krishnamachari about the Ilushin aircraft.³ For various reasons I have been anxious that we might complete this deal before I left India. I find, however, that there have been some difficulties and some rather extraordinary figures have been quoted for operational and maintenance costs. I cannot judge of these figures. But two or three facts appear clear to me:

- (1) that we cannot go on using Dakotas even if they are reconditioned, for long;
- (2) that we have to get some kind of twin-engined aircraft to replace the Dakotas;
- (3) that no twin-engined aircraft at reasonable cost is available, other than the Ilushin.

I should have thought that in any event we should get some of these Ilushin aircraft, say six or so, and try them and experiment with them. I know that so far as flying is concerned, they are much better than the Dakotas and the pilots who use them speak very highly of them. I think this matter should be looked into a little more carefully.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Communications.
3. Designed by S.V. Ilushin (1894-1977), a Russian aircraft designer; designed IL-2 diver bomber used by USSR in World War II, twin-engined passenger aircraft IL-12 (1946) and IL-18 Moskva, 4-engined turboprop transport aircraft (1957).

(vi) Small Savings

1. Big Role of Small Savings¹

I do not quite know what to say on this occasion. This is the first time I have been brought on such a platform to talk about national savings and small savings. It is a very laudable thing. It is also a profitable way of being patriotic—no sacrifice, in fact, gains, and yet you are serving your country.

Having pointed out the obvious necessity of savings, what more can I say? Mr Patil² recounted the history of what happened in the First World War, and I learnt from him that the movement started in the First War. I didn't know that. You see, in a sense, the history of India, started for us eight and a half years ago. Everything previous to that was pre-history! The history of independent India, and subsequently of the Republic of India, is what is important for us. We are responsible for both the good results and the evil results. And it is in this period that the necessity of pushing ahead these small savings schemes³ came before us forcibly. Previously, even in regard to large governmental loans, there were certain classes of people who subscribed to them—the Indian princes, big landholders, big industrialists and some odd people. Some of these classes of people are now not in the same position as they were to subscribe largely to governmental loans. And some other people, who are in a position to subscribe, sulk and do not do so. Fortunately, there has been, to some extent, a spreading out of money. More people have it, which is a good thing. It was easy to reach a selected few princes, or big landlords, or big industrialists. It is far more difficult to reach people by the hundred thousands or by the millions. Of course, the hundred thousands or the millions do not give large sums of money, because they have not got it. But they can all give smaller sums and in

1. Speech at the Mumbai branch of the National Savings Organization, Siddharthanagar, venue of the AICC Session, Mumbai, 1 June 1956. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. S.K. Patil, President of Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee since 1946 and Member of Lok Sabha, 1952-57.
3. The total small savings collection through Post Office Savings Bank, National Savings Certificates, Treasury Savings Deposit Certificates and others, during the five years ending 1955-56, amounted to Rs.235 crore and exceeded the First Five Year Plan target by Rs.10 crore.

the totality, it mounts to something much bigger than what one used to get from the relatively few well-to-do and rich people previously.

The problem is to tap the resources of India from places which normally were not being tapped. Of course, we also want to tap groups which were previously in the picture. But we want to go to millions and millions of persons for a variety of reasons. The first, of course, is that large sums of money are needed for our great developmental schemes. Where are the large sums to come from? Well, we may get a little help from outside, but obviously, the large sums have to come from the people of India. Where else? We cannot make our progress dependent on other's goodwill and charity. That is not becoming for a proud nation. There is no objection to, nor harm in accepting help on honourable and reasonable terms as between equals. But, it is better to depend on our own resources, on our money, on our own manpower, on our ability, on our enthusiasm, and on our spirit of dedication to great causes. And there can be no greater cause than the building up a new India.

I do not think it is quite enough for people to give a little money and then imagine that they have done something very big for the country. That is the least they can do. They can do much else, but at any rate they can begin by doing this. As I said, in doing so, they are profiting, insuring their own future to some extent and getting patted on the back for it. But in subscribing to these small state savings or government loans, more specially, for development projects, you become partners in this vast, magnificent and exciting undertaking of building up India. We want millions and millions of people, hundreds of millions in India, to have the sensation of partnership, in this tremendous cooperative piece of work.

When we started making appeals for these small savings, I was put in some difficulty. Because, naturally, one does not want to ask others to do something which one does not do oneself. So, I examined my budget. If I may reveal an entirely personal, private matter, the Prime Minister finds it very difficult to live within his budget. And usually I exceed it. Why usually? Every month. Fortunately, I have a small income coming by way of royalties on old books I have written. That helps to cover the deficit. Anyhow, whether there was a deficit or not, I thought, I must buy some of these small savings. At the worst, the deficit would be a little more. So, I try to do some saving every month, in a small way. Naturally, I cannot compare with the people of Bombay!

I hope that not only Bombay, but the whole country, will subscribe to these loans and savings, and do so in a spirit of enthusiasm. It is odd how success breeds success. Because our First Five Year Plan has been a successful plan, it

has created an atmosphere of confidence and success in the country, even in the Government. Our Second Five Year Plan is much bigger and more ambitious. We wanted it to be bigger still.

A few words about the gap in resources in our Second Five Year Plan. Why is the gap there? Because, according to our estimates, what we have and what we will get add up to less than what we want to spend. On what are our estimates based? Well, on past experience. We calculate how much money the State can raise from the people. And in a spirit of hope, we double it, or make it bigger than it is. Nevertheless, the gap remains. There is absolutely no reason why the people of India, instead of being contented in doubling it, should not make it four, five or ten times larger. I have no doubt they can do it if they make an effort. And, if they do that, we shall have got more money for India's development, but the result will be a much bigger thing, that we would have covered this gap that has been troubling us. We rise enormously in our own esteem as a nation, and get strength to go much further ahead.

I do not belittle other's help, but surely it gives one a proud feeling to do a job oneself. If we overcome a feeling of dependence on others, there will be a tremendous upsurge in self-assurance and self-confidence, which is more important than any amount of money. I am sure there are vast numbers of people in India who, if they understand this, will cooperate to the fullest extent.

II. SCIENCE

1. Policy and Programme for Atomic Energy¹

I have received three notes from Dr Bhabha, Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, during the last few days. One of these was about policy and programme, the second was about matters relating to atomic energy, which might arise in conferences directly or indirectly, to be referred to the Atomic Energy Department, and the third, dated 3rd May 1956 about certain definite proposals.

1. Note to H.J. Bhabha, Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, 4 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

2. I have already asked the Cabinet Secretary to inform all Ministries and Departments that any matter which relates to atomic energy should always be referred to that Department. It should also be referred to External Affairs Ministry. Sometimes these matters come up at conferences, as recently at the ECOSOC Conference.² They may not appear to be contentious but they raise important question of principle which might not be obvious to the persons attending that conference. Apart from the technical aspects, everything relating to atomic energy has now a high political significance. Therefore, there should always be a reference to the External Affairs Ministry and the Atomic Energy Department and no commitment of any kind should be made without such reference.

3. In the note by Dr Bhabha on policy and programme, two conclusions are drawn:

- (i) that the Indian atomic energy programme should be so planned that, if necessary, it can develop without any external aid; and
- (ii) the Indian programme, without external aid, should develop at least as fast as the programme in any other Asian or African country receiving external aid.

I agree to these general principles. In fact, our policy thus far has been to plan so that we can develop our atomic energy programme, if necessary, without any external aid. The second point must also be borne in mind. We have at present a certain lead in regard to atomic energy programme in Asia and Africa. We should maintain that lead.

4. The specific proposals made by Dr Bhabha in his note of May 3 refer to the production of uranium, heavy water, graphite and metallic zirconium. They also refer to the creation of some posts in the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay. Six posts are mentioned. Three might be considered senior posts and three relatively minor. The latter three can be appointed by Dr Bhabha without any reference to us. I agree to the creation of the three senior posts, that is, (i) Chemical Engineer for heavy water production, (ii) Chief Chemical Engineer or Chief Scientific Officer (Chemical Engineering) in the Atomic Energy Establishment, and (iii) Comptroller of the Atomic Energy Establishment.

5. These matters as well as those relating to the proposed new plants will have to be processed in due course through the Finance Ministry.

6. So far as the other new proposals are concerned, the first one refers to a mining programme of uranium to produce 100 tons of uranium concentrate

2. Held between April and May 1956.

per annum, to be expanded later, if necessary, to 500 tons per annum. This appears to be necessary for our work and steps should be taken for the production for 100 tons of uranium concentrate. If this has to be expanded later, the matter will have to be referred to us.

7. A small plant for producing atomically pure uranium with a capacity of 10 tons of metal per annum. I take it that this is necessary, but that it will be required at a somewhat later stage. This applies also to the production of pure graphite and metallic zirconium.

8. Then there is the proposals for the production of heavy water. Permission has already been given and indeed some steps taken for its production at Nangal. It is now suggested that the production of heavy water might be made a bi-product of the Fertilizer Plant at Sindri and the Iron and Steel Plant at Rourkela. Dr Bhabha says that in judging the economics of production of heavy water, two criteria should be used. Either

- (i) the cost of production should be comparable with or lower than the present American price of approximately Rs.3 lakhs per ton, or
- (ii) the total cost of the combined production of heavy water and fertilizer should be less than the receipts by Government from the sale of fertilizer, and heavy water at Rs.3 lakhs per ton.

9. I suppose these two criteria are right. All these projects are said to be economically paying. Whether we produce uranium or heavy water or graphite or metallic zirconium, they are all not only valuable but are easily marketable with profit. I think, therefore, that we should broadly agree to this subject, of course, to financial examination.

10. The Planning Commission in drawing up the Second Five Year Plan has not taken into consideration either defence or atomic energy. But the Finance Minister will naturally have to take into consideration the extra expenditure involved in this. The proposals made in the paper dated 3rd May by Dr Bhabha appear to involve a capital expenditure of about 10 crores and probably an annual expenditure of 2 or 3 crores. I am not sure of the figures. Presumably, this would be spread out over the next few years.

11. In the course of his note on policy and programme, Dr Bhabha has said something about the creation of a statutory authority for atomic energy. He has done so because the normal procedures for making purchases or for erecting buildings are dilatory and may cause not only loss but positive harm. Because of these, we have already agreed:

- (i) that the Atomic Energy Department will have its own Financial Adviser provided by the Finance Ministry,

- (ii) that the Atomic Energy Department can do its own PWD work and employ engineers etc.,
- (iii) that it can make its own purchases, that is, it can apply for its own purposes, the powers of the D.G., Supplies & Disposals.

12. This meets Dr Bhabha's points and removes his difficulties. I do not like the idea of the Atomic Energy Department being converted into a statutory body. A statutory body has necessarily to be related to some Ministry or Department. Whatever the powers it may have, it is subordinate to a Ministry or department. As it is, the Department of Atomic Energy functions as a Ministry and I am supposed to be in charge as Minister. Thus, the present position of the Department of Atomic Energy is much higher than that of any statutory body. I should not like to lower it. It deals not only with highly technical matters but also with political issues of the greatest importance. No statutory body would be given powers to deal with these political issues which have to be decided on the highest level. Therefore, the Department should continue as it is and every matter connected with any political issue should be referred for decision. At the same time, the Department should have financial and other powers which are so necessary to expedite work and which have already been agreed to.

13. I have repeatedly said in this note about the importance of the political aspect. This being a new subject, we have to take particular care not to make any commitments or get entangled in any way with foreign cartels or organizations. Every relationship with any foreign or international organization should be carefully examined. This is particularly necessary as their appear to be attempts being made for some kind of control of atomic energy by a few great powers. We have resisted this with some success so far. But we have to be careful in future. We have not committed ourselves to the draft statute which has been prepared for the proposed international atomic agency.

2. On Proposed Nuclear Centre in the Philippines¹

Yesterday I wrote a note about various proposals made by Dr Bhabha in regard to the Atomic Energy Department. In that note, a brief reference was made to

1. Note to Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, 5 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

the American proposal to put up a Nuclear Centre in the Philippines.²

2. Some days ago I received a note from Dr Bhabha about the visit of the American team in connection with this Philippines Nuclear Centre. This note has been fully considered in the External Affairs Ministry. The proposal to start an Atomic Centre somewhere in South or South East Asia was made at the meeting of the Colombo Plan countries at Singapore recently. So far as I know, this proposal was made without any previous reference to this subject. When we were asked about our opinion, we said that we could not object to the establishment of an Atomic Centre. If it had to be established, we thought that probably Ceylon would be a suitable place. I am afraid that, being confronted rather suddenly with this proposal when we were not quite prepared for it, we did not express our views as clearly as we might have done.

3. The first question that arises is as to whether this Atomic Centre in the Philippines is supposed to be within the purview of the Colombo Plan. Indirectly, it has been brought there, and so it might be considered that it is one of the schemes sponsored by the Colombo Plan countries. And yet, in fact, it is a completely unilateral decision of the US. The second decision to have it in the Philippines is admitted to be unilateral without any reference to the Colombo Plan countries. It does not seem to me a wholesome procedure for the Colombo Plan countries to be presented with an accomplished fact and then to be made at least partly responsible for something which they had not really been given an opportunity to consider.

4. This illustrates the danger of any step being taken in regard to atomic energy matters without the fullest consideration. In my previous note, I had stated clearly that we should be wary about such developments. Everything connected with atomic energy, apart from highly technical aspects, has important political consequences. Very probably, our representatives at conferences like Colombo Plan or ECOSOC or any other like gathering have little acquaintance with the implications of developing atomic energy. Hence it may be that they say something on behalf of our Government which embarrasses us later. It is necessary, therefore, that anything connected with atomic energy development should always be referred to the Atomic Energy Department and the External Affairs Ministry before any commitment, direct or indirect, is made.

2. At the seventh meeting of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee held in Singapore from 17 to 22 October 1955, J.B. Hollister, Director, US International Cooperation Administration, informed that the USA would establish, in any one of South or South East Asian countries, a centre for research into the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It was announced later that the centre would be located in the Philippines.

5. We cannot obviously object to the US Government establishing an Atomic Centre where they like. In a sense, the more such centres there are, the better. But this particular Centre, which is proposed to be started in the Philippines, probably involves certain political consequences rather than the development of atomic energy. The Philippines is very backward in this respect and would not normally have been chosen. It was therefore chosen by the US Government for political reasons, and even possibly as a set off against the atomic energy work being done in India. We cannot say this, but we should be clear about it.

6. In our atomic energy work in India, we have not said anything about this being a Centre for Asia or any part of it. We have, however, made it clear that we shall welcome for training at our Centre people from other parts of Asia. In our agreement with Canada for the Canadian Reactor in India,³ we have repeated this.

7. To call the Philippine Atomic Centre as a Centre for Asia or a Centre for a part of Asia like the South East, seems to me totally inappropriate. What area is it supposed to serve? Obviously, not China. Probably not Japan. The Indo-China countries are also out of it. Is it supposed to serve Indonesia, Burma, Thailand and Ceylon? Have these countries been consulted? Anyhow, it does not seem to me to be right to call this Centre as a Regional Centre for any area. At the best, it is an Atomic Centre in the Philippines. It should not be given any larger significance. Certainly, it does not cover India because India is far ahead of it and seeks no assistance from the Philippines. We should not, therefore, agree to any step or any description which directly or indirectly makes this Philippine Centre as including other countries.

8. Also, and partly for the same reason, it would not be correct to call it a Centre sponsored by the Colombo Plan countries.

9. There is some importance in making this position clear because it has certain political consequences.

10. I gather that when the American team visited our atomic energy establishments in India,⁴ they were surprised to find how far we had developed

3. India and Canada signed an agreement on 28 April 1956 for the setting up of an Atomic Reactor in India. Canada agreed to share roughly half the expenses.

4. The American team of nuclear scientists arrived in India in the third week of April 1956 and visited the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Bombay, the Indian Cancer Research Centre, Bombay, and the National Physical Laboratory, New Delhi. This was in connection with a proposal for a Nuclear Research Centre to be started in any one of the Colombo Plan countries.

and apparently said that the Philippines Centre would not be able to do much if India did not cooperate with it. If India's cooperation was considered so important, the least that should have been done was to consult India about it.

11. There should be no question of our refusal to cooperate because we are prepared to cooperate with every country and with every atomic energy centre. The point is in what capacity we cooperate and what is the status of that centre. Also, of course, in what measure we cooperate. I would hesitate to associate India financially in any way with this Centre as that will make us in some way a sponsoring country. We might be prepared to train people who come to the Indian Centre. Anyhow, we should give no definite assurance of assistance and cooperation in the setting up of this Centre at this stage. We should explain our position to the US Government, through their Ambassador⁵ here or through our Ambassador⁶ in Washington.

12. The attitude of the Philippine Government to India was recently made clear by an offensive speech by the Philippine Ambassador in Taiwan.

13. I see that a letter has been sent by the External Affairs Ministry to our Ambassador in Indonesia⁷ about experimental stations for the study and tests with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. This was in furtherance of the declaration of the Bandung Conference. It refers to a Memorandum that India had submitted⁸ to the Conference on this subject. I have not got the Memorandum with me, but I should imagine that it is rather out of date now and if this matter is to be taken up, something fresh has to be thought of and put down.

14. Since the Bandung Conference, India has made considerable progress in the development of atomic energy and we may have some further suggestions to make to some of the countries represented at Bandung. I rather doubt the advisability of circulating any kind of memorandum to all the countries that participated at Bandung. It is clear that most of them will do nothing at all about this and indeed are not in a position to do anything. Some of them may not like to cooperate with India at all. On the whole, I feel that the circulation of such a Memorandum to all the Bandung countries will not be desirable.

5. John Sherman Cooper.

6. G.L. Mehta.

7. B.F.H.B. Tyabji.

8. The Memorandum was submitted on 19 April to the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955, appealing to the great powers not to test or use atomic or thermonuclear weapons and to stop producing them. It was adopted by the Political Committee of the Asian-African Conference on 23 April.

15. There are some countries, however, with whom we can and should develop closer contacts in regard to atomic energy. These countries are Egypt, Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon. These contacts might be on the technical level and we might offer to take some of their scientists for training at our establishments. Possibly, some representative scientists from these four countries might visit our atomic energy establishments and discuss these matters. It would be better to keep this at a technical level and for Dr Bhabha to keep in touch with these scientists.

3. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi

6 May 1956

My dear Rajaji,

You have written to me from time to time about our taking the atom bomb to the World Court.² As a matter of fact, we have tried to get some of the UN Agencies to agree to do so, but we have been voted down.³ The question is whether we as a country should, nevertheless, go to the World Court for an advisory opinion after our attempt has failed in the UN.

In a sense, it is open to any country to ask for an advisory opinion. This is a difficult burden to undertake when we have got so many other problems to face. What we were thinking of doing was to produce a scientific paper on this subject and the harm that radiation etc., is expected to do. This would be an objective analysis by eminent scientists naturally based on published material.

1. JN Collection.
2. To pursue his anti-bomb campaign, C. Rajagopalachari urged Nehru to raise the issue of nuclear disarmament in the UN.
3. In September 1948, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India's representative in the UN, proposed the elimination of atomic weapons from national armament. But it was rejected in the First Committee of the General Assembly. In July 1949, India introduced a draft resolution in the ad hoc committee of the General Assembly which sought that no state or individual should use atomic energy except for peaceful purposes. Iraq, Mexico, and Argentina agreed but the resolution was rejected. In November 1951, B.N. Rau, India's representative, moved a draft resolution on the actual beginning of disarmament. In November 1953, V.K. Krishna Menon, India's representative, advocated, before the First Committee of the General Assembly, the elimination and banning of weapons of mass destruction. Again, in November 1954, Menon reiterated India's stand. India continued her efforts to secure the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Many of the facts are not known to the public, but enough is known to bring out the horrors of the use of atomic weapons.

We are in the last stages now of the preparation of this compilation.⁴ I hope that in a month or two it might be ready. After it is published, we might make an appeal to the various powers concerned to stop production and experimentation of atomic weapons. We may even introduce some such appeal in the United Nations General Assembly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The report on the consequences of the use of atomic weapons was finalized in June 1956.

4. International Nomenclature for Metric System¹

I have read these papers.² Having decided to adopt the metric system,³ there seems to me no help for it but that we adopt the international nomenclature also. Any change in the existing system of weights and measures will necessarily create confusion and opposition for some time. It is this change that is the important thing and not the names we give to the new weights and measures. The change has been decided upon and therefore this difficulty has anyhow to be faced. It is not lessened in any way by evolving a new nomenclature.

1. Note to Pitambar Pant, member, Planning Commission, 10 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. In his Memorandum on the Introduction of Metric System in India, submitted in February 1955, Pant suggested the adoption of the metric system in a period of 10 to 15 years. He also suggested that, "in the event of the adoption of the metric system of weights and measures, its international nomenclature be adopted in toto". Some representatives of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Dr Lal C. Verman, Director, Indian Standard Institution, wanted the Hindi nomenclature to be invented and adopted. Pant sent their suggestions to Nehru.
3. After considering Pant's memorandum, the Parliament decided in April 1955 to adopt the metric system for standardizing weights and measures. The system was introduced on 1 April 1957. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, p. 533.

2. It is not a question of finding Indian equivalents. If there were real Indian equivalents, one might consider using them. But there is no equivalent to a metre or a litre or a gram or an ampere or a candela or a second (I believe second is commonly used in Hindi).

3. We cannot call a metre a *gaz*. That would be wrong and confusing. We have to call it by some other name which will be completely artificial and without any real significance. This would apply to the other terms also. I really cannot understand what advantage is gained by searching for new terms which nobody understands. After all, some people at least understand metre, gram, etc.

4. But the real point is that there is advantage in using international terminology. This advantage is very great. In any event, our scientists and technicians will use international terminology. They cannot do without it. Thus we may have two sets of terms and that will not add to clarity.

5. Also, it will be no easy matter to impose a new set of artificial terms all over India in the various languages. There might well be vigorous arguments on behalf of the different Indian languages about these terms, even though they might be derived from Sanskrit. There will be no such argument if we adopt the international terminology.

6. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the majority view of the Sub-Committee on Nomenclature, that is, in favour of the adoption of international nomenclature in toto, is the right view and should be supported.

5. Methods of Water Conservation¹

I had an interview today with Mr J.G. Beale,² a member of one of the Australian Provincial Legislatures, and Chairman of the Water Research Foundation of Australia. A paper is attached which gives further particulars about him.

1. Note to M.S. Thacker, Director, CSIR, 10 May 1956, File No. 31(31)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Jack Gordon Beale (b. 1917); Australian engineer and provincial minister; publications include, *Cyclical Environmental Management System*, 1975, *Protection and Management of the Environment*, 1975, and *Theory and Practice of Environmental Management*, 1980.

2. I had a very interesting talk with him. In Australia, problems of the use of water have been studied a great deal because of the scarcity of water. Probably they have made more progress in this matter than any other country. Mr Beale mentioned to me two recent successes that they had achieved. One was meant to prevent the evaporation of water from large reservoirs, ponds, lakes, etc. The previous method of putting a thin layer of oil was found not to be successful. Now, they put Cetyl Alcohol. A cake of this is put in a small open case on the surface of the water and it gradually spreads out. A one pound cake is enough for about an acre. This is a cheap method as this cake would probably cost about two or three rupees. This was a very efficient method and stopped evaporation by 50%. It did not spoil the water at all for drinking or other purposes.

3. The second thing he mentioned was a method of preventing water in canals or other places from seeping down into the soil. Some kind of a very thin sheeting called polythene sheeting was placed, not on the surface, but about six inches below with earth or other stuff above it.

4. He also discussed with me what he called water harvesting. That is the best use of limited supplies of water without wastage. It was found that small supplies of water frequently given produced better results than larger quantities at one time.

5. By some of these methods, Mr Beale said there had been astonishing addition to agricultural production.

6. It seems to me that all this work that Australia has recently done is of the greatest importance to us, and we should enquire into it fully. I suggest that you should get into immediate touch with the Australian Council of Scientific & Industrial Research and request them to send you full particulars. You will yourself be going to Australia later in the year and can enquire into it further.

7. Mr Beale has already met the Minister of Food & Agriculture and some of his advisers. Naturally, the Food & Agriculture Ministry is greatly interested. It is indeed worthwhile, if necessity arises, for some special officers of the Food Ministry to go there to investigate.

8. I am also thinking in terms of some of these methods being introduced in our Community Projects areas. They appear to be relatively simple and inexpensive.

9. If it is possible you might see Mr Beale. You can get in touch with him through the Australian High Commissioner.³

6. To H.J. Bhabha¹

New Delhi
18 May 1956

My dear Homi,

Your letter of May 17th about the book² on the effects of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons.

I am looking at this question more from the public point of view than from the scientific, or perhaps you may put it, from the popular science point of view. I attach importance to the publication of this book as it will attract much more attention not only in India, but abroad, than the scientific and perhaps technical reports of the United States or the UK. It will also indicate to our people and to others how much we are interested in this aspect of the problem and that we have been working at it. Of course, we cannot produce anything new as our knowledge is based really on other people's experiences and even so it is limited. But, limited as it might be, it is far greater than what the public knows. I am sure that the publication of such a volume will be good and will be an important step towards educating not only the public, but various governments.

Apart from issuing it to the public and placing it on the table of Parliament, we propose to send it to various governments with some kind of a covering letter.

There is obviously an importance in this report being issued as early as possible. Otherwise, it tends to become out of date and when other and perhaps fuller reports are issued, the importance of our report will be less. The two expert committees of the USA and the UK apparently are reviewing the existing knowledge on the biological and medical aspects of nuclear radiations on living organisms. That is important, but is only a part of the problem. Even if our report is incomplete and compares, from the point of view of information given, unfavourably with the UK and the USA reports, it will nevertheless be important to publish it. It will indicate to the world that our atomic energy scientists are dealing with these problems also. We should not leave this kind of thing to the UK and the USA only.

I suggest, therefore, that you should speed up publication of this report in proper form. I do not quite know what you mean by saying that this might be produced in the form in which you prepared the report of the Conference on

1. JN Collection.

2. *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*. For foreword to this book written by Nehru see *post*, pp. 154-155.

the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held in Delhi.³ So far as I remember, that was a good report. I would like this also to be printed.

What you say in your letter seems to indicate that one volume only should be issued. If you think so, I agree.

I would certainly not wait for the USA and the UK documents to be issued before we issue our reports. This kind of waiting will go on indefinitely because something is always being found or done.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. For Nehru's speeches while inaugurating and closing the conference held on 26-27 November 1954, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 416-423.

7. Making Atomic Energy Commission a Statutory Body¹

Please see Dr Bhabha's note. This matter will have to be considered more fully. It is clear that the present situation is not satisfactory. When previously this matter came before us, it was thought that the proposal was that the Department of Atomic Energy should become a statutory body. It was pointed out then that this really meant lowering the status and authority of the Department which was really functioning as a Ministry. This was obviously not desirable.

2. Now, Dr Bhabha says that the Department should continue as it is but the Atomic Energy Commission should be made into a statutory authority controlling the various atomic energy reactors, atomic power stations, research establishments, etc. It is not clear to me how the Atomic Energy Commission as such is going to do this. The Commission, as formed previously, has tended to fade out, although I believe it still functions in some way.

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretary, 12 June 1956. JN Collection.

3. The point at issue is that apart from the Atomic Energy Department, there should be a statutory authority, whatever its name, to control the various research and productive activities in connection with atomic energy. This is obviously necessary. These activities are growing and large sums of money are spent upon them. We should, therefore, treat them all together as a unit under a statutory authority.

4. This might be considered by the Ministries concerned here. There is no immediate hurry for a decision, but a decision will have to be made before very long.²

2. In March 1958, the Atomic Energy Commission became a statutory body with full executive and financial powers.

8. Effects of Nuclear Explosions¹

About a year ago I suggested to the Defence Science Organization of the Government of India that an objective study might be made with the material available of the consequences of the use of nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Such a study could not, in the circumstances, be complete, as much of the information was considered secret. Nevertheless, I thought that it would enable us and others to form some picture of what modern war was likely to be. There have been frequent references in the newspapers and in periodicals to the result of nuclear explosions and some official publications have also been issued on this subject by various governments. But I was not aware of any connected account and I thought that such an account, even though incomplete, would be useful.

Dr D.S. Kothari of our Defence Science Organization was specially entrusted with this task. With him were associated Dr Homi Bhabha who is in charge of our atomic energy work, and Dr V.R. Khanolkar, the Head of the

1. Foreword to *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*—published by the Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, in June 1956. Also available in JN Collection.

Cancer Research Institute in Bombay. The preparation of this study was delayed because of the Conference on the Peaceful uses of Atomic Energy held in Geneva last year.² That Conference brought out many facts which till then had been unknown to the public.

The chief burden of preparing this study has thus fallen on Dr Kothari. Dr Homi Bhabha, in spite of the heavy burden he carries, has given substantial help. A number of our younger scientists connected with the Defence Science Organization and the Atomic Energy Department have also given valuable help.

I have tried to restrain our scientists from being too technical. I have not succeeded wholly, but I think that this study will be of value even for non-scientific readers and the public generally. It will give some idea of the world we live in and even more so of what the fate of the world is likely to be if we start playing about with nuclear warfare. I suppose that no one, not even the great experts in this new science, knows definitely what the full results of hydrogen bomb explosions will be. Enough is known, however, to give us some kind of a picture of a war in which these weapons are used. War is associated with death. We have now to face death on a colossal scale and, what is much worse, the genetic effects of these explosions on the present and future generations. Before this prospect, the other problems that face us in this world become relatively unimportant.

But even without war we have what are called nuclear test explosions which, in some measure, spread this evil thing over large parts of the world. These explosions continue in spite of the dangers inherent in them.

I trust that this study, brief and incomplete as it is, will be of some use in directing peoples' minds to the dreadful prospect of war in the nuclear age and to the dangers of continuing nuclear test explosions.

2. The International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva from 8 to 21 August 1955.

III. EDUCATION AND CULTURE

1. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi

7 May 1956

My dear Maulana,

More than two months ago you wrote to me about the Tibbia College² and sent me a letter from Colonel Zaidi,³ Chairman of the Tibbia College Board. In your letter you mentioned that you would like to talk about this matter with me at some convenient time. I had hoped to have a talk with you and therefore I took no further action.

It struck me today that even before we had our talk, I might make some enquiries. I have therefore written to Sardar Swaran Singh on the subject and I have also asked the Health Minister⁴ about it.

There is no doubt that the Tibbia college is one of the institutions which deserve our support. To what extent we can support it is a matter for consideration. The real difficulty, however, has been that the Tibbia College has been grossly mismanaged and has been tied up with litigation. It is difficult to help an institution which is not properly run.

Some days ago an eminent Russian Doctor, who was here, was sent by the Health Minister to see the Tibbia College or rather the Hindustani Dawa Khana. He came back to say that he was surprised at the insanitary way medicines were made. There was no cleanliness at all and such insanitary conditions should not be allowed. This is quite apart from the merits of the medicine.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40 (72)/56-60-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. The Tibbia College was founded in 1885 in Delhi as a centre for teaching Unani system of medicine. Hakim Ajmal Khan, his father, and several other members of their family were associated with the college.
3. Colonel Syed Bashir Husain Zaidi (1898-1992); politician and educationist from UP; member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52; Congress member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1956-62; Director, Reserve Bank of India, 1958-63; member, Rajya Sabha, 1964-70.
4. Amrit Kaur.

2. To Sucheta Kripalani¹

New Delhi

7 May 1956

My dear Sucheta²

I have seen a report in the newspapers of a meeting held in the Purana Qila at which you also spoke. The meeting was presumably held to protest against the proposal to transfer the refugee population from there to other quarters. According to the report, you said that animals were going to be kept in the Purana Qila and that it was far better for human beings to be kept there.

Evidently, there is a great deal of misapprehension about this matter. The Purana Qila is one of our oldest archaeological remains round about Delhi. It has pained me very greatly that it should be spoiled by any persons living there. Originally in 1947, it suffered considerably by being converted into a camp for Muslim refugees. Later, others came there. It is obvious that the Purana Qila will be completely spoiled and lose all its significance if it is used as a place of residence. Throughout this period, and quite apart from the proposal for a zoo or a park, we have thought of preserving the Purana Qila as a historical monument of great importance and not allowing anybody to live there. Unfortunately, owing to pressure of the refugee problem and our desire to help them, they were allowed to continue to live there pending further arrangements being made.

There is no question of animals living in the Purana Qila. Far from it. The proposed zoological gardens are going to be a part of a park which will also contain botanical gardens, etc. In this park, it was decided to include a certain area round about the Purana Qila as well as the Purana Qila itself. The main object was to prevent buildings going up round about Purana Qila. There has already been far too much building round our historical monuments, as for instance in the Lodi Gardens, which have partly spoiled these beautiful gardens. In this way, the Purana Qila would have been preserved and properly looked after as a great historical monument.

Surely, you would not suggest that we should utilise the Taj Mahal at Agra or many of our other famous historical monuments as residences for those who need habitation. We have to make other arrangements for them and not put an

1. File No. 40(61)/56-71-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Member, Lok Sabha.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

end to our history and tradition because of certain urgent needs of today which might be satisfied otherwise.

It seems to me absolutely clear that no one should be allowed to live in the Purana Qila and that this great monument should be preserved for future ages. Of course, the persons at present living there have to be provided for elsewhere. That is admitted. It is not reasonable or fair to say that they must continue to live in the Purana Qila.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In her letter of 30 May 1956 to Nehru, Sucheta Kripalani agreed that, "the refugees do not mind shifting to any area provided thereby they are not deprived of their work and living or these are made very difficult for them". She suggested that they should be given some alternative land within a mile or a mile and half radius of the Purana Qila.

3. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
11 May 1956

My dear Maulana,

The President has sent me a copy of his letter to you dated 10th May. In this he has expressed his concern at the condition of the old manuscripts that are spread out all over the country and suggested that something should be done to collect them.² I am sure that you must also share his concern as all of us do.

The question is what we can do in this matter. Proposals have sometimes been made for the setting up of some kind of an institute of Indology. I suppose that this will have to be done some time or other. But that project will probably

1. File No. 40(75)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. During his visit to Hyderabad in May 1956, Rajendra Prasad learnt that many valuable manuscripts were being kept in private collections. In his letter to the Prime Minister and the Education Minister, he suggested the establishment of a well-equipped Indological Institute where all such manuscripts could be preserved and studied.

be a somewhat ambitious one and it may take time to draw it up and finalize it. Meanwhile, it might be possible to take some preliminary steps to prevent the loss or the decay of these valuable manuscripts. In my letter to the Chief Ministers, which I am issuing today, I have drawn attention to this matter.

Perhaps, a suitable step which we might take now is to appoint a small committee of three or four or at the most five persons to consider how we can trace and collect these manuscripts and how we should house them till a permanent habitation is found. This committee might consist of the Vice-President as Chairman, yourself or some representative that you might appoint, C.D. Deshmukh and two others. I have not consulted the Vice-President or anyone else about this suggestion.

A special officer might also be appointed with some knowledge of these manuscripts. He could get in touch with the state governments, private institutions, temples, *maths*, libraries, etc., where these manuscripts might be found, and collect all relevant information.

All this need not cost us much money in the preliminary stages. We shall, of course, have to find some accommodation and to provide steel cases to preserve these manuscripts in proper condition. The larger question of an institute may be considered a little later.

I think that an organized attempt of this kind will yield many important treasures in India which are probably wasting away and might be lost for ever if not adequately taken care of.

The Education Ministry proposed some time ago that we should try to get art treasures and manuscripts in foreign museums and collections. I pointed out the difficulty about this because no foreign museum or collection is likely to part with anything that it considers important and our energies would be largely wasted.³ In India, however, there is this vast and largely unexplored field which we can take in hand immediately in a small way to begin with. Later we can expand.

This is just a suggestion that has come to me. I have no doubt that it can be improved upon.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. For Nehru's note on this subject, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 90-92.

4. Members of Advisory Board of Sahitya Akademi¹

I think that it would be unfortunate if we kept out of the Akademi distinguished writers merely because we do not agree with their political opinions.² I can understand someone, who is actively engaged in politics of an undesirable kind, not being taken into the Akademi. But mere opinions should normally not be a bar.

Apart from this, it will be still more unfortunate to remove a name which has already been added to the Advisory Board. This will create a needless controversy and invite criticism.

I agree, therefore, with the Vice-President that we should not reconsider this matter now. If anything happens in the future, we may give it a thought.

1. Note to Krishna R. Kripalani, Secretary, Sahitya Akademi, 17 May 1956, File No. 107/9 Part I, Sahitya Akademi Records.
2. Kripalani wrote to Nehru on 15 May 1956 that the Home Ministry objected to the names of N.V. Krishna Warrior, editor *Mathrubhumi*, and Prof. Joseph Mundasseri for membership of the Advisory Board for Malayalam because of their suspected communist connection. In spite of the objections, the President appointed them to the Advisory Board on the recommendations of K.M. Panikkar.

5. To Rana Jang Bahadur Singh¹

New Delhi
18 May 1956

Dear Jang Bahadur Singh,²

Your letter of the 16th May. It is clear that the Purana Qila has to be cleared. It is one of our historical monuments.

1. JN Collection.
2. (1900-2000); born and educated in UP; shifted to the Punjab in the early 1930s; joined *The Tribune* and became its editor in the early 1940s; served as editor, *The Times of India*, for a few years in mid-1950s; member, Punjab Congress Committee for several years; elected to the Legislative Assembly, Delhi, 1952; worked for the settlement of refugees.

I should like suitable accommodation to be provided for the refugees there and I am forwarding your letter to Mehr Chand Khanna. But I doubt very much if the land near Hardinge Bridge is suitable for this. I do not know where the Police Chowki is.

As a matter of fact, there has been so much mischief in the building of houses round about New and Old Delhi that all planning has been upset and we have now, therefore, undertaken this task in a planned way and prohibited all building till the Master Plan is ready. The Lajpatrai Market built in front of the Red Fort is a tragedy. It should never have been built there. Surely, we should look to the future in our building operations and not spoil the city.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Spreading Quality Education Fast¹

I send my good wishes to the All India Basic Education Conference being held at Kancheepuram.² I have often expressed my belief that basic education for the mass of our people is the right way for us to proceed.

In regard to this matter, as also in regard to many other matters, a problem always faces us. We are limited in our resources, in trained personnel and in finances. We shall, no doubt, gradually improve in all these respects. The question is whether we should concentrate on a certain fairly high standard rather with the expense of spreading out fairly fast. We want to do both, but it is beyond our capacity to do both at the same time. We have, therefore, to strike a balance. The balance can only be in maintaining a high standard in as many places as possible as an example to be aimed at and for the experience gained thereby, and to spread out in other ways which do not attain that standard and yet aim in the same direction. It is essential to maintain those standards somewhere. Otherwise, we will become a second rate nation, and not even try

1. Message to the All India Basic Education Conference, 22 May 1956, New Delhi. Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML.
2. The Eleventh All India Basic Education Conference was held from 30 May to 1 June 1956 at Kancheepuram, under the presidentship of Kaka Kalelkar.

to aim high. At the same time it is physically hardly possible to maintain those standards everywhere. The demand for education is terrific and we naturally welcome this.

While basic education is the recognized policy in our country, more or less accepted by very large numbers of people, there are certain differences as to the methods to be employed. It is desirable that full opportunity should be given for this kind of experimentation in various methods of basic education, so that we might have the advantage of learning from them, and finally adopting the most suitable one.

Education is presumably meant to fit an individual as well as the social group to live the good life and to take us to the Welfare State that we aim at. This must lay stress on individual development, in character training etc., and the capacity to cooperate with others in the social framework that is gradually evolving.

I think that the Hindustani Talimi Sangh³ is doing excellent work, both in regard to standards and methods. I am sure that this experience will be of the greatest advantage for our future advance. We should remember that we have not to function in a limited and rather sectarian way, but remember the manifold aspects of Indian society and to fit in with them.

All my good wishes for the Conference.

3. The Hindustani Talimi Sangh was constituted by Gandhiji in October 1937 immediately after the All India National Education Conference at Wardha to promote basic education.

7. Publication of Books at Cheap Price¹

It is stated in the resolution of the Government of India on the National Book Trust that the Publications Department of the Ministry of I & B shall be the principal publishers of the Trust. It was and is intended that all these books would be printed in Government presses run by the I & B Ministry and not by private presses. For this purpose, extensive orders for presses have been given

1. Note to Secretary, Sahitya Akademi, 24 May 1956, National Book Trust's Files, 1956-58, Sahitya Akademi Records.

and I imagine that some may even have arrived. The Book Trust, as such, perhaps may not be a suitable organization to run a press. Later it may develop into such. The whole point is that this is going to be Government publishing of cheap books on a mass scale and it has to be done by Government as printer and publisher.

The Sahitya Akademi can certainly get its books published by the National Book Trust of the I & B Ministry and need not go to private publishers and printers.

In fact, the original idea of the Book Trust was that it should be merely for selecting books and getting them printed at any available press, private or Government. This was objected to and it was thereupon decided that the I & B Ministry should arrange for their printing and publication. The only exception was some university publications, which may be helped and published elsewhere.

8. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
25 May 1956

My dear Balkrishna,²

I enclose a letter³ from Marie Seton⁴ who, as you perhaps know, is a well known author. I entirely agree with her about the film *Pather Panchali*.⁵ It is

1. File No. 43(40)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting.
3. On 23 May 1956, Marie Seton urged Nehru to send *Pather Panchali*, a Bengali film, to the British Film Institute for screening at the National Film Theatre, London.
4. (1910-1985); eminent British film writer and producer; visited India in 1955 at the invitation of Ministry of Education, Government of India; taught at the Indian Film Institute, Pune, for several years; publications include, *Sergei Eisenstein* (1952), *Paul Robeson* (1958), *The Film As An Educational Force in India* (1956), *Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru* (1967), and *Portrait of a Director: Satyajit Ray* (1971).
5. Satyajit Ray's first film that won an award at Cannes Film Festival in 1956. The story of the film was based on a novel of the same title written by Bibhutibhusan Bandyopadhyay. Marie Seton was greatly impressed by the film and stressed that "*Pather Panchali*, if given a fair chance to be seen, will pass into the category of great films in the history of cinema."

a first class film and we should give full publicity to it. I gather that there is some hesitation about this as it shows Indian poverty. I do not agree with this viewpoint. We are poor country and we should not be ashamed of it, except that we should get rid of poverty.

I hope that your Ministry will help in giving full publicity to this film. I gather External Affairs Ministry are buying some copies from the West Bengal Government.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Amir Khusrau—Symbol of India's Composite Culture¹

Pir Saheb,² Hazrat,

As you heard, this *Urs* has been held here for the last 650 years which is a very long period. But what has always amazed and impressed me is the kind of man that Amir Khusrau³ was. There have been other great men who are remembered to this day. But there is no doubt about it that Amir Khusrau was an extraordinary man. He was a Sufi poet and knew Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Sanskrit, Hindi and Urdu very well. But, what impressed me even more is that a man who lived in the district of Etah, six or seven hundred years ago, should have had such a great hold on the people of rural India. The folk-songs written by him are sung to this day in the villages. Perhaps, there is no other example anywhere else. Great scholars have read his works and written commentaries on them. But what is extraordinary is the fact that his songs, written in a simple dialect 650 years ago, have found a niche in the heart of India and are sung by boys and girls in the rainy season as well as *Vasant Panchami*.

1. Speech at the six hundred and fiftieth *Urs* (death anniversary) of Amir Khusrau, New Delhi, 28 May 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Zamir Nizami, the head priest of Dargah Nizamuddin Auliya.
3. Amir Khusrau alias Abul Hassan (1253-1325); born in Patiali village, Etah district of Uttar Pradesh; a close disciple of Nizamuddin Auliya; an outstanding poet who wrote in very simple Hindi akin to *Khadi Boli*; musician with great skills; a symbol of India's composite culture; author of many books.

Amir Khursrau is also famous for riddles. Many children come to me, nephews and nieces, and tease me with the riddles of Amir Khusrau and I do not know the answers. I do not know where they learn them from. They have not even heard of Amir Khusrau—I tell them about him—but they are familiar with his riddles. So, this way of getting a hold on the hearts of a people is something which is greater than knowledge. His works have come to us down the centuries. I think that Amir Khusrau belongs to the select coterie of the greatest men of India and is a symbol of the things which India has always been seeking.

For a long, long time India has been after a dream, which has been realized at times and then slipped away. What is that dream? Many streams and rivers of ideas and languages and cultures have flowed into India from other countries and joined her vast cultural bloodstream. What was their place here? Were they to be assimilated into one or were they going to remain as separate little ponds?

For thousands of years, I would say, it has always been India's consistent effort to synthesize and adopt the thoughts and ideas that flowed in, and to change and be changed a little by them. The culture and civilization of India evolved in this way by a gradual process of synthesis, and continued to change because the doors of a living and growing nation should never be shut to outside influences. They should be wide open to let in the fresh breeze of ideas and culture. What you adopt or assimilate from them is in your hands. But the moment you shut the doors, the nation stops growing and the air within, however good it may be, does not remain fresh if the doors and windows are not open.

This has always been India's effort. It is a vast country and has a myriad differences in language and habits and way of life. In some parts of the country, it is extremely cold while others are very hot. The weather and climate are different in different parts of the country and they affect people's dress, food, habits and way of life. In spite of such tremendous diversities, there has been an underlying unity which India has succeeded in maintaining except on a few unfortunate occasions. The question of unity is still before us and we must understand it and make an effort to solve it.

In this context, I do not know if there has been a greater symbol of India's unity than Amir Khusrau. It was not merely because he was a great scholar, which as I said, he was, in many languages like Arabic, Turkish, Persian, Sanskrit, Hindi, Urdu, etc. But I feel that his greatness lay more in the fact that he reached the people of the rural areas and caught their imagination by writing in their simple dialect, so much so that his memory continues to live even today, six to seven centuries later, in the folk songs and riddles of the people.

This is the real sign of greatness and I can find very few instances in India's history of such men who have made an effort to transform India's age-old dream into reality and succeeded to such a large extent.

Every year his *Urs* is held here. I would like that every child in India should be familiar with Amir Khusrau's name and story because it teaches us some very valuable lessons. So when you invited me, I came with great alacrity because I have had the opportunity of paying homage to the memory of Amir Khusrau⁴ and to listen to his songs and qawwalis, for which I am very grateful to you.

4. For more on Khusrau by Nehru see his prison diaries published in *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 13, pp. 190, 205, 207, 223 and 267.

10. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi

11 June 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,

I understand that you intend having some mural paintings in the new Conference Hall² that is being built. I am also told that the Artists' Committee has recommended the subjects as well as the medium. Among the subjects are the visit of Hsuan-tsang to India and Akbar and the Deen-i-Ilahi.

I am afraid some of our artists who advise us, however, good they may be, live in a world of Ajanta or Mughal paintings or Rajputana or Kangra school and the like. They have not fully caught up to modern times or to modern India. India today is pulsating with new life and work and in a place like the Conference Hall we must represent modern India and not ancient or medieval India. The thousands of people who come from abroad should see the life of today and the life of tomorrow that is to come, and not merely what some

1. File No. 28(21)/56-59-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Vigyan Bhavan.

important personages did in the past, important as that is. In particular, the Conference Hall might well depict our urge for peace.

I am very anxious that no wrong decisions should be taken about these murals. Murals have not been developed adequately in India yet. They are a popular form of art. Our art in the past was very fine, but it is of the past. Our paintings are definitely small and precise and not popular in that sense. Murals have developed greatly in the West and, more especially, in South America. As you know, we are having some mural designs in Parliament House. I feel, they are just decorative with no message in them, just pictures of the past, good or indifferent. We must try to break that decorative tradition and have something with force and a message. As our adviser artists themselves do not feel that message, they choose old motifs and even old media of painting, though there are new and more effective ones available.

I do hope that this matter will be very carefully considered and not left to others. My whole broad conception is that the murals in the Conference Hall should depict modern India and our message for peace. Gandhiji might come into the picture and then the new urges and the new efforts at construction should come in somehow.

I am told also that the medium that has been suggested is a continuation of the old media here. They wholly suit big scale mural painting. Modern buildings are different and have to put up with all kinds of shocks which affect the structures such as heavy traffic on the roads, lifts working and the like.

You suggested to me that the Conference Hall might be named Buddha Bhavan. I do not like bringing in Buddha here. Dr Radhakrishnan, I think, suggested Buddha Jayanti Bhavan. For the same reason I do not like this name either. A name has suggested itself to me, although I am by no means clear about it. This is Shanti Bhavan. We can consider this matter carefully somewhat later, when Dr Radhakrishnan comes back.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
13 June 1956

My dear Maulana,

As you perhaps know, I have received a draft for Rs.10 lakhs from the King of Saudi Arabia.² This is for the Aligarh University and is earmarked for the Medical College.

I did not quite know who to pay this to. I was waiting for Dr Zakir Husain to come back.³ I now understand that it will take some time for him to be back. I did not wish to delay to cash the cheque. I was afraid that if I sent it to the Aligarh University as it is, there might be formal delays. As I am leaving India soon, I have decided to cash the cheque and put the sum in fixed deposit for three months. This will earn a few thousand rupees for the Aligarh University. On my return from England, I shall hand over the money to them.

The President of the Aligarh Students' Union came to see me two days ago. He is a very nice boy. He said how sorry everybody in Aligarh was of Dr Zakir Husain's departure.⁴ They were very anxious that some person should be appointed as Vice-Chancellor who was not only competent but who could also fight communal and communist tendencies.

For some time past there have been rumours that Colonel Zaidi⁵ was going to be appointed Vice-Chancellor. I do not know how far this is true. I enclose a press report.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(6)/56-70-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. During the visit of Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the King of Saudi Arabia, in December 1955 to the Aligarh Muslim University, Zakir Husain, the Vice-Chancellor, had drawn his attention to some of the on-going projects, especially the nascent Medical College. On the King's invitation, a delegation from AMU led by Zakir Husain visited Riyadh in May 1956 where the King announced a donation of one million rupees for the College.
3. From early May to mid-August, he travelled overseas.
4. Zakir Husain resigned on 15 September 1956 to take up the Governorship of Bihar.
5. S.B.H. Zaidi succeeded Zakir Husain as the Vice-Chancellor of the Aligarh Muslim University.

IV. LANGUAGE QUESTION

1. Encouragement for Urdu¹

I send my greetings to the Conference of Urdu Writers and Poets which is being held in Hyderabad.² I think, it is important that we in India should encourage in every way possible the sound development of Urdu, which is our language, one of the national languages included in our Constitution. Its home is India.

Unfortunately, in the past it has been looked upon as some kind of rival to Hindi and there has been an unseemly controversy between the two. Hindi has an assured place in India which nobody can challenge. But we have to develop our other languages also and among them Urdu.

The way to develop a language is not by controversies with other languages but to make it a proper medium and vehicle of the thoughts and urges of the day. In the measure Urdu succeeds in this, it will grow and develop and play an important part in the life of India.

1. Message to All India Urdu Conference, New Delhi, 8 May 1956. JN Collection. Also available in PIB Files.
2. Held on 18 May 1956.

2. To G. B. Pant¹

New Delhi
12 June 1956

My dear Pantji,²

Your letter of June 12th with which you have sent me a letter from the President.³

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Home Affairs.
3. In his letter of 7 June 1956 to G.B. Pant, Rajendra Prasad had written: "As a beginning some day has to be made for introduction of Hindi as one of the media of examinations, I thought this large-scale recruitment might well furnish an occasion, and this could be done with the least disadvantage to those who do not know Hindi."

I appreciate the wish of the President to encourage Hindi in our Services and as an alternative medium for examination. I feel, however, that just at the present moment this would create a number of difficulties for us. You have yourself mentioned some of them.⁴ The major one, of course, is that we must avoid doing anything which creates further apprehensions in the South and in some other parts of India. As you will know, these apprehensions are not always based on any sound reason. Fear seldom is. We have seen a big agitation in the Punjab which I think is totally unjustified and is largely based on reasons which have nothing to do with language. Yet there it is. It is quite possible that if we took a step as suggested in regard to Hindi, there would be a strong reaction in the South and it will be thought that we are putting some kind of a barrier for people coming from the non-Hindi speaking areas of India. Of course, that would not be, because Hindi would only be an optional medium. But all the explanations we might give will be inadequate to convince people and they will say that this is a thin end of the wedge. We have had quite enough trouble of the language and linguistic provinces. To take any step which might add to it would not be wise and indeed, might not be in the interests of Hindi itself. Hindi will flourish because in the nature of things it has to do so. This progress will, however, be impeded by opposition elsewhere.

Also, when we start making Hindi as an optional medium we shall have to prepare for that carefully to see that more or less the same standards prevail. This is no easy matter. I doubt if it can be done at all in a hurry.

Thirdly, of course, there is the Official Language Commission and it is better to wait for its recommendations.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Pant pointed out: "if the examination is conducted not only in English but also in Hindi, two sets of examiners may have to be appointed and their methods of assessment and marking may not be identical." He also expressed that the people in the South might feel "that by allowing Hindi-speaking people to use Hindi as medium of examination, we were placing them at a disadvantage as they would have to answer their papers, not in their own regional language but in English."
5. For the Commission's report, submitted on 6 August 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 102.

V. TRIBAL AFFAIRS

(i) The Nagas

1. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
13 May 1956

My dear Medhi,²

This morning we had a conference to consider the Naga situation.³ Pantji and Dr Katju⁴ were present among our ministers and there were the senior officials of the External Affairs and Defence Ministries. Also our Army Chief of Staff, General Srinagesh.⁵

2. Nothing special had happened to necessitate such a conference, but we wanted to clear our minds not only about the present situation but the future. From a military point of view, some progress is being made on our side and no doubt this will continue. You suggested in one of your recent letters⁶ that more armed forces were necessary. The view of our Army Staff is that during the monsoon there will be no advantage in sending more forces. In fact, this may well be a liability because of the large scale arrangements necessary for maintaining them there. It may be that later it would be desirable to send more forces. We shall review the situation from time to time and, when it is necessary

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Assam.

3. From March 1955 the Naga extremists under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo, President of Naga National Council, incited serious disorders in the Tuensang Division of NEFA for the establishment of an independent Naga state. The situation was brought under control in January 1956, but the trouble had started in the Naga Hills District of Assam bordering the Tuensang division. The Naga Hills District was declared a disturbed area on 31 January 1956 by the Assam Government. As the Assam Police and Assam Rifles found it difficult to cope with the Naga armed gangs on account of bad terrain and lack of communications, in March 1956, army units were sent to the area at the request of the Assam Government. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 142 and Vol. 32, pp. 118-128.

4. K.N. Katju, Union Minister for Defence.

5. S.M. Srinagesh.

6. Of 7 May.

we shall try to send more forces. As far as we can see, this will not be necessary or desirable during the monsoon.

3. We recognize, of course, fully that this revolt of some of the Nagas has to be dealt with firmly and speedily. It is far better to restore law and order in these affected areas as quickly as possible, thus not to allow the situation to drag on. But, as I have said above, even from a military point of view, we cannot do very much in the interior hills during the monsoon. Operations will certainly continue even during the monsoon and we shall be preparing for a large-scale effort a little later.

4. That is, as I understand it, the military appraisal of the situation. But there is something much more to it than merely the military approach. These Naga troubles and revolts have a large significance for us in the international sphere and they give a handle to our opponents everywhere. More particularly, of course, Pakistan takes advantage of them. In view of our tense situation in regard to Pakistan, we have to be wary always and it is unfortunate that we should be tied up in the Naga Hills etc., when some other emergency might have to be faced by us.

5. But more important than all this is the question of the basic policy that we should pursue. There can be no doubt that an armed revolt has to be met by force and suppressed. There are no two opinions about that and we shall set about it as efficiently and effectively as possible. But our whole past and present outlook is based on force by itself being no remedy. We have repeated this in regard to the greater problems of the world. Much more, must we remember this when dealing with our own countrymen who have to be won over and not merely suppressed.

6. We have to remember that the operations in remote mountainous country without communications are always difficult. We have an example in Malaya⁷ where, it is said, that about 5000 or so rebels have held up very large British

7. When the Japanese occupation of Malaya ended in 1945 and the British were welcomed back, the Malayan Communists, consisting of 4,000 Chinese, former guerrillas from the Japanese war, school boys and criminals, made a bid to seize control over Malaya before the British took over the administration of many parts of the country. The British brought into force the Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948 through consultations with the Malay, Chinese and Indian leaders, according to which the British were given full control of defence and external affairs of the Federation. This was not acceptable to the Malayan Communist Party and the Malayan People's Liberation Army. Ultimately, the British defeated the Communists and handed over Malaya to Tengku Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister, in August 1957.

forces and aircraft now for seven years. In Malaya they have dense jungles, here we have this mountain area. Both are difficult of access. We know that the Nagas are tough people and are very disciplined. It is, therefore, conceivable that even when we have succeeded completely in a military sense, small-scale guerilla tactics may continue giving us continuous headaches, apart from our affecting our reputation both in India and abroad. How then are we to face this situation?

7. We shall, of course, use our armed forces to the fullest extent necessary. But, we have always to remember that the real solution will require a political approach and an attempt to make the Nagas feel that we are friendly to them and that they can be at home in India. It may be that the present is no time for the political approach, because it may be construed as a sign of weakness. But anyhow, our minds should be clear and even now onwards we should do nothing which will come in the way of that political approach and we should let it be known that we want to be friends with the Nagas unless they revolt against us.

8. In this morning's *The Times of India*, there is an article on the Nagas.⁸ This article is not a fair one, I think, and puts the blame entirely on our side. Even the facts are not correctly given. Nevertheless, there is some little truth in this article and I feel that we have not dealt with this question of the Nagas with wisdom in the past. We must not judge them as we would others who are undoubtedly part of India. The Nagas have no such background or sensation and we have to create that sensation among them by our goodwill and treatment. We shall have to think how we can produce this impression and what political

8. The three-part article "The Much-Maligned Nagas" by Harish Chandola pointed out that the Nagas were the most misunderstood people and the people of India had been fed on prejudices against them. They were well-organized and democratic but were driven to desperation by the Government's continued lack of understanding. According to the writer, the Naga demand for complete independence was recent, and all they sought in the beginning was regional autonomy and a status now enjoyed by the States of Manipur and Tripura. Even the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution disappointed the Nagas, as it asked them to elect a District Council by ignoring their village panchayats. The Nagas, the author revealed, feared that the new system would destroy their traditions and culture. Thus, they boycotted the elections to the District Council. But the Government judged their boycott as an act of hostility. The author pointed out that the Nagas were not given access at the right time to Nehru, G.B. Pant and U.N. Dhebar. All this, according to the writer, made the Nagas to believe that nothing short of an independent state could solve their problems and guarantee their social system. Lastly, the writer suggested that the only solution to the problem was to talk "and give them a fair chance to feel that they too are Indians."

steps may be necessary. This may come later of course, but the thinking part should begin from now onwards.

9. Unfortunately, the Nagas have got a particular grouse against the Assam Government. Your Government may not be responsible for this and the mere fact that you have to deal with them led to this situation. But the fact remains that they are very dissatisfied with the present position. One of their grievances is that under our Constitution we split them up in different political areas. Whether it is possible or desirable to bring them together again is for us to consider. Also, what measure of autonomy we should give them so that they can lead their own lives without any sensation of interference.

10. I suppose this developing Naga situation is bound to have some effect on the other Hill tribes in Assam. This has also to be borne in mind.

11. I have tried to think loudly in this letter, so that I might let you have a glimpse of my mind and I want you to think also and to have talks with your new Governor⁹ who has a good deal of experience and can view these questions with some wisdom.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. S. Fazl Ali was sworn in as Governor of Assam on 15 May 1956.

2. Broad Approach to Naga Problem¹

Our talks this morning about the Naga situation were rather inconclusive,² and yet they were helpful to some extent. Two or three facts emerged:

- (i) that the military approach alone is not adequate,

1. Note to N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, Subimal Dutt, Foreign Secretary, MEA, 13 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

- (ii) that the military approach has to be carried on as effectively as possible to break the back of this resistance;
- (iii) that we have to think of some political approach, but that any obvious move in this direction at the present moment may have an adverse effect.

2. We may, however, whenever an opportunity arises, give some hints or indication on the political side. For instance, I may refer to it in speeches etc. That reference is likely to be rather casual. I do not think a precise statement in Parliament or elsewhere would be desirable at this stage.

3. Meanwhile, we have to think more clearly of the future, so that when the time comes, we may be ready for any move that we may consider necessary.

4. The Army and the civil authorities should be made to understand again that we have to win over these people and nothing should be done which widens the gulf between us and the mass of the Nagas.

5. There was one matter which I had in mind, but forgot to mention this morning. This was the appointment of a senior civil officer to advise the Officer Commanding our forces there.³ At present, I suppose he has to deal with the Deputy Commissioner⁴ who, however good, can hardly fulfil this role. We might consider this matter a few days later.

6. The article in *The Times of India* this morning⁵ is not a fair representation of the problem and is to some extent factually incorrect. I think that some kind of a reply to it should be sent to the *The Times of India*. This might be drafted. It should be fairly brief. I should like to see it because I am concerned with some of the facts mentioned and I might be able to give the correct version. In the course of this reply, a hint could be given about our political approach without any definite commitment. All this will have to be carefully written and I am anxious to see it. The article would, of course, not be official.

7. Much is said in the *Times* article about our not seeing the Naga leaders.

3. For the overall command of the army as well as Assam Rifles and Assam Police, and also to intensify the combing operations, Raj Kumar Kochhar was appointed General Officer Commanding, Assam, in April 1956.

4. S.J.D. Carvalho.

5. See *ante*, p. 173.

I think, I have met Phizo three times, once in Delhi and twice in Assam.⁶ The Chief Minister of Assam and the Governor have met him and others too repeatedly. On the occasion at Kohima when I went there with U Nu,⁷ the facts are not correctly stated in the article. When we arrived there, we met the Naga leaders at a function and they presented us with gifts and a spear of peace etc. A little later we went to the public meeting.⁸ The moment I stood up there to speak, the Nagas got up and walked away. There is no doubt that the Deputy Commissioner⁹ had rather mismanaged the show. But it was not quite so bad on our part as is made out in the article.¹⁰ The Nagas had wanted to present their memorandum to me at the public meeting. The Deputy Commissioner had said that this could not be done, but the memorandum could be presented by a representative afterwards.¹¹

8. On previous occasions I had received memoranda from the Nagas and spoken to them at some length. I had always told them that I was not prepared to discuss independence, which seemed absurd to me. But if they gave up that demand, I was prepared to discuss everything else. There has not been any desire on our part to avoid meeting them or discussing with them except when

6. A five-member delegation, led by Phizo, met Nehru at Tezpur in December 1951. On 11 March 1952, a three-member delegation submitted a memorandum to Nehru in Delhi, when Nehru said that even if the heavens fell or India went to pieces, the Nagas would not be granted independence. On 24 October 1952, another memorandum demanding Naga sovereignty was presented to Nehru at Mao, when he was on a visit to the tribal areas in North East Frontier Agency. Nehru told them that his Government was not prepared to discuss the issue any more. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 150-151.
7. Nehru and U Nu, the Prime Minister of Myanmar, undertook a joint tour of the tribal areas on either side of the Indo-Myanmar border in March-April 1953.
8. The public meeting was held at Kohima on 30 March 1953. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 21, pp. 165-166.
9. S.N. Barkataki.
10. According to the article, the Naga Council widely publicized the news of Nehru's visit to Kohima and, as a result, 14,000 Nagas from different villages came to welcome him. They stood on both sides of the road, with presents to offer. But they were told that Nehru would receive neither an address of welcome nor presents. Hurt and frustrated, they walked away from the public meeting held later. After Nehru's departure from Kohima, the authorities arrested some of the defiant Nagas, seized their licensed arms, and searched their houses. As a consequence, many Naga leaders went underground.
11. Later when the Governor, Jairamdas Doulattram reprimanded the Naga leaders for their conduct, they submitted a written apology. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, p. 222.

they insist on talking independence only. During the last few months when violence crept into their activities, we made it clear that this violence should stop and independence must be given up before we could have a useful discussion.

9. It must also be remembered that Phizo has played a very mischievous part during these past months. He has said one thing to us and behaved differently.

3. To S. Fazl Ali¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,

I received your telegram. A few days ago I sent you copy of a letter I had written to the Chief Minister about the Naga situation.² We have seen some articles in *The Times of India* about this situation.³ The last article which appears today is a more sober one and more or less correctly represents the position.⁴

In the event of your speaking anywhere, perhaps you might make some mention of the Naga situation and indicate our broad approach to its problem.

1. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 171-174.

3. The article, published on 16 May, advocated establishment of a single autonomous unit for the entire region as a first step towards "political pacification" of the Nagas in which, the Congress and the Assam Government did not show interest. The article recommended immediate announcement of the political goal for the Nagas and building up of a special cadre of officers by the MEA trained to handle tribal problems.

4. The last article of 17 May viewed that due to preoccupation with vital problems immediately after independence, the Government of India failed to develop right kind of contacts with the Nagas and the Naga leaders notably, Phizo who misrepresented Government's policy towards the Nagas. Phizo condemned violence in public but organized violent gangs in secret and misled people that he had been promised independence in his meetings with the authorities. The Government welcomed discussions with the Nagas except when they insisted on independence and were determined to put down violence but not in any sense vindictive or revengeful. The Government also hoped that the Naga leaders would soon realize the futility of violence and cooperate in effecting a solution which would preserve their tribal autonomy within India.

You can say that we have always been friendly to the Nagas and desirous of their enjoying not only the full freedoms granted by the Indian Constitution but also a large measure of autonomy in their areas so that they can maintain their customs and social habits. We have no desire to interfere with these customs and social habits or their local autonomy. Unfortunately, they have taken to violent courses and these have to be met by Government and put down. No Government can tolerate this kind of violence. But we are always prepared to consider this broad question in a friendly way. This can only be done when violence is completely stopped and a proper atmosphere created.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Appraisal of the Naga Situation¹

Yesterday, I had a long talk with Shri Duncan² who is a member of the Public Service Commission of Assam now. He is half Khasi and has been in intimate touch with tribal affairs in Assam. He was Deputy Commissioner for some years in the Naga Hills District.

2. I discussed with him the background of the Naga agitation as well as the present situation. So far as the present situation was concerned, he was clearly of opinion that no political move can or should be made till the military operations have produced some substantial effect.

3. He was also clearly of opinion that the Naga Hills District should be brought under the Centre, either as a separate district or attached to the Tuensang Frontier Division. Further, that we should interfere as little as possible with the tribal customs and ways of doing things. He was not very satisfied with the working of the autonomous District Councils in the other tribal districts.

4. One aspect of this question has intrigued me for a long time. The Nagas were not previously known to be one community. The very name

1. Note to G.B. Pant, V.K. Krishna Menon, Minister without portfolio, Anil Kumar Chanda, Deputy Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, M. K. Vellodi, Defence Secretary, S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary and T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary (East) 19 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.

2. Simon Jenkins Duncan.

Naga is apparently not indigenous and was coined for these tribes by the British, who lumped up together a large number of tribes under this name. The principal tribes now called Nagas are the Semas, the Angamis and the Aos. It is well known that they have no common language even and that their dialects vary after every ten miles or so. They have blood feuds between different villages and, till fairly recently, they were cutting each other's heads in satisfaction of these blood feuds. Some of the tribes were rather dominant over others, notably the Semas, whose practice it was to levy tribute on the minor tribes. If the tribute was not paid, they led an expedition to punish the erring tribe. These Semas live in the Southern part of the Tuensang Division chiefly and partly in the adjoining Naga Hills District. Phizo is an Angami but he has had intimate contacts with the Semas and, last year, in spite of his public protestations, he encouraged the Semas to give trouble in the Tuensang Division. This trouble was put down.

5. How was it that these different tribes, often hostile to each other, came to function more or less as an organized unit? How did they develop this sense of something like common nationality? Mr Duncan had no adequate answer. It might be that the spread of Christianity to some extent brought about this common feeling. Those who became Christians became literate and had a measure of education in the missionary schools. They imposed themselves upon others. It may be also that the common feeling that came into existence was against the government apparatus which came in the way of the principal tribes dominating over the lesser ones and profiting by it.

6. However, the fact appears to be that some of these principal tribes, notably the Semas and the Angamis, are anti-Government at present, and they can dominate over the others.

7. I met yesterday Triloki Nath Purwar,³ who is a crank and who has done some mischief by his interference in Naga affairs. I believe, he is an honest man. But he thinks that fate has ordained that he should play a big role in bringing about a settlement between the Nagas and India. Apparently, he keeps in touch with them. He said that the Nagas were thinking in terms of a long conflict spreading over some years and that, for the present, they intended sending some kind of a deputation to the UN. Also, they hoped to intensify their operations during the monsoon and to spread out in the Tuensang Division also.

3. (b. 1924); a resident of Allahabad and a social worker who enjoyed the confidence of the underground Naga leaders and used to visit them unarmed; instrumental in influencing T. Sakhrie, member of the Executive Committee of NNC, who rejected the path of bloodshed and spoke of peace and non-violence.

8. I do not think that we need take these statements literally. They were passed on to Purwar to impress us and to frighten us a little. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it is always possible to carry on sporadic guerilla tactics in these difficult regions.

9. Purwar mentioned to me that it was likely that the Nagas obtained some help from Eastern Pakistan. Also, perhaps, from the KMT forces in Northern Burma, though how this could be done is not clear to me.

10. I do not think that it is desirable for us at this stage to make any political announcement. We have already stated clearly enough that, as soon as law and order are restored, we are prepared to consider these questions. More we cannot say, and, if we said much more, this may well be an encouragement to the Nagas to continue their mischief. They are under very misguided leadership. For the last six years or so we have dealt with them and found them most unaccommodating and even uncompromising. I agree that the Assam Government's dealing with their problems has not been very helpful, but we have to deal with the present situation, and I do not think that any attempt at political appeasement at this stage, beyond what we have said already, will achieve any useful result. It might do harm.

11. I think that it is inevitable that we shall have to take over the Naga Hills District under the Centre in the future. But we cannot do that or say that now. In effect, of course, the military command is dealing with the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Frontier Division, and civil authority is playing a very minor role. Elsewhere, I have suggested that it would be desirable to appoint a senior experienced civil officer to advise the military commander both for the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Frontier Division. This will, in practice, bring about that unity in the civil control too. I think, this idea should be pursued. It will mean, of course, a reference to the Assam Government.

12. Whenever the time comes for us to decide about the transfer of the Naga Hills District to Central control, the Assam Government is bound to resist this and to feel unhappy about it.

13. I do not take a tragic view of what is happening in the Naga Hills District, but I think that we have to be very vigilant and to watch each single development. We cannot be rigid in our approach. Our military officers functioning there should be told, as they have been told previously, that they have always to keep in mind that we have to win over these Nagas.

5. Question of Political Action in the Naga Hills¹

I have read these papers.² I recognize that the opinions of experienced officers, dealing with the Nagas, have to be given due weight. Also that the situation is essentially a serious one, though not in a military sense, and that we must bear in mind future developments. I have a feeling, however, that there is a slight tendency to be hustled into some action of a political kind. Political action will have to be taken, some has been taken in the various statements made. But we have always to weigh the effects of it on a complicated situation. First of all, it is always a doubtful matter how far such an action discourages or encourages the hostile elements. Secondly, we cannot ignore the Assam Government or the reactions in the people there and in the other Hill Districts.

2. I had a talk with the Home Minister this evening and discussed with him specially the appointment of a senior officer. He was not convinced of the advisability of such an appointment. The functions of such an officer would have to be clearly defined. There was also the possibility of difficulties arising as between this officer and the Military Command.

3. He ruled out, as I do, any constitutional change by Proclamation, as hinted in some of these papers. At this stage this would be clearly inadvisable. Without this change, the appointment of a senior officer would have little meaning. He might be called an Adviser to the Military Commander, and continue

1. Note to the Home Minister, 21 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. In his note of 20 May to the Prime Minister, T.N. Kaul proposed: (a) shortening of the period of military operations in the Naga Hills as far as possible by adopting a political and psychological approach simultaneously; (b) unification of civil administration in the Naga Hills and Tuensang through a Proclamation by the Governor and as this might lead to an uproar in the Assam Government, a beginning might be made by the appointment of a senior civil officer in charge of the civil administration of the two divisions with the consent of Assam Government from outside Assam Government and NEFA administration; (c) appointment of a new Deputy Commissioner for Naga Hills; (d) raising of two more Assam Rifles battalions to whom the Army should hand over Naga Hills District in due course; (e) a statement by the Prime Minister in the Parliament that the Government was determined to maintain unity and integrity of India and subject to that, proposals for maintaining unity of the Naga people and their tribal autonomy could be considered; (f) that the Assam Government should be persuaded to realize that for effective administration of Naga areas, it would be necessary to keep them under Central administration sooner or later.

to be in the present civil administration such as it is. It is not quite clear where he will fit in. Probably a less senior but experienced officer might fit in more easily as an adviser, but then what particular good would he do?

4. Any declaration of a state of grave emergency, even in a part of the area, justifying action under Article 352 of the Constitution appears to me undesirable.

5. If necessity arises, it might be possible for the Governor, by public notification, to exclude an area from the tribal areas attached to Assam. But this will require careful consideration and consultation with the Assam Government. I am not satisfied that this should be done at this stage.

6. As for my making some kind of a statement in Parliament, it is possible, though I cannot go much beyond what I have said. I am vaguely thinking of paying a visit to Shillong and possibly even to Kohima, in the second week of June. I have made no decision yet about it.

7. I have often said previously how much I respect and like the Nagas. I know that they are fairly tough people and we have to win them over. Nevertheless, I have a feeling that our nerves seem to be weakening. It does not help in dealing with tough people with weak nerves.

8. We must consider this matter fully and discuss it if necessary. I shall be grateful if the Home Minister will be good enough to see these papers, more especially the note by Joint Secretary T.N. Kaul, dated 20th May, and the papers flagged 'B', 'C', 'D' in this file. Afterwards, we shall discuss this matter further.

9. This file should be sent direct to the Home Minister.

6. Military Aspect Essential at Present¹

I have gone through the papers in this file. I attach considerable weight to the views expressed by T.N. Kaul.² He is fully familiar with the Naga problem and has tried to deal with it in a liberal way throughout, so much so that he virtually came in collision with the Assam Government because of his advocacy of the Naga cause. Yet, I must confess that I do not fully endorse his

1. Note to Foreign Secretary and Joint Secretary, MEA, 23 May 1956. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. See the preceding item.

suggestions. It has certainly to be borne in mind that the Naga problem is essentially political and not military but the issues which are facing us need not be mixed up. To some extent they overlap each other but perhaps, at present, while bearing the political objectives in view and also constantly remembering that we are not at war with the Nagas, who form an integral element of the entire Indian community, we have to concentrate for the time being on the military aspect. We should treat even the hostile Nagas in a humane and so far as possible friendly way, but nevertheless, we have to reconcile ourselves to effective means for resisting violence and breaking the bone of the resistance movement. Any constitutional change or even political pronouncements would be premature at this stage. The time is not ripe yet for it. They are likely to be regarded as the precursor of approaching surrender to the Phizo group and may tend to further stiffen their backs and result in the demoralization of the waverers. Even the liberal leaders may not feel happy over any such step in the existing circumstances. If it is considered advisable, a statement may be made in Parliament, but it will be perhaps no more than a repetition of what has already been said. I doubt if it will make any impression on the Nagas or result in any change in their mental or overt attitude.

7. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
28 May 1956

My dear Medhi,

Some two days ago I saw a paper purporting to contain certain proposals which some Naga leaders intended to put before the Government. I also saw a paper which contained alternative proposals which apparently had been suggested by the Assam Government.² I discussed this matter with Pantji.

1. Bisnuram Medhi Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. The Assam Government proposed that the Naga Hills District and the Tuensang Frontier Division should be constituted as a separate administrative unit within Assam, by adding an independent paragraph 22 in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. The area should have representatives in Parliament and the Assam Legislative Assembly. The administration of the area should be the responsibility of the Assam Governor. The President of India should issue directions to the Governor for securing peace, progress and good government of the area and might also appoint a special officer if necessary. No Act of the State Legislature should apply to the area until Governor extended it and all actions taken by the Governor should be reported to the President.

While both Pantji and I would welcome any forward move by the Naga leaders towards peace and a settlement, both of us were and are very definitely of opinion that this should be entirely their own move. It may be that we do not agree with it wholly. That does not matter and we are not committed to what they say and can consider it carefully later when we receive it. Any attempt of ours, directly or indirectly, to bring pressure upon them or to get them to change it, means first of all that it is not their own production but has been produced by them under pressure. Secondly, it means that we are committed to what is produced. Both these results would be unfortunate. A statement produced under some coercion has no value. Our varying anything and thereby committing ourselves to the whole might well put us in a very embarrassing position later, because we will be committed to it. If then we desire to make a change, we will be accused of going back on our word.

Therefore, I am not happy at all about these negotiations and any attempts made to bring pressure upon them to change a document or to sign it. Let them produce what they like freely and let us then consider it in a friendly spirit. If we want some changes made in it, we can then, after careful consideration, suggest those changes and discuss them with them.

While I do not wish to suggest the slightest change in a document they may draft themselves, it might perhaps be better for them not to mention Zapu Phizo by name in a document. Why should they give prominence to this man in this way?

I have been rather concerned about the case of the two men, Vizol and Megorto, who came here to interview us.³ I gather that on their return they were arrested and were subsequently "attached" as special constables or something like that to an Infantry Regiment.⁴ I was sorry to learn this and more so to learn that some pressure was brought to bear upon them to sign some documents.⁵ When these persons came to Delhi, we gave thought to the possibility of having them arrested here or later. We came to the definite conclusion that this should not be done.

3. A delegation of three Nagas namely Megorto, Vizol and Zashie Huire came to Delhi in March 1956. T.N. Kaul met them and explained the policy of the Government. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 120.

4. In fact, Vizol and Megorto were not arrested but were appointed as Special Police with the Sikh Light Infantry.

5. Vizol and Megorto separately clarified their stand vis-a-vis the Naga problem in brief statements.

I am glad to learn that the Naga Youth leader, Vilhume, surrendered yesterday.⁶ I am also glad that he was set free immediately in accordance with the declaration made by the Forces' Commander. This is a good sign, but we must not be deluded into thinking that this will be followed by the end of Naga resistance. We must proceed calmly and firmly and at the same time always making it clear that we want the friendship and cooperation of the Nagas.

I should like to add that it will be unfortunate if people get to know that there have been any kind of negotiations with the Naga leaders. This will embarrass us. I understand that there is already some talk among pressmen to this effect.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Vilhume, Phizo's private secretary and public relations officer of the Naga National Council, surrendered at Kohima on 27 May on General Officer Commanding, Assam, Raj Kumar Kochhar's appeal to the rebels to surrender. For his statement to the press on 29 May see *post*, p. 187.

8. The Naga Resistance and the Government Actions¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am not answering this question separately in the alphabetical

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 30 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. IV, Part I, 1956, cols. 4623-4628.

order of sections or parts, but the question as a whole.² This Short Notice Question is based on a number of wrong assumptions. For instance, there is only half a battalion of the Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Police in the Naga Hills. None of them have surrendered their arms to anyone. Again, it is not a fact that the operations in the Naga Hills against the violent gangsters have come to standstill by reason of the monsoon or otherwise. Despite the early setting of the monsoon in the middle of this month, our forces destroyed three strongholds of violent gangs concentrated at Khuivi, Vishyepu and Kivikhy, about 40 miles north-east of Kohima. On these places being cleared of the violent elements, the local population breathed a sigh of relief and voluntarily helped in the repair of the road, which had been damaged by the misguided elements. Action against the violent elements will continue during the monsoon, if necessary, until violence ceases.

2. Attempts were made by the violent Nagas to recruit youths and students to form a body of armed gangs, called the Naga Home Guards, in order to commit dacoity and extortion and collect food and money for the violent elements. Information in our possession does not reveal that any women or large number of youths and students have joined this body.

3. It has been reported that at a meeting held on 1st May, Phizo informed his associates that the Naga National Council existed no more. This announcement of Phizo, according to our information, has not found favour with several Naga leaders, some of whom have passed a resolution to reorganize the Naga National Council. We have only seen a copy of this resolution and

2. K. Muthuswamy Vallatharas, Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party member from Pudukkottai, wanted to know: (a) whether the two police battalions of Madhya Pradesh participating in the military operations in the Naga area had surrendered with their arms to the rebel Nagas; (b) whether the Naga National Council had been dissolved by the rebel Naga leader who assumed supreme command of the Naga opposition to the Government of India; (c) whether a Naga Home Guard had been formed and the youths, students and even Naga women had joined it in large numbers; (d) whether twelve Naga leaders had sent a memorandum to the Government, demanding general amnesty to the Nagas and if so, what were the terms of memorandum; (e) whether the Naga leaders who met the Central Home Minister about two months back in New Delhi, had been arrested and placed under detention in Assam; (f) whether the military operations in the Naga area had come to standstill due to the monsoon; (g) whether the Assam Government or the Officer-in-charge of the military operations had submitted a report of the recent happenings and the present situation to the Government of India; and (h) what special steps the Government had taken to check the activities of the rebel Nagas in the monsoon period.

have not yet received the original. The copy, as seen by us, asks for a general amnesty, the formation of a Naga State within the Indian Union and a referendum later. Among the signatories to this resolution are 2 of the 3 Nagas who came to Delhi about 2 months ago.³ These 2 Nagas are not under arrest; the 3rd is reported to have gone underground.⁴

4. The Forces' Commander has already issued a declaration assuring full protection to those who surrender their arms, unless they are involved in murder or heinous crimes. It is for the misguided elements among the Nagas to adopt a wiser policy and peaceful methods for the fulfilment of their legitimate aspirations. Government have already received assurances of peace and co-operation from about 100 villages. One of the important leaders of the Naga National Council and its Public Relations Officer, Shri Vilhume, surrendered on 27th May at Kohima and was set free in accordance with the Forces' Commander's declaration.

5. Government receive periodical reports about the situation in the Naga Hills. Steps have been taken to check the depredations and activities of the violent elements during the monsoon by (a) posting armed guards at various places, (b) organizing peaceful villagers for self-defence, and (c) enlisting the active cooperation of the Naga people. Lines of communications have been maintained intact and a few airstrips have also been constructed.

6. Government are determined to maintain the peace, integrity and unity of the Indian Union, and subject to this paramount consideration, Government have always been prepared to give due consideration to the legitimate aspirations of the Nagas.

In this reply that I have read out, there is reference to the recent surrender of Mr Vilhume, a leading member of the Naga National Council. Yesterday, I think, there appeared a statement by him in the public press.⁵ I am not reading

3. Megorto and Vizol. see *ante*, pp. 184-185.

4. Zashie Huire.

5. Vilhume issued this statement to the press on 29 May at Shillong giving reasons for deserting Phizo: "I parted company with Phizo as I disagreed with his violent policy by which he had brought immense misery on Naga masses... Phizo was issuing documents and publications as having been signed by me in the capacity of Public Relations Officer of the Naga National Council. Although I had never signed those documents, those had been published in my name absolutely without my knowledge and this really shows how Phizo is treating his old comrades and friends. Probably, his intention in doing so is to bluff the Nagas into believing that all his trusted lieutenants are still with him and thus not only deceive the Naga masses under his control, but also make them continue the programme of violence started by him."

it out because I presume honourable Members have read it in the press. It will show that how even leading members among the group which had been opposing the Government have realized the harm being done and the futility of the violent method and condemned violence and also condemned some of the leaders who have incited them to violence. This is a welcome development and, as will be seen, even this person who was a very prominent leader of the movement, when he surrendered, was set free. In effect, we give amnesty to everybody except someone who is guilty of, maybe, very serious and heinous crimes.

Vallatharas: Will it be the intention of Government to consider the question of a separate Naga State under the Republic and then start negotiations for the settlement of the outstanding problems, as suggested by some of these memorialists?

JN: Government are not prepared to consider making any political move or political change till conditions are settled and they can consider it calmly and dispassionately.

Khongmen:⁶ May I know if certain terrorists have entered the villages and terrorized people and extorted money and foodstuffs from the people and may I also know if a certain Naga chief of Mokokchung village with some 500 families has asked for protection by the military personnel and if so, what steps have Government taken to protect these people from the rebel Nagas?

JN: I did not hear the last part of the question. The first part was, I understand, if Government are aware of extortion of money etc., yes, that is so. We are aware of it and we are trying to stop that and we have succeeded in enlarging the area where they cannot function.

Speaker: The other portion is whether about 500 families have sought the protection of Government to help them get out of the clutches of the terrorists.

JN: I do not know about the number of families; but, they are constantly seeking protection and the Forces' Commander is giving it wherever he can. The difficulty, which, perhaps, honourable Members may not have thought of—is that even half a dozen persons may do a good lot of mischief. There are two types as I heard. There are certain strongholds which they make for purposes of taking defence. They are rather effectively made, making the advance of our forces very difficult. They put in spikes over it, covered with grass, so

6. Bonily Khongmen was Congress member from Assam.

that one could not see them. These are big strongholds. Most of them have been liquidated. Therefore, a large area is relatively free from the depredations of these hostile elements, and that area is increasing. The other thing is that of four or five persons suddenly swooping down in some village, and it is in the nature more of a dacoity than anything else. That kind of a thing is not a military operation; it is merely a police operation. The people there themselves do it. The people in these areas are progressively defending themselves much more against this kind of thing. From both these points of view, advance has been made, but in the wide hill areas with no communications, one can never be dead certain that there will be no dacoity or no attack like that just as even the House knows, the amount of difficulty we have had in dealing with gangs of dacoits in certain ravines in Madhya Bharat-UP area, where the terrain is bad and it is not easy to capture individuals or small groups. But the most hopeful factor about the Naga situation is that the leaders of the movement themselves are realizing the wrongness and the futility of the action they undertook and, more especially, the wrong lead that had been given to them. So far as we are concerned, we have made it perfectly clear that we cannot tolerate violence or any attempt to gain anything by violence, and we are not going to negotiate with anybody on the basis of threats and violence. Nor can we consider any matter in terms of anything that is against the unity and integrity of India. These are major factors. The other factors we have discussed, and we are prepared to consider what should be done because it is our object not to victimize, not to punish anybody, but to give them all the privileges and obligations of Indian citizenship.

H.N. Mukerjee:⁷ In view of the fact that Government's attitude, while technically justified, will perhaps only alienate further a proud people like the Nagas and other tribes, will Government contemplate the serious offer of complete amnesty conditional only upon a withdrawal of the movement and a promise of negotiations to follow? Will this gesture be made, particularly, in view of Buddha Jayanti?

JN: I have just pointed out what the Forces' Commander stated there. I need not tell the House that what the Forces' Commander states is just what we tell him to state; he does not function there as a local ruler, and whatever the Forces' Commander stated has been with the concurrence of the Government of India. The Forces' Commander stated something in the nature of a general amnesty except for those who are guilty of heinous crimes; in fact, there is a general

7. Hirendra Nath Mukerjee was Communist member from Calcutta north-east.

amnesty to those who surrender. You cannot give amnesty to those who hit you on the head all the time. Those who surrender are treated very leniently. In fact, a leader of the movement, as evidently the House knows, came and surrendered, and his surrender was accepted and he was set free. He is not proceeded against in any way. It is open to anybody to surrender and they will be treated alike.

Jaipal Singh:⁸ May I know if the special officer, the Commissioner for Scheduled Tribes,⁹ has played any role whatever in assisting Government in the taking of decisions? If he has, what role has he played? If he has not played any role, why not?

JN: I really do not know if that special officer for the scheduled tribes has played any part in this matter. He has some kind of assistant officer for those areas who has been in touch in the past certainly with the Government and with the other authorities and presumably still in touch. Apart from this, so far as the North East Frontier Administration is concerned, they have, as their special adviser in regard to tribal affairs, Dr Verrier Elwin.¹⁰ In this particular matter I do not know if he has anything to do with it, but he is a person with a great deal of knowledge of these areas, a person who is greatly respected there by all and whose opinion is always very helpful. But when a situation like this arises, then it is hardly a question of constructive approach. Constructive approach is important and must come, but one has to face hostile action in this way and to put an end to it and deal with the situation in a constructive way.

8. Jharkhand Party member from Ranchi.

9. L.M. Shrikant.

10. British anthropologist who worked amongst tribals in Central and North East India and became an Indian citizen in 1954.

9. To S. Fazl Ali¹

Camp: Bombay
1 June 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,

I have received your letter of May 27th. Since you wrote to me, some other developments have taken place and one of the noted Naga leaders, the Publicity

1. JN Collection.

Officer of Phizo, has left him and denounced him.² Some other happenings also indicate a certain weakening in the Naga ranks. All this is to the good. But we should not expect too much as a result of it.

Broadly speaking, I agree with what you have written. We have to continue our military operations firmly. So far as the political approach is concerned, I have said enough and I do not think, I will say much more now.

Major General Kochhar saw me in Delhi. His own opinion was that he would progressively contain the Nagas during the monsoon. After that he wanted six weeks to two months to clear up the whole area. This means practically the end of the year. He made it clear, however, that this would not mean that there would be no snipers or petty raiders. I would personally think that when the back of the Naga resistance has completely broken, the petty incidents are also likely to stop. Anyhow, we have to carry on.

Medhi has been writing to me repeatedly for additional armed forces to be sent, chiefly for the protection of the plains from possible Naga raids. I do not think this is desirable or necessary at this stage. We cannot use our Army for this minor police work and spread it out all over the plains bordering the Naga Hills. Kochhar told me of an instance when a few Nagas had gone to a village in the plains to buy some vegetables. On seeing them, all the villagers ran away. If they had remained at their post nothing would have happened and in any way a few lathis would have been enough to deal with the Nagas.

Kochhar indicated to me that he would require some more forces at the conclusion of the monsoon period for a swift campaign. He did not want any more forces now during the monsoon as this would be more of a burden to him than help.

I have seen some documents, purporting to be draft declarations to be made by some Naga leaders. Also, a revised declaration put forward apparently on behalf of the Assam Government.³ I wrote to Medhi about this. I was worried about the Assam Government getting entangled in this matter. I do not mind what declaration the Naga leaders put forward provided I am in no way committed to it. If the Assam Government wants to put forward a revised draft, then it is clear that they are committed to that draft.

Also, I do not want the slightest pressure to be exercised on the Naga leaders in this respect. I say so because I understand that pressure has been

2. See *ante*, p 187.

3. See *ante*, p. 183.

exercised. I think, this is a very wrong policy. We should, of course, welcome a proper declaration but it does not matter very much if the declaration is not wholly to our liking, provided we are not committed to it in any way. I wrote to Medhi to keep away from this business completely.

I have little doubt in my mind that some time or other the Naga Hills District will have to be joined to the Tuensang Frontier Division and both kept under the Centre. I know that the Assam Government will not like this but there is no help for it. I do not want to press for this just at this stage. We shall watch developments.

You refer to some statement by one Maijuddin Ahmed. I do not remember what this was.

I think that it is very important for our Intelligence to be good. Kochhar told me that it had improved considerably and, in fact, he was fairly close on the tracks of Phizo.

About sending a senior civil officer to advise the GOC, I have discussed this matter with the Home Minister. He was not quite clear as to what the functions of such an officer would be and how he would fit in with the existing set-up on the civil side. We shall discuss this matter further. I agree with you that Yusuf Ali⁴ is a good man and would suit.

I am sharing your letter with the Home Minister.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Rashid Yusuf Ali, Indian Frontier Administrative Service was at this time, the Deputy Adviser to the Assam Governor for NEFA.

10. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
5 June 1956

My dear Medhi,

Just before I went to Bombay, I had your long letter which, I think, I

1. JN Collection.

acknowledged.² I would have liked to have a talk with you in Bombay about the general situation. Unfortunately, I could not manage it, as we were all too busy with other engagements. Vaguely I had also an idea to go to Shillong for a day or two, and that would have given me an opportunity to meet you and to talk matters over with you. I now find that it is not possible for me, during the next few days, to visit Shillong. Within a fortnight, I have to leave India, and these intervening days are very full. I think, therefore, that regretfully I have to give up the idea of going to Shillong now.

On the whole, the situation in the affected areas, where military operations are going on, is better than it was. I might even say that it is a little better than we expected. But it is far from solution and we shall have to be careful. We have to continue to be firm and, at the same time, to leave the doors open for a proper settlement when the time comes for it. As I wrote to you previously, it would not be wise or safe to have any informal or other discussions with the Naga leaders about a settlement. These will commit us, and we may find it difficult later to get out of these commitments.

The last few years have shown that this Naga problem and, to a lesser extent, the whole problem of the tribal hill areas, is a very delicate and difficult problem. We have never viewed it as a military problem and will have to work for larger ends. Now that this upset has taken place, we shall have to think of every aspect of it and build more firmly for the future. We may indeed have to make some temporary arrangements which can later lead to a more final one. Anyhow, all this has to be considered very carefully in all its aspects.

2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 13 May, Medhi reiterated on 26 May, his argument for sending more army units to the north-eastern part of Naga Hills District not only to boost people's morale but also to combat the guerilla warfare of the Nagas. Medhi wrote that the Assam Government was encouraging Nagas to follow their traditions and customs and also enjoy the benefits of welfare administration at the same time. This approach, led to a serious rift in the leadership of Naga National Council and a positive movement had started against Phizo and his gangsters. Medhi denied that there was linguistic domination by the people of Assam and felt that Assamese was a natural lingua franca among innumerable tribes. The Naga demand for independence, he averred; had its roots before independence and the Assam Government had nothing to do with it, and there would be no problem if Nagas aspired for a united Nagaland, as the Constitution envisaged the possibility of their being brought together whenever necessary and convenient. If Nagas got a better deal because of their intransigence and hostility towards India, other hill tribes would be encouraged to force out similar advantages by being hostile and disloyal, he added.

I have been thinking that it would be helpful to Kochhar to have an Adviser from the civil side, with knowledge of tribal affairs. It seems to us that Yusuf Ali, who is at present Deputy Adviser to the Governor for NEFA, might be attached to Major General Kochhar. I think, this would be helpful to Kochhar. Kochhar is a good man, but obviously, he has to consider questions more from the military than from other points of view. Some views from the civil side, and more specially, from one who has a good deal of acquaintance with tribal affairs in the north-east, would create a better balance. Yusuf Ali's job will be thus to be attached to Kochhar and to advise him, when necessary, about dealings with the tribal folk.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To S. Fazl Ali¹

New Delhi
5 June 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,

I have just returned from Bombay.² On looking at my programme and engagements here during the next two weeks, I am afraid that it is not possible for me to pay a visit to Shillong as I had intended doing. This has to be dropped now.

In one of your letters you had suggested attaching Yusuf Ali, the Deputy Adviser, to Major General Kochhar. I think, this would be advisable.

At first, I had thought of some very senior civil officer being attached to Kochhar and being, in a sense, a liaison between him and the Assam Government. In effect, he would have dealt, from a civil point of view, with both the Tuensang Frontier Division and the Naga Hills District. On reconsideration, however, this course of action presented numerous difficulties. The Assam Government would have thought this an infringement of their authority and jurisdiction. As you know, they are very sensitive and suspicious in such matters. Also, the fact that we sent a very senior officer would have

1. JN Collection.

2. Nehru was in Bombay from 31 May to 5 June.

had some such implication. Further, he might not quite have fitted in with the military apparatus.

These difficulties do not arise if we send an officer of Yusuf Ali's standing to function as an Adviser to Major General Kochhar. He will not be a liaison with the Assam Government. He will just be attached to Kochhar to give him advice about tribal matters. I suppose that this will not raise any difficulties or suspicions with the Assam Government. I am writing a brief letter to the Chief Minister, a copy of which I enclose.

You will remember that I wrote to the Chief Minister at some length some time ago and sent you a copy of that letter. Medhi replied to me at greater length, and was evidently disturbed at the suggestion that the Naga Hills District might go out of his jurisdiction.³ We need not deal with this question at present, but I have no doubt that we shall have to deal with it later. Any kind of settlement of the Naga problem will have to include this matter. For the present, however, we need not raise it.

We are consulting the Army Headquarters here about Yusuf Ali being attached to Kochhar, and some kind of a formal communication will be sent on this subject a little later. Meanwhile, I should like you to explain to Yusuf Ali what his functions are going to be. He will have to be particularly careful not to do anything which rubs the Assam Government up the wrong way. That is, he must not directly interfere with the civil administration of the Naga Hills. His contacts should be, in the main, with Kochhar. He will advise him about tribal affairs generally and the Nagas. He might meet any Nagas that surrender and come to Kochhar. He should keep friendly contacts with the Deputy Commissioner of the Naga Hills District without appearing to interfere in his jurisdiction. In other words, he will have to exercise a great deal of tact, both in his dealings with the military and the Assam administration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See the preceding item.

12. To Bisnuram Medhi¹

New Delhi
12 June 1956

My dear Medhi,

Thank you for your letter of June 10.

The suggestion I made about a civil adviser for Major General Kochhar was not meant in any way to come in the way of the civil administration in the Naga Hills District or in the Tuensang Division, nor was it a criticism of it. So far as I know, your Deputy Commissioners and others are doing good work and are maintaining helpful contacts with the Forces' Commander. As you say, the position is different from that of martial law. The civil administration is functioning except in so far as military operations take place.

It is essential that close contacts of your civil officials from the Chief Secretary down to the Deputy Commissioners and others should be maintained with the Forces' Commander and that nothing should come in the way of such contacts.

Our purpose in suggesting a civil adviser was partly for our own benefit and partly for Kochhar's. He has to deal with a wide area and the civil officials have to deal with their own duties which are fairly heavy. I am glad that you have appointed an Additional Deputy Commissioner² and an Additional Superintendent of Police³ in the Naga Hills District. But obviously, none of them can be all the time with the Forces' Commander, nor can the officials of the Tuensang Division be with him. We wanted somebody with him who was fully acquainted with our viewpoint and could help whenever necessity arose. So far as the Tuensang Division is concerned, Yusuf Ali is very well acquainted with it and would be exceedingly helpful. This would not apply so much to the Naga Hills, so far as acquaintance with the area is concerned. But he would be a very good link between us here and Major General Kochhar. I think, he would be helpful to you also to some extent. This would be a temporary arrangement which seems to me desirable from various points of view which I

1. JN Collection.

2. R.S. Paramasivan was appointed Additional Deputy Commissioner of Naga Hills District in April 1956.

3. Jnanda Sarma Pathak was appointed Additional Superintendent of Police of Naga Hills District.

have mentioned above. The appointment of a Naga adviser, if it is necessary, can be made. But that does not serve the purpose at all from the point of view I have mentioned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. No Scorched Earth Policy¹

In *The Times of India* this morning there is a message from Shillong. In the course of this message, it is said:-

One of the methods adopted by the Army in the operations against the rebel Nagas is denial of essential supplies, mainly of foodstuffs. Recently, a huge rebel stockpile of rice, estimated at several thousands of *maunds*, was discovered by the Army deep inside the nearly inaccessible jungle country. Since the stock could not easily be removed, because of lack of means of transport, it was burnt.

2. I have just separately sent you a note about our distributing foodgrains free to those in need of them in the Naga areas, through our military personnel.² It seems very odd that when there is such food scarcity in the Naga Hills, our Army should actually destroy large stocks of rice. Normally, we do not like this scorched earth policy. It may be sometimes necessary to prevent supplies reaching the rebel Nagas, but this seems to go much beyond that, and is bound to affect the surrounding population.

3. Will you please enquire about this?

1. Note to M.K. Vellodi, Defence Secretary, 12 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. In his note of 11 June, (not printed), Nehru wrote that the Ministry of Food and Agriculture would hand over 500 tons of foodgrains to the Defence Ministry which should arrange for its distribution through the Forces' Commander, R.K. Kochhar.

14. Use of Harvard Aircraft in Naga Operations¹

I had a talk with General Srinagesh this afternoon. I agreed with him in the various steps which he had taken or intended to take. I think that we should make an effort to expedite repairs and construction of roads in this area. The Assam Government should be approached in this matter immediately.

2. The only real question that arises for us to consider is General Srinagesh's suggestion that "As a further measure of affording protection I propose resorting to machine-gunning from the air with Harvard aircraft to deal speedily with known concentrations of hostiles which present a favourable target for this mode of attack". I take it that this refers to the Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal road and possibly to the other road Amguri-Mokokchung. It does not relate to any other area.

3. I should not like to encourage this machine-gunning from the air. But, in the balance, I should not like to come in the way if the General considers it necessary. But one thing should be made perfectly clear and that is that we can take no risks with Harvard aircraft. We cannot afford to have a Harvard struck by snipers and possibly brought down. Apart from the loss caused to us, the other consequences will be very bad and this would greatly increase the morale of the hostiles. This matter should, therefore, be discussed with the Air Marshal.²

4. Subject to this discussion, and subject also to this method being only used in very particular emergencies and not if it can be easily avoided, I would be prepared to accept General Srinagesh's suggestion.

1. Note to Defence Secretary, 15 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. Subroto Mukherjee.

15. To S. Fazl Ali¹

New Delhi
19 June 1956

My dear Fazl Ali,

I am writing to you in some haste. I want to clear up a great deal of work before I go.

1. JN Collection.

Thank you for your letter of June 12th. I have today sent a telegram to Medhi,² a copy of which will be repeated to you.

I like your idea of opening relief camps for the Nagas. We have already placed a large quantity of food grains at General Kochhar's disposal. I am enclosing a cheque for Rs. ten thousand, which you can use at your discretion for this relief work.

We had a conference this morning with the Defence Minister, the Defence Secretary and General Srinagesh, and the whole question of the Naga Hills etc., was discussed. I must say that our Army people were certainly not wide awake or alert when these recent unfortunate occurrences took place near Kohima.³ I hope they have had their lesson. As you know, more troops have been sent.

It is difficult for me to advise you about the use of Naga officers. My own inclination would be to use them. How and where can only be determined by someone on the spot.

You know, perhaps, that we have got an Angami Naga girl serving as an Information Officer in the External Affairs Ministry. Her name is Miss N. Haralu.⁴ Her brother is Silie Haralu⁵ who, I think, is a fairly important person among the Nagas. She came to see me today and said that she was very worried at developments. On the one hand, recent incidents near Kohima⁶ had a very bad effect on the loyal elements. On the other hand, Nagas were being killed and were likely to be killed more in the future. Woman-like, she was not very consistent. She wanted firm action and at the same time a friendly

2. See *post*, p. 201.

3. On 11 June 1956, a large band of young Naga hostiles in army uniforms equipped with modern automatic weapons, ambushed a convoy near Kohima on Dimapur-Imphal road. They shot dead three persons, seized eleven trucks belonging to the Manipur State Transport laden with goods worth Rs. Seven lakhs. Again on 13 June, Naga hostiles launched a surprise attack on Kohima town killing six civilians and indulged in looting. A considerable quantity of arms and ammunition belonging to loyal Nagas were also taken away by the hostiles. Several village headmen were reported missing and able-bodied Nagas taken captive.

4. Niechulieu Nikki Haralu (b. 1922); Assistant Research Officer, MEA, 1954-55; Information Officer, MEA, 1955-58; Press Attache, Brussels, 1958-62; First Secretary (Information), Rome, 1962-65; Deputy Director, External Publicity, 1965-68; First Secretary (Information), Washington, 1968-71; First Secretary (Information), Colombo, 1971-75; Deputy Secretary, East Asia, 1975.

5. Naga leader of the liberal moderate group which opposed violence; Secretary of the Naga National Council after T. Sakhrie's death in January 1956.

6. See *post*, p. 201.

settlement as soon as possible. What were the friendly approach we were making, she asked. How could we settle the problem without making friends with these people. I can well understand her dilemma.

As you know, Medhi has worked himself up about my proposal to send a civil adviser to Kochhar. I shall not send Yusuf Ali now. But, even so, I think someone should be sent to Kochhar, and I have asked Medhi, in consultation with you, to find a suitable person. He should be at least of Deputy Commissioner status and this should be a full time job.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

16. Failure of Civil Administration¹

We have received information that civil administration has totally failed in areas of Mokokchung.² Eighty-six villages have been burnt, and people going about hungry without houses, unprotected and uncared for. As a result of this, the youngmen there are infuriated and disloyalty spreading fast.

2. I do not know exactly what has happened at Mokokchung and who is responsible for the burning of these villages. Anyhow, we must give them adequate relief immediately. I have asked the Governor to undertake this. Please ask Major General Sant Singh³ to discuss this matter as well as the general situation with the Governor.

1. Note to Defence Secretary, 20 June 1956, JN Collection.
2. Mokokchung sub-division in Naga Hills District witnessed violence in June when postal bags were snatched away by hostiles at some places. As a result the dak system to the rural areas was paralyzed. At Ghukiam a rural dispensary was attacked and looted. Dispensaries at other places were closed down. The local population was terrified as there was a feeling that the civil administration had failed to protect the loyal citizens. The hostiles distributed leaflets stating that Mokokchung would be attacked further and asked the civilians to leave the place.
3. GOC, Eastern Command.

17. Telegram to Bisnuram Medhi¹

Have received your letters and your telegram of June 16th.² Recent incidents near Kohima have been most unfortunate and will no doubt boost up morale of hostiles. But we need not attach too much importance to them. Anyhow, adequate measures have now been taken and a new plan of action prepared.

2. As you are so much averse to our sending civil adviser to General Kochhar, I do not propose to send any for the present. I would suggest, however, your attaching some competent and fairly senior person acquainted with Naga Hills to General Kochhar's staff. You might consult Governor about this and also Kochhar. It is not enough for Deputy Commissioners and others to advise him. This is useful, but Kochhar should have someone constantly with him.

3. There has been constant leakage from Gauhati about Army messages. *The Times of India* correspondent at Gauhati apparently has access to these Army messages sent to your Government. Please take stringent measures to prevent this.

4. Governor has written to me suggesting that relief camps should be started at Kohima, Mokokchung and other places. I like this suggestion. As you know, we have already given General Kochhar a large quantity of foodgrains for free distribution. If necessary, I shall send some money later from Prime Minister's Fund.

1. New Delhi, 20 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. Medhi had written that there were well-planned attacks both on Kohima village and town for about three days. Water supply in Kohima town and its police station were damaged and civil hospital and Government institutions subjected to continuous firing. Kohima village was completely deserted due to failure to provide protection to loyal elements. He also wrote that since Kochhar was being advised in all civil matters by Deputy Commissioner, Superintendent of Police, and Assistant Director, Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau, addition of another adviser to him was likely to introduce an element of uncertainty and misapprehension.

(ii) Others

1. On Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff¹

We had a talk about this this morning.²

2. I do not understand how we can accuse Mr Sucksdorff³ of having abused the privilege given to him. It is clearly stated in the letter of our High Commissioner, dated 15th February,⁴ that he wanted to make a colour film of the State and the tribal people. From all other accounts also, Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff are decent people and are friendly to India. I think, therefore, that we must treat them as such. I do not personally attach any importance to his taking pictures of a woman suckling a baby or with naked breast. There is nothing improper about this.

3. What I am worried about is that his activities in the interior of Bastar district might lead to some trouble with the tribal people there who can easily be excited. There is some conflicting evidence about this matter. Mr Sucksdorff indicates that he and his wife have become very popular with the tribal people.

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, MEA. 13 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff, Swedish documentary film makers of international renown, had been given certain facilities to portray the wild life and tribal life in Bastar, Madhya Pradesh in the first half of 1955. However, the local officials complained that the Sucksdorffs gradually strayed into fictional aboriginal life which was likely to wound the susceptibilities of the aboriginal people. On the basis of the letters from the Madhya Pradesh Government, Subimal Dutt advised P.M. Lad, Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, on 9 May to withdraw all privileges given to the Sucksdorffs and demand surrender of the objectionable films.
3. Arne Edvard Sucksdorff (b. 1917): Swedish film producer made a series of nature films; his documentaries were *Shadow over the Snow*, *The Open Road*, *Indian Village*, and feature films, *The Great Adventure*, *The Flute and the Arrow*.
4. On 15 February 1955, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Indian High Commissioner in London, wrote to M.O. Mathai, private secretary to Nehru, introducing Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff, who, had some time ago, made a film called *Indian Village* which was not approved by the Indian authorities. Now they wanted to go to Bastar to make a film on the tribal people but were afraid that they might not receive the cooperation and assistance from Indian officials owing to the prejudice against their last film. Mrs Pandit emphasized that Mr Sucksdorff was a friend of India and any interpretation of India by him could not be an unfriendly one and requested Mathai to give them assistance in their new project.

The Deputy Commissioner⁵ says that the tribal people are much agitated, and there is a feeling against Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff. Both these can hardly be true.

Possibly, some people may have complained to the Deputy Commissioner. Anyhow, we cannot afford to take a risk about the law and order situation.

4. I see in some of these papers that Mr Sucksdorff was disappointed with Bastar and wanted to go elsewhere and, more especially, to Assam.

5. I think, Mr Sucksdorff might be told that, in dealing with tribal people, there is sometimes a risk of their taking it ill and then a difficult situation arises. Naturally, we want to avoid this. According to our information, some of the tribal people have objected to his presence in Bastar. If that is so, we would not like him to do anything in that particular area, which may lead to an incident. We do not wish to come in his way, however, and we are prepared that he can go to almost any place in India with some exceptions. Even in Bastar district, we will have no objection provided the Deputy Commissioner thinks that that particular part will not object or raise any difficulties. So far as Assam is concerned, he can go to Shillong and the neighbourhood. Also, to the Lushai Hills. Obviously, he cannot go to the areas where we are having some operations. Nor would we like him to go to NEFA where communications are very primitive and we have to take special precautions.

6. Probably, it would be desirable from his own point of view to attach someone from the I & B Ministry who could help him and advise him about the areas to be visited.

7. We should treat Mr and Mrs Sucksdorff with as much courtesy as possible. I do not think they are to blame at all in this matter. We have encouraged them and they appear to me to be people of good intentions.⁶

5. Davinder Nath.

6. In his letter of 14 May to Lad, Dutt advised to give all facilities to the Sucksdorffs to complete the picture in some other part of Bastar district and to attach an officer of junior rank with them. He confessed that he was somewhat hasty in reaching certain conclusions on the basis of the letters he received from Madhya Pradesh Government.

2. Employing Hmar Tribal People¹

Please reply to this letter from Shri L. Tawna as follows:-

“Dear Sir,

The Prime Minister has received your letter of May 16. He would like me to inform you that he is much interested in the progress of the Hmar tribal people² and he would like to help them.

2. So far as Union Services are concerned or the Indian Foreign Service, recruitment to them takes place through a competitive examination and afterwards by selection by the Union Public Service Commission. Direct appointments to them are not made.

3. If you will send particulars to us of any outstanding graduates and postgraduates mentioning their qualifications and the training and experience they have, we shall consider what may be possible. We shall forward them to the Assam and Manipur administrations.³

Yours faithfully”

1. Note to B.N. Kaul, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 6 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. The largest concentration of Hmar tribe is found in Churachandpur, Tipaimukh and Jiribam subdivisions of Manipur. A good number of Hmars are also found in Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura and also in the north Cachar hills of Assam. Though scattered, they maintain their common customs and culture as well as their own dialect.
3. Nehru also enquired from the Manipur and Assam Governments if any of the Hmars were employed by them.

VI. SOCIAL WELFARE

1. To E.W. Aryanayakam¹

New Delhi

7 May 1956

My dear Aryanayakam,²

Thank you for your letter of May 4 and a copy of Dr Wilson's letter. I do not know what other people's views are about the work at Sevagram. But I have not thought at any time that it was not progressive or scientific. I think, it is an excellent institution. I have, however, wondered sometimes how far it could be duplicated on a large scale in India.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Education Ministry.
2. Gandhian constructive worker from Sri Lanka; served as Secretary, Hindustani Talimi Sangh for several years.

2. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi

8 June 1956

My dear Maulana,

I have received your letter of the 8th June with which you have sent a letter

1. File No. 17(19)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

and a note from Dr Shrimali² about the Central Social Welfare Board.³ I shall gladly discuss this matter with you.

I might remind you that this question was raised at the last meeting of the National Development Council at which all the Chief Ministers were present. One Chief Minister, I think, it was Hanumanthaiya of Mysore, criticized the working of the Central Social Welfare Board. Thereupon, others expressed their opinion and most of them spoke highly of the good work done by this Board.

I cannot, of course, speak of the financial aspect. *Prima facie*, it does appear that the expenditure is heavy and deserves closer attention. But I have little doubt that the Board has done good work in a field which was suffering from neglect. Local social work organizations in various cities and elsewhere, no doubt, were doing good work. But taken as a whole, there was not only complete lack of coordination but also no driving force. That driving force has now been supplied and the result has been on the whole good.

It is true that the original idea of the Board was to assist voluntary organizations. Lately, the Board has undertaken some direct projects. These direct projects appear to be good by themselves, though again I cannot say whether we get our money's worth. The question of jeeps was specially raised at the National Development Council and this was a heavy item. It was pointed out, however, by some Chief Ministers that it was not possible for the welfare organizations to work in the rural areas without some conveyance of this kind.⁴ Anyhow, the jeeps are there now and this question becomes rather a theoretical one. The broad criticism of Dr Shrimali, however, does appear to be correct, that is to say, that 26½ per cent of the funds are spent on administration and organizational purposes only.

2. K.L. Shrimali, Deputy Education Minister, Central Government had written to Azad on 5 June that between December 1953 and March 1956, the Central Social Welfare Board had spent 26½% of the total expenditure on administration and organizational purposes alone. According to him, the Ministries of Education and Finance, though represented on the Board, could not exercise effective control over its expenditure under the existing constitution.
3. The Central Social Welfare Board was set up by the Government of India under the Ministry of Education on 12 August 1953 as an autonomous body to give financial and technical assistance to institutions engaged in welfare work. It consisted of eleven members, six of which including the Chairman, Durgabai Deshmukh, were women.
4. Shrimali had written that the Board had spent Rs. 3368,200/- on jeeps in this period.

The two journals that the Board publishes are very good, as Dr Shrimali himself says.⁵ But evidently, little attention has been paid to the business aspect of these journals. I imagine that this business aspect can be improved and the loss on them considerably lessened. I see no reason why so many free copies of these journals should be supplied. The free list should be cut down very rigorously. Thus, Members of Parliament need not get them. Some copies can be sent to the Parliament Library.

I doubt very much if the Community Projects Administration can take up this work.⁶ It is heavily overburdened with work and cannot keep up with what it has already undertaken. We are training tens of thousands of workers for the Community Projects and the National Extension Service. It may be that at a later stage the two can be combined. But this is not feasible now. There is, however, the question of overlapping to which attention was drawn in the National Development Council. We were told that every effort was made to avoid this overlapping.

As regards the Chairman, the point raised by Dr Shrimali has some importance.⁷ But there is no doubt that the present Chairman has thrown herself with great energy into this work and has achieved considerable results. For this and other reasons, I do not think it will be desirable to raise this personal issue at this stage.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. According to Shrimali, the monthly journals *Social Welfare* and *Samaj Kalyan* could "compare favourably with attractive American journals but I am doubtful about their utility." He also mentioned losses incurred by the Board on this account and said that the way these journals were being managed was "neither good business nor social service".
6. Shrimali had suggested that organizing welfare extension programme could be easily linked up with Community Project Administration which was expected to cover the whole country by the end of the Second Plan. In his view, there was no need of a separate organization for this work.
7. Shrimali stated that the Central Social Welfare Board had not taken care in spending public funds and the Chairman, Durgabai Deshmukh had "greatly resented suggestions from the Ministry of Education." He felt that, "it was a great mistake to appoint the wife of Finance Minister as the Chairman of a Board which administers such large funds."

3. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi

9 June 1956

My dear Maulana,

I wrote to you yesterday in answer to your letter about the Central Social Welfare Board. I have thought a little more about this matter. I have no doubt that it is possible to make many criticisms of the work of the Board or of the Chairman. But it seems to me that this Central Social Welfare Board has filled a definite vacuum in our social life and has also given a great incentive to social work.

I think, it will be definitely unfortunate if an organization that has been widely welcomed for its work and which has tackled a problem which is normally overlooked by us, should be wound up. The whole field of this work has only been tackled in a small way in some cities. For the first time, an attempt is being made to tackle it in an organized way and also to approach the rural areas. Mistakes are, no doubt, made and money not always properly employed.

Another important feature of the work is that it has drawn out large numbers of women who are now engaged in this work. In such work, of course, the human aspect is most important, and normally official agencies cannot function satisfactorily.

I find that there is fairly close cooperation between the Community Projects Administration and this work and overlapping is avoided. In fact, the Central Social Welfare Board does not have any centre where there is a Community Project. It has some centres in the National Extension Service blocks because there was no provision for women's welfare in these blocks and a demand for it came.

In spite of its many deficiencies, the Central Social Welfare Board has, I think, done pioneer work in a new field with commendable energy and enthusiasm. We should try to improve it. But it would be a pity, and it would rouse much criticism, if we tried to stop this. As it is, our women folk have been sadly neglected in the past.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(19)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

VII. HEALTH

1. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear Gulzarilal,²

I understand that you have been carrying on arguments with the *vaid*s and hakims on behalf of the Planning Commission. I do not quite know how this matter came up before the Planning Commission.³ Anyhow, I hope that no commitment will be made to them in regard to any change in our present policy. This policy, I take it, is to encourage the Unani and Ayurvedic systems of medicine subject always to some adequate training in modern methods of anatomy, pathology, etc. That is, the approach must be a scientific approach.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 28(27)/56-57-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Planning, and Irrigation and Power.
3. Nanda explained on 18 May that the Commission had constituted a Health Panel, and with the approval of the Minister for Health, *vaid*s and homeopaths were consulted about certain policy matters as well as allocations in the Plan, regarding these systems.

2. Health Services for All¹

Mr President,² Fellows of the College, friends,

This is a somewhat unusual experience for me. I have had the honour of receiving a fairly large number of honorary degrees from universities. But this

1. Speech delivered at the special convocation of the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Sunderbai Hall, Mumbai, 1 June 1956, AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Shantilal Sheth.

is the first time a distinguished College of Medicine and Surgery has tried to envelop me in its fold.³ I feel a little as if I was in somebody's borrowed shoes. I also feel rather nervous, lest ignorant people might come to me for treatment.

I must say that these doctorates which are of so many varieties, are very confusing. I believe in Germany they clearly say whether a person is a medical doctor, a legal doctor, or a philosophical doctor. A person I know came back from America with a doctorate. He was an American himself. He came back to my home-town of Allahabad, and when I asked him what he got his doctorate in, he said he was a Doctor of Philanthropy.

I remember long ago when I was still practising at the Bar in Allahabad,⁴ a colleague of mine, who later became the Chief Justice of the Allahabad high Court, Dr Sulaiman,⁵ he had a good practice and another person in the Bar was rather jealous of his good practice. He let it be known privately to all kinds of people that Dr Sulaiman was really some kind of a veterinary doctor.

So, it is very confusing to the layman in India where doctors are thought of in terms of medical doctors. There is likely to be a great deal of confusion. Once you start giving degrees to persons not for their medical or surgical knowledge, but for other qualities or reputations that they may possess, difficulties are likely to arise.

But I am very thankful to you, because in giving me this honorary fellowship you have expressed your appreciation, not of course of my medical or surgical knowledge, but apparently of other qualities that I might be supposed to possess.

In the course of your remarks, you have referred to the necessity of providing large numbers of medical men and women to our vast rural areas and small towns which lack medical service. That, of course, is a very important and vital need. But a difficulty comes in. If we try to send fully trained doctors—those who have gone through six or seven years' course—we are not likely to have enough of them for a long long time.

3. The College conferred honorary doctorates on Nehru and Morarji Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay.
4. From 1912 to 1920.
5. Shah Muhammad Sulaiman (1886–1941); Judge and scientist; Judge, Allahabad High Court, May 1923; Officiating Chief Justice at Allahabad High Court at different periods in 1928, 1929 and 1931; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1929, 1930 and 1938; Chief Justice at Allahabad High Court, 1932–37; Judge, Federal Court of India, 1937–41.

You referred in your remarks to short courses of training for the purpose. I do not quite know what that means—whether you refer to people who do not go through the full course and are not fully qualified but are half-qualified and then they are sent out, or if you propose to produce qualified men in some compressed course of training. Nobody, I take it, certainly not members of your College, would like to lower standards in the slightest. Because we can't have low standards. The problem, nevertheless, is how to provide large numbers of people in our villages, especially in other distant areas, when we have not got and cannot produce in the near future, an adequate number of them fully trained.

It has been suggested that there might be shorter courses, not to produce fully qualified doctors, but people who might be called assistant doctors, or whatever, who would function in an area attached to some qualified doctor, and who could refer to him serious cases. It is a matter to be considered.

The other question that often arises in India, and in our Parliament, is the place of what are called our indigenous systems of medicine, the Ayurvedic and Unani. I don't know what many of you think of these systems of medicine. Maybe, you differ in your opinions. I can only tell you what I feel about it. I have no doubt that our systems of medicine made very considerable progress, on what might be called, broadly speaking, scientific lines. In fact, at one time rather long ago, medicine and surgery in India were possibly as advancing, if not more advanced than, any in the wide world. I remember reading many years ago about Harun-al-Rashid⁶ sending for an eminent physician from the University of Taxila.⁷ Arab medicine was by no means backward. It was advanced medicine even in those days. Our indigenous systems of medicine were also advanced. I think it is equally true that they became rather rigid and closed in, and lost the capacity to advance, while the rest of the world, by experimental scientific methods of trial and error, made progress in the discovery of more knowledge.

Now, the question is how we could take advantage of such accumulated experience as the country might possess with regard to its indigenous systems? I have little doubt that there is much in that accumulated experience so far as curative remedies are concerned. But I have equally little doubt of this fact

6. He was the fifth Abbasid Khalifa of Baghdad who ruled from 786 to 809 A.D.

7. According to the Arab accounts of India, when Harun-al-Rashid fell ill and could not be cured by his physicians, he sent for an Indian physician, Manka Bazigar. The physician cured the Khalifa who conferred gifts on him and fixed a handsome salary.

that if we are to progress at all, we must adhere strictly to scientific methods and to scientific training. In so far as Ayurvedic or Unani systems can be utilized and made to progress, that can only be done if they put themselves in line with scientific methods. I am glad that in some places in India, more especially, I think in Jamnagar, an attempt has been made to that end. I do not, therefore, see why there should be so much argument about this question if once you acknowledge that we must proceed on the lines of science. Science is not a closed system, it is an open thing. An open method of discovering the truth, wherever they may find it and whatever it may be, even though it may convince you of your previous errors, you have to discard your previous errors and not stick to them. But, you must be open-minded and not sit in your ivory tower, thinking that only you have a glimpse of the truth and nobody else has.

That spread of medical services in this country is bound to take place. How is it going to be done? I have little doubt that the only way it can be done effectively is through the state taking it up. Personally, I believe in the state being connected with medical services much more intimately and deeply, and for good medical services to be free to every single individual who lives in the country. At present, in spite of good hospitals—Bombay has many very good hospitals—there is little doubt that the poor man does not always get the same treatment which the rich man does. Many of them, if not in Bombay but elsewhere perhaps, hardly get any treatment at all or cannot afford the very expensive drugs that modern medicine uses more and more. That is not right or fair. They must get proper treatment, whether it is in hospitals or otherwise. They must get the drugs they use. From this, two things follow. First, that the service itself should be organized on a state basis so as to provide this free medical attention. Secondly, that the important and major drugs should be, by and large, be a state-manufacture—a state enterprise. So far as I can see, there are few bigger rackets in the commercial world for the manufacture and sale of drugs at tremendous profits.

I am glad that the Government of India have put up the Penicillin Institute for the manufacture of penicillin.⁸ Here in Bombay, you have had for a long

8. As per the agreement between the Government of India, WHO and the UNICEF concluded on 24 July 1951, the construction of the Penicillin factory was started in the latter half of 1952 at Pimpri near Pune. It was completed in 1955 and the factory, known as the Hindustan Antibiotics Limited, started production in March 1955.

time the Haffkine Institute,⁹ which has done such good work. I might inform you that we are intending to put up in a big way, on behalf of the state, other concerns for the large scale manufacture of drugs. I am sure that will lead to the cheapening in their price and they will be available to almost anybody who requires them.

I again thank your College for the honour you have done me.

9. Set up in 1900, the Institute acts as a centre for the manufacture of plague, cholera and anti-rabies vaccines and also sulpha drugs.

3. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi

7 June 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

The attached note² about Government's production of penicillin and other anti-biotics may interest you. Some of you know all about it already and are actually dealing with our Penicillin Factory at Pimpri.³ I am, however, surprized to learn that a number of state governments are still continuing to buy foreign made penicillin. This surely is not necessary now, nor is it desirable. Our production of penicillin is considerable and can meet all demands made upon it. It is of high quality. Therefore, I hope that every state government will now deal with our Penicillin Factory at Pimpri and not obtain penicillin from private sources.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 10/CF/49, Cabinet Secretariat. This special letter, in addition to the fortnightly letters, was sent to Chief Ministers of all states. Also printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 4, p. 375.
2. The note directed the state governments to secure their requirements of penicillin from the factory at Pimpri. It assured them that the quality of the drug matched international standards and the price was the lowest compared to prices abroad.
3. See the preceding item.

VIII. WOMEN

1. The Hindu Succession Bill¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr Speaker,² Sir, I have followed with some care and interest the long debates in this House on this Bill.³ As the House probably knows, I am deeply interested in this measure and yet I have refrained from taking particularly any active part in it and speaking about it and even now it is with some reluctance that I got up.

First of all, I should like to congratulate this House on the way it has considered this measure. Obviously, it was a Bill on which people felt strongly this way or that way, and yet, throughout these many days while we have considered this, we, the honourable Members of this House, have done so in an even temper and with a desire to understand each other's points of view. I need not say much about my colleague Shri Pataskar⁴ who was in charge of this Bill and who has conducted it throughout this long period with an amazing perseverance and evenness of temper.

I have just been listening to two speeches of the colleagues of mine—one from a very dear friend and one of the oldest colleague here—Shri Tandon⁵—and the other from another colleague who has just spoken.⁶ Both have, in

1. Speech in the Lok Sabha on the Hindu Succession Bill, 8 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1956, Vol. IV, Part II, cols. 7700-7709.
2. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar.
3. The Hindu Succession Bill, passed by Rajya Sabha on 30 November 1955, was also passed by Lok Sabha on 8 May 1956 after forty hours of debate with some amendments. Rajya Sabha considered and agreed to the amendments and passed the Bill on 15 May 1956. The Bill got President's assent on 17 June 1956. The Hindu Succession Act aimed at evolving a uniform system of law with regard to intestate succession among Hindus. It also gave for the first time a share of father's property to a daughter and gave women absolute right to self-acquired property.
4. H. V. Pataskar, Union Minister of State for Legal Affairs.
5. P. D. Tandon, Congress member from Allahabad, strongly opposed the Bill and said that it would bring harm to Hindu society and lead to disruption of families.
6. Thakur Das Bhargava, Congress member from Gurgaon, was opposed to the married daughter getting a right in the father's property. He felt that the Bill would lead to dissatisfaction in the Punjab and hoped that, in the course of time, the Bill would be altered restricting this right only to the unmarried daughter.

different degrees expressed their displeasure at either the whole of this conception or a part of it. I suppose there are not many people here who think that this particular Bill is the ideal one. We have all our reservations about it. We would like to have it go a little further here or there or vary it here and there. I am not going into those matters, because they have been discussed at considerable length in the course of the second reading and previously in the other House. What I am concerned with much more is the basic idea underlying this Bill and I think that is of crucial importance. We have passed many measures in this House during the past few years. I do think that from one point of view, this particular Bill dealing with women's rights can take precedence over almost anything that we have done. I do not mean to say that this is a terribly revolutionary measure, because it is not. Generally, it does not upset anything very much. It may upset things a little. But, the fact that it goes in a certain direction, the fact that it takes us out of the ruts of thinking and action and social behaviour that we are in, is of high importance.

Thakur Dasji expressed the hope that later, perhaps, some of the changes made in this Bill will be altered again or will be left out or eliminated. Well, I do not know about that; but, I feel pretty sure that in course of time, and not in the too distant future, other changes will be made which perhaps will go in another direction not approved by Thakur Dasji, because the basic thing is this. Let us think of the past. Certainly, it is important that we remember our past, because we are products of that past, whatever we are.

We have grown in that past and that past is now there in our blood and bones and in our thoughts. But, we live in the present and we must have an understanding of the future, where we are going to. The honourable Member Mr Chatterjee, said something.⁷ I had said previously in this House which I can repeat and that is, that the whole conception of Hindu law and Hindu custom became petrified with the coming of the British here. It was a dynamic idea, a dynamic conception of something changing not only by geography in different parts of India, but by influx of time. It may not have changed rapidly or dramatically, but it did change. It did adapt itself to changing circumstances and when the British came, they petrified it partly because they did not

7. N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Mahasabha member from Hooghly, West Bengal, said that the promoters of female emancipation who supported this measure did not realize that if there was one legal system which gave absolute property to women it was the Hindu system. The Bill was a "perversion of coparcenary", and was "born out of a blind adherence to non-indigenous reform", he added.

understand it and partly because they were not interested in social reforms. They were only interested in not having trouble in carrying on with their business of government or making money or whatever it was. So, they petrified it and made something that was dynamic completely static. So, today we suffer from that. We have suffered from that in various ways. Our economy became static; our social behaviour became static; our thinking became static.

In the political field, various circumstances forced us into thinking on different lines and the mere fact of subservience or subjection to foreign power was itself a major relevant in that. Politically, we began to get out of the grooves, and yet it is quite extraordinary, while we have got out of the grooves politically and we have brought about a political revolution in this country, it is strange how closely we follow the British models in the political field. Whether it is this Parliament, whether it is even a good bit of our Constitution, whether it is even the language we often use, we follow the British models. I am not complaining about that; I am merely pointing out the fact. Then, something as important and sometimes even more important than politics began to stir our mind. And that was in the economic field. I hope we are engaged now in something that is in the nature of an economic revolution in this country. Now, almost for the first time we are touching the social field.

Nand Lal Sharma:⁸ Moral field.

JN: Quite right; moral field. There is nothing more immoral than the type of static society in which we have lived for a long time. There is nothing immoral than to be out of step with the times. What is morality? There are certain basic principles of morality undoubtedly. But, morality and social behaviour have to fit-in with the times.

May I give an example, for instance? Do you expect the same type of social behaviour in a society which is, let us say, educated, in a smaller sense of the word, of going to school, etc? What social behaviour do you expect? Do you expect the same social behaviour in an industrial society as in an agricultural society? When the whole conditions of life have changed, obviously, the social behaviour must fit in. You may struggle against it. I saw somewhere—I hope I am not wrong—my honourable friend, Shri Tandon expressed his displeasure at the coming of the railways to India. We need not go into that argument whether it was good for the railways to come or not. The fact is that the railways have come. The fact is that we have adapted ourselves to railways. He and I and all of us travel by rail unless we travel by air. We have adapted ourselves.

8. Ram Rajya Parishad member from Sikar, Rajasthan.

Yet, we want the society in its social sense to function as in the pre-railway days, if I may say so, for example. It cannot be done.

Tandon, I understand, expressed a certain displeasure at some of our young women.⁹ Now, there are many things which our young women, or for the matter of that, our young men, or for that matter our old men and old women do which I strongly disapprove. That is so. They are all aspects of society. I have previously expressed in this House my admiration for the womanhood of India. When I said that, I was not merely referring to the historic examples of great women in India whom we all remember and revere. But, when I said that, I referred to the women of India today, in our times. I am not approving of everything that is done. Nobody can approve of everything that is done by any country or any large group. But, I do say that and I say that with some knowledge of other countries and other people. It is not up to us to criticize any people and I do not see why we should. Each country grows according to its genius. The new womanhood of India which is growing, with all its petty faults and superficialities, is something which I admire, is something which gives me hope for the future. I believe that if any great real advances are going to come to India,—I believe they are going to come—they will come very largely through the women of India. There was a French writer, a great writer who once said, if you want to know how civilized a country is, how advanced a country is, how progressive it is, find out what the women of that country are like, what the laws relating to the women are, what is the social behaviour relating to women and you can judge the country from that. You can ignore the men. That is a better test. I think that is a better test and that is the correct test.

Many of you may have read the Hindu law report or the Hindu Code report, or whatever it is called, of Shri B.N. Rau.¹⁰ Some parts of it are pretty ghastly in their description of the lot of the women of India. It is no good my judging the lot of women in India by my family or by my friends' families who may be

9. While opposing the Bill, Tandon advised Pataskar to consider the opinion of women in the households rather than of the butterflies from Connaught Circus (“कनाट सर्कस की तितलियो”), whether they want to share their property with their daughters. He was sure that the women in the households, even educated women, would not be willing to give their daughters a share in the property.
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favourably circumstanced in various ways. But the lot of women in India today is not a good lot, and that is not the fault of the women. It is the fault of the social structure that has long survived the period when it might have been good, because we must always remember that even a good law, even a good society of a time may outlive its usefulness and may become a bad structure later. You and I may talk about feudalism, and yet feudalism in its heyday was something suited to the environment of that period. What is the good of cursing feudalism of a thousand years ago? It was a right thing then probably. I was not there then. Or, you may talk about capitalism. Capitalism in its day was a good thing but the day has passed. It is no good sticking on to it when the day has passed and something else is demanded of us. Therefore, social structure if it is static is necessarily, by the very nature of things, unprogressive. Life is not static. We are born, we are children, we are young, we grow old and we die. Life is a flux. It never stays. Society is always in a flux. If a social structure becomes static, loses touch with the dynamism of life, and what has happened in India is that in spite of many great things that our forefathers accomplished, in spite of even the dynamism of the Hindu structure of society in past ages, it became static and what is demanded of us and, more especially, the Hindus, is to give it its dynamism and vitality again. We ill-serve the Hindu conception of society as it was by maintaining that it should remain static. It cannot remain static. If one thing is dead certain, it cannot remain there because life is changing all round us. The result will be if you do not go with this current of life and change with it, the whole structure will crack up and go to pieces. Or else, we adapt it to these changing conditions in life.

At no period in history I suppose, has there been such rapid changes in the structure of life—leaving out the biological part, and even that is changing—as in recent ages. They are due to many causes. We are living completely differently from what our forefathers used to live in. And I have been wondering, thinking, well, necessarily of my own family, of how in two or three generations the changes it has seen—my grandfather, my father, myself, my daughter. I see these three or four generations before me and the rapid changes that are coming in each generation. And that, of course, is one of a million families in India which are varying from day to day. Everything is changing, except the minds of some people, which refuse to change or see or understand anything, and they get left behind and then they are angry, angry with the world that the world does not fit in with their thinking, not realizing that it is they who are out of step with the world. The world may be good or bad as it is, but the world is a changing world and unless we keep in step with it, it is not the world that suffers, it is we who suffer, and if a group or society falls out of step, that society remains behind, becomes a backwater.

Changes have come, they have come because of many reasons, but certainly the changes now in modern life have come through science and technology, which have changed the texture of our life. Wherever we are living, we are using science and technology all day. We are not a technically advanced country and yet we are using technological things and scientific and industrial things every day and every hour of the day practically. Other countries are doing so more. Now, the whole system of production, of consumption, everything is changing. Therefore, the texture of life is changing. The basic principles do not change, I am prepared to agree. Goodness is goodness, evil is evil. May be, let us admit that. And we have to build up what I would call a good society—certainly a prosperous society, but also a good society—whatever our conception of good may be; it may slightly differ, but I think basically we may agree about what a good society is and what a prosperous society is. But having conceded that the whole texture of life changes, you have to fit in your conception of goodness and evil in that texture. Otherwise, you are completely stranded away from it, and the goodness, if it does not fit in with life, itself does not affect anybody or apply to anybody and the structure breaks up. So, I should like this House to consider this question from this broader point of view.

I have no doubt in my mind that one of the basic things essential in India is the complete freedom, economic freedom—political freedom in a sense they have—of the women of India. I do not mean to say that the women of India are deliberately suppressed by their menfolk; many of them may do so. I do not mean to say that they are not admired or liked. It is not that. But there is no doubt about it that the women of India at the present moment, by and large, do not, and have not had, economic freedom. This Bill of yours will not give them economic freedom as such. But it is a step in that direction. Personally, I am not very anxious for my daughter or anybody to have to rely upon me for maintenance and the like; I want her to stand on her own feet. I want everybody in India to have the capacity to stand on his or her own feet. I do not like this idea of dependence even of the most intimate people. I want comradeship. I do not want dependence between anybody. So, this Bill is only useful really because it has taken a first, and a good and vital step in that direction—it has not done very much—because it has taken us out of the ruts of our thinking and behaviour. It may be that many people do not like it. Many people, used to other ways, think that it is a very radical step, and it will upset our joint family and many other ways of life that we have been accustomed to. But those ways of life are being upset by many factors. It is not your little Bill that is going to upset them. In fact, your Bill itself is the result of the other factors. And I want you to think of that.

I talked about the changing conditions of life. I imagine that the next few years or so will see an even more rapid tempo of change in technological advance and the like, with the coming of far greater forces in man's control. They may annihilate man possibly, and they may rebuild human society. My point is that in this rapidly changing world, nothing seems to me more out of place and rather ridiculous than to continue thinking as if we lived a thousand years ago or two thousand years ago.

What are our laws? After all, our laws are more especially based, and very rightly based, on a society that existed hundreds or, may be, thousands or more of years ago. And what was the population of India, let us say, two thousand years ago? I do not know. But I did see some estimates of it. It was a very very small fraction of the population of today, and naturally—I do not know—about a hundredth of it, or in fact, less. I think it was calculated that the population of India two thousand years ago was infinitely less than what it is today.

Nand Lal Sharma: It was 56 crores, five thousand years back.

JN: Here speaks a voice of experience.

Nand Lal Sharma: Yes, of experience of the shastras and of history.

JN: I regret to say that I do not accept that statement of the shastras and any shastras that say so, do not speak in the language I am aware of, the language of accuracy and science.

V.G. Deshpande:¹¹ What is the authority of the figure that the Prime Minister is quoting?

An honourable Member: Census.

V.G. Deshpande: Which census? Census conducted two thousand years ago?

JN: If Shri V.G. Deshpande wants some authority, I suggest his taking an elementary course in science.

A.M. Thomas:¹² Why this war of words?

V.G. Deshpande: He should take a course in arithmetic. His arithmetic is zero.

JN: What is the world's population today? It has grown from what it was. We know the figures of the world's population during the last 200 years or so with fair accuracy. We have seen it grow, and grow very rapidly. However, we need not go into those figures. But what he said is completely and absolutely

11. Hindu Mahasabha member from Guna, Madhya Bharat.

12. Congress member from Ernakulam.

inconceivable. I should like him to work it out, how 56 crores, or if I may say so, one-tenth of that figure, were fed in India with the amount of cultivable land in India at that time. We can estimate it, the land, the forest and so on. I should like him to estimate it. Of course, if we lived in a period of jinns and fairies and wonderful happenings and men coming from the skies, that is a different matter. But if they grew food from the land, how much cultivable land there was, how much per acre could be cultivated from it? It is a relatively easy calculation, not accurate but easy. I say today if we want to go back to that method of cultivation, half our population would die through sheer hunger, because there would not be anything to live on.

Nand Lal Sharma: It is on account of your Partition. It was not the geographical dimension of today.

JN: My humble effort was to point out to this House that it has become important and vital for us, even if we are to survive as a nation—much more so if we want to progress—to get out of the thinking of our honourable friend opposite. That thinking is very interesting but it is fit for an anthropological museum. Anthropological museums are very important for us to know the past or even the survivals of the past unto the present, but they are not guides to us for the present, much less for the future.

I submit therefore that we have to understand these questions in the present day, to understand them in the context of it, and have some vision of the future society that we are going up to. We have to hold fast to what I consider are basic conceptions and basic ideas which have moved our society. We have to realize, as I do realize, that there was great strength in them and something of tremendous value in them, which has kept Hindu society going through all these ages past. I respect that, but I think it is doing discredit to that dynamic conception of Hindu society if we approach it from the static and unprogressive point of view and think in terms of a magic past. Whether there was magic in the past or not, I feel there is no magic in the present. And we have to live in the present, understand the present and thus work for the future.

In spite of its partial deficiencies, in spite of the fact that it is not anything ideal that we are going to pass in this Bill, I do consider that it is the most important measure. I consider it a vital and, in a sense, a revolutionary measure, in the sense that it takes a revolutionary step in a particular direction, although by itself it is not revolutionary by any means, because it shakes them out of their lethargy of thinking. That, I think, is highly important, because India can only progress if in addition to the political revolution that we have had and the economic revolution through which we are passing, we have a social revolution also, and integrate these three. Then India will progress and we will be worthy of our past and our present and be able to build up a magnificent future.

2. Training Camp for Women¹

I am glad to learn that the Mahila Congress of the Allahabad City Congress has organized a training camp for women. Also, that there is going to be a Congress Seva Dal camp. These camps should help greatly in training our workers, both in understanding the past and the present and the work they should do. Women have a very important part to play in the building up of the new India and they should prepare themselves for it.

I am glad that our Parliament has recently passed important legislation in regard to women's rights.²

I send my good wishes to the training camps.

1. Message for a women training camp at Allahabad, 15 May 1956. JN Collection. Indira Gandhi inaugurated the ten-day camp, organized by the Allahabad Mahila Congress Committee and attended by about fifty women, on 20 May 1956.
2. See the preceding item.

IX. CHILDREN

1. Priorities in Child Welfare¹

President,² Members of the Children's Development Council,

You have invited me and so I have turned up here, although I have no special experience of children. All of you who are assembled here from various parts

1. Inaugural speech at the first National Conference on Child Welfare at Irwin College, New Delhi, 9 May 1956. AIR tapes, NMML. Original in Hindi.
2. Amrit Kaur, President, Indian Council for Child Welfare.

of the country and whose profession in a sense is to look after children and work for their development, are more familiar with their problems and issues. You have also heard the various messages of blessings from elders which we have received. Where do I fit in between the two? It is true that I like children, just as all of you and others too like children. I like to play with them and talk to them. If that is a sufficient reason to be present here, then I certainly have the right. But the question is very important. In India, whatever we take up assumes great magnitude for it is a large country with a very large population of children as well as adults. When I go to the different cities and villages, I see that our small, innocent, beautiful children are not properly cared for. Often they do not get enough to eat. They may not need much by way of clothes, but they do need some clothes to protect them from the cold, etc. It often happens that mothers swathe their children in too many clothes, so much so that their health may be permanently damaged. They do not get fresh air, for they are overprotected. What is most saddening is how few of our children get proper education. Only about 50% of the children in India go to school. I do not know whether that is the exact figure, for the percentage is increasing and it is said that within the next five years it will rise to 60% or 70% or something like that. Anyhow, all effort is being made and undoubtedly a time will come when every child in India will go to school from a young age and the schools will be good schools with proper facilities for learning as well as playing.

I feel very sad when I see the children in the rural areas who are not properly cared for. They have parents and yet they are like orphans. It makes me feel ashamed because we are not doing what should be our foremost task. We cannot change India overnight by magic. The question is of priorities and all these things are linked and all of them are essential. But undoubtedly, in my opinion, the work of development and education of children should be given topmost priority. To leave children uncared for today will create serious problems for us in the future. From your programme I see that over the next five days you will discuss various problems connected with orphans and handicapped children, poor children, etc. Not less important than these is the question of what to do with the children who are normal, physically and mentally. It is not enough to set up a few institutions here and there for the poor, unfortunate children with some physical or mental deformity. We must not forget that the real question is of India's millions of children who are well and who have no defects except the lack of opportunity to progress. I sometimes feel worried by the fact that our people who are well off suffer from some sort of a complex and as a result try to do some social service here and there. Perhaps, they feel reassured that they have done their duty. Though that is a good thing in its own way, social service here and there does not really solve the big problems. Government and the people must together solve them. So long as some arrangement is not

made for every child to go to school right from a very young age and the schools are not good, these random efforts at social service cannot take us far. There is no doubt, however, that it can be of great use, for it lays a foundation, makes us aware of realities and trains people to take on these tasks.

How are these things to spread? As you know, we have started Community Projects and National Extension Service all over the country. They have caught the imagination of the rural population. Already they have spread to nearly a lakh and fifty thousand villages. Anything that we want to take up can spread rapidly through their medium. I want to know how much interest these schemes are taking in children.

What is the philosophy behind these development schemes? We do not want that everything should be done from the top. Government ought to help, but it is the people who have to do the work. Once the people, especially in the rural areas are trained and understand how to do all this, these schemes will have a far-reaching effect. Even if everyone does a little, it will go very far and reach millions of people.

So, I was thinking, how best to draw the attention of the Community Projects towards children. They are doing something because part of these schemes is the opening of schools. But I want them to pay special attention. Once that happens, the work that is being done by all these institutions separately in their own small areas will immediately be multiplied a thousand-fold. It is possible that the work may not be of such high quality as done by educated, and trained people like you. But immediately it puts down roots and will not be superficial, as it often happens these days, but will come from within. The fact is that whatever we may take up in India, unless it captures the minds and hearts of the people, and puts down roots in the soil, it cannot flourish. Yes, you may do something in the cities, or even in villages, and it may do some good. But the question is not of temporary relief here and there, but how to help millions of human beings and children. I often think of the Community Projects in this connection because they are revolutionary in nature, especially for rural uplift. Our attention should be focussed on the rural areas. We must solve the problems in urban centres too as far as possible. But please remember that after all, 75% to 80% of India's population lives in villages. It is only when they move towards progress that this huge elephantine country will advance rapidly. All the rest is very slow.

I would like to suggest that your conference should consider by what means the rural areas can progress in small things done simultaneously in millions of places. Then the impact will be tremendous. You have a charter for children which is a good thing. But you should make a small charter of simple, easy things which the people in charge of the schools and the Community Projects, etc., in the villages can understand and implement. It is quite clear that somehow

we must reach the millions of children in India. We must not become complacent with our own institutions.

There is another matter. There must be a number of lists of the institutions in India which are working for child welfare. But do you have any information about what results they are showing? Is there a correct appraisal of this? That is what really counts. A list of the institutions, good, bad or indifferent, is meaningless. There should be a proper appraisal.

I shall mention some other thing with some hesitation. We can learn a great deal from other countries where these tasks have been taken up and the people are trained to do them. The work of child welfare has become a science. We must undoubtedly learn from them. But I often think it is strange that people should go abroad, travelling thousands of miles, to learn how they should work in the Indian villages. This has always seemed exceedingly strange to me. If you want to really learn, you should go to the villages. How can you work in Indian villages by going to a university five thousand miles away and getting a degree? People in India going abroad to learn social service is absolutely beyond my comprehension because if you wish to do social service in India, then India is the field for you to learn. It is a good rule that you must learn to become familiar with the area where you want to work, understand the people's minds and establish a rapport with them, mentally and emotionally. These things cannot be done by getting degrees from abroad. It has to be done in a different way. You must certainly have the know-how.

So, I am afraid that in the matter of child welfare also, we might tend to look elsewhere where the conditions may be totally different. I want you to learn as much as you can from others. But the fact is that conditions in India are different from those in other countries, especially, the advanced ones where there is an enormous amount of wealth and equipment. We cannot copy them. We must look at these things in our own way. If we go abroad and learn to use sophisticated equipment and implements which have no scope in India, all our learning will become useless. I can understand our people going to conferences abroad, exchanging views and trying to learn from others. I must confess, though, that I feel a little scared at the number of conferences that are held in the world so much so that the ordinary traveller finds it difficult to get a seat on planes.

I would say that the answer to almost any problem in India can be got in two ways. One is what we can learn from the rest of the world which is more advanced. But perhaps more important is that we should understand the problems of our country here itself. We should not try to understand the picture from outside. If we look at the economics of our problems, we can understand them best here in India, not by applying some foreign theory to our conditions.

This applies to matters pertaining to children too. You may learn something from other countries. But ultimately, you have to understand the problems

connected with children in the Indian context and which are peculiar to Indian conditions. You must understand the soil and the atmosphere in which these problems have been born and bred and then try to find a solution. We can undoubtedly learn from others. But, ultimately the problems are peculiar to India and cannot be solved by copying others.

I have put before you some of the thoughts that came to my mind. As I said in the beginning, I do not have any special knowledge of the problems connected with children, nor have I read any special books on the subject. So I hesitate to venture an opinion before a congregation of specialists. I cannot tolerate it when in areas where I have special knowledge, people who know nothing about them shout out their views from the roof-tops without trying to understand the issue. Therefore, I hesitate to venture an opinion on subjects of special interest. But what I have said just now are general things. Moreover, when people delve deep into specialities, they generally tend to forget the common things. If you spend all your time on matters relating to handicapped and disabled children, you may forget those who are sound in body and mind. You must think about them for ultimately the proper care of those who are normal—fortunately they are in a majority—must be our foremost task.

So, I hope that you will consider these suggestions which I have dared to put before you, and create an atmosphere in the country where the attention is constantly focussed on children and their welfare. Everyone who claims to be a partner in the building of new India must realize that the children of today are the future of India and whatever we are doing is for their welfare. *Jai Hind!*

2. Joint Committee for Bal Bhavan and Children's Museum¹

Some time ago I wrote to you making a suggestion about a children's museum.² This proposal of mine was particularly related to the collection of dolls which Shankar Pillai³ had made. This is a unique and very valuable collection, and it was a pity that it was not properly housed or used. I suggested, therefore, that

1. Note to the Education Minister, A.K. Azad, 25 May 1956. File No. 28(5)/56-59-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. For Nehru's letter of 14 April 1956 to A.K. Azad, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 98-99.
3. Cartoonist and founder-editor of *Shankar's Weekly*.

a children's museum might be built not only for the dolls, but for other purposes like pictures, toys, etc., also.⁴

2. Since then I have not heard of the progress made in regard to this idea. Today, rather incidentally, I happened to see some papers which were sent to Indira Gandhi on this subject. From these papers it appears that some expert committee has been appointed for the children's museum. I do not know who the members of this committee are except that, presumably, Indira Gandhi is one of them. She does not know much about it either. A meeting of this committee is going to be held on the 28th May. Indira Gandhi will not be in Delhi then and will be unable to attend it.

3. I shall be grateful if I am kept informed of developments. I would suggest that we should avoid in this, as in other like matters, too official and departmental an approach to the problem. I say this because I find that one of the first things that the committee have thought of is to make a list of the staff necessary from the keeper to the sweeper. Regular scales of pay and increments, etc., are all laid down according to Government rules. This, I would suggest, is much too rigid an approach to this problem, and there should hardly be any question of staff at this stage. The staff should be kept at the lowest to begin with and increased as and when necessity arises. The main thing is a competent person in charge. Other staff does not matter.

4. Then there is the question of the land for the building as well as the building itself. You may remember that we had a great deal of difficulty in getting some land for the Bal Bhavan. Even after getting it, there has been a controversy, which is still going on about this land, and the Delhi State Government have not approved of this particular piece of land.⁵ This kind of difficulty arises if the initial steps are not adequately coordinated with the various authorities concerned.

4. The dolls, packed in boxes, were kept for sometime in the Theatre Communication building which was situated in Connaught Place where Palika Bazar was built in 1970s. The dolls were finally shifted to International Dolls Museum set up by Shankar in Nehru House on Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg. The Museum was opened by S. Radhakrishnan in November 1965.
5. To begin with the Bal Bhavan was run in a temporary shed near Turkman gate from 1956. It was later shifted to the new building constructed on Kotla Road near Income Tax Office. Nehru inaugurated the building on 14 November 1958 and dedicated it to the children of India. The main purpose in establishing Bal Bhavan was to provide non-formal activities to children to enhance their creative potential and self expression.

5. There is at present some kind of a committee for the Bal Bhavan. Or, rather, it is an autonomous board. To some extent, Bal Bhavan's activities will overlap those of the children's museum. It might be desirable ultimately to have the Bal Bhavan and the children's museum under some joint board. They will help and serve each other.

6. Even in regard to the building, it would be a good thing if the two buildings were near each other. If this is not possible, even so, it would be desirable for the same organization to deal with both.

7. If this is our ultimate objective, then it is better to proceed now in a way which is in line with it. Thus, I would suggest that the Bal Bhavan Board should be intimately connected with this new proposal. The Board as it is may not be large enough for this purpose and some persons may be added to it. Thus, for the present, a committee might be appointed consisting of the Bal Bhavan Board and two or three others such as the Education Secretary (Shri Saiyidain).⁶ Also, it is desirable that Shankar Pillai should be on this committee, because he is intimately concerned with these dolls and the whole idea of a children's museum.

8. I think, a joint committee like this for the two institutes would avoid duplication, overlapping and delay. It may even be considered that the buildings to be put up might be located at some place other than the present site of the Bal Bhavan, to which the Delhi State people have been continuously objecting.

9. I am writing this note at this stage so that independent decisions might not be taken which perhaps come in the way later of this joint working.

6. K.G. Saiyidain.

X. EVACUEE PROPERTY

1. Dealing with the Evacuee Property¹

This morning I had a talk with you about this case and later we had a talk with

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 10 June 1956. JN Collection.

Begum Anis Kidwai² who has been connected with this case³ almost from the beginning. She was entirely opposed to the idea of handing this girl over to the person who claims to be her maternal uncle from Pakistan.⁴ As a matter of fact, she did not like the girl to continue to stay with Khalil Ahmad⁵ because apparently Khalil Ahmad has taken no steps at all to educate her or train her in any way. Whenever she has seen the girl, she has found her almost dumb. Always Khalil Ahmad was present and in fact, the interview was a very very short one. Begum Anis had previously suggested to put her in some girls' hostel and arrange for her training, but Khalil Ahmad did not agree.

2. I propose to see the girl myself soon.

3. Meanwhile, I do not understand what the position of her property is. Apparently, it has been attached to the Evacuee Pool. Possibly, it has been allotted to refugees. It is obvious that in regard to this property no question arises of the Evacuee Pool. The Rehabilitation Ministry cannot just seize hold of property on a totally unjustified presumption that somebody has gone to Pakistan. Such evidence as we have indicated that there was a large-scale slaughter in Jind and practically, every member of the family of Bakshi Shafqat Ali⁶ was killed. His daughter, Roshan Ara Begum, three or four at the time was somehow rescued and brought to Delhi in 1948.

4. I find from a note in the file that the Rehabilitation Ministry or the Custodian has refused to accept Roshan Ara as the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali and has suggested that a civil court should decide this. This seems to me an extraordinary suggestion to make. There is enough evidence in the file itself as well as, I believe, outside that Roshan Ara is Bakshi Shafqat Ali's

2. Anis Kidwai (1906-1982); member, Indian National Congress since 1921; Vice-President, Anjuman-i-Taraqqi-i-Urdu, Delhi branch; member, AICC, 1954-57; member, Rajya Sabha, 1956-1968; publications include: *Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein* (1974), *Nazre khush guzre* (1976), and *Ab Jin ke dekhane ko* (1980).
3. The reference is to the case of Roshan Ara Begum, who had filed an application for grant of a certificate under Section 16 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act 1950 through her guardian Khalil Ahmad for restoration of the properties of her father Bakshi Shafqat Ali and her uncle Bakshi Shaukat Ali of Jind. The total value of the properties, consisting of houses and agricultural lands, was estimated to be between Rs. 2½ to Rs. 4 lakhs. The four-year old Roshan Ara was rescued during the disturbances and was the sole surviving heir.
4. Sardar Ali Khan.
5. Khalil Ahmad was appointed Roshan Ara's guardian by the MEA.
6. Bakshi Shafqat Ali, a minister and adviser to the Maharaja of Jind State; President, Jind Municipality and Honorary Magistrate.

daughter. There is a certificate to that effect also. To ask this minor girl to go to a civil court to establish her claim is really extraordinary.

5. If Roshan Ara is the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali, then she is the obvious owner of the properties left by him and the Evacuee Property Pool has nothing to do with those properties. By merely grabbing every property it cannot create a claim or dispossess the rightful owner.

6. I am disturbed at this case and the way Rehabilitation Ministry has handled it. We cannot function as Shylok, intent on grabbing the property regardless of legitimate claims and the human aspect.

7. Kindly find out from the Rehabilitation Ministry about this case in so far as the property is concerned. Have they given any allowance or any other help in recent years to Roshan Ara or have they left her to the tender mercies of Khalil Ahmad and dealt with her property in other ways?

8. In this matter, we shall have to consult Shrimati Rameshwari Nehru⁷ also as she has been connected with this case right from the beginning.

9. You will see from these papers that there is some reference to an enquiry being held at Jalandhar on the 9th October 1953 about the claim of Sardar Ali Khan as being the maternal uncle of Roshan Ara. It is stated that the Tribunal accepted Sardar Ali's claim. I do not quite know, how and in what form this matter went up to the Tribunal.

10. There are very large properties involved in this matter and, no doubt, many people would like a finger in the pie. We have, therefore, to be particularly careful. But the principal consideration must be the good of the girl.

7. Rameshwari Nehru (1886-1966); social worker and freedom fighter; President, All-India Harijan Sevak Sangh for several years; editor, *Stree Darpan* since 1909; President, All-India Women's Conference, 1940; took active part in the Quit India movement, worked for the rehabilitation of refugees after Partition; President, Central Advisory Board for Rehabilitation; awarded Lenin Peace Prize, 1961.

2. The Case of Roshan Ara¹

As arranged, Mrs Kidwai brought the girl, Roshan Ara, to my house this evening. Her present guardian, Shri Khalil Ahmad, also came. The girl, Roshan Ara, was just recovering from an attack of typhoid and was rather weak. She seemed rather tall for her age. I would have taken her to be about 15 or so. She looked normal, though weak. I enquired what kind of education she had been receiving. I was told that an attempt was made some time ago to send her to Sanawar at the instance of Mrs Rameshwari Nehru. But the charges at Sanawar were about Rs.250/- a month and they could not afford this. Later, she was apparently overage.

2. The Rehabilitation Ministry did not pay anything to her or for her till about six months ago, when Indira Gandhi, who had heard of her, intervened. Since then, Rs.100/- a month had been paid for her. The only education she has received has been by some private tutors in Hindi and Persian.

3. Shri Khalil Ahmad appears to me a decent kind of person. He told me that the girl's uncle had been to his house and wanted to take the girl with her. He had not agreed to this and said that she had been entrusted to him by the External Affairs Ministry and he would carry out any instructions from the Ministry.

4. Khalil Ahmad told me that probably at the instance of Mridula Sarabhai,² Roshan Ara's case came up before the Tribunal at Jalandhar. He took Roshan Ara there and the maternal uncle from Pakistan also came there. The Tribunal decided in favour of Roshan Ara remaining with Khalil Ahmad. (My own recollection is that the record in the file was somewhat different.)

5. The girl seemed eager to learn and to go to school. She is backward from the school point of view for her age. I have asked both Mrs Kidwai and Khalil Ahmad to arrange for her to go to the Indraprastha Girls College, which is near Khalil Ahmad's house. She need not enter into any particular class at present, but remain for two or three months taking up some subjects and generally preparing herself for more formal entry later. I have told them that I shall pay any fees etc. She will probably take two or three weeks to recover from her typhoid. I have told them that I shall see her when I come back from

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 11 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. Worked for the recovery of abducted women after Partition.

Europe and I have told Roshan Ara that she should come to see me from time to time. She appeared pleased at my invitation.

6. There can be no question of our handing her over to her maternal uncle in Pakistan.

7. I hope that you will get full particulars about her property—what it was, what it is and whether any part of it has been disposed of? We have to proceed on the basis that she is the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali of Jind. I have no doubt about it. There is enough evidence in the file. Apart from this, some others had come from Jind and accepted her as such. There is probably some resemblance also.

8. Once you accept her as the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali, then Rehabilitation Ministry have no case for keeping her property and we shall have to deal with this matter in some other way. I am surprised at the careless way they have treated her all these years.

3. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi,
11 June 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,²

I had a visit today from Maulana Ahmed Saeed, Hifzur Rahman,³ Nooruddin⁴ and Sultan Yar Khan⁵ who gave me a letter⁶ a copy of which I enclose. They also discussed these matters with me for some time.

You know that when the Evacuee Property Act was being acted upon, I pointed out repeatedly that it was wrong and improper to continue such an Act which could only be justified under very exceptional circumstances and for

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister for Rehabilitation.
3. Maulana Muhammad Hifzur Rahman, Congress member of Lok Sabha and an eminent leader of Jamiat-al-ulama-i-Hind.
4. Nooruddin Ahmad (1905-1974); Congressman from Delhi; Advocate, Supreme Court; member, Delhi Legislative Assembly, 1952-1956; Alderman, Delhi Municipal Corporation; Mayor of Delhi, 1962-66.
5. Associated with Jamiat-al-ulama-i-Delhi.
6. The memorandum pointed out some important matters affecting Muslim community, viz (a) though the Government repealed the Evacuee Property Laws and passed Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act 1954, prohibiting launching of fresh proceeding under the Act after a prescribed date, this Amendment had been circumvented by several devices viz. through use of the theory of Automatic Vesting i.e. contending that property though not formally notified as Evacuee Property vested in the Custodian automatically under Act 14 of 1947. In several cases the Amendment Act was circumvented by reopening the cases decided in favour of the Muslim years ago. Large number of cases under Evacuee Property Law were pending which were covered by Section 16 and restoration of properties under the said Section was tedious, protracted and complicated. A Muslim claimant was thus required to account for each day of his life during last 9 years. The memorandum suggested issue of directive to restore properties to claimants on proving that they were owners of them and they should not be required to prove their continuous presence in India since 1 March 1947. (b) As the mosques and *waqf* properties abandoned during communal disturbances in 1947 and under unauthorized occupation would ripen into ownership of the unauthorized occupants under Indian Limitation Act, the memorandum urged urgent steps for early restoration of these places to Muslims. (c) Auction of evacuee properties was putting pressure on the poor Muslims of Delhi to vacate their properties and since they were likely to yield to pressure rendering many of them shelterless, the deputation wanted early sympathetic consideration in this regard by the Government.

short periods of time. Ultimately, this Act was repealed⁷ and we stated that that kind of an inquisition would no longer apply to any Muslim in India. You pointed out then that there were some pending cases which would take a little time to dispose of. Reluctantly, we agreed to this procedure and we were given to understand that this would take a few months, perhaps six.

Subsequently, when I enquired from you about these pending cases, I was much surprised to learn that the number was very large and that it would take a longer period. Indeed, the number far from going down apparently increased and ran into many thousands or tens of thousands. I have never been able to understand how this has happened. Anyhow, the position is that, far from ending this sorry and wretched business, we carry on with an army of Custodians and the like, harassing large numbers of our fellow countrymen. This surely was not our intention when we repealed this Act.

The enclosed memorandum refers to what is called the Automatic Vesting of evacuee property in the Custodian under Act 14 which was repealed. I do not understand this and it seems to me not only entirely opposed to what we have felt and stated but exceedingly unjustified. Further, the cases under Section 16 of the Evacuee Property Law which are still pending appear to require some kind of evidence which is beyond the scope of any person to give. I think that this matter has to be tackled at the highest level now and ended in some way or other. It goes against all my notion of law and my conscience that we should carry on this vendetta against a very large community in India. I want, therefore, this to be considered at an early date at a full Cabinet meeting. The Cabinet Committee is not enough. As you know, I am going away from India on the 21st June.⁸ I am asking the Cabinet Secretary to put this up for consideration of the Cabinet on Tuesday, the 19th of June. The Cabinet will meet at 11 a.m. that day. Naturally, we can only consider the broad principles at that time. I hope that you will prepare some kind of a paper to give the present position and the principles involved.

I tried to get in touch with your Ministry here but there was apparently no responsible person there and I gathered that you and your Secretary were in Simla. I was told that you did not intend coming here from Simla but were likely to go to Calcutta direct. I should like you to come here and I should like to meet you and discuss these matters with you before the Cabinet meeting on the 19th.

7. The Evacuee Property Act, enacted on 14 April 1950 and amended on 29 April 1953, was abrogated on 8 October 1954.

8. Jawaharlal Nehru travelled overseas from 21 June to 22 July 1956.

In the memorandum attached, there are one or two other points mentioned also about which I should like to talk to you and which might be referred to in the Cabinet meeting also.

I understand that the auctions that have taken place of evacuee property have resulted in displacing a number of Muslims who were living there as tenants. According to law, they have a right to stay there for two years. But as a matter of fact the pressure on them is such that they are pushed out immediately. This question is likely to become an even more important one involving large numbers of people when further auctions take place. We shall then have to deal with these dispossessed Muslims and have to tackle the question of rehabilitating them. They cannot vanish.

There is the question of mosques, and an important aspect of it is referred to in the memorandum. This is that the law of adverse possession does not take effect.

There are one or two other matters too which I shall discuss with you when you come here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
11 June 1956

My dear Pantji,

I had a visit today from some Muslims of Delhi and they gave me a memorandum, copy of which I enclose.² When after much trouble we repealed the Evacuee Property Act, we thought that this sorry business was over. In fact, we were told that some pending matters will be disposed of within a few months. I now find that far from ending it is an expanding business, and more and more cases are brought under its scope under some pretext or other. I am very worried about it, and I think, this is highly improper. It is in the nature of a vendetta against a large community of our fellow citizens. I am asking the

1. JN Collection.

2. For the main points raised in the memorandum see *ante*, p. 233.

Cabinet Secretary to put up this matter at the Cabinet meeting on the 19th June. We can consider the broad principles then. The army of Custodians all over the country has become a regular menace.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Property of Muslim Evacuees¹

Please enquire from the Delhi Administration:-

- (1) What they have done thus far about recovering possession of mosques, dargahs, etc., in wrongful possession of other people, chiefly refugees?
- (2) How many have they handed over to Muslims?
- (3) How many still remain?
- (4) What steps are being taken to recover them?

2. You may point out that under the Indian Limitation Act, adverse possession for 12 years entitled them to ownership even if the ownership is by trespass. Some early steps have to be taken, therefore, to prevent this happening.

3. I should also like to know how far Muslim graveyards have been protected. I gather that buildings are put up there in many places. What steps are being taken for their protection? Or for the removal of any building recently put up on them? Is there full record of these graveyards?

4. You might mention that these and allied matters are likely to be considered by the Cabinet on the 19th June.

1. Note to B.N. Kaul, Principal Private Secretary, 11 June 1956. JN Collection.

6. The Question of Moveable Evacuee Property¹

I enclose a paper given to me today by Shri Anis Ahmad Abbasi of Lucknow. The point he has raised is mentioned in the notes. Will you please enquire from the Rehabilitation Ministry immediately how such questions arise when there was an agreement with the Pakistan Government in regard to moveable properties?² Apparently, no instructions in accordance with the agreement were published in the Gazette and so the Custodians function in the old way and say that they are bound by the old Act. This appears to be contrary to our agreement with the Pakistan Government.

2. I understand that many such cases are arising and, therefore, this matter should be cleared up by some publication in the Gazette. The particular matter in the present case is now pending before the Custodian of Lucknow and 4th July has been fixed for disposal.

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 12 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. India and Pakistan signed an agreement on 28 June 1950 for the settlement of moveable assets abandoned by Hindus and Muslims in 1947. Under this agreement, after the claimant produced necessary documents to the governmental agencies the two dominions had to make arrangements for transfer of the assets to the rightful owners after necessary investigations. But by creating artificial barriers Pakistan had reduced the agreement to mockery. Again in July-August 1953, the agreement came in for a fresh examination and an understanding was reached on some matters like the removal or disposal by evacuees of their personal and household effects. However, several items of moveable property remained untouched. Finally, in March 1955, all problems relating to moveable properties were tackled and resolved.

7. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
15 June 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th June in which you have dealt at some length with various complaints of the Maulanas.² None of the persons, who

1. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, p. 233.

came to see me, complained of you or, indeed, of the Rehabilitation Ministry. They did complain of the way various Custodians were dealing with these problems, more particularly the Custodian at Lucknow.

What I have been worried about was not so much their specific complaints but the fact that in spite of the Evacuee Property Act having been ended, this vast apparatus of Custodians still continues and hangs like the Sword of Damocles over large numbers of people. My own impression is that many of these local Custodians (not the Custodian-General) are not the kind of persons I would trust with any important decisions. Also, that the pressures of the refugees and displaced persons all work in one direction.

Nooruddin Ahmad, who is himself a lawyer and who has appeared in many such cases, gave me some instances of Custodians not even accepting decisions that have been announced by you and Parliament because they had not been gazetted or some such thing. I think, it is desirable that the whole Cabinet should be given information about the present position. Vast sums of money are involved and vast numbers of people are concerned and we should take the Cabinet into our confidence.

There is one other matter which was not mentioned to me by the Jamiat deputation but which has come up before me separately. This is the case of Roshan Ara who was brought here as a baby of three or four in 1948 from Jind. The matter came up before me because of a letter I received from the Pakistan High Commissioner³ for the restoration of this girl, who is about 13 now, to a person who claims to be her maternal uncle in Pakistan. I went through the file and wanted information about various matters, especially, relating to property, from your Ministry. But as you were all away, I have not been able to get it yet. I found from the file, however, that although there seemed to be quite adequate proof that this girl was the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali, a Minister in Jind, someone had stated that she should go to a civil court to establish her parentage and only then could she be entitled to claim the property. This seemed to me rather extraordinary. The whole family excepting one person was murdered in Jind. She was picked up from among the dead bodies and recovered. We have certificates on the file about her identity and there is other evidence also.

If it is clear that Roshan Ara is the daughter of Bakshi Shafqat Ali, then it is obvious that she is the heir of her father. The Evacuee Pool has no right to the property of a number of persons who were killed in India and owned property.

3. Ghazanfar Ali Khan.

To my surprise, I found that this girl had not been even given a maintenance allowance till about six months ago when Rs.100/- a month was fixed for her. The result is that her education has suffered. I have now taken it upon myself to pay for her education in proper schools. This case has to be gone into fully. This is not a matter for the Cabinet.

I suggest, therefore, that we might consider the broad question of the position of pending cases under the Evacuee Property Act in the Cabinet. We cannot go there in any great detail or discuss individual cases. The broad policies have to be clarified. After that the Cabinet Committee on Rehabilitation can consider, where necessary, details and particular matters.

I am going out of Delhi tomorrow and returning on the 18th forenoon.⁴ I shall try to see you that day in the afternoon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 16 and 17 June, Nehru was at Narora in Bulandshahr district to attend the North Zone Congress workers camp organized by the AICC.

8. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
19 June 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

Your letter of the 15th June about Roshan Ara Begum. The only question, as far as I can see, is whether she is the daughter of Shafqat Ali. In a matter of this kind, it is obvious that only circumstantial evidence can be available. To ask this little girl to go to a law court to get some kind of a certificate seems to me asking for far too much. The facts are bad enough. The whole family was killed.

This is clearly a matter which should have been decided by the Minister for Rehabilitation on the evidence available or, better still, by the Cabinet

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Foreign Secretary.

Committee. On looking through the file and hearing other accounts from various persons, it seems to me that there was adequate evidence about her being the daughter of Shafqat Ali. In any event, I think this matter should be put up before the Cabinet Committee on my return.

So far as I know, there was no warrant for presuming that anyone belonging to the family had gone to Pakistan. In fact, the evidence was that nearly all of them had been killed. It was, therefore, not quite right to distribute the property to displaced persons. However, this matter will not offer much difficulty.

Meanwhile, I suggest that you increase the allowance that you are giving to Roshan Ara Begum.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

1. Choosing the Right Intelligence Agents¹

I had been told that one of the persons delivering the most violent speech on behalf of the Hindu Mahasabha at Bhopal was in the Central Intelligence.² One or two others, equally violent in inciting others, were in the local Intelligence. I wrote to the Chief Commissioner of Bhopal about this to enquire. His reply is enclosed.³ From this, it appears that my information was correct.

2. I can understand members of an organization being used as Intelligence agents, but when it is publicly known that these persons are Intelligence agents, then not only is their value useless but government necessarily becomes rather ridiculous in the eyes of the public as well as associated with such undesirable persons. It is said that government encourages agents provocateur. This is a ridiculous position.

3. I might add that the original information was given to me that these people were in the Central Intelligence, by a person who is either a Communist or a near Communist.

4. You might draw the Home Secretary's attention to this odd situation.

1. Note to PPS, 1 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. This refers to an office-bearer of the Hindu Mahasabha, who spoke at a meeting in Bhopal on 6 April 1956 and was also a "source" in Central Intelligence. Nehru had written to S.D. Sharma, Chief Minister of Bhopal, about this meeting and the communal situation in Bhopal. This letter is printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 135-136.

3. K.P. Bhargava, Chief Commissioner of Bhopal, wrote to Nehru on 25 April 1956 that the local police received information from "sources" in all the parties in addition to certain others who were "unattached". Bhargava added that it was not otherwise possible to get reliable information about the activities of political parties and organizations which worked in secret and the Hindu Mahasabha "sources" were used primarily to get information about their activities. Bhargava noted that Home Secretary, A.V. Pai would explain the position about "sources" in Central Intelligence.

2. Selection of Delegation Going Abroad¹

I am surprised to see the above note of the Finance Minister.² There is no question of the German Government or the German Vice-Chancellor dictating to us. When the Vice-Chancellor came here,³ I discussed at some length with him the progress that Germany had made. Thereupon, he suggested that it would be a good thing if our Planning Commission sent three of our eminent economists to Western Germany to study this development for some time. I agreed to this proposal. No names were mentioned of course. I mentioned this matter very soon after in the Planning Commission and thought that steps would be taken by the Planning Commission. In fact, I was told then that this would be done.

2. This was essentially a question for the Planning Commission to decide though, of course, it would consult the Ministries concerned. After that no reference was made to me. Apparently some kind of a delegation was decided upon, by whom it is not quite clear, consisting of six persons. This was intimated to our Ambassador in Bonn who pointed out that this was not the kind of small delegation that had been discussed previously⁴. It was at this stage that I saw these papers and I agreed with our Ambassador's view and wrote to the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission suggesting that in addition to any delegation which we might send as suggested, we should also send three leading economists as had been agreed upon previously. It is, of course, for us to determine who should go.

3. I see from a note from the Ministry of External Affairs that Dr Bluecher in his talk with our Ambassador suggested Dr V.K.R.V. Rao's name as one of the three economists. I rather doubt if this was Dr Bluecher's suggestion. It is

1. Note to the Finance Minister and the Cabinet Secretary, 15 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh wrote on 15 May that it was not right for Dr Franz Bluecher, West German Vice-Chancellor, to "dictate to us the names of whom we should send" as part of a delegation to study Germany's economic progress. Bluecher had suggested the name of V.K.R.V. Rao, then Director of the Delhi School of Economics.
3. Bluecher visited India for 11 days from 10 January 1956.
4. On 3 May 1956, A.C.N. Nambiar, India's Ambassador in Bonn, informed him that a six-member delegation had been chosen to visit Germany. Nambiar in turn, pointed out that its changed composition indicated that, "we are not giving serious concern to Bluecher's invitation".

possible that in the course of a talk with our Ambassador, the latter might have suggested the name. In any event, there is no discourtesy to us even for Dr Bluecher informally to suggest a name that he might know. It is for us to decide.

4. The Minister in charge of Economic Affairs is, of course, concerned with this matter. But the Prime Minister and the Minister of External Affairs is even more concerned and in fact, he has given his word to the German Vice-Chancellor. In all economic matters dealing with foreign countries, the External Affairs Ministry is intimately concerned because they affect external policy.

5. All kinds of delegations are going to foreign countries. Possibly, many of them are not very necessary. It is surprising, therefore, that in this matter, where the Prime Minister himself is concerned, objection should be raised. As there is some objection and this raises wider questions of policy also, this matter should be considered by the Cabinet.

3. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear Pantji,

Dhebarbhai came to see me today about the new IAS recruitment.² He suggested that political sufferers might also be allowed to appear for this. Of course, they can only be taken in if they fulfil the necessary requirements. He was particularly referring to young men who could not complete their formal education because of the 1942 Movement.³

1. JN Collection.

2. In 1956, the Union Government launched a special recruitment drive of personnel into the IAS due to shortfall of officers. In 1955, it was estimated that the Central Government would need 200 officers.

3. The 1956 regulations for special recruitment, raised the age limit from 40 to 43 for political sufferers. For this concession, a candidate must have taken part in the national movement and must either have been actually debarred from or refused admission to a competitive examination or government employment on account of his political activities, or being in government service was punished for taking part in political activities; or have been imprisoned or detained or dismissed from service on account of political activities.

Perhaps, you might give consideration to this question. I do not know all the terms of recruitment, but if a person has the qualifications I should imagine there is no harm in taking these political sufferers.

Dhebarbhai also was rather put out by the qualification that the applicant should have been earning Rs. 300 a month at least.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. For this special recruitment, the age for competition was 25-40 years. A university degree and a pay or income of not less than Rs. 300 per month were the prescribed qualifications. In the first emergency recruitment in 1948-50, the minimum income qualification was Rs. 400 per month.

4. Leakage of Secret Documents¹

Members of the Cabinet will remember that I have often drawn their attention to the great importance of keeping all the Defence papers secret.² Indeed I have suggested that they should be returned to the Cabinet Secretariat after every meeting. It has happened, however, on more than one occasion and once recently when an important and top secret paper was not returned to the Cabinet Secretary and no trace of it can be found now.

I am venturing to draw the attention of the Cabinet Ministers to this serious matter and to request that very particular care should be taken about these papers and every single paper should be returned to the Cabinet Secretary. I would further suggest that these papers should not be seen by any member of the staff other than the member to whom these papers are sent.³

1. Note to Members of the Cabinet, 27 May 1956. T.T. Krishnamachari Papers, NMML.
2. Concerned about the leakage of his fortnightly letters in 1955, Nehru asked the Cabinet Secretary to send a note on his behalf to the Council of Ministers. For this note dated 21 October 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, p. 502.
3. Nehru wrote to Keshava Deva Malaviya on 24 May 1956 (not printed) that all ministers should be 'rather careful' about their papers and notes, adding that these be circulated to as few persons as possible. Malaviya had on the same day brought to Nehru's notice an article printed in the *Hindustan Times* on 22 May by Durga Das in which he had reproduced some important words from a Finance Ministry note.

Ministers will no doubt realise that if any paper is lost or gets into wrong hands, this may have very serious consequences for us.

5. To John Matthai¹

Camp: Bombay

2 June 1956

My dear Matthai,²

Thank you for your letter of the 30th May with which you have sent me an extract from an article by a retired British member of the ICS. This extract has been interesting and, no doubt, it has some truth in it. But, to counter your extract, I send you another.³ This is from a report on India's administrative system by Paul H. Appleby, who is the Consultant in Public Administration of the Ford Foundation and is now in charge of the finance of the New York State. Appleby has been to India on three occasions during the last six years, and has spent two or three months on each visit. The first report⁴, he gave us was very interesting and, in fact, resulted in some change in our thinking and in our administrative set-up. The change was obviously not enough as he himself has pointed out.

There is no doubt that the various ministries in the Government of India have expanded tremendously. I have also little doubt that there is superfluous personnel in many places, more specially, in the lower ranks. But the work has grown enormously. The Government of India of the British days was really, in many ways, just an extension of the UK Government. The most important decisions were taken in London. There was no foreign service or foreign ministry. Defence matters were decided in Whitehall. The Home Ministry

1. JN Collection.

2. John Matthai was at this time Chairman, of the State Bank of India.

3. This was an extract from the second report on the administration of the Government's industrial and commercial enterprises by the American expert, Paul H. Appleby. According to the report, which was tabled in Parliament on 13 August 1956 the achievements of India in recent years had been made "beyond the capacity of the Indian administrative system." He noted that by pushing the administrative systems to its limits, India had achieved "great results."

4. For details on the first report submitted by Appleby in 1953, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 24, pp. 338-343.

was only concerned with law and order and service problems chiefly. Now, there is a vast Foreign Ministry looking after a very large number of missions abroad and foreign missions in Delhi, quite apart from our entanglements in Korea, Indo-China, UN, and elsewhere. Being personally concerned with the Foreign Ministry, I know that the senior officers are terribly overworked. Their normal hours are from 9 in the morning till 7 in the evening, in office, and then much work to do at home. In fact, quite a number were on the verge of breakdown in health because of this overwork.

The Rehabilitation Ministry is completely new, dealing with millions of refugees and vast properties.

The Production Ministry is new and deals with great undertakings and enterprises. The Irrigation & Power Ministry is new. This also deals with vast river valley schemes, flood control, irrigation, etc. The Defence Ministry has now very difficult problems to tackle apart from many new and big enterprises, which it runs including Hindustan Aircraft, Machine Tool Factory, etc. The Transport Ministry has grown greatly and includes shipping. The Food & Agriculture Ministry has faced a tremendous task both in importing large quantities of foodgrains and in increasing our food production. I could go on in this manner about almost every ministry of ours.

The Home Ministry, to which the British ICS man refers, has now to deal with large numbers of most intricate problems, not only in the autonomous states, but in Centrally administered areas and all the old states that have come under our ken. There is the Kashmir problem. There is Pakistan, of course, which is chiefly the concern of the Foreign Office. The work of the Finance Ministry has grown greatly. Indeed, both Finance and Commerce & Industry control vast empires, if I may use that word.

We are a different kind of state now not only because we are independent, but because we are social minded, and our responsibilities have grown and are growing. We have to function in a democratic set-up, which is necessarily expensive and often wasteful. Parliament sits for seven to eight months in a year. In the last session of Parliament, there were about three thousand questions. To get information to answer them requires a big apparatus. Bureaucracy necessarily grows when the state undertakes new types of work in many fields. In a socialist state bureaucracy will be even bigger.

In the extract you have sent, reference is made to interviews. I know that our ministers have to give a great deal of time to interviews of all kinds, infinitely more than in the British days. Even I see hundreds of people separately or in small groups. Among them are peasants and workers, apart from others.

The report of Appleby, from which I am sending you an extract, is a confidential document and is still in a discussion stage. Much of the report is really a criticism of our administrative apparatus, and the numerous checks that there are. Appleby has always pointed out that we cannot work a modern state with the system that we have inherited from the British. We must give greater freedom. The first page of the report is, however, full of praise.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
6 June 1956

My dear Pantji,

I enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from Deshmukh.² There has been a difference of opinion between him and T.T. Krishnamachari.³ I am unable to appreciate what our right course should be in such matters. I am suggesting to Deshmukh that we might have a little meeting in which you and T.T. might also be present to discuss this.

There is another matter in regard to which there is a difference of opinion between Deshmukh and T.T. T.T. suggested that we should give a revolving credit of a sum of rupees five crores to the Soviet Union to enable them to buy

1. JN Collection.
2. Deshmukh's letter of 5 June 1956 dealt with additional issue of capital to some Joint Stock Companies, to finance their increased activities. Deshmukh contended that he was against issuing "rights" shares at par by companies whose shares were already quoted on the stock exchange at a high premium and suggested ensuring a net return to existing shareholders of such companies of approximately five per cent on their total investments after they had received the additional shares to which they were entitled under the law.
3. The main area of disagreement between Deshmukh and Krishnamachari was the differential treatment accorded to the issue of "rights" shares by the former in the case of Tatas and Indian Iron & Steel Company. T.T. Krishnamachari took objection to Deshmukh's contention that he had been consulted on the issue on a "purely personal basis," and added that "the speculation in shares of these companies is a matter which concerns me vitally as it affects the stability of the industry." He wrote to Nehru on 6 June that he was willing to transfer control of industry to the finance ministry, if Nehru so desired.

goods in India. We are, in fact, paying them for the plants and machines they are sending us, in our own goods, and it was to facilitate this that a revolving credit was suggested. Finance Ministry do not agree to this.⁴ This will also have to be considered.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. The Finance Ministry's objection, expressed in a note on 4 June 1956, was that since India itself was short of foreign exchange, and taking credits from others including from the Soviet Union, it would be strange for India to advance credits to the latter. Krishnamachari wrote to Nehru on 6 June that the Ministry's "response springs from the attitude that the Finance Department should not help. It is in this context we want the development of our foreign trade."

7. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
10 June 1956

My dear Pantji,

As I am going abroad soon, it was suggested to me that I should draw my salary in the UK. It was pointed out that if I did so, under the existing rules,² I would save a considerable sum of money. This may amount to Rs.1,500/- or so. Apparently, the saving is on two counts—one is in exchange and the other in income tax. Whether this figure is correct or not, I do not know.

This indicates how present rules in favour of payment in England favour those who draw their salaries in England. Evidently, this rule was made for the benefit of Englishmen and it is continued for the benefit of others.³ This is one of the anomalies of our continuing old and out of date rules both in regard to exchange, payment in pound sterling and freedom of income tax for payments abroad.

1. JN Collection.
2. On 11 June, Nehru wrote to Pant (not printed) that the relief he referred to was allowed under section 4 (1) of the Income Tax Act by which income earned abroad by a resident Indian was exempt from tax upto Rs. 4,500, the condition being that the income be earned abroad. The practice was started in 1939.
3. For Nehru's views on the special privileges for Servicemen, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp. 291-293.

I have drawn your attention to these matters previously and you told me that something was being done soon in regard to them.⁴ I hope that we shall be able to finalise this before long. This matter has been pending for a long time.

I have often gone abroad during the past few years. But on no occasion have I drawn my salary in the UK, as I might have done. I do not propose to do so in the future either because I do not approve of this system.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. For his previous letter to Pant, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 143-146.

8. Foreign Funding of Political Parties¹

Owing to the approach of the General Elections² there is, I believe, already much activity in various political parties in India. Many of the difficulties and problems that we have to face today are partly, at least, due to the approaching General Elections.

2. We have received a good deal of information from Burma and Ceylon, where they have recently had General Elections,³ to the effect that some political parties were actively encouraged and financially assisted by foreign interests. Normally, the more conservative parties were encouraged and assisted by some organizations connected with the United States and the more leftist and pro-communist parties by organizations directly or indirectly connected with communist countries.⁴

1. Note to the Home Minister, 10 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. Voting for the Second General Elections in India began on 24 February 1957.
3. The results of the General Elections, held in Myanmar on 27 April 1956, were announced on 10 May 1956. Sri Lanka had its General Elections between 5-10 April 1956.
4. On 23 April 1956, U Nu indirectly referring to the Chinese hand, characterized the Elections as a "contest between stooges on one hand and genuine patriots on the other." See *post*, pp. 451 and 461. Similarly in Sri Lanka, the Left parties and the MEP led by Bandaranaike charged the UNP Government of Kotelawala of being subservient to western powers. They criticized US economic aid to Sri Lanka, announced in March 1956, as an effort to influence the outcome of the Elections.

3. I should like our Intelligence to be vigilant about this matter in India, more especially about funds from abroad coming to assist parties here. We have often suspected that the Communist Party in India manages to get some kind of financial assistance from outside.⁵ They may not get it from any official source abroad but there are many other ways of getting it. It is difficult to find out how this money comes. But it should not be difficult to find out how this money comes. That is, if considerable sums of money are spent and there is no apparent source visible, then the inference is that they have come from abroad.

4. Similarly, we have often suspected and had good reason to do so that certain American agencies helped communal parties in India. Newspapers were said to be subsidized in this way. Very indirectly, the PSP sometimes got some help from abroad also.⁶

5. I am told that at the Palghat Communist Conference many questions were asked of the Executive about their finances and accounts. An answer to these was avoided. Ultimately, some figure was given, but no account was produced as to where it came from. Local communist parties are usually poor and there is some complaint among local communists about the extravagance of the Central Committee people and they enquired as to where they got the money from.⁷ I am told that the Communist Party has acquired a piece of land in Delhi where they intend putting up a big press especially for election work.

6. In Burma and in Ceylon, it has been hinted that American sponsored organizations like the Asia Foundation⁸ and the like often assist parties financially. There is in Bombay, some Freedom League with which Shri M.R. Masani is

5. For Nehru's talk with Bulganin and Khrushchev on this point, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, p. 343.

6. For Nehru's comments on this subject, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 284-286.

7. On 26 April 1956, the Politburo of the CPI informed the fourth congress of the Party at Palghat that the "management of central finances was unplanned and chaotic.... There being no planning and check up by the Politburo, avoidable and extravagant expenditure has very often been incurred."

8. The Asia Foundation, known earlier as the Committee for Free Asia, was an organization funded by the American CIA. In the first week of June 1956, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, told the head of the Asia Foundation that they should function under government supervision, otherwise they would have to wind up their operations.

closely connected with also issues leaflets and magazines.⁹ These do not matter much. But the agency is there for financing people.

7. I am drawing your attention to some of these matters because foreign countries attach the greatest importance to our elections and have a tendency to interfere by assisting various groups or parties. We should be wide awake about this and our Intelligence should especially pay attention to this matter.

9. This refers to *Freedom First*, the organ of the Democratic Research Centre which was established by Minoo Masani in November 1950 as a research and information centre. During 1950s, it published about 32 pamphlets.

9. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi

12 June 1956

My dear Balkrishna,²

I enclose a note on the case of Dr Syed Mujtaba Ali.³ I am not personally acquainted with him, but all the reports about him are extraordinarily in his favour. Two Chief Ministers, Dr Roy⁴ and Nabakrushna Chaudhuri,⁵ speak very well of him. His record is also unusually good, both in the scholastic and the political fields. Normally, one should think that he is a person whose services should be valued. I do not understand, therefore, why a person with this great talent and competence as well as experience should not have proper

1. JN Collection.

2. Minister for Information and Broadcasting.

3. Syed Mujtaba Ali (1904-1974); renowned litterateur and linguist; studied in Calcutta, Vishwa-Bharati, Aligarh and al-Azhar Universities, and obtained doctorate from Bonn University; worked in the Afghanistan education department as teacher of German and English in Kabul 1927-1929, Principal, Baroda College, 1932-1940; Principal, Bagura College, Bangladesh, 1948; Secretary, Indian Council of Cultural Relations, 1952; joined AIR as Station Director 1954 and served in Patna and Cuttack and Delhi; head of the department of Islamic Culture, Vishwa-Bharati, 1956-1964; author of a number of brilliant travelogues, belles-lettres, and novels in Bengali; publications include *Deshe-Bideshe* (1948); *Panchatantra* (1952), *Chacha Kahini* (1955), *Shabnam* (1960), *Hitler* (1970).

4. B.C. Roy, Chief Minister of West Bengal.

5. Chief Minister of Orissa.

opportunities with us. Please let me know. I am interested in him, rather specially, not only because of his marked ability but because he is one of the very few persons among Muslims that we have in relatively high posts. His removal is likely to lead to much criticism.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
15 June 1956

My dear Swaran Singh,

I mentioned to you briefly yesterday about the case of some clerks in the Ministry of External Affairs who had worked in the Central Recovery Organization.² Our talk was interrupted.

2. I have now seen the papers. I think you are completely right in what you say. Also, I have little doubt that these persons were taken in by the Central Recovery Organization irregularly and perhaps through some kind of backdoor arrangement. I do not know, but that is probable.

3. The question now is what we should do about it. What you have suggested is a strictly correct course. But I am reluctant to be very strict in this matter for two or three reasons. I do not think these clerks were personally to blame about this. The blameworthy person must have been the individual in the Central Recovery Organization at the time who did this. I do not know who he was. If the clerks took advantage of this, one can hardly blame them. That, however, is a minor matter.

4. The principal thing is that having worked for some time in the CRO, they were transferred to External Affairs. External Affairs wanted some staff urgently and in the ordinary course, they approached the various Ministries,

1. JN Collection.

2. The Central Recovery Organization (CRO) was set up as a result of the First Inter-Dominion Conference, held at Lahore on 6 December 1947, as a joint organization for the rescue of abducted women. It started working under the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation but after August 1948, responsibility for operations was first transferred to the Minister without Portfolio and then to the Ministry of External Affairs.

etc. Among the names sent to them were some from the CRO. External Affairs had no knowledge that these men from the CRO had come in somewhat irregularly or subject to some proviso. They treated them just as if they had come in the normal way from any Ministry. They had a test and those who passed the test were taken in. They have been working in External Affairs now for about a year and a half or so. I find by a reference to our senior officers in External Affairs that they worked satisfactorily and, in fact, some have been given promotion because of their work. Three have been sent to Foreign Missions.

5. External Affairs are on the eve of forming a Branch of the Foreign Service for Superintendents, Clerks, etc.³ Those who have done good work will be taken into this and, in fact, a considerable number of our present staff will be absorbed, if it passes the tests applied. These persons would also be given a chance for this purpose.

6. If these persons are sent back to CRO, they will practically have to be retrenched, if not now then some little time later. The CRO is shrinking continuously. They will thus join the ranks of the unemployed and the most they can do is to have their names registered in the Employment Exchange.

7. There are two aspects to this question. One is, how far we would be fair to them and secondly, how far we shall be fair to the needs of the External Affairs. On the whole, I think, it will be unfortunate and not quite fair in the circumstances to push these people out after they have done good work during the past year and a half or more, which has brought them promotion. But my main consideration is that we are very short-handed at present, and we would be hard hit by reduction even of our present staff. We can, of course, engage more in the normal way. But we shall spend some months in training them and then we are not quite sure, how they will turn out. That will be wastage. There are also, as I have said, three men abroad whom we have to summon back.

8. I feel therefore, that, considering all the circumstances, it would be desirable to formalize their appointment. I do not quite know what steps have to be taken to this end.

9. I had a brief talk with Pantji today on this subject and he also felt that it would not be a good thing to push them out now, as they had done good work and we were in need of them.

3. The IFS (B) was formed on 1 August 1956 as a junior service to have a regular and permanent cadre of personnel to man the junior ranks in the Ministry of External Affairs, and in the missions abroad.

10. Could you kindly give some further thought to this matter? I am sending you the file that came to me from the External Affairs.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
19 June 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

I have your two letters of June 18th, 1956. One of these is about the Chairmanship of the State Bank² and the other about the Chairmanship of the Life Insurance Corporation.³

You have argued about the desirability of appointing senior officials to these positions of responsibility. No argument was needed to convince me that some of our senior officials are quite capable of assuming such positions. Indeed, I think that as time goes on and our public sector expands, we shall have to rely more and more on trained officials. As for the two senior officials

1. JN Collection.
2. As the Chairman, John Matthai and Managing Director, S.K. Handoo of the State Bank of India had submitted their resignations over some remarks in Parliament about the pay and perks of the top SBI management, the matter of appointing a new Chairman became urgent. Deshmukh wrote on 18 June. He also stated that he was unable to understand the 'undesirability' of appointing senior officials to nationalized institutions as observed in Nehru's letter of 15 June (not printed) arguing that he himself had headed one such institution—the RBI—with no ill effects.
3. Deshmukh's letter of 17/18th June dealt with the appointment of a Chairman for the Life Insurance Corporation when it would come into existence on the 1 September 1956, consequent to the nationalization of the insurance business. Deshmukh sought Nehru's approval to appoint H.M. Patel as LIC Chairman in addition to his duties as Secretary, Economic Affairs in the Finance Ministry. Deshmukh added that he envisaged a number of intricate problems arising from the integration of many Insurance companies, "which will call for solution and whose solution will necessitate either government approval or guidance."

you mention,⁴ I know them well and have a high opinion of their competence.

My difficulty was that we require men of competence in the Central Government also, and it might not be advisable to send away a number of them from here. Also, that if we have to select senior officials, we might choose them from a larger circle. There may be some others here who might be at least equally suitable and who might, perhaps, be spared a little more easily. As you know, within a day and a half, I shall be leaving India and I am trying to rush through a great deal of work during this brief period. I do not think it would be right for us to come to decisions in a hurry in such matters. It may be that, after fuller consideration, the names you have suggested might be considered the most suitable. But, I think it would be better to make some temporary arrangements now, such as you think proper, and to take final decisions somewhat later. No great delay need take place even in arriving at the final decisions.

I suggest, therefore, that you might make these temporary arrangements both of the Chairmanship of the State Bank⁵ and of the Life Insurance Corporation.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The two names suggested by Deshmukh were H.M. Patel for LIC Chairmanship and P.C. Bhattacharya, then Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, for the post of SBI Chairman. Nehru, in his letter of 15 June, refused to move Bhattacharya too soon.
5. On 25 August 1956 H.V.R. Iengar, Secretary in the Commerce and Industry Ministry, was appointed Chairman, SBI, in succession to John Matthai. Pending Iengar's take over, V.L. Mehta, Vice-Chairman of SBI, carried on the duties of the Chairman as Matthai's term in office ended on 30 September 1956.
6. H.M. Patel, then Secretary, Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance, was appointed as first Chairman of the LIC on 1 September 1956.

I. PUNJAB

1. To Tara Singh¹

New Delhi
2 May 1956

My dear Master Tara Singh²,

Thank you for your letter of May 1st which I have just received.³ I have read it with astonishment and dismay. If what you have stated is even partly correct, then this is a very surprising state of affairs. I entirely agree with you that this must be looked into. I shall do so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. A prominent Akali leader and associated with the Sikh Missionary College in Amritsar at this time.
3. Tara Singh alleged that it had become the general practice of the Punjab Police to murder people and call them as dacoits killed in encounter. He cited several such instances including the Mukerian dacoity case in Hoshiapur District. He was convinced that two innocent men were in the Police custody when they were reported to have been killed in an encounter on 19 April in this case.

2. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
2 May 1956

My dear Pantji,

I enclose copy of a letter from Master Tara Singh.² Some time ago, Shriram Sharma³ of the Punjab spoke to me about these matters and made exactly the same type of complaint to me. In fact, he gave me a number of names too of

1. JN Collection.
2. See preceding item.
3. Member, Punjab Legislative Assembly and leader, Haryana United Front.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

people who had been shot down in cold blood. I was much disturbed and I wrote to Sardar Partap Singh⁴ on the subject.

I am again speaking to Partap Singh about this and also writing to the Governor⁵. I feel, however, that something more is necessary. Could we not have some kind of an informal enquiry without fuss by the Centre? It need not be a very elaborate enquiry.

I do not want the Punjab Government to feel in any way that we are distrusting them or bypassing them. But the charges are too serious to be overlooked.

Ashwani Kumar⁶ is a person against whom rather strange things have been said. He certainly has a certain competence but he is apt to talk too much about himself and his deeds. I think that part of the trouble in Himachal Pradesh was due to his unusual way of doing things.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Partap Singh Kairon, Chief Minister of Punjab.

5. C.P.N. Singh.

6. (b. 1920); joined IPS, 1945; DIG, Jalandhar Range, 1955-56; Officiating DIG, Ambala Range, 1956-57; Officiating DIG, Patiala Range, 1957-61; DIG, Border Range, 1961; incharge of the investigations into the Mukerian police station dacoity case; Vice President, Indian Hockey Federation; member, International Olympic Committee; author of *Casual Symphony*.

3.To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
3 May 1956

My dear Pantji,

I sent you last night a copy of a letter from Master Tara Singh. This morning, I had a talk with Partap Singh Kairon. He said that he did not know about the previous complaints but there was a good deal of truth in what Master Tara Singh had written in regard to the Mukerian incident², that is, the police had

1. JN Collection.

2. Tara Singh insisted that contrary to the assertions of the Punjab Police that the two persons Mohan Singh and Gurcharan Singh killed in an encounter on 19 April were dacoits, they were, in fact, innocent men killed in police custody.

taken the law into their own hands.³ Of course, the persons concerned were notorious dacoits and dangerous men.

As this is an admitted fact, there is no need for an enquiry I had suggested to you last night. I am disturbed at this and I told Partap Singh that this kind of thing would totally discredit his administration. He agreed and said that he would make this clear to the police.

Ashwani Kumar, DIG in the Punjab, has a habit of bragging and talking about his own heroics in the public press. I told Partap Singh that this was very objectionable. He agreed with me and said he would speak to Ashwani Kumar.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. Nehru wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 5 May (not printed): "Evidently, the police are afraid of even well known and dangerous dacoits getting off in the law courts because of some technical difficulty."

4. To Partap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi
8 May 1956

My dear Partap Singh,

I enclose a copy of a letter² I have received from Parmanand, a member of your Pradesh Congress Committee. This is about the nomination of Surja Ram to the Punjab Council.

1. JN Collection.
2. Parmanand, a member of the Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee from Abohar, alleged that the Chief Parliamentary Secretary, Devi Lal got Surja Ram nominated to the Punjab council out of Governor's special powers through Partap Singh Kairon, "with a view to get some heavy amount from him for the coming elections." Surja Ram had fought in the last General Elections on a Jana Sangh ticket and was badly defeated by an Akali candidate. Surja Ram was a cotton factory owner and a very reactionary type of landlord. These, observed Parmanand, were Surja Ram's "total qualifications" which led the Governor to nominate him.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

If the facts stated in this letter are correct, I am unhappy about this nomination. But, apart from these facts, there is another question of some importance. According to our Constitution, the persons to be nominated must be distinguished in arts, science and literature. We have always followed that rule. I imagine that Surja Ram has nothing to do with any of these subjects. It is unfortunate to go against the directions of the Constitution, and this creates dissatisfaction and criticism.

This rule applies both to the Centre and the States. In the Centre, we have been careful to choose our men for nomination from this point of view.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
11 May 1956

My dear C.P.N.,

Thank you for your letter of May 10.² I am glad to know that the circumstances reported to me about the Mukerian Dacoity Case were not so bad as I had imagined. Both Pantji and myself have been greatly exercised over the reports we have received. A government has to function as such and observe its own laws, and its officers cannot behave just as they like.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. C.P.N. Singh wrote that the information he gathered about the death of two dacoits in the Mukerian dacoity case, suggested that Tara Singh's version about the incident was "over-exaggerated" and "the impression conveyed by Sardar Partap Singh to you and to me also seems to be based on the versions of interested parties... the Police have obviously been painted blacker than what they deserved... On the other hand, it seems clear that an attempt to arrest the culprits...and not resort to shooting, does not seem to be the accepted method by the police."

6. To Partap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi
15 May 1956

My dear Partap Singh,

I have been following in the newspapers, the happenings in the Punjab. In spite of the mischief that the Jana Sangh or the Hindu Mahasabha or the RSS make, I do not attach too much importance to them.² What the Arya Samaj might do in this language matter, however, is relatively more important.³

I see that you and some others are now addressing meetings.⁴ I think that the Congress has been slow and has rather left the field open to its opponents, most of whom probably do not even understand what we have decided.

Asoka Mehta, the PSP leader, saw me today and told me that he addressed a fairly large gathering somewhere in Ludhiana or Jalandhar. He supported our decisions and explained them. He told me that the public agreed with him at the end as they had not understood them previously. I think, therefore, that every effort should be made to explain all this to the people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. To oppose the merger of Pepsu and Punjab, without Himachal Pradesh and the adoption of the Regional Formula for Punjab, the Maha Punjab Samiti (a conglomeration of parties, mainly the Jana Sangh and the RSS) launched an agitation in April-May 1956. The Samiti organized anti-Formula meetings, boycotted meetings of Congress ministers and held black flag demonstrations. In their efforts to disrupt pro-Formula meetings, the Samiti often clashed with the police, as happened, for instance, on 13 May 1956, when the Jana Sangh workers were teargassed while trying to disrupt a pro-Formula meeting in Amritsar addressed by Ram Kishen, a Deputy Minister in Kairon's Cabinet.

3. On 8 May 1956, the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and Arya Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha issued a joint statement declaring its opposition to the Regional Formula for the Punjab. The statement claimed that the Formula, relegated Hindi to a secondary position in the State. And, added that since Hindi was a pivot around which their aspirations revolved, the Arya Samaj was not prepared to yield on the issue. "No sacrifice however great should be considered adequate for this sacred cause" warned the statement.

4. Several Central and State ministers addressed public meetings in parts of Punjab to try and explain the Regional Formula to the people. Partap Singh Kairon himself had addressed such a gathering on 13 May 1956 in a village in Ambala district.

7. To Chaman Lall¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear Chaman Lall,²

Your letter of May 17th.³ I am glad to know of the effect of your meetings. I am convinced that if properly approached, the people of the Punjab will understand that what has been done by the Government is in no way harmful to them and in fact is good. I have had reports of various meetings, some by Congressmen, some by non-Congressmen, such as Asoka Mehta.

During a fairly long experience, I do not remember having come across a more ridiculously foolish agitation than the one now being carried on by the Maha Punjab people, the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and the Jana Sangh.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Congress Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-1968.
3. Chaman Lall claimed that a meeting he addressed in Ludhiana to explain the Regional Formula, was attended by several thousand people. Despite attempts to disrupt the meeting, Chaman Lall did not ask the police to interfere. He suggested that attempts at conciliation were aimed at ensuring that the situation did not develop into a crisis.

8. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear CPN,

Master Tara Singh came to see me last evening. He referred to the Mukerian dacoity incidents as well as to some other incidents connected with police misbehaviour. He showed me four or five letters, which he had received from odd persons, giving information of some other incidents where the police had misbehaved and the matter had been hushed up. One or two of these letters were from ex-policemen.

1. JN Collection.

I found Master Tara Singh in a fairly good mood and relaxed. He was neither excited, as he usually has been, nor depressed. He said that what he was worried about was the future behaviour of the police and not so much about the past. Also, he said that this is not a communal issue, because about 80 per cent of the guilty parties in the police might well be the Sikhs. What he was worried about was the feeling of lawlessness that was increasing, and if the police also was lawless then a very bad situation would be created, as it was when the police and others went astray in 1947.²

I told him that I had written to you about these matters and we were all very anxious that the police should behave correctly and in a disciplined way. We were horrified to learn the allegations made against them.³ Thereupon, he asked me, if he could send the letters he had received, to you. I said, certainly he could do so.

What he pressed for was some kind of an inquiry by independent persons from the Centre. I told him that we were inquiring in our own way.⁴ I do not think any such formal inquiry is desirable.

Tara Singh did not say anything to me about the Maha Punjab agitation or any other local communal troubles. He was going to Bombay and asked me if he could do anything there about the Maharashtrian agitation. He condemned the violence in Bombay.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. For Nehru's comment on this, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, p. 443.
3. See *ante*, pp. 261-262. Nehru also wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 18 May 1956 (not printed) that while Tara Singh's charges against the Punjab police were greatly exaggerated but "quite a number of other people.....said the same thing to me". Nehru added that much to his surprise, this kind of thing (fake encounters) was not very uncommon in some other states.
4. On 5 June, Nehru sent to G.B. Pant the report of a month-long majesterial enquiry which found these allegations to be incorrect.

9. Linguism in Punjab¹

I met a deputation of some Punjab MLAs today.² They were about seven or eight of them. They said they had come on behalf of about 50 MLAs and MLCs.

2. Right at the beginning, I told them that I was surprised that they should be indulging in linguistic controversies when so much mischief was afoot in the Punjab and gangsterism and goondaism was flourishing.³ Their first duty was to meet this menace. If a house was on fire, we had to put out the fire and not argue about abstruse matters.

3. They said that they agreed with me that this gangster menace must be met. In fact, they were meeting it and they proposed to go on doing so.

4. They then spoke about the use of the Punjabi language in Gurmukhi in administration below the district level and said that this was very unfair, as many people would not know this.

5. I pointed out to them that Hindi was the only all India language and therefore, all over India any application could be given in Hindi and an attempt should be made to answer it in Hindi, whatever the language of the state might be. Secondly, that the Punjab has two official languages in the State, that is, Hindi and Punjabi. As one of the official languages of the State, also any person could send an application or write a letter in Hindi, and it would be proper for the answers to be sent in that language. In fact, every effort should be made to send an answer to any application or a letter in any of the Indian languages in that language. The only difficulty might be that that particular language was not known in that office, such as Tamil or Malayalam, etc. This difficulty did not arise in Hindi, as everybody in the offices was bound to know

1. Note on talks with Punjab MLAs, 22 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. The eight-member delegation of Punjab MLAs & MLCs, led by Yash, included A.C. Bali, Jagdish Chandra, Vaid Ram Dyal, Gopi Chandra Gupta, Sita Devi, Ralla Ram, Dev Raj Sethi and Probodh Chandra. They demanded that Hindi and Punjabi be the languages of the administration at all levels. It also sought that children living in the Punjabi zone should be imparted instructions in Hindi, if they so desired.

3. Nehru also wrote to C.P.N. Singh on 18 May 1956 (not printed) that the Maha Punjab agitation was thoroughly misconceived and the work of gangsters. "It is true that the gangsters can raise the sympathy of others. But gangsters have to be dealt with firmly if they commit violence".

Hindi. I was, in fact, merely stating the general principles of application to the whole of India and not interpreting the particular Regional Scheme⁴ relating to the Punjab.

6. I made it clear that the records would be kept in one language and script below the district level, that is, either in Hindi or Punjabi, according to region. But it would be open to any person to give an application or write a letter in either of those languages in either region and it should be accepted and replied to, where necessary, in that language. Further that copies should be supplied, where necessary, in either language.

7. The deputation expressed their satisfaction at this interpretation. They talked something about charge being made for copies. I said this was a trivial matter and should be dealt with by their Government.

8. They then talked about Kapurthala which would be an enclave in Jalandhar. Kapurthala was definitely a Punjabi area, but it would be surrounded by an Hindi area and what would happen to it? The areas had not been defined yet and I could not say how this would be defined. This was a matter of accommodation on a convenient basis.

9. They referred to Kangra which, they said, was definitely Hindi area but was cut off from the other Hindi area, unless Himachal Pradesh was added to the Punjab. I replied that Himachal Pradesh was not going to be merged into the Punjab at this stage at any rate. As for how Kangra might be treated, I could not say. This again was a matter for consideration when the areas were defined.

10. They talked about the capital and said that they hoped that Chandigarh would continue as capital and the demand made by some people for Patiala as capital would not be accepted. I said that so far as I know, there was no question of the capital being changed.

11. They suggested that it would be very helpful if my interpretation of applications and letters, etc., being received in Hindi and copies given could be made clear publicly. This would be very helpful and would totally undermine the agitation of the Jana Sangh and the Maha Punjab Samiti. I said that this

4. According to the agreement between the Congress and the Akalis in March 1956, Punjab and Pepsu were to be merged into a single state, and the State would then be divided into two regions, Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking. Punjab was to be bilingual recognizing both Punjabi (in Gurmukhi script) and Hindi (in Devanagari script) as the official languages of the State. The official language of each region was to be at the district level and below, the respective regional language.

was too trivial a matter for any kind of a statement to be made, but if occasion arose, this could be clarified.

12. Finally, I again drew their attention to the aggressive attitude and the gangster methods of the communalists in the Punjab. This was the major issue and it was absurd to think that Hindi was going to suffer because of the proposals made. Hindi had the force of all India behind it and there could be no doubt that Hindi would go ahead. Their attitude should be one of friendliness and encouragement to Gurmukhi. This will not affect Hindi, but it will remove this atmosphere of conflict and tension. They must fight the communal elements and not make it appear that they were siding with them in the slightest. They agreed.

10. To Partap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi

26 May 1956

My dear Partap Singh,

Your letter of May 24 in which you refer to your meeting the representatives of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha.² I refer to the points you have raised seriatum below:

1. The demand is that private schools should be allowed to begin teaching Punjabi in Gurmukhi script as a secondary language from any class and not compulsorily from the 4th. Does this mean that they can start it at a much later stage? If we agree to this, we shall have to agree to this rule being applied in the other region. If Punjabi is to be taught, as is going to be, then obviously this teaching should begin at a fairly early stage and normally the 4th class is suitable. In any event whatever rule one applies will have to be uniform for both regions.

2. That applications and letters should be replied to in Hindi. Of course this should be done. But I do not understand why you insist on a copy being sent in the regional language. A letter should be replied in the language it is

1. JN Collection.

2. Kairon met Arya Pratinidhi Sabha representatives on 23 May to discuss a few items of the Regional Formula, regarding the language problem. Amongst others he met Swami Arunanand, President of Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Punjab; Rai Bahadur Badri Dass; Suraj Bhan, Shiv Ram and Virendra of the *Pratap*.

written in, if that is possible. Suppose you get a letter in English, it is absurd to send a reply to it in Gurmukhi or Hindi. The reply should go in English. If you get a letter in French, the proper thing would be for you to reply to it in French. But, of course, you cannot do so, because there will be no one knowing French. There is no point in your adding a copy of your reply in the regional language.

In regard to applications, the order on the applications may be passed in the regional language and a copy of it in Hindi be sent to the applicant.

3. Records should certainly be given in the language desired by the applicant. If you like, you can charge a trivial sum.

4. It is quite right to say that notices should be issued in both regions in both the scripts. I would add, that as a pure matter of convenience for the public, these should be issued in Urdu also, wherever necessary.

5. That Hindi language should also be used in the Punjabi speaking region even upto the district level as the official language.³

There seems to be some confusion about this matter. Quite apart from Hindi being the all India official language, Hindi will be, in common with Punjabi, the official language of the whole of the Punjab. That is, Punjab will have two official languages—Hindi and Punjabi. Either can be used in any part of the Punjab. The only question that arises is: In administrative matters, how the records should be kept. It would be wasteful to keep records in both the languages and scripts. Therefore, in the Punjabi region the records upto a certain level should be in Gurmukhi. In the Hindi region this should be in Hindi. Apart from this keeping of records, Hindi and Gurmukhi should both be equally used.

I am sending you my immediate reactions to your letter. I am forwarding your letter and copy of my reply to Pantji.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Arya Pratinidhi Sabha demanded that Hindi should also be used in the Punjabi-speaking region up to the district level, as the official language.

11. To C.P. N. Singh¹

New Delhi

27 May 1956

My dear C.P.N.,

Your letter of May 26th.² I have had more than one talk with Partap Singh recently about the Punjab situation. He has also seen the Home Minister³ here. He showed me some correspondence he had had with Mehr Chand Mahajan,⁴ the ex-Chief Justice of India. Partap Singh had written to him, as Mahajan is one of the bosses of the Arya Samaj. Mahajan replied, to which Partap Singh sent an answer.

When I saw the Punjab MLAs here,⁵ I began by telling them with some vigour that I was surprised at their raising petty points when a number of misguided and mischievous persons in the Punjab, belonging to the communal organizations, were misbehaving and acting like goondas. This kind of attitude indirectly encouraged these mischievous elements. The MLAs immediately tried to clear themselves and said that they were entirely opposed to this agitation and had in fact spoken against it and proposed to take a strong line.

I then discussed some points that they raised. It seemed to me rather trivial. I am asking my Secretary to send you a note I wrote then about the talks I had with the MLAs,⁶ as I have not got it with me at present.

Partap Singh gave me the definite impression that the situation was well under control and the meetings that the Congress people had held were producing a good effect. I told him and others, and I have written to you also, that this agitation of the Jana Sangh and others is completely misconceived

1. JN Collection.

2. C.P.N. Singh stated that the intensity of the agitation launched by the Maha Punjab Samiti was because of the support it got from a few disgruntled Congressmen, who wanted the Kairon Ministry 'to go down'. He observed that the main grievances of the Samiti were that, "they were slighted by the Centre, having been ignored when consultations were on with the Akalis" and "Gurmukhi was being imposed on unwilling people."

3. Kairon met G.B. Pant on 23 May 1956 and again on 25 May 1956.

4. M.C. Mahajan was at this time, President of the DAV College Managing Committee, Punjab.

5. On 22 May 1956.

6. See *ante*, pp. 268-270.

and objectionable. Apart from this, the violence they have used cannot be tolerated. I have asked the Congress people not to remain passive at all and to take an active part in meeting this agitation. In fact, I have written to the Punjab PCC President⁷ and asked him to show my letter to the leading Congressmen. If he chooses, he can even publish it.

I think I wrote to you some time ago that I did not attach very much importance to the Jana Sangh or the RSS or the Hindu Mahasabha, who usually functioned on the violent plane. If, however, the Arya Samaj took it up in a big way, then the position would be more difficult. However, whoever takes this up, we have to face it with vigour. There is absolutely no question of our submitting to this gangster tactics. I think that the regional formula that was evolved after our talks with the Akalis, is a reasonable and fair formula, and the Hindus who have opposed it have demonstrated their own intense communal character. That brings them no credit. We should, of course, try to explain this in a friendly way even to our opponents and of course, to the public. There is no question of our giving in on this issue.

I think that the Punjab Government should certainly take action where there is actual violence. I do not favour the application of Section 144 or anything like it which gives an opportunity to people to make formal breaches of the law and get arrested in large numbers.⁸

I dislike very much what has happened in the Punjab recently, but on the whole I am not worried by it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. G.S. Musafir.

8. Singh's assessment was that the Maha Punjab Samiti supporters were "toiling for a situation" in which the Government would be forced to take drastic action, and this would bring them the support of the public. Singh opined that some action should be taken by the Government against the agitation "though not on a large scale."

II. HYDERABAD

1. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

Camp: Bombay

4 June, 1956

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,²

Your letter of the 29th May. As regards the commutation of the death sentences by the Nizam in the exercise of his discretionary power, I am quite clear that this discretionary power has to be exercised on the advice of the Government and not independently. In other words, he has no absolute discretionary power. That is the rule applicable not only to the Governors but to the President himself.

Of course, if the President or the Governor feels that in the circumstances a death sentence should be commuted, I think that his views should be given effect to and the Government should agree. That is different from the Governor claiming the right to use his discretionary power independently.

In Hyderabad, there is an additional reason for commutation of death sentences as the death penalty has apparently not been carried out for a long time.

It is many years ago when Lord Mountbatten was functioning as Governor-General, there was a convention that mercy petitions should be considered both by the Home Ministry and the Law Ministry. Sardar Patel was the Home Minister and Ambedkar was the Law Minister. Sometimes they disagreed. It was then decided that the matter should be referred to me before a recommendation was sent to the Governor-General. I laid down a rule for myself that if either the Home Minister or the Law Minister was in favour of commutation, I would agree to it. My own inclination has been that in this matter one should give the benefit of doubt to the person sentenced. After all, it is not anything very much to commute a death sentence to a sentence for life. On one occasion, Lord Mountbatten was against commutation in a case when I had recommended it. However, he accepted my advice, of course.

Therefore, on the question of principle you have raised, I am quite clear that the Nizam cannot act independently. All he can do is to express his own views in the matter. It is better for this to be done informally because otherwise

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Chief Minister of Hyderabad.

it would be embarrassing for the Government and for him later. In practice, I would recommend to you to accept every recommendation in favour of commutation of a death sentence....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III. WEST BENGAL

1. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
23 May 1956

My dear Bidhan,

Your telegram about the United Press of India. We had a meeting of the Cabinet Committee dealing with Information and Broadcasting. We considered this question of the United Press.² All of us are anxious to help it and, in fact, we have been helping it. The Communications Ministry, against all their rules, have been piling up the arrears due from the United Press to them.

We want the United Press to continue, but is there no way of their showing a little efficiency? I really am a little tired of the complete lack of enterprise and efficiency that they show. They seem to have fallen in some kind of a rut out of which they cannot emerge. From time to time, they ask for financial help. Help can be given. But, what is the good of giving help when it does not really help?

The United Press has got into the habit of working in a narrow groove as if it was a small family affair. They will have to pull themselves out of this.

We are perfectly prepared to help financially and otherwise, but our Committee decided that this can only be done if the whole organization is overhauled and put on a stable basis. I am sure you will agree that this is the

1. File No. 43(86)/57-59-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.
2. On the initiative of B.C. Roy, then editor of the *Forward*, editors of various Calcutta newspapers agreed to extend their support to create a nationalist news agency in 1933. B. Sen Gupta, Calcutta Editor of Free Press of India, set up an independent organization called United Press of India. But in 1958, UPI closed down and liquidated its assets.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

only right course to adopt. If a news agency is to function, it should do so effectively and with some enterprise and not go on losing money every month.

Our Information & Broadcasting Ministry will presumably be writing direct to the United Press.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
13 June 1956

My dear Bidhan,

I wonder if you have seen a secret information report dated 24th May 1956 from Nadia. This is forwarded to us by our DIG.

In this report, reference is made to the activities of the Rev. Louis L.R. Murrow, the American Bishop of Krishnanagar. It is said that he issued instructions to Catholics to "start everywhere a propaganda against the non-Christian doctrines, e.g., coexistence, Panchsheel, family planning, secularism, etc." They should try to subvert the very basis of India's foreign policy of which India's Prime Minister Nehru was the founder and the principal architect, as their first loyalty was to the Catholic Church and to the Catholic Government if any and not to their own country. It is stated that there was a closed door meeting at the Bishop's House in Krishnanagar on the 4th May where all this was repeated and certain Vatican directives were given. Further, that there was great jubilation over the grant of further extension of residential permit to Bishop Murrow, who said that he had some friends at the top of the administration and therefore, nobody could harm him. He said much else about the weak-kneed Nehru Government, etc.

I do not know who this man Murrow is, nor do I know how and when his residential permit was extended. But I think, we should take up a strong line with any missionary or foreign priest who behaves in the manner in which Murrow is reported to have behaved. It would not be quite proper for this secret information report to be shown to him. But, I think it would be right

1. JN Collection.

and desirable for you to send for him and tell him that you have received information about his disloyal and anti-Government activities.² You might tell him of a speech³ I delivered recently in Bombay where I made it perfectly clear that we would not tolerate any disloyalty from any foreign priest. Their religion was free and any interference in politics against the Government would not be tolerated.

I think the matter of not extending his residential permit might also be considered.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Roy indicated on 15 June that if Murrow was sent for and told of his undesirable activities, the latter would approach the courts. Roy preferred to tell Murrow that his permit to stay in India would not be extended beyond July 1956. He also opined that the Centre should not extend Murrow's permit, as permits for foreigners depend on Centre's approval.
3. See *post*, pp. 405-420.
4. In a note to the Home Ministry on 18 June, Nehru agreed with Roy's suggestion about not extending Murrow's permit.

IV. AJMER

1. To Haribhau Upadhyaya¹

New Delhi
16 May 1956

My dear Haribhauji,²

Your letter of 15th May.³ If you wish to see me, you can do so, but I fear I can do little in this matter. Quite apart from the merits of the question, it is not at all easy to make Ajmer the capital of Rajasthan at this stage at any rate. As Pantji has written to you, any such change without the consent of the Rajasthan

1. Haribhau Upadhyaya Papers. NMML.
2. Chief Minister of Ajmer.
3. Upadhyaya sought a meeting with the Prime Minister to discuss a proposal for making Ajmer the capital of the new state of Rajasthan.

people, will be difficult. Very probably, your proposal will be vigorously opposed by the people of Rajasthan.⁴ I think that a more feasible question to consider is how far important offices can be situated there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Upadhyaya wrote that the case for making Ajmer the capital was strong and those against it were "disinterested" and "incorrect" in their assessment of the situation.

2. To Haribhau Upadhyaya¹

New Delhi
7 June 1956

My dear Haribhauji,

About two weeks ago, I received a communication signed by Ram Dhan who claimed to write on behalf of the Ajmer State Reform Board. This communication and the attached papers contain virulent attacks on Balkrishna Kaul,² chiefly about his personal life. Some press cuttings were also attached.

I happened to see Balkrishna Kaul who had come to Delhi just about that time. I spoke to him about this matter and in fact gave him all the papers and asked for his explanation. I pointed out to him that while it was perfectly true that false charges were often brought by disgruntled people, public statements made in newspapers or otherwise had to be countered. We could not always ignore them. If necessary, legal action had to be taken.

The next day, B.K. Kaul again saw me together with the Ajmer delegation when you were also present. He gave me a letter and a note.³ In his letter he denied all the allegations made and pointed out that the persons behind them were one Arjan Das and a Sindhi Wakil Israni. These persons were connected with Jana Sangh, etc., and were angry with him because of the action taken from time to time. Further, Kaul said that he had wanted to take legal action

1. JN Collection.

2. Finance Minister, Ajmer.

3. See the following item. The Ajmer Delegation met Nehru on 22 May.

previously against such malicious attacks but he had been advised that it was difficult to bring home any charge. Also, that he had discussed the matter with you once and you dissuaded him to take such a step.

In his note, he has given some specific replies to the charges made.

B.K. Kaul says in his letter that he is prepared to face the charges boldly or, if I considered it necessary, to retire from his present position.⁴

I am writing to you not only to inform you of these developments but to have your advice in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. B.K. Kaul wrote to Nehru on 22 May that charges framed against him were based on misinterpretation of facts. He thought of initiating legal action. The only other options open were to, either, "boldly face the challenge or retire from my present position", concluded B.K. Kaul.

3. To Bal Krishna Kaul¹

New Delhi
13 June 1956

My dear Bal Krishna,

You will remember the papers I gave you, in which various personal charges were made against you.² You gave me a brief reply, denying these charges. You suggested some kind of an enquiry. I think it is proper that, whenever serious charges are made, there should be an enquiry. I am, however, a little doubtful as to how this enquiry should take place. Within a few days, I am leaving India.

You must remember that a person engaged in public activities has not only to act perfectly correctly but to produce that impression on the public. Even a wrong impression is harmful, and one should avoid doing anything which might

1. JN Collection.

2. Nehru sought the advice of Haribhau Upadhyay on the 'virulent' attacks on the personal life of his finance minister, B.K. Kaul, on 7 June 1956.

give such an impression. Your manner with people is often curt and must hurt them and even irritate them. In this way, you needlessly create trouble for yourself. The exercise of authority is not weakened by courtesy.

One of your PAs, I understand, is a woman. There is no harm in this. But, unfortunately, people in India have not got used to women working in offices, etc. Therefore, for the woman's sake, if not for oneself, one should be particularly careful. I understand that you went for some time to Kashmir and took this PA with you. This was not wise.

Then, again, your visits to the hospital. It is perfectly right for you to visit a hospital to inspect it. But, is it necessary to go there almost daily?

The promotions, etc., that you gave, though perfectly in order, also were perhaps not quite wise in the circumstances.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

V. DELHI

1. To Brahm Perkash¹

New Delhi
25 May 1956

My dear Brahm Perkash,²

We had a meeting about slums on the 5th of May.³ I suggested then that monthly reports should be sent to me. I think, however, that it will be better to have a full meeting early next month so that we can discuss the matter again and report progress. I am, therefore, asking my PPS, Dr Kaul, to arrange a

1. JN Collection.

2. Minister of Development, Delhi State.

3. This meeting, inter alia, suggested: (a) making of adequate provisions for the clearance of slums keeping in mind Delhi's Master Plan, then under preparation and for alternate accommodation for displaced persons; (b) stoppage of sale of government lands to individuals, which might be required for improvement or clearance of slums; (c) priority to provision of basic amenities in some two hundred slums of Delhi. Additionally, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi was put in charge of slum clearance work, and participating government authorities were asked to send monthly reports to the Prime Minister.

meeting on the 8th of June at 9 a.m. in my office in External Affairs. I hope that the progress reports will be satisfactory.

Brij Krishna saw me for five minutes a day or two ago. He said that a point had been raised as to how the money⁴ I have given to the Bharat Sewak Samaj should be spent, that is, whether this should be governed by the same rules as government money sent by any of our Ministries or the Municipal Committee. I did not give that money to the Bharat Sewak Samaj under any conditions, except that it should be rapidly spent for providing certain amenities like latrines, water, etc., to some of the slum areas which were given to them for work. I want results as rapidly as possible. Government money as such has to be spent according to some rules. It was to avoid these delays that I wanted a particular part of the slums to be taken over by the Bharat Sevak Samaj. We can then judge results and the best method of working. Obviously, the Bharat Sewak Samaj can only work satisfactorily if they get the full support of the Delhi Government and the Municipality.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Nehru also wrote to Chandiwalla to this effect on the same day.

VI. MADHYA BHARAT

1. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
3 May 1956

My dear Gulzarilal,

As you know, Madhya Bharat has suffered from dacoities for years past. Indeed, it might be said that they have always suffered from them. One of the reasons for this is the presence of numerous ravines on the Madhya Bharat and UP border and near-about.²

1. JN Collection.
2. The river system in this area—the Chambal and the Kuari besides many others—had cut up the banks into picturesque ravines which provided shelter to dacoit gangs and made recruitment to dacoity attractive.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

I was discussing this matter with Takhtmal Jain.³ He wanted some engineers to have a look at this area and make suggestions how the ravines could be converted into cultivable land.⁴ The whole project might be a very big one because the area is large. But it might well be possible to take bits of it in hand year after year. Anyhow, we should know exactly how far it is possible for us to tackle this from this point of view.

I do not know if Takhtmal Jain has spoken to you about this. He said he would. I hope you will be able to spare two or three engineers, presumably irrigation engineers, who could have a look at this area together with the officers of the Madhya Bharat Government and then give us their advice as to what is feasible.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Jain, Chief Minister of Madhya Bharat, had met Nehru on 2 May.
4. To tackle the chronic dacoity problem, an attractive proposition was reclamation of these ravines which would simultaneously (i) provide extremely fertile new land for agriculture raising the target for agricultural produce; (ii) reduce soil erosion; and (iii) create more employment.
5. On 4 May, the Irrigation Ministry enquired from the Madhya Bharat Government if they had ever examined the ravines for converting them into cultivable land earlier and had any information about it, before sending their team for a preliminary survey.

2. To Narsingh Rao Dikshit¹

New Delhi
8 June 1956

Dear Narsingh Raoji²,

Your letter of the 6th June. I had heard of this case of sati and was disturbed by it at the time. I am glad you have written at some length to explain all the

1. JN Collection.
2. (b. 1920); joined Indian National Congress, 1937; participated in Quit India Movement, 1942; elected to Madhya Bharat Vidhan Sabha, 1952; Education Minister, Madhya Bharat, 1952, and Home Minister, 1954-1956; Deputy Home Minister, Madhya Pradesh, 1956-62; Minister for Commerce, Industry and Natural Resources, 1963-64; Minister for Education, November 1964.

circumstances and the steps you took. I must say, however, that it is odd that your policemen should be totally unaware of something that attracts 5,000 persons who were shouting slogans.

So far as I know, Madhya Bharat is the only place in India where cases of sati have occurred in recent times. We must, of course, do our utmost to put an end to this practice. The real way is not just the police way, but the educational and social approach.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VII. RAJASTHAN

1. Bhooswami Sangh Agitation¹

I shall see the Bhooswami leaders² on Monday, the 7th May, at 12.30 p.m. in Parliament House. I am not quite sure when I will be free on Monday morning, as I propose to speak in the Lok Sabha. But, provisionally, this time may be arranged.³

2. It would be better if you saw them before they came to me. You might tell them the time when I would meet them and also make it clear to them that this is a difficult and unusual matter for me to take up. I am terribly busy at present. But, because of my desire to help in a mutually satisfactory settlement

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 5 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. The Bhooswami Sangh, an association of small *jagirdars* constituting majority of the Rajput population, sought maximum compensation for the their *jagirs* under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act, February 1952. Nehru had deputed G.B. Pant to adjudicate in the matter, when an appeal was sent to him against the Act. While conceding many demands of the *jagirdars*, the Pant Award of July 1953 contained a provision that the *jagirs* having an annual income of Rs. 5000/- or less (not in the original Act) were also to be resumed. The small *jagirdars* opposed the Pant Award, and blamed the State Government and the Kshatriya Mahasabha, which had earlier opposed the Act, for accepting the Award at their cost.
3. A five-man delegation of the Bhooswami leaders met Nehru on 7 May for redressal of their grievances. For Nehru's note on an earlier meeting with the Sangh leaders on 30 April 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 174-175.

and, more particularly, to remove any idea that the Bhooswamis might have that we ignore them, I am prepared to consider this matter and give some time to it.

3. It must be realized that the Rajasthan Government is an autonomous government and it is not our practice to interfere with the autonomy of the states. It must also be remembered that this matter has gone up to, I think, the Supreme Court which has finally given its decision.⁴

4. I can only take up this matter if the Rajasthan Government on the one hand and the Bhooswami Sangh on the other are prepared to abide by my decision. Therefore, so far as the Booswami delegation is concerned, they will have to give me their clear undertaking to this effect. It is not enough for some of them to do so. Their organization should agree to this.

5. If this is done, then I shall accept this burden and take such steps as I may consider necessary.

6. For your personal information, I am not going to give any assurance to them of any kind as to what the Rajasthan Government will do after this reference to me. Certainly, I expect them to release the prisoners⁵ and not to take charge of any small *jagirs* whose possession has not already been taken, pending a decision on the reference. But, I do not accept any condition which the Bhooswami leaders might lay down.

7. You have referred to the second stage of Pantji's consideration of this problem. The matter did come up before me, but I did not wish to get entangled in it and I sent it on to Pantji for the second time. His report came to me, and I considered it and accepted it.⁶

8. I understand that one of the persons who have come up in the present Bhooswami delegation, also went to Pantji on behalf of the Kshatriya Mahasabha.⁷

4. The Supreme Court on 15 April 1956, dismissed a number of petitions filed by Rajasthan *jagirdars* holding that the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act 1952, which provided for the resumption of any class of *jagir* lands in the State from a specified date, was a valid piece of legislation and that it was protected by the Constitution.

5. Booswami Sangh had launched a peaceful movement on a massive scale opposing the Pant Award.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, pp. 90-91. Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 26, pp. 238-239.

7. The Kshatriya Mahasabha, dominated by big Rajput landlords, had made representations to the Rajasthan Government and the Prime Minister in 1953 and had also filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging that the Jagir Resumption Act was *ultra vires* of the Constitution.

9. You have written a great deal about the smaller *jagirs* and the possibility of their being allowed to continue as such. I think that this would be a clear going back on a basic principle⁸ we have laid down and, for the moment, I do not see how this can be done. To delay action is another thing.

8. *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 374-375.

2. To Mohanlal Sukhadia¹

New Delhi
9 May 1956

My dear Sukhadia,²

I have received your letter of May 8th and have read it. This gives me some broad idea of the position and of what is being done. For the moment, this is enough. If I have to go further into this matter, then necessarily I shall have to discuss it with you rather fully, and I will ask you to come up here. For the present, I am waiting for the answer of the Bhooswami Sangh.

Yesterday, I had a letter from the Bhooswami Sangh enquiring from me whether, in case I became the arbitrator in this dispute, I would function in my capacity as the Prime Minister or otherwise. I had an answer sent to them to the effect that I could not function as arbitrator in my capacity as Prime Minister. Under our Constitution, the State Government was fully entitled to deal with such matters. But, in my desire to help, I have offered to consider these questions provided that the Rajasthan Government and the Bhooswami Sangh both accepted me and were prepared to abide by my decision.³

If I have to undertake this work, then immediately some steps have to be taken from the short term point of view, to give relief. The decision on the main issues will necessarily take some time, but it would not be proper to hold up short term measures till the final decision is given. It was from this point of view that I asked for some information from you.

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Rajasthan.

3. Madan Singh Danta, president of the Sangh, later said that he and some members favoured Nehru's mediation but many others did not agree. Ultimately, he had to resign from the presidentship of the Sangh.

Broadly speaking, a final reference to me as arbitrator would necessarily imply the complete abandonment of the Bhooswami agitation⁴ on the one hand, and the release of those in prison on the other.

Further, it would imply that, pending a decision, no further *jagirs* should be resumed.

Thirdly, that interim compensation should be given as rapidly as possible. It is good to be generous in such matters, as this helps in changing the atmosphere of conflict.

Kaul⁵ has told me that you telephoned today saying that the Bhooswami Sangh people want the members of their Governing Body who are in prison,⁶ to be released so that they might confer together before giving an answer to me. You will no doubt be examining this matter in all its aspects, and it is difficult for me to advise you off-hand. It may be worthwhile for you to release members of their small working committee to begin with. Let them confer. If they are agreeable to make a proper recommendation to the larger body, then the larger body can be released on parole. I am suggesting this really without giving much thought to the matter and should like to know what your own reactions are. Generally speaking, it does not much matter if you release more people or even the whole larger committee of a hundred. They might later give trouble, but that would mean their breaking their parole and that will go against them.

In the balance, therefore, I should not particularly mind your releasing these hundred or so on parole and with the strict understanding that after conferring with their colleagues, they will return to prison. A gesture of this kind will be appreciated by the public and by others. If it is misused by the Bhooswami leaders, they will lose credit. You will probably be able to arrest a number of them immediately.⁷

4. The Bhooswami Sangh agitation against the resumption of *jagirs* began on 16 December 1955.

5. B.N. Kaul, PPS.

6. Madan Singh Danta, Iwan Singh, Shiv Charan Das, Narain Singh Sargot, Sawait Singh and Tan Singh were members of their governing body.

7. Nehru in a note to his PPS on 10 May (not printed), said he had suggested to Sukhadia that 49 members of the Bhooswami Sangh under custody should be removed to some other place and given full opportunity to meet others. Alternatively, they should be released on parole on certain condition of not participating in any agitation. Nehru also observed that the dispersing the prisoners as suggested by Sukhadia might be postponed for a few days pending attempts at negotiations.

However, it is for you to think and let me know how you feel.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To U.N. Dhebar¹

New Delhi
11 May 1956

My dear Dhebarbhai,

I want to keep you informed of developments in regard to the Bhooswami agitation in Rajasthan.

Two weeks ago or so, Chief Minister Sukhadia came and spoke to me about it and gave me a number of papers. Till then I had only read about this agitation in the press and did not know much about it. Sukhadia suggested that I might agree to meet some of the leaders of the Bhooswami Sangh. I also got a letter from the Rajpramukh of Rajasthan² making the same suggestion. I agreed to meet them.

Some of them thereupon came to see me a few days later³ and talked about the injustice done to them. They said they were anxious about only two things: their 'roti' and their *izzat* and that both had been attacked.

I told them that so far as their *izzat* was concerned, their *izzat* was my *izzat* and there could be no question of anything being done which would affect their honour. As for the 'roti' part, we were also anxious not only about them, but about the whole of India. As I had little time, I asked them to see my PPS, Dr B.N. Kaul, and tell him their story in full. Kaul met them at length. Later he met the Chief Minister of Rajasthan and reported to me.

I saw the Bhooswami Sangh leaders again⁴ and told them that this business was outside my sphere. It was entirely for the State Government to deal with it. But, busy as I was, I was anxious to help in settling this matter if I could. I

1. JN Collection.

2. Sawai Man Singh.

3. In the meeting on 30 April 1956, the Sangh delegation explained the circumstances which led to the launching of their agitation in December 1955.

4. On 7 May 1956. See *ante*, pp. 283-285.

would only undertake this work on the clear understanding that my final decision, whatever it was, would be accepted. The Bhooswami Sangh people would not give me a clear answer. I told them that they could think about it and I would not be satisfied with any vague answer. Also that the commitment should be not of a few persons, but formally of the Bhooswami Sangh.

They then went away. The next day they wrote to me asking me whether I would function as "arbitrator" in my capacity as Prime Minister or otherwise. To this, I had an answer sent by my Secretary that as Prime Minister I could not interfere with the authority of the State Government which was autonomous. It was only in my personal capacity that I would deal with this matter provided the Rajasthan Government and the Bhooswami Sangh were agreeable to accepting my decision as final. I have had no answer from them yet.

Meanwhile, the Chief Minister informed me that the Bhooswami Sangh people wanted about sixty or seventy of their members, who were in prison, released for consultation. Some ten or twelve who had been detained had already been released on parole. I understand that the Rajasthan Government has agreed to release these sixty or seventy additional persons on parole for this purpose on condition that they will remain in Jaipur and not participate in any agitation. The parole is, I think, for one week.

That is the present position. I might add that I have not liked the behaviour of some of these Bhooswami Sangh people in some matters. For instance, in a letter to the Chief Minister, they talked about "the counter-proposals of the Prime Minister". I have asked the Chief Minister to make it perfectly clear to them that this is completely wrong and I object to any such statement.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Withdrawal of Bhooswami Agitation¹

Please inform the representatives of the Bhooswami Sangh that since the Sangh

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 19 May 1956. JN Collection.

has rejected my offer to consider this matter,² there is nothing more that I have to say to them. Whenever such a matter is referred to me—and this has often been done in the past—it is always understood that the decision I give will be accepted and honoured. There is no point in my undertaking to deal with this matter at considerable length if that assurance is not given to me.

2. I am glad that the Bhooswami Sangh has withdrawn the agitation they were carrying on, but I feel that in doing so, statements have been made by the leaders of the Sangh, and these have appeared in the press, which contain threats of future action.³ This is not only not becoming of the Sangh, but is improper. I have also been informed that during the past months a number of members of the Sangh have gone to Pakistan.⁴ To go to a foreign country in this way is not a sign of loyalty to the motherland.

3. The statement made in the resolution of the Sangh and repeated in the talks with you about the previous awards is not correct.⁵ However, I had agreed to look into these matters and to help where I could in reconsidering anything that appeared unfair. Since my offer has not been accepted, I cannot be expected to go into all these details now.

4. As Prime Minister, I am interested in removing any injustice or solving any difficult problem. I should continue to be interested, and will give such advice as I feel proper, whenever I think this is necessary, but I cannot give advice to people who have already rejected the advice I gave them and who have made it clear that they are not prepared to accept my judgment in this matter.

2. On 14 May 1956, the representative body of the Bhooswami Sangh turned down the proposal for investing Nehru with full powers to settle the dispute. It decided to unconditionally withdraw its agitation which had started in December 1955. The Bhooswami Sangh resolution indicated that the proposal for arbitration had its origins in the Rajasthan Government's policy to make a solution to the problem difficult.
3. On 19 May, Madan Singh Danta in a statement to the press said the object of non-violent Bhooswami agitation had been to draw the Government's attention to their problems, but by 'the attitude of the Prime Minister' it had been proved that Government paid no heed to such non-violent action. He said that the Sangh would take up another peaceful course of agitation.
4. Nehru in a note to PPS on 1 June (not printed) recorded that when he met the Bhooswami leaders for the first time, "they agreed in as many words that many members of their Sangh (I think they mentioned the figure 100) had gone to Pakistan. I have no doubt that they said so. Now their total denial does not fit in with their previous statement."
5. The Bhooswami leaders argued that jagirs below Rs.5,000 were not meant to be resumed either when the question of jagir resumption was first referred to the Prime Minister in 1953 or when Pandit Pant gave his first award the same year. The State Government finally reopened the issue which had been settled by Nehru in October 1953, according to the Bhooswami Sangh.

5. Bhooswami Sangh Members in Pakistan¹

During the last few months, there has been a big agitation in Rajasthan, conducted by the Bhooswami Sangh. This is against the legislation for the recovery of the smaller *jagirs*. It appears that, in the course of the agitation, about a hundred to two hundred of these people crossed the border into Pakistan (Sind). It is possible that some more may do so in the future.

2. This Bhooswami Sangh is closely connected with the most reactionary communal organizations. It is believed that it is in touch also with some of the dacoit gangs of Rajasthan, more particularly those who hop in and out of Pakistan.

3. I should like you to inform our High Commissioner in Karachi about this and to ask him to try to get as much information as possible about these Bhooswami people who have gone across or who may go across. Do they have any contacts with Pakistani leaders or others? Are they making Pakistan a base for dacoities in India?

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA. 24 May 1956. JN Collection.

VIII. UTTAR PRADESH

1. To C.B. Gupta¹

New Delhi
2 May 1956

My dear Chandrabhan,²

Thank you for your letter of April 28.

I know very well that you have been connected with the Lucknow University for a long time, long before you became a minister. I know also that you have

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. C.B. Gupta, Minister, Uttar Pradesh Government.

been of great help to the University. I also know that most of the intrigues in the University come from the academics and the professors and lecturers.

Nevertheless, we thought that the pressure of a Minister in an executive office of a university was undesirable, and the Working Committee stated this quite clearly nearly two years ago.³ The fact that the Members of the Executive Council of the University did not want you to leave the treasurership has hardly any relevance in this context. Naturally, they would like you to be there to help them. The point was what was the right step to be taken, and the Working Committee had indicated that.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The CWC Resolution, passed on 5 December 1953, indicated that party politics should not be brought into the University in any way. For Nehru's earlier correspondence with Gupta on this subject see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 159, 172-173.

IX. MADRAS

1. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi,
12 June 1956

My dear Prakasa,

Your letter of June 8. I am rather worried about your health. I do hope that your liver trouble will be controlled and ultimately eliminated.²

The stories in the newspapers about your going to Bihar have no foundation at all. I quite agree with you that Bihar would not be a suitable place for you to go to, though I am sure you would fit in anywhere.³ I agree that it will be best

1. JN Collection.
2. Sri Prakasa, Governor of Madras had written that, for the last two months, he had fever and cough. He suffered from a bad liver condition.
3. Sri Prakasa expressed his willingness to accept Governorship of Bihar, if Nehru so desired. But he felt "a little embarrassed because of the close association of UP with it (Bihar) and my own relationships there."

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

for you to complete your term in Madras and stay there till March or so next year. March 1957 is still far off and many unexpected things happen nowadays.⁴ I find it difficult, therefore, to make any plan so far ahead. I shall, however, bear in mind your wish to go abroad and specially to visit England.⁵

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 18 October 1956, the Government announced that Sri Prakasa had been appointed Governor of Bombay. Prakasa assumed charge on 10 December 1956.
5. "I do want to have a chance of visiting England once before I get too old," wrote Sri Prakasa, adding that he would like to meet a "few friends who are still left."

2. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
18 June 1956

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 18th June.²

I am much worried about the new developments in South India. I feel that, however Subramaniam may have been in the wrong, Kamaraj has not done well at all in this matter. Some of his speeches have been extraordinary, as

1. JN Collection.
2. Krishnamachari expressed concern over the trends that were developing in South Indian politics over the desire of creating Dakshina Pradesh which began to serve as an issue "for dividing congressmen and for providing the emergence of an opposition based on a slogan which appeals." Further, he pointed out that C. Subramaniam, the Finance Minister and S.R. Sethupathi (Raja of Ramnad), the Public Works Minister in Kamaraj's Cabinet, had been carrying out a propaganda for a Dakshina Pradesh ideal. He urged Nehru to take a strong line against Subramaniam whose activities and ambitions were bound to weaken the Congress in South India.

reported³ Also the type of speeches that have been delivered by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker⁴ have been objectionable in the extreme and nothing is done to him. There is, as you know, a widespread belief that Kamaraj is rather partial to Ramaswami Naicker. This may not be true or it may be exaggerated. But this very belief is harmful.

I do not quite know what to write to the various people you have suggested.⁵

So far as the Dakshina Pradesh⁶ issue is concerned, it is certainly not a live one at present.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. K. Kamaraj Nadar, Chief Minister of Madras, at a meeting on 25 May 1956 compared the Congressmen who favoured Dakshina Pradesh with the DMK for, "their common aim being to defeat the Congress" and himself. But just because one or two Congressmen thought that way, the entire Congress organization was not going to support the DMK. Kamaraj also remarked that few Congressmen, supporting the Dakshina Pradesh ideal were "worthless people."
4. Leader of the Dravida Kazahgam.
5. Krishnamachari suggested that Nehru should write (i) to Kamaraj that he (Nehru) sympathized with his struggles against the Dakshina Pradesh ideal but wanted him to seek a compromise with his detractors in the Congress; (ii) to Rajagopalachari to "discourage separatist tendencies" in the Congress; and (iii) to C. Subramaniam that he (Nehru) would not approve any attempt to weaken the Congress in South India.
6. The boundaries decided by the SRC for southern states were not approved by several Congress leaders, including C. Rajagopalachari. They desired that a single southern state of Dakshina Pradesh consisting of all Telugu, Tamil, Kannada and Malyalam areas should be created.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

3. K. Kamaraj¹

New Delhi

18 June 1956

My dear Kamaraj,

I have read a report of a speech delivered at Madurai by E.V. Ramaswami Naicker on the 5th June 1956.² This is an extraordinary speech asking people to go about with swords and knives to kill Brahmins and the like. He talks about Jinnah and how heads rolled because of the Muslim League policy and therefore they got Pakistan. This example should be emulated and heads should roll.

I think that this is going completely beyond any possible limit and this kind of speech should not be allowed to go without some action being taken. I should like you to consider this matter.

I am leaving in two days time for Europe and America.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 57/98/55-Poll (1) - MHA.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 26, p. 193 for a similar reference.

REORGANIZATION OF STATES

1. To D.K. Kunte¹

New Delhi

1 May 1956

Dear Shri Kunte,²

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 20th April. I have been rather overwhelmed with work during the past few days.

So far as the area of the city of Bombay is concerned, I take it that the only reasonable way would be to take a larger unit.³ Anyhow, I am sending your letter to the Home Minister here.

You refer to the various arguments both in regard to the city and to certain areas in Belgaum district. We gave a great deal of consideration to these matters repeatedly. It is obvious that many of these areas, such as in Belgaum, are multilingual and a number of considerations apply. Ultimately, we came to the decision, which you know. Any principle of division that is chosen is bound to have some drawbacks and we have to apply some broad rule.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Speaker, Bombay Legislative Assembly.

3. The States Reorganization Commission recommended that the Bombay State be reorganized into a bilingual Bombay state and a separate Vidarbha state. The Maharashtra PCC opposed such a recommendation. The Congress Working Committee on 9 November 1955 proposed a three-state formula—Maharashtra, Gujarat, and a Centrally-administered Bombay city. Claims and counterclaims were put forward by the two linguistic communities for Bombay city resulting in violence in November 1955 and January 1956.

2. To G.D. Patil¹

New Delhi
1 May 1956

My dear G.D. Patil,²

Your letter of the 28th April.

I do not quite understand what you complain about in the statement made by Shri Morarji Desai in the Bombay Council debate.³ He said what you have quoted and added that "I do not know exactly why the Prime Minister said it. I am saying this as I understood him. I may be right or wrong." He further added that "geographically Maharashtra surrounds the city of Bombay on three sides and therefore geographically it is within the Maharashtra territory."

As far as I remember I had said something to the effect that geographically Bombay belongs to Maharashtra. I do not quite remember my words. Nevertheless, for various reasons we had decided at the time to keep Bombay as a separate entity. There appears to be no particular conflict in all this.

You say that Shri Morarji Desai has been working against the interests of Maharashtra. It is obvious, and everybody knows, that his views are that Bombay city should either be a part of a multilingual state or a separate entity. That does not mean that he is working against Maharashtra. I do not understand what you mean by proving something against him before any impartial tribunal. I do not even know what the allegations are.

I have known Shri Morarji Desai for a long time and considered him a person of high integrity and ability. I have sometimes disagreed with him, but I have never doubted his bona fides. It would become a difficult world to live in if we doubted the bona fides of everyone who did not agree with us completely.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Gundu Dashrath Patil (b. 1921); lawyer from Maharashtra; imprisoned during the Quit India Movement, elected to the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, 1952, 1957, 1962; Deputy Minister in the Maharashtra Government, for Planning and Development, 1957-60, for Planning, Labour and Industries, 1960-63, and for Planning, Industries and Electricity, 1963.
3. Speaking on the States Reorganization Bill on 27 March 1956 in the Bombay Legislative Council, Morarji Desai said: "It has been asked, Sir, why is Bombay city kept separate when it is agreed and when it is admitted by the Prime Minister even that it is a part of Maharashtra. It can be called a part of Maharashtra, because it is surrounded by Maharashtrian territory on three sides."

3. To Lala Duni Chand¹

New Delhi

2 May 1956

My dear Lala Duni Chand,²

Thank you for your letter of the 1st May.

So far as the Punjab is concerned, we have come to a final decision after much thought and we do not propose to change it.³ I think that the activities of the Maha Punjab people have been deplorable and utterly lacking even in decency.⁴ There is no question of our changing our decision to please them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. (1873-1965); an advocate and Congress leader from Ambala; associated with the educational programme of Arya Samaj; participated in the agrarian agitation in Punjab; imprisoned during the freedom struggle; member, AICC, 1921; President, Punjab PCC, 1930; elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937; retired from active politics after Independence.
3. Under the Regional Formula, PEPSU was merged with Punjab. The Formula provided for one legislature, one governor, one council of ministers for the whole reorganized State. It also provided for the constitution of two regional committees consisting of MLAs belonging to the two language regions, except the Chief Minister, to deal with legislation on specified subjects. The State Government was empowered to demarcate the two language regions with Hindi and Punjabi as their official languages respectively.
4. The Maha Punjab Samiti organized protests and demonstrations against the Regional Formula at various places in Punjab. A protest day was observed at Amritsar on 23 April. A public meeting, called by the Civil Liberties Union, was disrupted on 27 April at Ludhiana. This meeting condemned the incident of 18 April at Jalandhar when U.N. Dhebar had to be escorted under security cordon.

4. To Harekrushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi

2 May 1956

My dear Mahtab,²

...I need not tell you how much worried all of us have been about the S.R. Bill.³ We may consider the historical, the physical, the psychological and other aspects of the problem, but in the ultimate analysis we have to face the situation that has been created, and the future consequences of any action that we might take. We are still considering this. Pantji is in charge of the Bill, as you know. He has hardly referred to Bombay yet in the course of his speech. In the Select Committee, however, some more definite line will have to be taken,⁴ and subsequently I shall speak in the House.

I think, there is no question that the present Bill, as framed, should remain as it is. The only question that arises is about any future assurance. In a sense, I have said something about the future on several occasions. I have said that nothing is final and that it is always open to us or to a state to raise this question even under the Constitution. I have indicated that we wish to follow democratic procedures and abide by the people's decision. This ultimately means the decision of the people of Bombay. How that democratic procedure is to be selected is a matter for us to consider in the future. I should not like to put any time limit to this either. This is my broad thinking at present. It is subject to any minor variation after further consultations.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Governor of Bombay.
3. The States Reorganization Bill embodied the Government of India's decisions of 16 January 1956 on the recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission, and Regional Formula for the Punjab area and three-state formula for Bombay region. G.B. Pant introduced the Bill in the Lok Sabha on 18 April 1956.
4. On 26 April 1956, the Lok Sabha referred the Bill to a 51-member Joint Committee of both Houses under the chairmanship of G.B. Pant. It was passed by the Lok Sabha on 10 August and by the Rajya Sabha on 25 August.

5. To N.V. Gadgil¹

New Delhi
6 May 1956

My dear Gadgil,²

Thank you for your letter of the 5th May which I have just received.³ You have written at length and what you have said will naturally receive every consideration.

There is just one small matter which I should like to correct. You say in your letter that Mr Fazl Ali⁴ did not like the three-state formula and had communicated his views to me.⁵ This is not so. After the three-state formula was announced, I happened to see Syed Fazl Ali and he mentioned to me that much as he would have preferred a bilingual state, there was perhaps no other way out left than to have the three states. He did not write anything to me at all and his remark was rather casual and we did not discuss the matter at all.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. N.V. Gadgil Papers, NMML.
2. Member, Lok Sabha.
3. Gadgil argued against a separate Bombay state and favoured the formation of Maharashtra with Bombay city. According to him, a bigger bilingual state meant the reopening of the Brahmin and non-Brahmin trouble. Geographically also "Bombay is right in the heart of Maharashtra" and the "nearest border of Gujarat is about 110 miles away". He supported Asoka Mehta's suggestion that any democratic procedure to decide Bombay's fate would mean creating an atmosphere of strife and violence. Gadgil wrote that as the Bombay Corporation "has given a verdict in our favour", Morarji Desai should follow B.C. Roy's example of withdrawal of proposal of union of West Bengal and Bihar and accept the popular verdict.
4. He was the chairman of the States Reorganization Commission.
5. Gadgil also wrote that "I do not know whether this is a fact."

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

6. To Kasturbhai Lalbhai¹

New Delhi

9 May 1956

My dear Kasturbhai,²

I have received your letter of the 8th May, 1956, together with a note on the State Reorganization Bill as affecting Bombay State.³ Any communication that has behind it the spirit of good will and understanding is always welcome.

to certain decisions on the merits. I am sorry to note that you are under the impression that we come to decisions regardless of merits and because of pressure being exercised by some party. You have every right to hold your opinions about this or any other matter. But, it does not inevitably follow that your opinions are the right ones and, certainly it is hardly becoming for accusations of partiality to be made against those in the Central Government who have come to certain decisions after careful consideration.

The people of Gujarat or their representatives have every right to express an opinion about the future of their own State. They may also express any opinion, just like any other part of India, in regard to other matters. But, it is rather surprising that a claim should be made, on behalf of the people of Gujarat, of their refusing to accept some proposal outside their own area which is likely to become a separate state soon. The word "betrayal" has been used in the memorandum on two occasions, and it is suggested that, if a certain kind of decision is made about the city of Bombay, this would amount to a betrayal not only of the people of Gujarat but of democratic principles also.⁵ This kind of an approach to the problem over which there is difference of opinion among the people concerned, can hardly be considered helpful. The principles of democracy require that, above all, the people directly concerned should be given an opportunity to decide their fate. If the question relates to the city of Bombay, it is the people of that state, whether Gujaratis or Maharashtrians or Hindustanis or South Indians or others, whose views have primary importance, though undoubtedly national considerations should always be kept in view. I am unable to understand where democracy comes in when people outside that area desire to enforce their own opinion or exercise a veto.

The people of Gujarat have, as the memorandum points out, played a great part in the struggle for the freedom of India and in the building up of India. They have ability, enterprise and great virtues which are valued throughout India. To suggest that they are being used as pawns or chattels does little justice

5. The memorandum said that the Gujarati families, who toiled for generations to make Bombay city "what it is", could not be persuaded to accept that they had no say in its future. Therefore, any solution making Bombay a part of Maharashtrian state or giving undue weightage to Maharashtra in Bombay was unacceptable. The memorandum observed: "Any such imposition would be a betrayal of the people of Gujarat and a betrayal of democratic principles because the Government would be disregarding not only the existence of a vital people, not only the considered views of three impartial and influential commissions, but also its own views, embodied in a Bill, after a free and a mature consideration."

to others and, more especially, to the Government of India.⁶ I take it that the people of Gujarat are not only proud of Gujarat and her traditions but rather even more proud of India as a whole and do not wish to lay stress on their separate individuality. Neither the people of Gujarat nor the people of any other part of India can be or should be treated as pawns or chattels, but all of them have always to remember that the major consideration is India. If this major consideration is forgotten or given second place, then there is little hope either for India or for any part of it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. The memorandum stated that the people of Gujarat were "no pawn or chattel" that they could now be asked to be part of a larger state of Bombay, just because "the Maharashtrians find that it is the only way they can retain the city of Bombay."

7. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
15 May 1956

My dear Sri Babu,²

Awadheshwar Prasad³ came to see me this evening and said that he was going to Patna tomorrow. I thought I might take advantage of his visit to Patna to send you a letter.

The newspapers have announced that you were sending me a letter. I have not received any yet. I hope that you have not written suggesting resignations and the like. That does not help anybody.

I can well understand the difficulties you are facing.⁴ I am afraid that all of

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Bihar.

3. Awadheshwar Prasad Sinha, Member of Lok Sabha.

4. There was unrest in Bihar, over Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Bill, which proposed transfer of 2,500 square miles area to West Bengal. Sinha was also facing opposition from the rival caste faction of the Bihar Congress.

us have got rather stuck in some kind of a quagmire. But we have to pull ourselves out. It does not do any good to accept this position. As you know, I have on the whole remained rather quiet over all this agitation in various parts of India. Every opposition element as also every mischievous element in India is having a high old time. We shall have to face this. It is not fair to ourselves or to the country to allow this kind of thing to go on.

I was myself surprised to see Dr Roy's statement in the newspapers about giving up the plan for the union of Bengal and Bihar.⁵ It is true that I expected that decision because conditions in Bengal had been deteriorating. Dr Roy had told me many days before that if he lost the elections, then he would have no choice left but to withdraw that proposal. Nevertheless, I did not expect this sudden action on his part. The proper thing would have been to inform you and us.

But I cannot blame Dr Roy much. He has shouldered a very heavy burden and has faced enormous difficulties and I do not wish to add to them.

Many of the Bihar MPs came to see me the other day and I had a long talk with them. I realized fully their difficulties and I wished them to appreciate our difficulties and Dr Roy's. I think, they did appreciate them.

I hope you are keeping well.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Considering the defeat of Congress candidates in the Parliamentary by-elections in Midnapur and North Calcutta as people's verdict against the proposal of union of West Bengal and Bihar, B.C. Roy issued a press note on 4 May 1956 withdrawing the proposal.

8. To L.B. Bhingardev¹

New Delhi
6 June 1956

Dear Shri Bhingardev,²

I have your letter of June 2nd. I answered your first letter on this subject after reading the official report of what Shri Morarji Desai said in the Assembly and Council debates.³ I really do not understand what you wish me to do about it, or what your difficulty is. He gave expression to his opinion of what he thought had happened. He was entitled to do so.

It is admitted that geographically Bombay is surrounded by Maharashtra territory, and that this is a strong argument in favour of the claim made on behalf of Maharashtra. But there are other factors to be considered also. This is what I said recently at the AICC meeting.⁴

That the fact of my saying this will be appreciated by people of Maharashtra was clear, but it was also clear that this could not by itself satisfy the claim made on behalf of Maharashtra.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Lakshman Babaji Bhingardev (b. 1911); Congressman from Maharashtra; elected to Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1946 and 1952.
3. For Desai's statement, see *ante*, p. 298.
4. For Nehru's speech at the AICC session, see *post*, pp. 338-341.

9. Reorganization of Bombay Region¹

As some enquiries have been made about the speech I delivered on the 3rd June, 1956, at the All India Congress Committee meeting at Bombay,² I am explaining below what I said there. I have been asked to elucidate six points:-

(1) Continuance of Central Administration of Bombay

I said that the provision in the Bill before Parliament providing for Central administration of Bombay represented the Government's point of view and the Congress also agreed with it. There is nothing more to be said about it. I added, however, that subject to the Central Administration of Bombay, it was our intention to make some suitable arrangements to associate representatives of Bombay with this administration. I further added that, after a certain period which might be about five years, the people of Bombay should have the opportunity to decide for themselves about their future. The method to be adopted for this purpose could be decided later in consultation with the people concerned.

(2) Offices in Bombay

I said that certain offices of the Maharashtra Government could be kept in Bombay so long as this was necessary. This is a matter for mutual arrangement and convenience. The capital of Maharashtra, however, would be somewhere in Maharashtra State and not in Bombay. Naturally, the Secretariat of Maharashtra State would be where the capital is.

(3) High Court

I said that we would like a single High Court for Bombay, Maharashtra and Gujarat, situated in Bombay, that is, the present High Court of Bombay would continue but would exercise its jurisdiction not only for Bombay, but over the new states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Division benches of the High Court could function in Maharashtra as well as in Gujarat.

(4) Public Service Commission

I said that we hoped that there would be a single Public Service Commission for Bombay city, Maharashtra and Gujarat and that the states would agree to it.

1. Note in reply to certain clarifications sought by T.R. Deogirikar, President, Maharashtra PCC, on Nehru's speech in Bombay. 8 June 1956. File No. G-4(A)/1957, AICC Papers, NMML.

2. For Nehru's speech at the AICC meeting, see *post*, pp. 338-341.

(5) Future of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri Districts

These three districts would, according to the provisions of the Bill before Parliament, be parts of Maharashtra State. But the intimate contacts of these districts with Bombay city in regard to many matters and especially the many people who had their work and occupations in Bombay city, would not be interfered with in any way, that is, their occupations will not suffer by the proposed changes.

(6) Employment situation: officers and clerks working in Bombay

I said that we did not want any person, officer or clerk, to suffer because of the change. A large number of these would continue to be employed in Bombay but some, no doubt, would have to go to Gujarat or Maharashtra. There should be no question of retrenchment because of these changes.

10. To Damodar M. Vagal¹

New Delhi
9 June 1956

Dear Friend,²

I have your letter of the 7th June, which I have read with interest.

You will not expect me to enter into a long argument in a letter about the various questions you refer to. I have referred to them on many occasions. It is after the deepest thought and full consideration of all aspects that we have come to the conclusion we did, and which has been announced. There is no slur meant to any group or community. Everybody knows the great part that Maharashtrians have played in India's history, as well as in our struggle for freedom. I am convinced, however, that the kind of violent forces that have been let loose will do more injury to Maharashtrians and to the Maharashtra State than anything else.

Whether peaceful individual satyagraha is legitimate or not is not a political question. Obviously, if an individual feels very strongly about a matter, it is always open to him to do it and to suffer the consequences. Indeed, if the consequences are not there, then it is not satyagraha. Large-scale satyagraha, however, stands on a different footing. It is the equivalent of a peaceful rebellion,

1. JN Collection.

2. An advocate from Bombay.

provided it remains peaceful. In a democratic set-up, there should be no place for a violent or peaceful rebellion.³

But, apart from this theoretical approach, the practical aspect is that such attempt at large-scale satyagraha almost inevitably leads to large-scale violence, and therefore, defeats its purpose.

India today is struggling with mighty problems and, the whole world is interested in this. Our Second Five Year Plan is a challenge to every person in India. When we have these big problems to face, which will determine the future of our country, it surprises me that we should spend our time and energy over quarrelling amongst ourselves over relatively secondary problems. So far as Bombay is concerned, obviously the best course is for the people of Bombay to decide. They cannot do so in the present state of affairs because of the passion and violence that is so evident. We have, therefore, said that after five years or so let there be a full opportunity to decide this question by the people.

The stature of a people is judged essentially by their thoughts and actions and to what they attach importance. A people with vision think of great objects. Smaller people get tied up with small objects. A villager may think only of his village.

My source of information are not confined to one or two individuals, but are many and varied. They include all kinds of persons expressing all kinds of opinions.

During my visit to Bombay this time,⁴ I was greatly impressed by the discipline and restraint of the police force that I saw. In fact, everybody I know commented on this.

You refer to the firing which took place near Chowpatty when a young boy was shot dead.⁵ That very day, when I heard of this, I enquired into the matter and obtained reports from several sources. The information I received was that some persons going in a car were surrounded by a large group which attacked them violently. They were pulled out of the car and were injured in the process. People were shouting that they should be killed. It was then that

3. This refers to the satyagraha launched by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti during the AICC meeting.

4. Nehru arrived in Bombay on 31 May to attend the AICC meeting on 2 and 3 June 1956.

5. At a public meeting near Chowpatty on 3 June 1956, Nehru announced that Bombay city had "disqualified itself from deciding its future for the present" and would have to remain under Central administration for five years. It sparked off violent reactions from pro-samyukta Maharashtra people, leading to the police firing on four occasions.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

one person who had been so pulled out and who had a licensed revolver, used it and, unfortunately, a young boy died. As a matter of fact, statements were taken from a number of persons there and they confirmed the facts. However, much we may regret the death of the young boy, as we should, it seems to be that the crowd that attacked the car was ultimately responsible for this. Violence begets violence, and private violence is normally ruled out in a state.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

1. To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar¹

New Delhi

3 May 1956

My dear Ananthasayanam,²

I have noticed in the Pakistan press a good deal of criticism of what you are reported to have said at a Convocation Address at Doaba College.³ It is reported that you said that the students should prepare themselves "to teach Pakistan a lesson" so that when the time came, she would have to look for "a place to hide".

I do not know what exactly you said and whether the report is correct. But I would suggest to you that, as Speaker, it would be desirable for you not to refer to controversial politics, more especially international controversies. This gives a handle to the other side and is often criticized even in the foreign press.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Speaker, Lok Sabha.

3. On 24 April 1956, *The Tribune* reported that the Speaker expressed hope that Pakistan would cease to issue threats to India and talk about the forcible occupation of Kashmir. While concluding his speech, he urged the outgoing graduates to strengthen the Prime Minister and thus help in maintaining world peace.

2. To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar¹

New Delhi

16 May 1956

My dear Ananthasayanam,

There has been one matter which has been rather troubling me, but I hesitated to speak or write to you. This is about the new concessions to MPs, announced

1. File No. 28(26)/56-PMS. Also available in JN Collection.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

recently in the *Gazette of India*.² They referred to remission of rent, exemption in respect of telephone charges and certain other remissions. I have felt rather troubled about these additional concessions and so have many of my colleagues in the Cabinet. We do not grudge MPs any facilities, but there is a good deal of public criticism about these matters and I think, this does not enhance the credit of MPs.

Today I received a letter from the Congress President on the subject, copy of which I enclose.³

There is one other matter. The Speaker has, I believe, appointed a committee for preparing Hindi terminology. There are already big committees at work on this subject. These were appointed by the Education Ministry and have done a great deal of work. I do not know how far it would be helpful to have parallel committees doing this kind of work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 8 May 1956.
3. In his letter of 15 May, UN Dhebar, President, Indian National Congress, referred to a notification issued by the Lok Sabha Secretariat regarding telephone facilities and remission in rent to the MPs, which were to be effective retrospectively from 1 April 1955. He pointed out that these concessions, however small and unobjectionable they might be, would create a misapprehension in the minds of the people about the attitude of the Congress organization towards these high offices at the expense of the public. Nehru replied on 16 May that the decision on these concessions were not taken by the Government but by a Committee of Parliament functioning under the Speaker. He also expressed his disapproval of these concessions but did not quite know what to do except informing the Speaker.

3. To M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
22 May 1956

My dear Ananthasayanam,

Thank you for your letter of May 22nd about the recent announcement in the

1. File No. 28(26)/59-PMS.

Gazette of India relating to reduction of house rent etc.² My object in writing to you was just to give expression to a feeling of apprehension about these new facilities and exemptions. I am surprised that Satya Narayan Sinha should have given the impression that he was consulting me or had my approval. This was not so.

Jagjivan Ram's answers in Parliament, no doubt, must have created a certain impression. But, in effect, what he said was that, if the Lok Sabha paid him for the telephones, as they did for the Railway passes, he had no objection. It made little difference to his Ministry as it was paid anyhow.

I did not suggest that any step need be taken about this matter now.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Ayyangar stated that Satya Narayan Sinha, Union Minister for Parliamentary Affairs and Chairman, Joint Committee of Parliament on Salaries and Allowances of the Members, had advised him on salaries and allowances of MPs. He believed that the concessions had Nehru's approval. Ayyangar also wrote that the main reason for asking for house rent reduction was that it would be hard upon MPs to pay full rent even during the inter-session period when the members had to maintain two establishments. As for the telephone facilities, he said that Parliament's Joint Committee considered them necessary. These concessions, which also had the concurrence of the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, were not unreasonable and would not impose any unfair burden on the exchequer, he added.

4. To Ashok K. Chanda¹

New Delhi
26 May 1956

My dear Ashok,²

Your letter of the 25 th May.

The matter you refer to was mentioned in the Lok Sabha, first of all, by a member of the Opposition who produced a note which he said he had received

1. JN Collection.

2. Comptroller and Auditor General of India.

from you.³ I understand that another member of the Opposition⁴ also said he had received this note from you. I was not in the House then. Many members of the House were surprised that your note should have reached only a few members of the Opposition. None of the Ministers, so far as I am aware, had seen it. I knew nothing about it, neither the Finance Minister.

The Finance Minister had to say something in reply. Whether he said so in suitable language or not, is another matter.

The impression was created in the House by the statement of the members of the Opposition that you had especially briefed them in this matter. This was naturally resented by many members. When I heard of this, I was surprised. I asked the Secretary to the Lok Sabha⁵ what the facts were. He did not know much about them and said he would enquire.

It is true that when the Cabinet was considering this particular Bill,⁶ it came to the conclusion that the audit of these insurance companies need not be placed under the control of the Auditor General. I do not remember if any reference was made to the practice prevailing in the United Kingdom.

This matter is now being dealt with by the Speaker and the Lok Sabha Secretariat. I think, therefore, that the proper course would be for you to send an objective note on the facts to the Lok Sabha Secretariat. The Speaker is not concerned with the merits of the question, but rather with the other developments that took place.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. During a debate on the Life Insurance Corporation Bill in the Lok Sabha on 21 May 1956, Asoka Mehta, Praja Socialist Party member, informed the House that he had received a note from the Comptroller and Auditor General giving his opinion whether or not the audit of the Corporation could be placed under the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
4. N.C. Chatterjee of the Hindu Mahasabha.
5. M.N. Kaul.
6. The Life Insurance Corporation Bill, which proposed transfer of the assets and liabilities pertaining to the life insurance business of existing insurance companies to a statutory corporation, was passed by Lok Sabha on 23 May 1956.

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

(i) Bombay Session of AICC

1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Congress¹

It has become customary for every Annual Session of the Congress and even for every meeting of the All India Congress Committee, to say that this is vital and likely to have important consequences. We live in changing and stirring times and, therefore, each step that we take is of importance and consequence.

Nevertheless, I think, it could be said with truth that the next meeting of the AICC, to be held in Bombay early in June, is taking place at a critical time in Congress history, and the future of the Congress may well be shaped, to some extent, by that meeting.

The Congress, as an organization, is so intimately connected now with governmental affairs as well as with the entire situation in the country that it is difficult to consider its problems in isolation. What are these major problems of the country? Broadly speaking, they are the international problems affecting India and our domestic problems.

So far as the international problems are concerned, there is overwhelming evidence that the policy pursued by the Congress and the Government is supported, and indeed wholeheartedly approved, by the great mass of the people of India. Indeed, that policy has brought increasing support not only in Asia but also in other parts of the world. This does not mean that we have solved our international problems. There is Goa, and there are the many questions between India and Pakistan. There is Indo-China which, apart from its intrinsic importance, has become a particular concern of India because our representatives are the Chairmen of the International Commissions there. There is the question of people of Indian descent and indeed all non-Europeans in South Africa and the intense and aggressive policy of racial segregation and humiliation followed there. This policy, in a somewhat lesser degree, is followed in some other parts of Africa.

Then there are questions of countries under colonial domination. Recently, the struggle in North African countries has attracted much attention. Fortunately,

1. Message sent to the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, 2 May 1956. JN Collection. It was published in a souvenir brought out on the occasion of the AICC session held in Mumbai from 2 to 3 June 1956.

in Tunisia and Morocco, some settlement has been arrived at, but Algeria still is going through a terrible period of trial. There is the question of the Arab countries and Israel and the very delicate and explosive situation in that area. Finally, there are the major world questions of the conflict between the so-called Western and Eastern blocs of nations. The centres of this conflict lie in Europe and in the Far East, but to some extent, it has spread even to Asia with the formation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

All these are difficult problems of our age and, to some extent, they are related to each other or influence each other. It is true that we have not succeeded in solving our own immediate international problems. Much less can we hope to do much in regard to the bigger international questions. But the fact remains that our general policy in regard to these matters has been to help in seeking a solution and, I believe that we have exercised some influence in that direction. In any event, the point to remember is that in this world full of conflicts, suspicions and hatreds, India endeavours to exercise a soothing influence directed towards peace. Further that this policy of India is increasingly understood and appreciated all over the world. Certainly, in India it has overwhelming support.

Coming to the domestic field, there are many problems and difficulties, and yet the major question before us is the rapid development of India. From this point of view, the Second Five Year Plan, which has just been finalized, occupies first place. Our domestic policy must be judged by this Plan. There may be, and there are, criticisms of various parts of this Plan but, by and large, it has been welcomed in the country and it is realized that it is an earnest attempt to utilize the resources of India for the rapid development of our people. It is a balance between the idealism which, I hope, fills our minds and hearts and the realism of the situation.

Thus, both from the international and the national points of view, the policies of the Congress are widely appreciated in this country. In fact, there are no other basic policies which have any reality or substance. The other parties that exist in India may emphasize one aspect or another, may criticize here and there, but they are compelled by circumstances to appreciate the broad lines of approach which the Congress has adopted both in the domestic and the international fields. Seldom has any one organization in a country stood out in this way in both these important domains of policy.

And yet, there can be no doubt that the Congress organization is suffering from a deep malaise. We have seen many evidences of this. I am not referring

so much to election losses although they also point to a certain trend which should make us think. To some extent, it is natural for a Government which has functioned for many years, to have such electoral defeats. In a democracy that often happens. But it seems to me that there is something more about it than mere dissatisfaction with a continuing state of affairs. The recent controversies and conflicts resulting from the proposals for the reorganization of states are evidence of this malaise. It must be remembered, however, that in so far as the greater part of India, there has been little trouble over this matter, and yet the malaise affects the whole of India and not just a part of it, where controversies rage over the SRC proposals.

What then is the matter? It is this question that has to be considered in all earnestness by the leaders and workers of the Congress all over the country. Have we become too stale, too complacent, not having enough touch with realities? Has success itself loosened the fibre which gave strength to the Congress in the past? Success often has that effect, and it is a good thing sometimes to have to face difficulties which pull one up.

We have difficulties enough today, and though they are local, they sum up to a good total. Our discipline is weakening and without discipline no organization can function effectively. The Congress has not only had this inner discipline, but has been a factor in disciplining the public life of this country. If the discipline of the Congress goes, then the discipline of our public life also goes.

We have thus a heavy responsibility. In discharging this responsibility, we must remember that, above all, we have to maintain integrity of purpose, that we have often to subordinate ourselves to the larger good of the Congress and the country. We are an individualistic people and tend to walk separate ways in thought and action. There is some virtue in individualism, but, carried too far, it leads to anarchy. It is the Congress which has combated these disruptive tendencies in the past, and it is up to it to do so today, when the work of the past generations might be imperilled.

This is the basic problem before the Congress, and I hope that at the coming AICC meeting, it will be faced squarely and frankly.

2. International Affairs¹

The All India Congress Committee notes with hope the recent events and developments in international affairs which have resulted in personal contacts and direct talks between the Heads of Governments and the leaders of some of the great powers and also between other leading statesmen. These developments and consequent improvement in the international political climate are welcome, even though the great and vexing problems which afflict the world and on the solution of which the avoidance of great world conflicts rests, remain yet unsolved.

2. The AICC hopes that these developments will gather momentum and that the overwhelming desire of the peoples of the world for peace will, as a result, come closer to realization. The Committee hopes that the wisdom, patience and perseverance of the statesmen of the world will lead to the increasing recognition of the inevitable and imperative character of peaceful coexistence based on the independence and equality of nations, respect by them of one another, non-interference in internal affairs and non-aggression in respect of other nations.

3. The AICC regrets the continuing endeavours to form and maintain military pacts. Even economic assistance, where it is a part of such military alliances, assumes a military quality. More particularly, the Committee deplores the extension of these pacts beyond even the intentions and purposes proclaimed in their behalf. The Committee regrets the reference to Kashmir in the recent meetings in Karachi and Tehran of the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact organizations.² This concerns the integrity and the sovereign rights of India.

4. The AICC notes with concern the grave developments in Algeria and welcomes and supports the peace initiative contained in the Prime Minister's

1. Draft resolution for the AICC, Mumbai, 31 May 1956. JN Collection. The resolution, moved by G.B. Pant on 2 June, was adopted the same day.
2. For the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi in March 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 304, 335 and 337. A communique, issued at the end of the second annual meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact held in Tehran from 16 to 19 April 1956, emphasized *inter alia* the need for "an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes". It further said that "the Baghdad Pact offered the best means of safeguarding peace and stability and of promoting the welfare and unity of the area".



AT THE A.I.C.C. SESSION, MUMBAI, 3 JUNE 1956
ALSO SEEN SITTING SATYA NARAYAN SINHA (ON LEFT) AND A.K. AZAD (ON RIGHT)



WITH U.N. DHEBAR, AT THE A.I.C.C. SESSION, MUMBAI, 3 JUNE 1956

recent statement in Parliament.³ It expresses the confident hope that both the French and the Algerian people will find it possible to take steps to stop the fighting and thus open the way for negotiations.

3. See *post*, pp. 481-483.

3. Treaty of Cession of French Settlements¹

The AICC rejoices in the conclusion of the Treaty of Cession of the French settlements in India² and congratulates and pays tribute to the patience and wisdom of the Governments of France and of India which have led to this result. The Committee welcomes these former settlements into the Union of India in which they will find happiness and fulfilment. The Committee conveys to the French people the assurance that the people of India will seek to promote further friendship and good relations between the two countries.

1. Draft resolution for the AICC, Mumbai, 31 May 1956. JN Collection. The resolution was moved by U.N. Dhebar on 2 June and adopted unanimously the same day.
2. See *post*, p. 402.

4. Violence and Indiscipline in Public Life¹

The All India Congress Committee has noted with grave concern the increasing tendency in the country towards violence, indiscipline and the lowering of

1. Resolution for the AICC, Mumbai, 1 June 1956. JN Collection. The resolution was moved by B.C. Roy on 2 June 1956 and adopted the same day. Differences in the text of the resolution as drafted on 1 June and the one adopted by the AICC on 2 June 1956 are indicated in footnotes.

standards of public life and behaviour. India, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, set the unique example of peaceful and disciplined revolutionary action in the struggle for freedom. It was the combination of peaceful action with discipline and sacrifice and the maintenance of high moral standards of public behaviour that gave strength to her people and enhanced her reputation in the world. Mahatma Gandhi always laid stress on the importance of means to achieve any objective. It is in the measure that we adopt right means that we shall achieve right objectives. Any other methods, which are improper, can only injure and weaken the nation. Apart from resulting in the lowering of moral standards and values for which the country stands, they lead to disunity and disruption.

2. In recent months mounting violence has been witnessed in connection with the controversies relating to states reorganization and also in some industrial disputes, notably concerning the railways. Some² students have also been misled into wrong directions. Howsoever³ the policies of different organizations or groups might differ, it should be common ground among all that for the working of a democratic system peace and order are essential. Even more so they are necessary for a fulfilment of the Second Five Year Plan on which the nation is launched.

3. The Congress has always stood for the advancement of the working class movement in the country and has helped in the organization and strengthening of the trade unions. The strength of a trade union lies in the unity and disciplined working under responsible leadership. Adventurist tactics and violence do not strengthen the worker or his union. Recent examples of such action taken by some railwaymen have alienated public sympathy and have brought no credit to them or to their organization. They have also caused considerable loss to the country.⁴

2. In the draft resolution, "Many" in place of "Some".

3. In the draft resolution, "However" in place of "Howsoever".

4. The draft resolution had the following para in place of para 3:

"The AICC has always wished well to the working class movement in the country and has helped in the organization and strengthening of the trade unions. The strength of a trade union lies in the unity and disciplined working under recognized leadership. Adventurist tactics do not strengthen the worker or his union. Recent examples of adventurist sporadic and violent action among some railwaymen have brought no credit to them or to their great organizations and have caused considerable loss to the country".

4. The progress of a country and indeed of civilization is not measured merely in terms of factories or even greater production and consumption, important as these are. Every civilization is based on certain moral values, every nation has to maintain certain moral standards of behaviour. If these⁵ are lacking in a nation or a people, then all the advances of science and technical civilization, which we wish to make our own, will avail little. A people raise themselves ultimately by the moral qualities they possess and the civilized behaviour to which they are accustomed.⁶

5. India has stood for peace in the world and has laboured to that end. But if we⁷ belie our professions and do not function⁸ peacefully and with restraint, then India's voice counts for little.

6. The AICC, therefore, appeals to the nation and to every party and organization of the country to overcome these tendencies towards violence and indiscipline and adventurism. These, if not ended, may well imperil democracy and progress.⁹

5. In the draft resolution, there was "If these moral qualities" in place of "If these".
6. In the draft resolution, there was "that they are accustomed to" in place of "to which they are accustomed".
7. In the draft resolution, "our people" in place of "we".
8. In the draft resolution, "act" in place of "function".
9. The draft resolution had the following para in place of para 6:
 "The AICC, therefore, appeals to the nation and to every party and organization of the country to face and overcome this tendency towards violence and indiscipline and adventurism, which if not ended, may well put an end to democratic functioning and progress".

5. Portuguese Possessions in India¹

The All India Congress Committee reaffirms the sympathy and solidarity of the people of the Indian Union with their compatriots under colonial rule and aggression in the Portuguese possessions in India, in their resistance to the power and the methods of terror of the colonial authority and in their endeavours to free themselves from alien rule.

2. The AICC expresses its abhorrence of the inhuman policies and practices of the Portuguese authorities, contrary both to the sentiments and practices of civilized nations and to the principles of the United Nations, and in particular, of the barbarous and humiliating treatment meted out to political opponents, more especially, to political prisoners.

3. The AICC reaffirms its support of the policy of the Government of India, as confirmed at the Congress Session at Amritsar, of adhering to peaceful methods for the liberation of parts of the motherland under alien rule in the Portuguese colonial possessions in India.

4. The Government and the people of India have been compelled to take steps in various directions to deny support and resources to the Portuguese Government in these colonial possessions. These steps have often resulted in hardship on the general population as well as on the active participants in the liberation struggle. The people of India are painfully aware of this additional suffering which our compatriots in the Portuguese possessions have to endure, but ask them, with confidence, to accept it with forbearance and understanding as part of their contribution and sacrifices for their liberation.

5. The AICC appeals to the people of India, and more particularly, to those closely concerned, to cooperate fully with the Government in the various measures they have taken to deny support and resources to the Portuguese Government. They should avoid evasion of or any neglect to comply with the rules and regulations made by the Government for the purpose. In particular, the Committee warns smugglers and others circumventing Government measures that they are acting not only illegally, but dishonestly and unpatriotically, and that they should desist from such actions. Any such action

1. Draft resolution for the AICC, Mumbai, 1 June 1956. JN Collection. The resolution was moved by Morarji Desai on 2 June and adopted unanimously the next day.

would be regarded by the people as a betrayal of the country and the cause of freedom.

6. The AICC looks to the civilized nations and peoples of the world to express their disapproval of the policy and conduct of the Portuguese authorities against the people in their possessions in India, especially against political prisoners and more particularly, women prisoners. The Committee also appeals to them to proclaim their sympathy with the people in the Portuguese possessions in their aspirations and endeavours for freedom from alien rule.

6. Congress and the Second Plan¹

The All India Congress Committee notes with satisfaction the interest and enthusiasm with which the Second Five Year Plan, recently placed before Parliament by the Government, has been received throughout the country and by all sections of the people.

2. Encouraged by the success of the First Plan and the awakening and appreciation of planning in the masses that have resulted from it, the Second Five Year Plan has laid down with confidence further and substantial advances towards the achievement of our national economic and social objectives of a Welfare State and a Socialist Cooperative Commonwealth. The Plan aims at adding to the wealth and productivity of the nation by an increase in the national income by 25 per cent in five years, fuller and more distributed employment, greater industrialization, more specially, in the basic industries, the development of rural industries and economy on a nationwide basis, land reform, expansion of foreign trade and foreign earnings, and a higher level of social services. It aims also at progressively greater social equality and the lowering of economic disparities within the nation, by planned betterment of the living standards and earnings of the less privileged, providing them greater opportunities on the one hand, and on the other, by limiting the economic power at the higher levels, restricting monopolistic tendencies and high incomes by fiscal and legislative measures aimed at social equity.

1. Draft resolution for the AICC, Mumbai, 1 June 1956. JN Collection. The resolution was moved by Gulzarilal Nanda on 3 June and adopted unanimously the same day. Six amendments to the resolution were moved but none of them was accepted.

3. The targets set out in the Plan, though high when viewed in the background of our low living standards and economic capacity, are yet insufficient at present to provide standards of life and opportunities similar to those enjoyed by the peoples of many nations of the modern world, and such as may be considered as necessary for our people for their full growth. The AICC recognizes the considerations that led the Planning Commission to set what they regard as realistic targets in the present conditions. The Committee, however, believes that by the organization of the nation's enthusiasm and the mobilization of her resources, large and small, particularly, in the way of capital formation and human endeavour, and by the exploration and utilization of new means and avenues of greater productivity, and above all, by greater discipline and dedication, these targets can be exceeded in achievement.

4. The Plan is a national Plan and must, therefore, be viewed from the point of view of the development of the nation as a whole. It is important, however, that full attention should be paid to the requirements of the states and regions, more particularly, those regions which have suffered in the past from neglect. The AICC considers it essential that the Government should always keep in view the necessities of regions less well provided, so that progressively regional disparities may be lessened and uniform progress made.

5. A socialist pattern of society must be based on an equality of opportunity for everyone and a substantial reduction of economic and social inequalities. This aim must be constantly kept in view, more especially, as a rapidly developing economy may tend to encourage concentration of wealth. Steps must, therefore, be taken to counteract such tendencies and reduce concentration of wealth and higher incomes and at the same time to raise the incomes at the lowest levels. These inequalities should be progressively reduced by fiscal and other means, provided always that production, which is so essential for this very purpose, does not suffer.

6. The programme of development envisaged in the Second Five Year Plan will cast a heavy burden on all transport services and, more especially, on the Railways. It is necessary, therefore, to explore and utilize all possible methods of transport, such as waterways and roads, to reduce this burden on the Railways.²

2. Paragraphs 5 and 6 above were not part of the draft resolution of 1 June 1956. These were added subsequently and formed part of the resolution adopted by the AICC on 3 June.

7. The Plan provides for a substantial increase in the public sector, particularly in the field of heavy industries and power development. These are the mainstay of the technical and economic advance envisaged in the Plan as necessary for the growth of our country. The Plan provides also for a vast field for the development of small-scale and village industries as well as private enterprise in industry, commerce and agriculture.

8. The Congress has always attached importance to decentralised industry, wherever this is possible, for increasing production, providing employment and spreading the benefits of a developing economy to as large a number of persons as possible. Such small and cottage industry should utilize efficient techniques in order to make them progressively³ stable and economically feasible.

9. The private sector has great opportunities open to it within the national objectives, bearing in mind that greater productivity, efficiency and service of the nation are the criteria⁴ by which people will accept or reject the contribution in either sector. The AICC confidently hopes that the opportunities and responsibilities which the developmental projects in the Second Five Year Plan will place on public servants and administrators as well as on private industrialists will be fully discharged patriotically and with integrity.

10. The Committee is of opinion that the targets laid down in the Plan for the agricultural production⁵ are capable of being, and should be, considerably raised. This is necessary both to provide higher standards of nutrition and the earning of foreign exchange to help the process of industrialization. In the opinion of the Committee such higher targets are⁶ feasible having regard to the low yield of our agriculture at present and the successful experiments that have been made in raising the yield considerably by the employment of newer techniques of cultivation, storage and distribution. Agrarian cooperatives should be progressively organized and the Community Projects and National Extension Service organizations should pay particular attention to increasing the yield from agriculture. Congress workers should carry on sustained work in the rural areas in order to create in our vast agricultural community a strong and

3. In the draft resolution, "it" in place of "them progressively".

4. In the draft resolution, "criterion" in place of "criteria".

5. In the draft resolution, "production of food products" in place of "agricultural production".

6. In the draft resolution the wordings of this part of the sentence were: "Such higher targets are, in the opinion of the Committee".

enduring sense of their identification with the economic national revolution on which we are embarked.

11. While the country has made great progress in agrarian reform, a great deal still remains to be achieved both in order to make the land more productive and more equitably distributed. Both these objectives have to be pursued, keeping always in mind that it is essential for production to increase in order to bring increasing prosperity both to the nation and the cultivators.

12. The AICC invites all Congressmen to rally to the call of the nation in the gigantic constructive efforts of the Second Five Year Plan—to wage war against poverty, ignorance, disease and social backwardness, and to realize and accept to the full, the responsibilities of leadership and service that are theirs. The Committee does not consider that either the Plan or the effort that it calls for is the exclusive concern of Congressmen or of any political party or economic group or class. It is a national Plan and the call it makes is a national call for national effort, in which all should join. The All India Congress Committee, therefore, makes its appeal to the nation for this great national task.

7. Combat Violence, Come What May¹

It is most unfortunate that undesirable tendencies like violence, irresponsibility and meanness are rearing their heads in the country. It is the primary duty of all Congressmen to fight this tendency to violence and lawlessness. What is most deploring is, that today Indians are killing Indians in India. We have, before this, fought the Britishers also, but we fought them non-violently and with tolerance. Indians then were hurt and suffered injuries. When one is hit by his enemy, he forgets and his wounds heal easily; but when a brother hits a brother, the wounds forever pain. They do not heal easily.

Have we now become more inhuman than when we fought our enemies? Have we now become worse than brutes?

1. Speech at the AICC meeting on a resolution condemning violence, Mumbai, 2 June 1956. From *The Hindu* and *National Herald*, 3 June 1956. For the text of the resolution, see *ante*, pp. 323-325.

I am reminded of the inhuman and ghastly scenes of bodies piling up on the streets after the Partition. These disturbances have torn asunder thousands of hearts. Do you think that these broken hearts can ever be healed? We have spent the last eight years in trying to solve those wounds, and the task is still difficult.

When everything is being done to erase those memories, a new violence is rearing its head in the country—brothers killing brothers on sectarian issues like language.

Today the prestige of India in the world is high, but, with our mean and contemptible actions, we are doing our best to lower this prestige. This prestige is not mine, it is that of Gandhiji and the Indian nation. Will India lose her honour and respect, abroad and in the country, by truckling to forces of violence here? Whether the Congress lives or not, whether we live or not, we cannot allow this tendency to grow. We have to check and eradicate it.

The agitation in the Punjab is the most stupid thing. If there has been any settlement peacefully arrived at, in a spirit of satisfying everyone and hurting none, it is in the Punjab. Then why did the people there start throwing stones? It is undoubtedly an irresponsible and dishonest movement.

We shall not tolerate this sort of violence. We shall have to deal with this with all the strength at our command. Even if the Punjab, even if the whole country, has to suffer in the process, we will not submit to these dishonest tactics and methods.

I strongly condemn the violence indulged in by workers at Kharagpur and Kalka.² The unfortunate workers were misled and incited to indulge in practices, the gravity of which they did not realize. The innocent workers today are left in the lurch while the leaders remain safe. Neither the irresponsible leaders, who incited them, nor these misled workers know what trade unionism is. Trade unionism means the unity of workers for their good; it does not mean unity for violence. Trade union movement cannot progress by threats, violence and lightning strikes.

Trade union movement should be in the hands of responsible leaders. Under irresponsible leadership, labour would become a demoniac force let loose without control.

2. See *ante*, pp. 128-136 and *post*, 337.

I cannot describe how sad I feel to see such things happening today in the country which gave birth to the Buddha—the apostle of non-violence and peace.³

Only a few days ago, we celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the *mahaparinirvana* of the Buddha. It looks from our actions as though we need the Buddha to come again and live among us after 2,500 years.

It is stated in the Bible that he who conquers by the sword shall perish by the sword. The hydrogen bomb in our own generation has proved that no one can win a war these days. The hydrogen bomb is perhaps the best exposition of the wisdom and truths expounded to humanity by teachers like the Buddha and Christ, because it brings home to every one again the truth that if he starts war, he himself will be destroyed by it. Yet, in spite of these teachings, when we look around, we see everywhere meanness, violence and inhumanity.

It is the first duty of every Congressman to spread the message of peace. Violence solves no problems, it makes them only more knotty. In putting down violence, are we to be afraid that the Congress might lose the election? I do not care if we lose the election. Let the elections go to hell. Let us behave like human beings. It will be better for Congressmen if in the process of ending violence, the Congress is ousted from the seat of power. In any case, the Congress has been in power too long and is tired. Perhaps, the Congress will be able to do better work in some other field than administration.

I am not averse to democratic opposition and difference of views honestly held. I welcome it. But how can opposition based on violence and irresponsibility benefit the people of the country? This approach will endanger all our five year plans and the country's goal of economic and social progress. The sense of irresponsibility that is spreading in the country is worse than actual violence because we can fight violence but we cannot fight irresponsibility so easily.

In this connection I may tell you that I am strongly against the loose behaviour of Congressmen at some places, for example, in the Punjab. I have

3. Commenting on the "atmosphere of violence all over the country" and the "terrible" occurrences at Kharagpur and Kalka, Nehru wrote to Vijayalakshmi Pandit on 30 May 1956: "I do not know what all this is going to lead up to. We talk about Buddha and peace, and are full of violence. The odd thing is that our broad policies, domestic or foreign, are popular. Nevertheless, the spirit of violence in petty matters grows. In the Punjab, the RSS, the Jana Sangh people, have developed a technique of throwing stones at meetings they do not approve of."

written to the President of the Punjab Congress Committee⁴ that if some of the Congressmen there, who have been behaving loosely, did not want to correct themselves then it would be better for them to leave the organization.

I would like to warn all the people that violence and bitterness will work against the goal of the socialist pattern of society. This pattern cannot be achieved without complete unity. Disunity will spell disaster to the country.

Important questions like international affairs and the country's own economic and social progress should claim the nation's attention. People should bend their energies in these directions. We have decided to achieve big things under the Second Five Year Plan and we will, but only when there is peace in the country. Otherwise, we shall lead ourselves only to unhappiness.

Demonstrations and propagation of one's views are all right and have a proper place in the country because the Government is a democratic Government. Everyone can bring their views before the public and have their differences settled by mutual negotiations. There is complete freedom of the press; complete freedom of speech and individual liberty are guaranteed to all citizens.

I want to be modest, not boastful, still I cannot help saying this: You cannot find another country where there is a Government more democratic than ours. Anybody having opposite views to ours can come and tell us. Why then should people take to these methods and violent acts?

I refer to another form of violence and hoax that appears on the Indian political scene, that is, satyagraha. In the so called satyagraha, anyone can become a hero by shouting in a public place or demonstrating. If he courts arrest and goes to jail for a few days, he becomes a hero. It is not this kind of cheap satyagraha that matters at the moment. There is a tendency among parties and some people to fight the Congress, not on democratic, non-violent basis, not to create a healthy opposition, but only to create disorder.

The Government of India has been following a particular policy in its internal affairs which in its opinion is in the interest of the people. There has been no opposition as such to the foreign policy. This is not because there is no alternative to offer. These policies are backed by the people because it is they who formulate them.

There is the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha making common cause against it! Is there anything common between the two?

4. See *post*, pp. 343-344.

Parties like these were founded on ideologies and one of these ideologies was fascism. The fascist ideology believed in the cult of violence, in achieving objectives by threat, violence, destruction and death. I regret to find that this ideology is spreading among many political parties in this country. These parties are making strange alliances among themselves, ostensibly to fight the Congress. If their objective is only to defeat the Congress in elections it would not be wrong. But what the country seems to be passing through now is something worse than working for such an objective.

The Congress ideal is to understand one another's point of view. Let this ideal be still pursued even if it means some sacrifice. Let us eschew violence in all its forms and adopt a policy of understanding each other's point of view through talks and personal contacts.

8. Second Plan—the Horoscope of India¹

India today is going through the biggest revolution ever witnessed in the history of the world. It is much bigger in its concept and purpose than those experienced by the socialist countries. The five year plan is a journey of millions of people to their future where we shall be having a new and glorious India.

India is very strong, not militarily but in its resources in moral strength. But this strength has been considerably reduced in the past because of foreign domination. We must not look at the past any more, but look forward. This journey to the future glory of India could not be undertaken by the people in the past because of the weakness created in the nation by the British rulers. Now that that bondage is gone, the march forward can be easier and the nation has also acquired the strength to undertake this great journey. This journey is to be carried on everyday and there must be no halting on the way.

Government have effected many social reforms because after political independence the country has now embarked upon a social revolution. I am happy that in the last session of Parliament a legislation was passed giving

1. Speech at the AICC meeting, Mumbai, 3 June 1956. From *The Hindu and National Herald*, 4 June 1956. Nehru was speaking on a resolution on the Second Five Year Plan. See *ante*, pp. 327-329.

some fundamental rights to our sisters.² This is only a just and right thing to do. There are people who do not like these measures because they believe that the elections will be affected. The prospects of elections have made people so weak that they even dare not speak out their mind.

It is the habit of some to compare India's progress with that of America and the Soviet Union. What is forgotten is that these countries had launched on their development years ago while in India it is a matter of a few years. The problem of economic development in underdeveloped countries presents a difficulty in the matter of raising resources. The Soviet Union has the capacity to produce wealth and use that wealth for further progress. But in an underdeveloped country there is little to invest on development with the result that the progress is slow. Yet, I am proud of the strides India has made and am confident that she would achieve the progress America or the Soviet Union have achieved, in a much shorter period than these countries took. There are also people who believe that quick progress in backward countries is possible only through totalitarianism or authoritarianism. It is wrong to say that India's development is slow because of the democratic set-up in the country and cannot be as rapid as in the socialist countries.

For the establishment of socialism or a welfare state what is essential is to produce in the country the goods that would make socialism or welfare of the people possible. It is in this context that the building up of industries and factories—not of the type one sees in Bombay but basic and mother industries—assumes paramount importance. Nationalization of all industries is an attractive slogan but not a practical one in the present context when more and more industries have to be started so that the wealth of the country can be increased. The Planning Commission has, because of this aspect, laid emphasis in the Second Five Year Plan on the basic industries. I admit that a mistake of the First Five Year Plan lay in not starting at least one iron and steel mill in the country. The country's economy suffered due to it. If we could have started such industries in the First Five Year Plan, it would have been possible for the country to think in terms of more rapid progress than we are planning now.

There can be no rigidity about the plan. A rigid approach will not lead to a true appreciation of the problems facing the country which is marching towards progress like a river rushing towards the ocean. You cannot confine the river in a tank and stagnate it.

2. See *anti*, pp. 214-221.

The Second Five Year Plan can be described as a horoscope—the horoscope of Mother India. But this horoscope is not based on the position of the planets; it is based on the circumstances of the country, the pulse of the people, their hopes, their aspirations, their strengths and their weaknesses. Our problems are immense and diverse and also changing. What is true of today cannot be and is not true of tomorrow. Planning also has to take into account that no region in the country should remain neglected. At the same time, there cannot be a uniform pattern of planning for all the regions. No planner can conceive of starting a steel mill in any area other than where basic raw materials for this industry, like coal and iron, are available.

Socialism cannot be established in the country through legislative measures nor can you do it by applying ceiling on income.³ Imposition of ceiling on income is impractical at this stage and will only jeopardize production schedule. At this stage implementation of this ideal will only be harmful to the country. We have to consider the production aspect in the Plan which cannot be set aside while considering this issue. There cannot be any progress without increasing production. The objective in view in calling for a ceiling on income, namely, that wealth should not get concentrated in the hands of a few and disparity in income be reduced to a minimum, can to a certain extent, be achieved by an effective taxation system. Such a step will not prove harmful to the country. It is possible that the country can realize the objective of ceiling on income in the future but now we have to concentrate on our economic growth and that can be achieved through keeping to the production schedules laid down in the Plan.

There is no doubt that there is a wide disparity in the income of the people. There are two ways of removing this disparity, that is, either by bringing down the level of the rich or by raising the level of the poor. So far as India is concerned, I would advocate raising the level of the poor. We must achieve it by improving the income of the poor and by providing them social amenities like education and housing, which will reduce the burden on their incomes. There cannot be socialism of poverty in the country.

Fears have been expressed about the country being overtaken by inflation because of deficit financing proposed in the Plan.⁴ The planners and the Government are aware of this possible danger and they will always remain vigilant to see that the country does not suffer on this account. Sufficient production of such basic commodities as food and cloth and a check on their

3. Kali Mukherjee of West Bengal had moved an amendment to the resolution on the Second Five Year Plan urging fixation of ceilings on income.

4. Krishna Kumar Chatterjee had suggested that measures to stop inflation be taken.

prices will keep away the danger of inflation. It does not matter much if the prices of motor cars go up.

As far as foreign aid is concerned, there is nothing wrong in accepting it as long as it comes from outside voluntarily, and without any strings attached to it and does not make people complacent. But ultimately progress lies in one's own efforts and work, and I want that our country should be built up with our own strength, and with our own sacrifices.

The Second Five Year Plan calls for a national effort for its success. There are some sections who do accept the Plan, but forget that they should do nothing that will hamper its progress. They create difficulties by encouraging strikes, satyagraha and violence. That is not cooperation. The recent incident at Kalka and the railway strike that resulted from it, are examples of this kind of tendency.⁵ At the Bhakra Dam, which is being constructed not far from Kalka, work is going on day and night. The Dam needs a continuous flow of cement. If the flow of cement stops even for a single hour it will cause incalculable damage to the Bhakra Dam and the nation would lose a hundred crore of rupees. This shows how delicate is this entire matter of constant supplies reaching the works of construction. Violence and sudden work stoppages would have disastrous effect on our development work. It is not the danger of inflation but the wave of violence, and irresponsibility which hold out a real threat to the success of the Second Five Year Plan.

The AICC members should take a perspective view of the Second Five Year Plan and not look at it in a piecemeal way, isolated from the context. This perspective is clear to Congressmen, as is evident from some of the amendments moved by them.⁶ In my opinion, in every session of the AICC from now onwards, time should be allotted for a special discussion of the five year plan.⁷

5. On 29 May 1956, four workers of the Kalka Railway Workshop were killed and seven injured when police opened fire on violent demonstrators at Kalka Railway Station. The workers had stopped the Chairman of the Railway Board, G. Pande's rail car and demanded a decision on the spot on their charter of demands. After the police firing, the Railway employees went on strike and rail traffic between Kalka and Delhi stopped. This incident and the issues of violent method and violent action were raised in the Parliament on the next day.
6. For example, Savitri Nigam's amendment sought development of the cooperative movement; Parmanand Patel's amendment urged greater marketing and storage facilities for agricultural produce.
7. Supporting the resolution, Munishwar Dutt Upadhyaya suggested for a special meeting of the AICC to seek cooperation of the people in implementation of the Second Plan.

In fact, the Planning Commission is reviewing it every day, and at the end of every month, the Commission gets reports from the states with regard to the progress of the Plan. The Plan cannot obviously be implemented by the passing of a resolution by the AICC. It needs hard and united work on the part of millions of people living on this land. The Plan is to be translated into action if the objective of a socialist India is to be achieved.

9. The Future of Bombay City¹

Some of you may wonder that in the AICC we pass so many resolutions, but that we have said so little about some questions, which are very much in your minds and in the mind of Bombay—in fact, not only in the mind of Bombay but in the minds of others who have reacted strongly to other matters. Why did not the AICC deal with these matters? Questions in relation to the States Reorganization Commission Report have already been disposed of. There is precious little to dispose of now in so far as the AICC is concerned. It is true also that another Bill is coming relating to Bengal and Bihar and some other matters.

So far as we could, we tried to arrive at settlements. Perhaps, we overdid it—I think, we did overdo it. But we did so with the best of intentions. Sometimes good intentions pave the way to wrong things. All kinds of conflicting statements, proposals and suggestions created confusion. From the beginning, I and my colleagues approved of the idea of bilingual states.

In India, it is not possible to avoid having bilingual areas, however, one tried to divide the country. No division which does not protect and give opportunity to minority languages to flourish can be a good division.

The Constitution mentions fourteen languages including Hindi. No language grows on the basis of conflict with another. All languages should grow together. As far as possible, every child must be given facility to take its primary education in its own mother tongue. The children in a bilingual area must also learn the language of the state at a later stage.

1. Speech at the AICC meeting, Mumbai, 3 June 1956. From *National Herald*, 4 June 1956. Nehru was speaking on a resolution on safeguards for linguistic minorities. The resolution was moved by Jagjivan Ram on 3 June 1956. It was adopted unanimously the same day.



AT A MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF P.C.Cs, NEW DELHI, MAY 1956



WITH PARTICIPANTS OF A CULTURAL PRESENTATION ON CONCLUSION OF A MEETING OF THE PRESIDENTS AND SECRETARIES OF P.C.Cs, NEW DELHI, MAY 1956

As regards administration, records, of course, can not be kept in a multitude of languages in one state. But every administration should, as far as possible, be prepared to accept applications, etc., in any of the fourteen languages. If these principles about the choice of language in education and administration are applied to bilingual areas, there will be no controversy about language. There might be a controversy on the political plane but on the linguistic plane there will be none.

By and large, we approved of the SRC proposals. Later, certain variations in the proposals were made, for instance the addition of Vidarbha to the larger bilingual area. This was done to maintain the unity of this great area. Unfortunately, many others concerned did not approve of the idea of bilingual states. They were repeatedly entreated to agree to it, and they might have done so, but for certain developments that took place one after another, making it more and more difficult for agreement on that basis.

Thereafter, other possibilities were examined. We realized that no doubt there was a strong feeling among Maharashtrians on the city of Bombay. We knew that geography supported the Maharashtrians' argument; that they had powerful arguments on their side. But there were other important arguments also to be considered in this context. If the ground for cooperation and mutual respect created by a hundred years of living and working together, in business, factory and in a thousand different ways, is removed, then something basic and fundamental is knocked out. Cold arithmetic and geometry cannot determine human problems.

In fact, the Bombay question went through various phases. We decided that the city should be Centrally-administered. Even that we decided, thinking there was a large measure of consent of the parties concerned. However, we did not want to come in the way of the people of Bombay to finally decide their future. Possibly, they are the most advanced political group in India, and it would be absurd for us to deny them the right to look after themselves or fashion their destiny within the larger destiny of India.

Two questions remain: what should be the method of the democratic decision and what should be the timing of the decision.

I confess that I cannot say now what the method would be. There are two, three or four possible methods, and when the time comes, it will not be difficult for us and you, in consultation with those concerned, to decide the proper method. There will be no difficulty about that. The other question is of time. The question may be asked: why don't you allow the city of Bombay now to decide by a democratic process? My answer would be that for the moment the city of Bombay—you will pardon my saying so—has disqualified

itself for taking a democratic decision. It is not in a normal mood. It is not in a peaceful mood.² This far-reaching decision would have to be taken, in so far as is possible, in normal and peaceful atmosphere when there is not too much excitement and passion. Today, there is too much excitement and passion. I hope this excitement and passion will start going down very soon. Nevertheless, it takes time and there is this danger. Suppose we say, we decide two years from now, then the people may be kept excited for the whole period. The period must be a longer period, let us say, round about five years. That gives a period of stability of working together in new ways, and after all what is five years in the life of the city or the life of the nation? Then you decide the future of Bombay quietly and calmly and come to a decision. You must welcome, it whether you like it or not. That is the only democratic way.

Central administration does not mean that we are going to cut off people working in Bombay from the surrounding districts such as Kolaba, Thana, and Ratnagiri. No barriers can be put up in any event, and more specially, when the city is Centrally-administered. I can say with certainty, that people will be given every facility to carry on their avocations and nothing will be allowed to come in their way. Secondly, there are a large number of others, people working in offices, clerks, etc. They might feel a little nervous. There is no need for that. Surely, we don't want to take any step which would result in uprooting people's lives, throwing them out of employment, etc. Nothing of that kind will happen.

It has been suggested that the capital of Maharashtra should be located in Bombay. Normally, this is not done. It produces confusion and certain difficulties. It would mean continued tension if two capitals were located in Bombay. It would also lead to legal and constitutional difficulties. But I don't mind about that. It would create psychological, emotional and other difficulties. It would come in the way of a settling down process which is essential.

Although, the Maharashtrians are not in a majority in Bombay, they are said to be 44 or 45 per cent. In the normal course of things it should not be difficult for them to win over some others to their point of view. That is the proper, democratic and peaceful way.

For the moment we propose, and hope that everyone will agree, that the Bombay High Court should continue serving not only Bombay city but the

2. Violent demonstrations in support of the inclusion of Mumbai in Maharashtra State took place in Mumbai on 2 and 3 June. As a result of police firing, two persons died and many others sustained injuries. Several shops were also looted.

great State of Gujarat and the great State of Maharashtra. I have no doubt that the High Court will have division benches in various parts of Maharashtra or Gujarat. I should also like the two States and Bombay city to have the same Public Service Commission. I hope the States will agree to it.

I understand that the vast majority of civil servants in Gujarat are Maharashtrians. They are competent people and they are there. I do not want that after reorganization Maharashtrian civil servants should be herded in Maharashtra, Gujaratis in Gujarat and somebody somewhere else. The idea of such a division does not appeal to me at all.

I hope that the two States and the Bombay area will now settle down, put an end to controversies and take up the bigger work they have to do. Bombay, which has played such an important part in the past, will no doubt do so again in the future.³

3. At the request of T.R. Deogirikar, President, Maharashtra PCC, Nehru recorded a note on 8 June 1956 explaining the main points of this speech. See *ante*, pp. 307-308.

(ii) Other Matters

1. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

New Delhi
2 May 1956

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

Your letter of the 2nd May about the proposal to have a separate PCC for Telengana. I have heard about this, but thus far we have not discussed this matter. I do not know what the Congress President thinks about it.

My own provisional views are that there should be only one Pradesh Congress Committee in areas where large states are being formed by joining together other states or areas. At the same time, I think that some kind of regional arrangement might be desirable, that is to say, that the members of the pradesh committee coming from a particular region, say, Telangana, could meet occasionally to consider their own problems and to see that the Congress

1. JN Collection.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

organization in that area functions properly. I understand that some such arrangement existed in the Gujarat PCC and Saurashtra. The Congress President is fully acquainted with that.

The point is that it is necessary to have one pradesh committee. At the same time, for purposes of effective working of the organization, it seems desirable to have some regional grouping. In a large state it will be difficult for the PCC to meet frequently and work might well suffer.

In the new Madhya Pradesh, the area is a very wide one and it will not be an easy matter for the PCC for the whole State to meet frequently. There might well be one PCC for the whole State and Regional Committees for Madhya Bharat, Vindhya Pradesh, etc. This might apply also to Vidarbha in the new Maharashtra State.

You might discuss this matter with the Congress President.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Shriman Narayan¹

New Delhi
19 May 1956

My dear Shriman,²

Thank you for your letter of May 19th.³ I appreciate greatly what you have written and I think there is force in it. Some two or three years ago, I felt strongly that I would be of greater use to the country and to the Congress if I left the offices I held.⁴ At that time, I was Congress President also in addition to being Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Fortunately, Dhebarbhai took charge of the Congress Presidentship. I gave up the Ministry of Defence.

1. From Shriman Narayan, *Letters from Gandhi Nehru Vinoba* (1968).

2. General Secretary, Indian National Congress.

3. Shriman Narayan suggested that young men in large numbers could be mobilized for revitalizing the Congress and the youth would join the Congress "only if some of us were prepared to work with them". Narayan wanted to devote his whole time to organizational work and not contest the General Elections due in 1957.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 312-317.

But I could not manage to give up the Prime Ministership.⁵

What you have written, I think, has force, but the time has not yet come to take a final decision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Narayan replied on 20 May that the idea of Nehru giving up the Prime Ministership was farthest from his mind and under the existing circumstances, inconceivable. He clarified that he was only referring to the type of training camp to be held at Narora next month which Nehru had already agreed to attend.

3. To Gurmukh Singh Musafir¹

New Delhi
24 May 1956

My dear Musafirji,²

I am glad to see in this evening's paper that the Executive Committee of the Punjab PCC, at its recent meeting, has taken up a strong line against the false propaganda and violent methods of some individuals and groups in the Punjab, in regard to the Regional Formula.³ I have been astonished to watch these developments in the Punjab and the activities of some of these groups. During a fairly long experience of public life, I do not remember having come across anything more misconceived and unreasonable as this agitation. Apart from this, the methods employed are sheer goondaism.⁴

1. JN Collection.
2. Member of Parliament and President, Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee.
3. Upholding the Regional Formula for Punjab as "fair and feasible", the Executive Committee of the Punjab PCC, at its meeting held at Jalandhar on 23 May, decided to launch a vigorous campaign to counter the "violent and provocative" demonstrations and "false propaganda" against the Formula carried on by the supporters of the Maha Punjab Samiti.
4. The Maha Punjab Samiti decided on 6 May to launch a civil disobedience movement throughout Punjab from the first week of June in protest against the Regional Formula, demanding a bigger State comprising Punjab, Pepsu and Himachal Pradesh in accordance with the recommendations of the SRC. Meanwhile, the Maha Punjab supporters held demonstrations at several places in Punjab carrying black flags, shouting slogans, disturbing Congress meetings and hurling brickbats.

What has disturbed me especially is the fact that many Congressmen have been rather passive about this. Some have almost indicated by their attitude a measure of sympathy for those who are carrying on this agitation. It was time, therefore, that they were pulled up and made to realize that by their passive attitude, they were, in effect, giving some assurance to this mischievous and harmful agitation of communal organizations. I hope that this has been made clear to all Punjab Congressmen.

I am convinced that the Regional Formula evolved for the Punjab is fair and just to all people concerned and that those who object to it have either not understood it properly or simply want to use it for some political purposes regardless of the good of the Punjab and of the people who live there, both Hindus and Sikhs and others.

If you like, you can bring this letter of mine to the notice of the PCC or of Congressmen in the Punjab.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Supporting these sentiments the Congress MPs from Punjab and Pepsu, at a meeting in New Delhi on 30 May called by Musafir, appealed to their Congress colleagues "not to encourage the opposition by their passivity, connivance or active support".

4. To Sampurnanand¹

New Delhi
24 May 1956

My dear Sampurnanand,

Your letter of May 21st.²

The problem of the relationship of the PCC to the state governments has

1. File No. A/100, Sampurnanand Collection. National Archives of India. Also available in JN Collection and File No. PG-24/1955, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Sampurnanand, the Chief Minister of UP, wrote that the jurisdictions of the PCC and the State Government seemed to overlap and difficulties arose because of this. He added that the "formula adopted at the meeting held in Delhi some months ago, suggesting certain methods of bringing Congress Governments and Congress Committees together, is much too vague and does not seem to meet all the requirements of the situation.

been frequently discussed by us. Indeed, we started discussing this problem in the middle thirties when the first Congress Provincial Governments were formed. We could never arrive at a very satisfactory formula. The result has been, as you say, that some vague directions are issued. In the nature of things it is difficult to be more precise. Any definiteness would create difficulties.

I should think, however, that the general directions issued are broad enough to cover most points. No definition or direction can take the place of the human equation and the capacity of the leaders on either side to work cooperatively and produce confidence in each other. Therefore, it was suggested that there should be periodical meetings of the members of government with the president of the PCC. Also, that members of government should attend the meeting of the executive committee of the PCC and explain any point that arises.

In a state, the ultimate responsibility is that of the government. In normal day to day affairs there should be, of course, no interference with the government. In matters of principle, if there is a marked difference of opinion between the government and the organization, then the only way to resolve it is to refer the matter to the Congress Working Committee.

It is, obviously, to the interest of the government to have the goodwill and cooperation of the organization. The organization, of course, is not any particular Congress committee but broadly it includes the PCC, which should play an important part in state affairs. If there is a marked conflict between the government and the PCC, both will suffer, but the government will suffer more. If this fact is kept in mind, then the government will always necessarily try to gain the cooperation and goodwill of the PCC. Even if this is not always obtained, an attempt to do so itself goes far and creates a better atmosphere.

If the president or some other members of PCC criticize the government at a meeting of the Committee, I think, a minister would be justified in answering him in the sense of explaining the fact and giving justification for any steps taken.³ It will depend on how this is done. I agree that we cannot have unseemly squabbles.

3. Drawing Nehru's attention to the proceedings of the last meeting of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee, when the PCC President, Munishwar Dutt Upadhyaya, "spoke very strongly about the sins of omission and commission of the UP Government", Sampurnanand asked, whether it would "have been justifiable for me or some other minister to get up and refute the President".

It would be desirable for bills to be sent to the PCC.⁴ But I agree with you that you cannot give an assurance that bills cannot be brought forward without previous consultation with the PCC. If the bill raises some high question of principle, then it seems to me desirable for that question, apart from the bill, to be considered by the Executive of the PCC. This is really to ensure smooth working in the future and to gain the cooperation of the organization. Obviously, however, the Government sometimes has to bring some legislation rather suddenly or of a kind to which publicity cannot be given.

I am sending your letter and a copy of this letter to the Congress President.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Sampurnanand did not object to the PCC President's request that all Bills coming before the Legislature should be sent to his office. He, however, pointed out that if the PCC were to claim the right to be consulted before the State Government brought forward any particular Bill, an awkward situation would be created.

5. India's Role in World Issues¹

...Well, I shall say a few words. As a matter of fact there is a great deal to talk about, that is, many important matters in India and outside. To take outside first, there have been many important developments in external affairs, in the international situation, some of them rather remarkable, and people are still guessing what exactly these developments signify. In the main, these developments are concerned with the visits of Russian leaders to various countries and the internal changes in the Soviet Union. Nobody can say exactly, precisely, what these changes signify but, I think, everybody admits that these changes are important and have a considerable bearing on what is happening in the Soviet Union and outside. In effect, one might say that these changes,

1. Address to members of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 29 May 1956. Tape No. M-17/C, NMML. Extracts.

internal changes in the Soviet Union, and the external policies that they have adopted, have to some extent given them a certain initiative, because others are trying to understand what they are, and to adapt their policies to this new initiative.

Recently, you must have seen that the Soviet Union decided to reduce its army by a million or so men. Well, some people say it is a very big step; others say, well, it has no particular meaning because they wanted the men for industry, therefore they have done it, and anyhow they have got the biggest army still. That is true, that if they do not employ their people in the army, naturally they have to employ them somewhere else and in some kind of industry, it is obvious. It may also be said that this whole conception of warfare is so rapidly changing and so governed by nuclear weapons that any country which has the nuclear weapons can safely reduce its other army having conventional weapons. It is not so important. One can go into these matters in some detail but, I think, the fact is that there has been a major change, not superficial, but something deeper in the Soviet Union, in fact, the change of policies and that this is related not only to the people deciding at the top there but to the growth of, well, ideas, opinions, and experience of a new generation of highly technical people, well educated, well read people. You see the whole content of the people in the Soviet Union has been changing. One forgets that. From being a nation largely of farmers, now they are a nation of highly technical men today; from being a nation largely unread and illiterate, they are not illiterate but rather a well educated nation. All this makes a difference. However, I am not going into that. The point is that these changes have occurred which have, shall I say, taken out the major questions out of the ruts they were in, and they have to be considered afresh, whatever the question is, for example, disarmament which is very important.

Now, broadly speaking, in disarmament too, it is the Russians who have been taking various initiatives and making proposals and the other countries have been rather reacting to them, usually rather unfavorably than otherwise. But I am not going into these matters. I am merely mentioning that somehow the state of affairs, broadly speaking, as between the two major groups of nations, is not in a jam at present; it is slightly changing, and although people hold opinions of their respective groups, they are beginning to wonder if their own policies they pursue, have any relevance today or they are worthwhile or they do any good. So, outwardly people may hold together, inwardly they begin to doubt and think of some way out of this jam—and on both sides, I am not referring to one side which I suppose is a good thing—although the fears and apprehensions are still there.

I think, one may say that the chances of any world war are less than they were previously. What are the places where such conflagrations might occur. Well, the major one we, for the moment, rule out, that is, a major world conflict. The others are obviously the Far East, Taiwan, etc., and the Western Asia region, these are the two main spots, Palestine, Israel, specially. Well, the most explosive position at present is in Israel. I do now wish to lessen the inherent danger in the situation in the Far East. I do not call it at present an explosive situation but it is a situation which may at any time become more serious because it is essentially serious and there is no apparent solution of it in evidence. It is not explosive. As you know, for the last seven-eight months, talks have taken place between the US and Chinese Ambassadors in Geneva. They are very extraordinary talks. They have carried on for eight months. They meet once, twice a week and talk to each other and decide to meet again a week later and come back to discuss the same thing more or less again. What does that show? It shows that neither party is prepared to break those talks. It is rather ridiculous in a sense to go on talking about the same thing for eight months and very simple issues, I mean to say, relatively simple issues they go on talking. Then after a month or two of these talks, perhaps a very tiny move is made, then after a few months another tiny move, but it does show and it is a hopeful sign that neither party is prepared to break—they go on for months, even years. That itself shows that the intent of both parties is to avoid conflict which is a good thing and so far as it goes. But it also shows that after seven or eight months of talks they have not come to an agreement about relatively minor matters. It shows how they are occupied in entrenched positions.

But, the most explosive situation obviously has been in Israel.² Perhaps that too is toned down for the present a little, though it was much worse two or three months ago, and nobody knew what would happen. But it is a bad situation and again there is no way of solution visible, because both sides are so completely entrenched and so passionately attached to their viewpoints. Of course, there is another aspect of it, that is, some of the great powers can exercise a great deal of influence there and if they do not want the conflict probably conflict will not occur. And recently, there has been this little

2. Israel armed forces attacked Syrian regular army forces on Syrian territory, east of Lake Tiberias, on 11-12 December 1955. They did so in violation of the ceasefire provision of the Security Council resolution of 15 July 1948, and of the terms of the armistice agreement. On 19 January 1956, the Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the attack.

development that the Soviet Union has also, well, thrown its weight on the side, you might say, of avoiding conflict in the Middle Eastern region.³

I won't say anything about Indo-China, although Indo-China is a peculiar responsibility of ours. We are tied up there and the situation again is one where we carry on from day to day without very clear directions as to what should be done. On the one hand, the Geneva agreements, out of which arose the situation in Indo-China, are not accepted by at least one of the parties. On the other hand, nobody wants a break there. Nobody wants, for instance, the International Commission, of which India is Chairman, to walk out, because if you walk out, there is a danger that the whole structure breaks down and there may be conflict, and so we carried on getting explanations, elucidations, this, that and other. There are two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the British and the Russian. They met recently and passed long resolutions which, well, chiefly indicated their desire that we should carry on, and that everybody else should try to fall into line; but they avoided the basic issues there. They slurred over it. So, all of us tend to slur over difficulties and carry on, but if you do not solve a question by slurring over, it arises from time to time.

Then there is Algeria, about which recently I made a statement in the Lok Sabha.⁴ Now, about Algeria or other countries it is very easy for us to take up a brave attitude, a crusading attitude, and condemn those who come in the way. But as things are, such attitudes do not help; they may be justified or not justified but they do not help, problems are much too complicated and it is not easy to solve them even if you want to solve them. We know that the problems—we have to deal with some of them—are complicated enough. Now, our natural reaction in regard to Algeria, of course, is that Algeria should be free, obviously. That is our opinion, but the question is how we help in that process and merely shouting loudly does not help. You see we have to function today as a mature country, mature government, mature party. The influence we have in the world today is obviously not due to any inherent strength that we possess, military or financial or any other. What is it due to? Well, to various

3. Speaking in the Security Council on a draft resolution of the UK on the Arab-Israel dispute, first circulated on 25 May, the USSR representative stated that the USSR was ready to assist the UN in achieving a peaceful settlement between the Arab States and Israel, on the understanding that measures to relax the tension in the Palestine area would be taken with due regard for the wishes of the States of the Middle East and without interference in their domestic affairs.

4. See *post*, pp. 481-483.

causes but in the main because people begin to recognize more and more that we function in a mature way, we consider a problem in all its aspects, we do not function on the international plane in a purely agitational way. Agitation is good on occasions, but a government normally does not function in an agitational way. Even if it feels very strongly, it has to express itself in a diplomatic way, probably in an informal or formal or private way. But the main thing is, I think, that a certain respect is shown to us because they realize that we function in a more or less mature way and not merely shout out what we like or what we dislike. Therefore, what we have said about Algeria is quite easy for me to say at a meeting in the Ramlila Ground or anywhere else or in the Lok Sabha. It gives expression to our strong views. But, some of our neighbouring countries do not do anything positive but they shout a lot. As a matter of fact, for all these problems with regard to Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, etc., we have done a good deal of work in the UN publicly, and even more so privately, informally, and have certain achievements to our credit, because our approach there has not been one of condemning any country, even though we were opposed to its policy but trying to seek a way out in conformity with our objectives and ideals and yet not condemning anybody. So, a certain value attaches to what we say, partly because it is generally recognized that there is no animosity against any country or unfriendliness about it, even though we may disagree.

What we have said about Algeria has attracted a good deal of attention. I cannot say whether it will bear fruit, because it is a difficult question, passions and national interests are involved. But anyhow, it does take that question out of that region of just passion and conflict and some way out is indicated. Whether people are prepared to take it or can take it now or later I do not know. But, if not today I can see they may be prepared to do so tomorrow, day after. Yet, we have said, we have not suggested any solution. In the main, we have suggested two things: that fighting should stop; it makes matters worse, dangerous; more passions, more anger, more suffering, more deaths should stop; and that the parties concerned should deal with each other. That is all that we have said but, of course, we have added that the parties concerned should recognize well the broad idea of Algeria being a national entity and a separate individuality of the nation. That is on the one side. That is really for the French to do. On the other side, everybody in Algeria should have equal rights. That is to say, even the descendants of the French and European settlers there, should have equal rights. They should be considered part of the nation, as there are large numbers of them, about a million and a quarter, and if you do not agree to that, then it is a question of an attempt to exterminate each other. These are broad approaches; for the rest, it is for them to decide.

Our country is chiefly concerned with, well, with the Kashmir issue, and the Goa issue. I can say little about Goa, as there has been no change in the Goa situation. Recently, there were hunger strikes there of some women prisoners. After a few days, so far as we know, the hunger strikes ended and the immediate objective of those women prisoners was obtained, that is to say, they were removed—they wanted to be sent from the lock-up to the normal prison and that was done. That was a small thing which is good because they were living under conditions of great hardship. Their conditions are slightly better, of course. That is not saying very much. Now, Goa again illustrates the difficulty of dealing with these problems in a mature way, which takes time and which ultimately, I have no doubt, brings results, without producing highly difficult and complicated situations. But as I said yesterday in the Lok Sabha in presenting the treaty of cession with the French Government about Pondicherry, etc.,⁵ this method yields results and, what is more, it yields results without leaving bitter trails and new problems. In trying to solve one problem you create ten other problems. The virtue of this method is that it really solves a problem. Now, we have never been so friendly with the French Government and people as we are today after the settlement of this Pondicherry affair in a friendly way. They are more friendly than ever before. We have got what we wanted and they have no sense of illwill or grievances against us. I should like you to consider how rare it is to solve any problem in this way. It very rarely happens. Usually with force, whether it is war or other ways of compulsion and coercion, something may be achieved but leaving trails of bitterness and conflict behind. Now, conflict is there but of course, we do not want it. But apart from conflict being bad all this affects any other step that we may take in the United Nations or elsewhere, because other countries function there. If we make any enemies of those countries in attaining some objective here, well, we have to face them as opponents and enemies elsewhere. So, if properly done you achieve your objective even though it might take time, without making the other party your opponent, your enemy, hostile enemy against you in the wider affairs of the world.

Well, there is Kashmir. I made a statement in the Lok Sabha⁶ some two months ago or three months ago—I forget—in which I stated something about the early history of it, because people have forgotten it, and clarified our

5. See *ante*, pp. 402-404.

6. On 29 March 1956. See *post*, p. 383. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 301 and 532.

position. I pointed out that the old approaches to this problem had failed, in spite of years and years of talk. I said I am prepared to talk still more. I do not mind if it is a question of talking about it. I will talk with the representatives of Pakistan, if necessary. But if we take a practical and sensible view, it is obvious that the line of talks we had carried on throughout these five, six, seven years not having yielded any results thus far, it was hardly likely to yield any other results now. As a matter of fact, it was much less likely, because in the last two years other things have happened, military aid to Pakistan by the US Government, other developments, Baghdad Pact, SEATO—all these things became further obstructions in the way of pursuing the old line of thought. So, the practical way out was to accept things as they are and deal with the question in that way. Now, I want to make it clear that I have not ruled out talks of any kind. It has never been our practice to refuse to talk to any country about anything. About Goa we always wanted to talk to the Portuguese people although we know they are frightfully unreasonable and, shall I say, quite incapable of understanding even the simplest propositions, but we said we will talk with you. They never turned up. We think, it is wrong to take up this pessimistic attitude, we won't talk, we will only show you the big fist; we do not do it. So, in the Kashmir question I pointed it, and I said that the accession of all the Jammu and Kashmir State was a legal and valid affair, that it is a bitter thing that Pakistan committed aggression. We pointed this out to the UN and then we got rather lost in interminable arguments. Our weakness is, if I may say so, a good weakness, but it is a weakness that in our eagerness to find a way out to peaceful settlement, we are always making suggestions and proposals while the other side never commits itself to anything; it is all veiled. They sit tight and then try to take advantage of what we say because there it is. So, we have made many suggestions because it is our desire to have peaceful settlement but that does not mean, of course, that we should give up what we consider is a vital consequence to us; that is a different matter. Our soft language which is desirable does not and should not be understood to mean that we weaken on any vital point. So, I thought it necessary to express quite clearly in my statement here what our position was.

Subsequent to that, a few days later I addressed a public meeting at Ramlila Grounds here and I repeated this same thing and in slight elaboration of what I have said. I said something about the settlement,⁷ I referred to a pact, that previously, a year ago or more, I had suggested a settlement to the Prime

7. On 13 April. For details, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 301.

Minister of Pakistan on the basis of the ceasefire line, broadly speaking, that is to say, I really repeated what I said here, let us take this position as it is and discuss minor matters on that basis, which they had not accepted then.

Now, what I said then attracted a good deal of attention, favourable and unfavourable both. Some of our friends here of the Jana Sangh and others shouted a lot and cursed a lot. They have got a habit of foaming and frothing at the mouth, whatever happens. Then, they have some leisure in their normal practice of throwing stones. Extraordinary parties we have developed in this country who alternate between throwing stones and foaming and frothing at the mouth. Well, there it is. They shouted a lot. The Pakistan people shouted a lot. It is rather extraordinary how the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS, for entirely opposite reasons, behave like the Pakistanis so frequently. As a matter of fact, our politics, national and international, tend to be, and I am glad they are, frank politics. I do not mean to say that we must shout from the house tops everything that we think, no government can; and even if a government wanted to, it could not, because of other governments concerned. But broadly speaking, our policies are frank policies and we tend to be frank in what we say. Other people sometime mistake our friendly language for weakness which it is not, as events have shown repeatedly. So there is no question of weakness and there is no question of our flaunting all over the world about our offer in regard to Kashmir. I informed the House and to some extent, in a public meeting, what I had said last year. Well, there the matter ends. They did not accept it and we stand by our rights, by our full rights, legal, constitutional and the rest. And, there is no question of my throwing about offers all the time.

If the Kashmir question comes up, well, we shall face it standing by our full rights in the matter, and I have no doubt in regard to our rights. We are in a strong position in spite of all the shouting that has been done. In a sense, the national movement of India and Muslim League's communal movement of India tried to capture the mind and heart of the people of Kashmir. Certainly the Muslim League tried very hard and failed miserably before Partition. It failed because the national movement of Kashmir was closely alike in spirit primarily with the States People's Organization in India and only indirectly with the Congress. The States People's Organization was, of course, largely dominated by Congressmen, so that the outlook of the Congress and the national movement of Kashmir is more or less the same. Not quite so with the Muslim League. And the Muslim League tried its utmost to win over the people of Kashmir and it failed. That was its failure, initial failure. It was not, remember, the question of merely the Maharaja doing this or that. The Maharaja came

into the picture, of course, as a formal ruler, but the main thing was the Muslim League had failed to create an impression on the national movement of Kashmir. Of course, quite apart from this, the fact is this, that Kashmiris whether Hindus or Muslims have been in a sense, far less communal than any other people in India, whether Hindus or Muslims. Anyhow, so when the Partition came and later troubles, etc., arose, plenty of troubles, in Pakistan and in India after the Partition, Kashmir kept calm. There was no trouble there. There was some trouble a little later, on the western side of the Jammu province, Poonch, etc. However, I am not going into that. The point is that we can never accept or agree to the principle, that because a country has a certain religious majority, its fate should be determined on the basis of religion. It may, the people, may determine, but I mean to say they may be moved by some religious passion, bigotry. I can't help that, but I am not prepared to admit it because that knocks down the whole basis of a nationalist and reasonable approach, a normal political approach to a problem.

Well, so now coming to internal problems, these last few months or more, as you know, have been peculiarly distressing, distressing because they have brought out our weaknesses, our divisions. The way we are influenced so much by considerations which may have importance but which certainly are less important than considerations of national unity and cohesion. We have seen that in connection with the report of the States Reorganization Commission. We have seen that from the provincial and linguistic points of view. Behind that we have seen a feeling which can only be called purely communal. I cannot remember anything so misconceived, so misdirected and so highly unreasonable and objectionable as the attitude taken up by the Punjabis, the Hindus, the Maha Punjab Samiti, the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha. I can argue with a person who holds a different opinion from me, convince him or be convinced or may agree to differ, but what am I to say or do with absolute sheer stupidity and bigotry and a narrow-mindedness, and there is no hope for a country where stupidity and narrow-mindedness and bigotry play an important part. I find in the Punjab today this kind of excessive narrow-mindedness. I have talked to those people, some of them who led that agitation, and they have taken up quite a different attitude when talking to me, quite a reasonable attitude. Well, there was no answer to what I told them and then they go and say and do something entirely different. Now, this is very unfortunate because I do believe that the Formula, what is called a reasonable Formula, that we have arrived at in Punjab is hundred per cent fair and reasonable. I put it to you, suppose it is not five per cent very logical here and there, suppose it is not, well, surely, it is far better to try to change it if you like, but because you dislike

some odd things here and there, to go about indulging in violence, indulging in not the violence of the moment but organized violence is a bad thing. I talked about it even in the Lok Sabha yesterday. We are getting in India a broad taste of these gangster methods.

We see sometimes the strikes and the like. We have seen it in connection with this SRC agitation. I can understand people feeling strongly, people may be even passionately attached to this or that view, but the moment we take to this business of violence and stone-throwing and arson and all that, we lose all foundations as a political, as a social, and as a national group and we go against each other and it is inevitably a precursor of mutual conflict and ultimately it develops into civil war, because these are things which separate us. Suppose we did not have the good and fine and loyal disciplined army that we possess or a fairly good and disciplined police force, what exactly would happen? When you accept one section of the police force fighting another section, one section of the army fighting another section on the ground of province or language or religion the whole country goes to pieces. We take some things for granted. We take for granted the loyalty and discipline of the army. It is a good thing that we take it for granted. It is a good thing that we have that. But one can strain that or the police force and when questions of conflict amongst ourselves arise then they go on to strain all the people. After all, they are the same people as we are; there is no difference. If we fight amongst ourselves, the army and the police and others are ineffective. Now, most of the people who created trouble know that and deliberately they want to create chaos. But what pains me is this, that many other people do not realize this and in their ignorance they take part in the activities of those elements who want chaos. This has been distressing. Because after all, we can do little in any department of national activity unless there is a measure of national cohesion. Democracy has no meaning unless it is based on national cohesion. Even though our opposition is a part of that cohesion in a democracy, if the opposition refuses to accept the verdict of the majority, well, then it is not democracy and you settle it in street or in fighting or by some methods of terrorism. That is not democracy, that is just going back to the law of the jungle. Now, this tendency takes to violence in a big way, arson, violence, injuring people and then it takes the form of satyagraha.

With the slightest pretext large numbers of people come out on the road and conceive themselves as martyrs and, well, they spend some days or some weeks and some months in prison and they come out. All these cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be called democratic ways of dealing with a question. Now, I am the last person to deny the individual right, the right of an individual

to rebel. Rebel anyhow. It is not a question of your passing a law, rebellion is against the law. I do not deny that right, much less do I deny the right of performing satyagraha by an individual whose conscience says so. But you must always remember if a person rebels with arms, I deal with him with arms or without and he has to suffer for that penalty of rebellion. And if a *satyagrahi* rebels in a peaceful way, I also have to deal with him. It is quite absurd for people to imagine that because a person is a peaceful rebel therefore he should not be dealt with by the law. As a matter of fact he is not a *satyagrahi* even in that limited sense. It is quite absurd that with the chaos everybody does what he likes. It is an extraordinary notion that the so called *satyagrahis* can do what they like and the government has no business to interfere. It is quite absurd. It shows how muddle-headed we have got in our thinking.

I recognize perforce, the right of the individual to rebel if his conscience says so, and suffer the penalties of rebellion, or the right of the *satyagrahi* to perform satyagraha if his conscience says so and again suffer the penalties of the breach of the law. Naturally, if he is peaceful the penalties will be light. That is a different matter, but he has to suffer. But it is quite another thing for a group rebellion or a group mass satyagraha. An individual has conscience; a group has no conscience. One can understand an individual's conscience coming and taking the consequences, but a group talking about a group conscience, in a democracy, has no meaning to me. You may say large number of individuals make a group; well, it may be so, but the difference is quite clear. Thousands and thousands of individuals may do so, but where an organized effort is made by a party for this mass effort then that, I say, is basically opposed to any approach or understanding of democracy. Of course, the whole conception of satyagraha has nothing to do with this kind of business. Satyagraha ultimately, surely, is to move the heart of the opposite party by your own suffering. You melt the stony heart of the other person or government or whatever it is. But you do not melt the stony heart of the other person by hitting the other person on the head, or by threats or by coercion, whatever form the coercion may take.

These are basic questions about which we should be clear in our country. The Congress should at any rate be clear. But I want others too to be clear, because it is not a question of our winning this election or that election, it is really a question of laying the foundations of our future in India. And at the present moment—I do not wish to compare it; comparisons are not good—but after all we rather stand out among the nations in many ways, certainly among the newly independent nations and others rather even older nations, many of them, in many ways—in our general, political and economic approach

and the way we have settled major problems in this country through peaceful methods and behaved maturely and all that. Now, all this is the result of what we have done. Of course, there is no maturity in it. It is childish and infantile behaviour and, mind you, I am not for the moment talking about violence being inherently bad. I am not discussing the moral issues although it is important. We commit violence everyday—I mean to say government adopts its coercive apparatus. But violence has now led us to the ultimate violence of the hydrogen bombs. Smaller violences become silly before the major violence. It is absurd for me to send an army with lathis against guns. Therefore, violence has to be viewed in a new context today, in the days of the hydrogen bomb. I do not want to develop that, it becomes a long argument, but I wish you to think about it. The whole conception of violence has to change because of this overwhelming violence that is coming to the world. In the same way this overwhelming violence as well as the tremendous development of technology forces us to think even of our other problems, political, national, international, economic, in a somewhat different context than might have been the case, say, twenty, thirty years ago. I am, specially now, referring to the technological growth. My point is that all this violent approach to the solution of a problem is completely out of place today in a civilized society, whether it is the approach to war or whether it is the approach to internal violence, it is completely opposed to it. The strength in the hands of a government, in the hands of a state, is so great today that no crowd can face it, no mob can face it. Of course, the government may change, that is a different matter and that is a right way. Change the government if it disapproves of it. In the old days, even fifty, sixty years ago, there was not too much difference between mob violence and the state's power, say, about a hundred years ago. There was a difference of course, but not much. Now, the difference has become greater and greater. No mob can suppress a state apparatus if the army is a functionary of the State; if the army goes against it that is a different matter. So that the whole conception of violent behaviour has to change. It is futile unless, of course, it is just to create chaos. Just to put the government in a difficulty and make it unpopular, when elections are coming, that is a different matter. But surely you must see these things from a longer and broader viewpoint.

It has been given to us at this generation to go through this vital early period of Indian Independence and to lay the foundations as strongly and as well as we can. I believe, we have done so in a large measure. But let us not be at all complacent about it. There are dangers all over, and dangers ultimately in our own weaknesses. Do not worry about any external danger. We should be vigilant, of course, but do not worry about it. The real thing is how far we

are strong ourselves in our unity of purpose, in our behaviour and all that. If that is so, I am quite convinced that there is no danger in the wide world that can really affect us. But, I am concerned about our own weaknesses, and how we get terribly excited, and how we get terribly narrow-minded, bigoted and take to violence and make gods out of things that are worthy of admiration but not worthy of being made gods out of whether it is a province or a language or anything else. Nothing is big enough for us to break up this conception of Indian unity in practice or in theory. We have got to face difficult problems in the future.

Therefore, I venture to speak to you in this manner and each one of us individually and separately is being and will be tested when these hard decisions have to be made. When sometimes we have to see that a decision we make might make us unpopular, and make us lose an election what are we going to do? Well, I have no doubt in my mind that it is infinitely better to lose an election than to do something which we consider not quite right merely for winning an election. Nothing is going to happen to India, do not you worry about it. Nothing very big is going to happen to India even if you lose the elections. Not that you will lose the elections, that is a different matter, but I say the people who win are those who are not afraid of losing, because the moment you are afraid of losing, you live in an unstable nervous state, you compromise with this, compromise with that, lose your footing and ultimately stumble and fall. That is what happens. I tell you without being impertinent, I hope you will forgive me to indulge in a personal reference, such strength as I may appear to possess is largely due to the fact that I do not care two pence for what happens. I am not worried, what happens. I try to do my best in any circumstance and worry sometimes about the solution of some problem, this or that, that is a different matter. But in the final analysis, I am not worried about the future of India, about the things that I care for. Having done my best I have a good sound sleep, and I get up refreshed in the morning whatever may happen. And if I speak to the great people of the earth, leaders of other nations, who probably are much cleverer than I am, maybe more experienced than I am, I am not bowled over by their greatness or by their cleverness. Because my mind is fairly clear and frank, and I say what I have to say, and I want to be friends with them, but anyhow, I am not afraid of what they might do or say. Therefore, I behave, and as we should all behave, normally, not abnormally. We behave abnormally when we are full of apprehension and fear. I want India in the international sphere, in the national sphere, to behave normally, as mature people do, who can judge of circumstances, who are not rash—they must not be rash as a nation—but who do not live under fall of fear.

Now, any way, we are going in two or three days' time to Bombay. Many of you may be going to the All India Congress Committee meeting. It is an important and difficult meeting, again not only because of problems we have to face but rather the atmosphere in the people's minds which may make even a small problem a difficult and a dangerous one. And that is the time when we have, if I may use the word again, to behave normally and calmly and dispassionately and not get excited, and keep the major issues and objectives before us. I have not referred at all this time to our Five Year Plan. We are all attached to this Second Five Year Plan. We shall have occasion to discuss this more, I hope, in the Party and outside because after all India is going to be judged by this Five Year Plan. We have come at the parting of the ways in our economic life. If we go ahead and make good of this Plan, well, the past is past and we are well entrenched in the future. If not, then we are dragged back by the past. So, it is of the highest importance. But even more important is, of course, the atmosphere and the sense of unity and cohesion in the country. If that is not there then where is the Five Year Plan?...

6. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi

6 June 1956

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th June.

I need not tell you that whenever a letter comes from you, it is most welcome and any advice or suggestion you make necessarily is considered with care and respect.

You have made two suggestions in your letter. One is to postpone all reorganization of states for five years. Quite apart from the merits of this proposal, I fear we have gone much too far for us to retrace our steps. Any such attempt would not take us back to the pre-reorganization period. We cannot wipe out history. All that it will lead to will be instability and uncertainty and widespread dissatisfaction. This is not a question of prestige. It is just a practical question.

1. JN Collection.

As for your second proposal, it is not clear to me how we can give effect to it.² What kind of a rule can we make about it and how do we enforce it? Even in the old days, that is, long before Independence, we did not try to function in this way. What are the normal sources of gaining livelihood? A person gains it by being engaged in some productive enterprise. This may be on an individual scale or on a group scale, or he possesses land or other property from which he derives rent, or is in some profession, or is in service. Would it be correct to say that persons belonging to these groups are incorruptible? I should have thought that much of the present-day corruption and fraud comes from people who are in some way in a position to earn their livelihood.

Perhaps, you are afraid of the Congress being controlled by moneyed people who can pull strings from behind. I entirely agree with you. But how exactly is this to be done?

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Rajagopalachari suggested that only "effective" but incorruptible members were required in the Congress, and the organization should, throughout be manned only by those having some ostensible means of livelihood and no one without a demonstrable source of livelihood should be allowed to function in the Committees. He noted that this was the only way to reduce the corruption and fraud that were "sapping the spiritual power of the Congress organization".

7. To U.N. Dhebar¹

New Delhi
9 June 1956

My dear Dhebarbhai,

As you know, I met Sardar Gian Singh Rarewala² two days ago. Subsequently, he saw you. I told him that so far as I was concerned, I saw no objection to

1. JN Collection.

2. Former Chief Minister of Pepsu and at this time, leader of the United Front opposition in the Pepsu Legislative Assembly.

his joining the Congress.³ Indeed, the Congress was open and anybody could join unless there was some special objection. But this was a matter for the Congress President to decide finally.

This morning I saw Maulana Sahib and he told me that he had seen Rarewala and had a talk with you also about it. Apparently, you had left it to Maulana and to me to give some final word about this matter. I told Maulana that I thought we should accept Rarewala. The question arose about our two-year rule, etc.⁴ We are not being asked to give any assurance or guarantee. Rarewala is coming in without any conditions. But I do think that the two-year rule should not be rigidly applied in regard to all newcomers to the Congress. If you apply it so rigidly, this will mean really shutting the doors to young people or old who might be capable of good work. You will remember that I mentioned this to you at the Working Committee and you said that it was always open to you or the Committee to relax this rule in case of individuals.

I think, therefore, that when a person joins the Congress and becomes an active member, accepting the obligations of such membership and we are otherwise satisfied, we should relax the two-year rule.

Your Private Secretary⁵ telephoned this morning and wanted to know what my opinion was. I had a message sent to him that I felt that Rarewala should be accepted as a Congress member.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. After meeting Nehru on 7 June, Rarewala confirmed his joining the Congress along with his supporters. According to Rarewala, who was a member of the five-man Akali delegation which negotiated with the Government the reorganization scheme for Punjab, there was no purpose in the Akali Dal staying in politics after its demand for a Punjabi-speaking state had been given up. He thought that if the Akali Dal continued to be in politics, the Sikhs would remain outside the main current of Indian politics.
4. According to the Congress Constitution, primary membership for at least two consecutive years was essential for a person to become a "qualified member" and be eligible for election to a primary Congress panchayat.
5. Nalin Mehta.
6. Rarewala was expelled from the Akali Dal on 15 July. When the Pepsu Assembly began a brief session on 23 July 1956, he along with eight of his supporters, seven of whom had been elected on the Akali Dal ticket, formally joined the Congress and sat on the treasury benches.

8. To U.N. Dhebar¹

New Delhi
9 June 1956

My dear Dhebarbhai,

I have just received from your Private Secretary your note on the constructive work programme for active members.² There is not much I have to say about this. One thing, however, might be stressed a little more.

You have mentioned in this note that each team will also explain to the people the salient features of the Second Five Year Plan. Before the leader of the team explains these salient features, he or they must understand the Plan. Understanding the Plan does not mean just knowing the targets but rather following and understanding the argument given in the report of the Planning Commission on the Second Five Year Plan. That report should be read by as many people as possible. I realise that the report is a very big document. I think a kind of a summary or shorter account is going to be published soon, both in English and Hindi and later in other languages.

The other day a prominent American author to whom I gave the Second Five Year Plan book told me that he was very greatly impressed by it and it was one of the great State documents of the time. I think it is a very ably written report, discussing our problems frankly and without any propaganda bias. The mere reading of it helps in understanding our problems and the various aspects. It is not necessary to agree with everything that is written in the report but it is necessary and desirable for people to understand the argument in the report.

We should, therefore, recommend to our workers to read this report, either as a whole or in the shorter version. Probably we shall be able to supply it in fairly large numbers soon.

1. JN Collection.
2. Dhebar, in his note of 1 June, set out the main features of the scheme of forming teams of active members for constructive work programme: There would be about 2,000 teams, each team consisting of 15 to 25 members drawn from a permanent roll of active members to be prepared by scrutiny committees. Each team would be responsible for a particular area and, inter alia, be entrusted with propagating Congress ideology and programme among the people, seeking people's cooperation in the implementation of the Second Five Year Plan, and bringing about greater coordination between the administrative machinery and the organization.

I suggest that something about studying this report carefully might be mentioned in your note.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Points of Fundamental Importance¹

We have met here to discuss some problems. It is indeed the first venture of its kind that the workers have come together to live in some rural atmosphere and discuss the points of fundamental importance. Such form of gathering helps the organization itself and adds to its strength and vitality.

We should know clearly what is the Congress ideology now and how it is taking shape and where does the Congress stand? Before Independence, the political question was the main factor that interested Congressmen most. Of course, the problems of the *kisans*, the upliftment of Harijans, and unity among different communities were also emphasized. In the resolution adopted in Karachi in 1931 about fundamental rights, new questions were mooted slightly touching on the problem of socialism. Gradually that question has assumed considerable importance in our political life. Some members who advocated socialism in earlier days left the Congress on the ground that they were not afforded adequate opportunities to express their viewpoints so as to persuade other Congressmen to lend their support to the same.

Congress consists of people of differing viewpoints who have different approaches to the problems that beset us. What is socialism? Some feel that it advocates equality. Thereby, they seek to restrict the sphere of socialism to one aspect only which forms but an ingredient of socialism. Some people advocating socialism, merely indulge in slogans and shibboleths and their programme of action is based on some vague conceptions, divorced from any

1. Address to a convention of Congress workers, Narora, 16 June 1956. File No. G-79(a)/1956, AICC Papers, NMML. A two-day convention of prominent Congress workers from the North Zone States of UP, Punjab, Pepsu, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi, Rajasthan and Ajmer was held at Narora, 45 miles from Bulandshahr in UP, on 16 and 17 June 1956.

objective study of the problems. Thereby, the essence is lost and they can hardly tackle with the problems in a scientific way.

The Communist Party raises the slogan of Russian Socialism. The long worded resolution adopted by the Party at Palghat in the last Party Conference indicates their mental confusion and the absence of a clear perspective.² Stalin was recognized to be the greatest architect of communism and now that his policy and action have been denounced by his own colleagues,³ the members of the Communist Party in India have been put to a very inconvenient situation and they are trying hard to find a way out of it.

What is the picture of a society which we envisage in a socialist state? The advocates of socialism have sought to put forth their ideas in different forms but the general trends indicate that they are looking forward to a society which will be brought into force by revolutionizing the social conditions. The means and techniques differ according to local conditions and it does no good to the people to try to imitate others without caring to examine the special factors that develop in particular environments. For the last one year or so, a new approach to different problems has been introduced in Russia and the people are now given certain amount of liberty to discuss government policies, which was simply tabooed earlier. If we really consider the problems that are making their appearances in India, we shall find that the long worded resolution of the Communist Party does not convey any meaning to us. The AICC adopted a resolution in Bombay condemning violence and no organization or party was, specifically mentioned. It is so curious that the Communist Party of India has come out with a big statement objecting to the passage of the resolution.⁴

2. Describing the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union "as an event of the greatest importance", the fourth Party Congress of the Communist Party of India held at Palghat from 19 to 29 April called upon "all Party Committees and members to study the documents and organize discussions". It also declared that the Central Committee would "review such discussions and endeavour to enrich our understanding in the light of these documents and discussions".
3. Such deviation in policies was decided at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union in Moscow in February 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 334.
4. The Politburo of the Communist Party of India, in a statement issued on 6 June appealed to "all democratic elements, including democratically-minded Congressmen and Congress committees...to tell the Government that the major responsibility for the increasing tendency towards violence, indiscipline and the lowering of standards of public life and behaviour lies on the shoulders of the leaders of the ruling party itself".

Similarly, the Socialist Party, which is now split into two groups,⁵ also has failed to give any correct lead to the people. The PSP tries to make its influence felt by resorting to some form of agitation calling it satyagraha, in different parts of India, on minor issues. As a result, the main problems of national importance are overlooked.

It is essential that Congressmen should try to keep in contact with the current of events, both national and international, and thereby adjust their own outlook. There may be different ways of reaching the goal of socialism in different countries. For the first time, the Head of an administration and a great leader, namely, Marshal Tito, has made it so clear in his statement in this line.⁶ We have to consider how far we should run after slogans or we should apply our energy and labour to effective implementation of a programme which has been drawn up for the development of the country.

Take for example, the Ambar Charkha. The vital question that is associated with it is—how to utilise it in the task of national development. There was some difference of opinion over its introduction. One section felt that it would unbalance the economic position and create a dearth of textile production by debarring the mills from making their own contribution only with the object of giving facilities for the introduction of the Ambar Charkha, whose potentialities and efficiency of production were uncertain and unknown. Indeed, we have to take steps with proper care and vigilance and see that we should not create unnecessary complications. Food and cloth requirements of the people have to be satisfied. In the attempts to increase the production, we should not unbalance the economic factors and bring about inflation that will nullify the purpose for which these attempts are being made. In case, something goes wrong, it may land us in serious difficulties and as such we have to test the efficiency of the new agencies through which we want to improve our productive capacity.

5. A split occurred in the Praja Socialist Party at its National Executive meeting in Jaipur in July 1955, and Rammanohar Lohia was suspended from the membership of the party. The PSP was formed in September 1952 after the merger of the Socialist Party and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party. In November 1955, Lohia launched a new Socialist Party.
6. Tito had signed a joint declaration on 2 June 1955 with Bulganin at the end of the Soviet leaders' visit to Yugoslavia which said: "questions of internal organization, of differences of social systems, and of different forms of socialist development, are exclusively a matter for the peoples of the different countries". He reaffirmed the same on 2 June 1956 on his visit to the USSR.

There was a suggestion that further extension of mill spindlage should not be encouraged. In this machine age we cannot altogether leave them out of account. The introduction of machine brought about a great change in world relations. Asia lagged behind and Europe emerged out superior in world prosperity and power; capital goods were produced which added to further production and the British supremacy in the sphere of commerce and industry grew up. The productive power of an individual has increased to a considerable extent with the introduction of machine. Electricity and hydroelectric power have revolutionized society and so also atomic energy. It is not the machine that is to be held accountable for the suffering of the humanity. We have to see how and for what purpose it is applied.

Planning indicates the preferences that are drawn up for augmenting production. While increasing the efficiency we have to see how we can at the same time remove unemployment. Planning thus becomes a complicated factor and an overall picture of the country's resources has to be borne in mind before steps are taken to deal with different segments of population. We have to know what are the essential requisites? It is only when proper estimate is made that the preferences may be determined.

Where does socialism come in the Second Five Year Plan that we have placed before the country for implementation? Undoubtedly, by gradual processes the society should turn into a welfare state. But, that is not the achievement of socialism though it may form its inevitable part. There can be a welfare state without socialism. People should have full opportunities for education, health, employment and other avenues for their self-expression. The means of production have to be controlled by the state. Nationalization of industries and commercial enterprises does not necessarily bring in socialism. Essentially, the basic industries should be state controlled. Now, the question of compensation comes in: should we try to deplete our resources by trying to pay compensation for the old factories or utilize the national wealth and resources for further production and thereby, raising the standard of living of millions of our people? In any case, the national wealth has to be enhanced and all our efforts should be mobilized towards that vital question and the Plan has to be drafted only to give effect to those ideas objectively analysed. The complete picture cannot be drawn in full at this stage and placed before the public. After all, the Plan evolves and its different facts are made known through working.

The world forces are bringing about rapid changes in the productive system itself. The atomic energy has revolutionary potentialities. If we forget the reaction of these forces we shall be merely theoretical and shall achieve nothing. Let us build up an atmosphere of clear thinking and attune our mind to the

dynamic progress of the social forces. The Planning Commission report should be read with care by all Congressmen. It has attempted to deal with many fundamental questions and has given indications as to how to deal with the same. Recently, an expert from outside India visited our country and gave a careful appraisal of our national progress.⁷ He visited India on earlier occasions too and is competent to read the trends of progress. He has in his review highly appreciated the progress achieved in this country through a short space of time. But he finds it strange that people of India fail to note the extent of our own achievements and there is a tendency to condemn all the efforts in Parliament and through the Press. India is trying to tackle its problems through techniques of its own and it is expected that Congressmen should try to understand its proper implications and create a congenial climate in the country by applying themselves to the practical task of building up the country, and utilising its creative resources to the full.

[Nehru concluded his speech at this point, whereupon some of the members present gave their suggestions regarding the issues raised in the speech. Thereafter Nehru spoke again.]

It is indeed true that the standard of morals of Congressmen should be kept high and the technique adopted by them in carrying out the constructive programme should be also efficient. There are many factors which add to administrative efficiency and integrity of workers. When work extends to larger areas and is carried on in greater tempo, other unknown factors are created and responsibility of the people incharge also increases to that extent. Unfortunately, there is a tendency to put forward claims asserting rights but disowning responsibilities. It is true that we could not retain the high standards as was expected of us after the struggle for Independence was over. Nevertheless, the Congress has set up a noble tradition of its own and Congressmen are expected to maintain the same.

Sometimes, reference is being made to *Ram Rajya*. One cannot be sure of earlier statistics. It will not be wrong to say that the population of India has multiplied many times while the land remained the same. Thereby, varied problems have been created and we have to seek proper remedies to deal with them as they are today. In this age of machine, it is hard to conceive that the people of India will continue to carry on the primitive system of cultivation and rural economy as in the days of yore. The village may be self-sufficient in its

7. The reference is to Paul H. Appleby, the American expert on public administration. See also, *ante*, pp. 247-249.

essential requirements, but it is hard to set up barriers or walls round the same to stop inflow of machine-made products. The application of science increases productive efficiency and one could hardly ignore its impact on the modern civilization. Machine increases earnings well. The nations which grew into prominence with the application of science did so because they were more efficient, enterprising and hard working and the success was undoubtedly due to their outstanding eminence. Their superior productive efficiency should not be associated with the rise of imperialism and exploitative economy. It is the better technique of production that yields better results. Without a higher technique, a country can hardly compete and prosper.

The standard of wages and salaries in our country is not high as compared to that of many other countries. Reference is sometimes made to the Karachi resolution which suggested that the maximum salary should be Rs.500/-. If we take into account the heavy rate of taxation and fall in the purchasing power of money, we shall find that the present salary schedule practically comes up to the figure indicated in the Karachi resolution. Any attempt to lessen the salaries will adversely affect the progress of work as well as its effectiveness. Really, efficient men are hard to find. Retired officials are offered higher salaries in business and industry in India and even outside, than what they had been drawing before retirement. It would be rather taking a great risk in attempting to lower the salary and at the same time increase the tempo of national development. What is essential is to put greater efforts in increasing the productive efficiency by employing the right man in the right place.⁸ It is equally applicable to industry, administrative services, engineering and technical work and the skilled professions.

Regarding the position of Congressmen who do not believe in socialism in the present organizational set up, it may be pointed out that one who does not believe in the fundamentals can hardly continue to be a member of the organization. As every Congressman knows, the Avadi Session of the Congress clearly indicated that the object of the Congress can only be realized by the establishment of a socialistic pattern of society. The events in the modern world have also shown the same trends. The USA, though a big capitalist country, is getting socialized and, maybe, the two countries, the USSR and the USA may come nearer one another through different channels. India has no other alternative than to proceed towards socialism. Even in spite of this clear

8. Nawal Kishore of Bareilly suggested that it was preferable to accord higher status to the engineers who were urgently required in the development projects.

objective, if persons differ dogmatically on questions of principles, they will have no place in the Congress.

A tradition of parliamentary democracy has grown up in the UK through several generations. We are experiencing difficulties in working out parliamentary practices because of our lack of experience. Maybe an authoritarian government is in a better position to take a decision, but the individual freedom which forms the basis of democracy is crucified. Every individual must have unfettered right to expand his personality, and it is democracy that can offer proper opportunity in that time.

In democracy, election plays an important role. Our recent experiences show that even organizational election is proving to be rather a costly game. The tendencies are rather unhappy and if they are allowed to gain ground, the entire organization will be ruined. It is better to have direct election at the base and indirect election onwards.

A form of industrial democracy has also been growing up in different parts of the world and I endorse the view that people working in industry should also have a say in its growth and administrative control. But that cannot be brought about in a fortnight. It requires proper training and equipment.

I believe that cooperatives, both industrial and agricultural, should be organized in larger numbers and people should be trained properly to make the cooperative movement a success. Congressmen must play an important role in organizing the cooperatives. In this connection I may point out that a delegation of six or seven persons would be proceeding to China to study the working of the cooperative movement in that country.⁹

So far as the Second Five Year Plan is concerned, I am sure that the Congress, being the main political organization in the country, has a great responsibility in the task of its successful implementation. I also expect good response from the private sector.

As for employment, twelve million has been the fixed target. In calculating the figures of employment, one has to take note of the fact that along with each direct employment greater scope for indirect employment in secondary and tertiary professions is yielded.

As regards ceilings on income, I am sure that no attempts in imposing ceilings would be successful at this stage, and they would rather create complications.

9. See *ante*, p. 111.

A practice has developed amongst some people to criticize the government with no clear understanding of the local situation. Sometimes, partial observation of some factors prejudices the mind and one is apt to indulge in criticism without going deep into the matter.

Today, there is an urgent need of maintaining the unity in the country. Casteism is a bane which stands as a barrier between different sections of the people and vitally affects their solidarity.

One member has raised the question: how can one make a distinction between a patriot and a lackey? True patriotism means unselfish devotion to the service of the country and one can easily find out how far the activities of a man are motivated by personal interests or a spirit of service.

As regards the controversy over the question of states reorganization, let me tell you that due notice has not been taken of the concluding portion of the States Reorganization Commission Report which relates to the safeguards for linguistic groups, the integration of services, financial and other administrative matters and the unity of India. These sections lay down certain formulas which the reorganized states are expected to follow to ensure confidence amongst linguistic minorities. These broad principles and objectives which govern the approach to the vexed problem should by all means be accepted.

Steps have been taken through the Sahitya Akademi to develop all the major languages in the country by getting important books translated in the different languages and thereby establishing more intimate contact among the people conversant with their own languages. I feel that mutual cooperation and increased contact will benefit all the different languages through interchange of thoughts and ideals. The people of a state or region should not have any apprehension that the regional language of the area would be dominated by a superior language from outside. History has proved that all attempts to undermine the inherent strength of a language have proved futile. No language can be suppressed. In this connection I may mention that the richness of Urdu language, which is specially prevalent in Delhi, UP and Punjab, will add to the development of Hindi and it will be a folly to think that Urdu will in any case go to undermine the importance and excellence of Hindi.

I appeal to all the workers and Congressmen present here that they should try to understand the different problems of the country and the policy and programme undertaken by Government in tackling and give them their whole-hearted support.

10. Reorient the Congress Party¹

It is not a fact that groupism in the Congress organization has made its appearance only after the achievement of Independence.² From my experience in Uttar Pradesh, I know that groupism and party rivalries were prominent even as early as 1935-36. Generally, no appeals came from UP to the AICC, because the Congressmen there felt that it would be expedient for them to dispose of their local disputes and by and large the decision of the PCC was accepted as final. But the malady of groupism and rivalry is deep rooted. Undoubtedly, the Congress organization gets devitalized by mutual rivalries and steps should be taken to work against its corroding effects.

The organizational set-up has undergone changes through different epochs beginning from 1920, 1930 and 1940. The Congress workers had been trained to a form of discipline under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi and his voice was inspiring. The different issues that came before Congressmen were settled by mutual discussions and in times of crisis in the party, the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi guided its destiny. Democracy has its own virtues, but it demands adequate training from the persons who have to work it out. Undesirable persons try to find their way everywhere through unscrupulous methods and the organization suffers as a result. In our attempts to maintain the democratic form, we have to guard against all forms of encroachment from different quarters. As an organized party, the Congress is expected to play a very important role in making democracy a success in the country. In countries like the UK the party plays a minor role. It sets up candidates for election and holds some annual conferences, and on other occasions, the leadership in the Parliament decides the line of action. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party practically spreads itself to all spheres and the policy and the programme of the Government bear distinctly the stamp of the Party. Practically, the Party is the Government itself.

1. Speech at a convention of Congress workers, Narora, 17 June 1956. File No. G-79 (a)/1956, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. During the discussion that preceded Nehru's speech, Brahm Perakash of Delhi pointed out the reasons for groupism and loss of faith in the Congress ideology because of vague conceptions about the Congress objectives among the Congress workers. He emphasized the need to train and educate them.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

But the Congress in India stands on a separate plane, distinct from the political parties in the UK on one side and the USSR on the other. The Prime Minister of India holds office as the elected leader and at the same time he is guided by the policy and programme of the party to which he owes allegiance. As such, Congressmen are expected to work differently in an atmosphere distinct from that of the UK and the USSR.

The working of the AICC and the PCC Secretariats should inspire confidence in the people and it is incumbent on each PCC to carry on its work with impartiality by keeping itself free from all groupism. The Congress organization has developed a noble tradition of its own and it is expected that despite its other drawbacks, it would be in a position to maintain the standard and draw the confidence of the people.

In the process of the working of the Community Projects and the National Extension Schemes and other development works, it has been found that officials are trying to assume public leadership in a way through greater contact with the people. It indicates a change in their attitude. If Congressmen carry on their work with real zeal, the attitude of the officials will also undergo a definite change. Congressmen should take very active interest in these development works.

Congressmen should also understand their responsibility in the context of changes taking place in the world. For instance, the introduction of atomic energy is going to bring about a revolutionary change in the technique of production and along with it the meaning of socialism will also change. In this changing world one cannot have a static mind. Congressmen should have more intimate knowledge of the current events. Generally, we are ideologically deficient. We must improve our knowledge by careful study. The Congress workers should properly keep themselves in touch with progressive developments so that they can adjust themselves with the changing order of things. No party can continue to function properly unless it reorientates itself by making adjustments in line with the progressive events. For example, it is not necessary that everyone should be an expert in economics, but he should know the implications of the Plan and the technique on which it will have to work. Effort must be made by Congressmen to understand those implications and also to make others understand them. The workers cannot afford to isolate themselves from the working of the agencies which are trying their best to change the face of the country. One should not be content with calling himself a Congress worker and parade before the world his past services, sacrifices and sufferings. The Congress has an added responsibility to undertake this big task of nation-building. The past activities of the Congress in launching

the national struggle are, indeed noble and the attainment of swaraj bears witness to its immense success and that can only be continued if workers also continue to carry on their work with the same amount of zeal and ardour.

By no means the women should be kept at a distance. This will only weaken the organization and one day the workers will find to their utter discomfiture that they have gone weaker by keeping away a very powerful section which can strengthen the organization. Proper representation should be given to women and minorities, so that they may have full scope for making their own contributions to the development of the country.

Congressmen should interest themselves also in international developments and should understand the effects of the policy of non-alignment which has been pursued by the Government of India and has proved its efficacy.

1. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi

3 May 1956

My dear Jayaprakash,

Your letter of May 1²....

About Kashmir, it is difficult to discuss the situation in a brief letter. But I am absolutely convinced that your information about 95 per cent of Kashmir Muslims is completely wrong. It is difficult for anyone to express a firm opinion about this matter. If one takes the population of the whole of the State, apart from the part occupied by Pakistan, I think, it is rather doubtful which way a majority would lie. I think, there is a fair possibility of the majority being in favour of India. If you would take Kashmir proper only, the probability is that the rural areas would be in favour of the Bakhshi Government. In some of the urban areas there will be a marked division and it is possible that in two or three of them the majority may be against Bakhshi. It is rather difficult to say what might happen in a plebiscite in Kashmir proper. Much depends on how this question is raised. If it is made a communal issue, then it is probable that a majority of Muslims might vote against India. If the issues are purely political, different voting would take place. But all this is guess work and people's opinions vary from time to time and are affected by some occurrence.

At the present moment there is a rather small group which is carrying on an agitation against the Bakhshi Government.³ That group itself is a small one, though it may have the sympathy of many others. Most of the people in this group are very irresponsible.

1. Jayaprakash Narayan Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Jayaprakash had written that from all the information that he had "95% of Kashmir Muslims do not wish to be or remain Indian citizens." He expressed that it was unwise to keep people by force as it could have serious long-term political consequences "though immediately it may suit policy and please public opinion" but could prove disastrous for establishing a peaceful social order. He wished that, "this question be considered more from a human, rather than a nationalist, point of view. All men have to live upon this earth as brothers, irrespective of what national frontiers divide them. World peace is possible upon no other hypothesis."
3. The Plebiscite Front, formed by M.M.A. Beg in 1955, favoured a plebiscite in Kashmir under the auspices of the UN and pleaded that the framing of Kashmir's constitution be deferred for a while.

Apart from these questions, I am sure that any change in the present position in Kashmir would lead to dangerous consequences, large migrations, great bitterness between India and Pakistan and probably war.

You might be interested to know that some time ago Fatima Jinnah went to 'Azad Kashmir'. She returned rather disgusted and said that 'Azad Kashmir' would vote for India if they had a chance.⁴ The fact is that the people in 'Azad Kashmir' are in a miserable condition and they look with great envy on the much better conditions on our side. Also, Kashmiris proper (excluding others in the State who are not Kashmiris) have always had no great love for the Punjabis. This applies to both Hindus and Muslims as the Punjabis were looked upon as exploiters in Kashmir. This is the reason why Kashmiris who are in 'Azad Kashmir' now are distrusted by the Pakistanis and are in a particularly bad condition.

I have written to you briefly about this matter. The story is a long one and a very complicated one. But it seems to me clear that your sources of information are not good.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Probably, this refers to Fatima Jinnah's visit to 'Azad Kashmir' in May 1949.

2. To Hyder Husein¹

New Delhi
5 May 1956

My dear Hyder Husein,²

Your letter of May 4th with your note on Kashmir. As you have apparently issued it to the press already, there is no particular point in my correcting some mistakes in it. However, I mention one or two.

1. JN Collection.
2. (1890-1966); advocate, Supreme Court of India, 1933-37; member, UP Legislative Assembly, 1937; member, Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57.

When Kashmir acceded to India in October 1947, there was no mention of plebiscite by India. What India said was that the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be consulted.³ The first mention of plebiscite came long afterwards in a resolution of the UN Commission, which we accepted.⁴ That resolution contained various conditions to be fulfilled before the question of plebiscite came up. Among these conditions was the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces.

It is not quite correct to say that Sir Owen Dixon named Pakistan as an aggressor.⁵ No UN authority has directly stated that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the UN Commission indirectly stated so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Accepting the accession, the Governor-General, Mountbatten wrote on 27 October 1947: "...it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."
4. Part II of the resolution, adopted by the UNCIP on 13 August 1948, affirmed that the future status of the State would be determined in accordance with the will of the people, and that, upon acceptance of the resolution, both Governments would consult the Commission to determine conditions for a fair and equitable plebiscite.
5. Australian jurist and UN mediator in the Kashmir dispute, Dixon submitted his report to the Security Council on 15 September 1950. He characterized the entry into Kashmir of Pakistani tribesmen and regular forces as contrary to international law. But he did not agree with India's contention that Pakistan be declared an aggressor. He stated, further, that he had not been commissioned to make a judicial investigation of the issues.

3. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
19 May 1956

My dear Pantji,

Farooq Abdullah,² Shaikh Abdullah's son, came to see me this afternoon. He was rather excited and gave me an account of how he had been ill-treated during his recent visit to his father in prison. He gave me a paper describing

1. JN Collection.

2. Farooq Abdullah was a student of Jaipur's S.M.S. Medical College, at this time.

this.³ I enclose this. It is quite possible that there is exaggeration in this. Also that both Shaikh Abdullah and his son are not very mild persons.⁴ Nevertheless, I am worried at reports of police rudeness and misbehaviour. This rudeness has very unfortunate consequences. These stories circulate among the Members of Parliament here and create a bad impression. Also, it is bad policy from a wider point of view in regard to Shaikh Abdullah.

I have sent a copy of this paper to Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad also.⁵

What I am particularly worried about is that the Police are Indian Police—the Central Reserve Police—and so we get all the discredit. Is it possible to make it perfectly clear to these policemen that they must behave politely and on no account must they misbehave?⁶

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. Farooq complained on 19 May 1956 that on his visit to Sub-Jail at Kud on 6 May, his jeep was stopped on the road side at a lonely corner by the police, he was manhandled, and his clothes, books, etc., were thrown out of his box.
4. Farooq had described how Shaikh Abdullah was insulted and abused by the guards, and how the Jail Superintendent was afraid of the CRPF guards who were not under his control and appeared “to have strict directions not to miss any chance of causing irritation and humiliation to every detained person, especially Shaikh Saheb”. Farooq also mentioned that his brother, Mustafa Kamal too was searched in January 1956.
5. Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, informed Nehru on 23 May that the Jail staff had been changed at Kud.
6. On 10 May, Shaikh Abdullah also wrote to Nehru about such harassment. Years later, he recalled the Kud incident in his autobiography, *Flames of the Chinar*: “Once Farooq came to visit me, carrying a few golf balls. The security personnel mistook them for bombs and started harassing him. This matter was brought to the notice of Jawaharlal Nehru who ordered the security contingent to be transferred without delay.”

4. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
26 May 1956

My dear Bakhshi,

Thank you for your letter of May 23. I am glad you have changed the police staff and the Superintendent of the Jail at Kud. It seems to me that these

1. JN Collection.

exhaustive searches of persons visiting the prison are hardly necessary. In fact, no searches are necessary as a rule except when there is some special need for them. My long experience of prison life has proved to me that it is always possible to send out any paper or to receive it, whatever the precautions. Care should be taken that no weapons are taken in. I suggest to you, therefore, that you might tell the Superintendent of the Jail not to have these searches unless on any particular occasion, he thinks, it necessary.

Vishnu Sahay is going tonight to Geneva. He came to see me today and I gave him a copy of the letter I had just received from Ghulam Qadir.² I am enclosing a copy for you. How far the account given is correct, I do not know.³ The matter was mentioned to me by Mridula, but I pay little attention to what she says. Then Asoka Mehta of the PSP spoke to me about this and I told him that these reports were usually grossly exaggerated. It was Asoka Mehta, I suppose, who then spoke to Ghulam Qadir and hence Ghulam Qadir's letter to me.

I believe that Ghulam Qadir's wife is mad or on the verge of insanity. She created a scene in our Lok Sabha some years ago. She was in the visitors' gallery. She got up suddenly and started saying something. She was removed quietly by the Watch and Ward Staff. Ghulam Qadir was not in Delhi then.⁴

Remembering this incident, I can well believe that the woman might have acted madly or foolishly. Nevertheless, this kind of story going about here does no good. Probably, you know nothing about it and some underling was responsible. I do hope that you will issue strict orders that every kind of rough and even discourteous treatment has to be avoided.

I shall be going to Bombay on the 31st May. I expect to return to Delhi on the 5th June.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Ghulam Qadir Bhatt (b. 1912); a close associate of Shaikh Abdullah; imprisoned five times during Quit Kashmir movement; Chief Administrative Officer, Ladakh, 1948-51; member, Kashmir Constituent Assembly; member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57.
3. On 24 May 1956, Ghulam Qadir wrote about the ill-treatment meted out to his wife by police and Peace Brigade on 20 April. He informed that due to mental shock, his wife went missing and could be traced only the next day with the help of Begum Shaikh Abdullah. Mridula Sarabhai gave the family shelter. Qadir explained that the reason for his writing to Nehru was the report that this episode was fictitious and baseless and his silence would have meant believing the story as a fabricated one.
4. Reminding Ghulam Qadir of this incident, Nehru replied to him on 26 May that he was enquiring into the matter.

5. Accession of Chitral¹

Brajeshwar Prasad (Congress member from Bihar): Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state:

- (a) whether the Government of India have recognized the accession of Chitral to Pakistan;
- (b) whether Hunza has also acceded to Pakistan; and
- (c) what is the relationship of the principalities of Nagar and Puniyal with Pakistan?

Jawaharlal Nehru: (a) Ever since 1876 the Maharaja of Kashmir exercised suzerainty over Chitral. Various internal changes took place subsequently,² but the suzerainty of Kashmir continued, and I would add, continues.

The Government of India are not aware of any formal accession of Chitral to Pakistan. In the Establishment of West Pakistan Act of 1955,³ it is stated that "the tribal areas of Baluchistan, the Punjab and the North West Frontier and the States of Amb, Chitral, Dir and Swat...shall be incorporated into the province of West Pakistan". There is no question of the Government of India having recognized this change of status of Chitral. I would add that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir offered by the former Maharajah and accepted by the Government of India was in respect of and included the entire territories then within the suzerainty of the Maharajah. This position remains unchanged.⁴

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 26 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. IV, Part I, cols. 4370-4371.
2. Tribal territories, interspersed among the districts of NWFP near the Afghan frontier, were administered since 1947 by the Central Government of Pakistan through the NWFP Governor who, in respect of these areas, acted as the Agent to the Governor General. This region was divided into six political agencies, administered through Pakistani officers known as Political Agents. Four states of Chitral, Dir, Swat, and Amb had acceded to Pakistan in 1947 and were in the Malakand—one of the six political agencies.
3. Former provinces of Baluchistan, North West Frontier Province, Punjab, and Sind were merged into a single province named as West Pakistan on 14 October 1955.
4. India's Ambassador in Kabul, Bhagwat Dayal, wrote to J.S., MEA on 29 May 1956 that this statement had caused "a stir in Afghan circles, because the Afghans consider Chitral a part of Pakhtunistan which is a bone of contention between them and Pakistan." He cited interviews given by a spokesman of Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a nationalist leader of Baluchistan, and a Prince of Chitral objecting to this statement in mass media. Dayal suggested that it would be expedient to clarify matters, so that "the present Afghan mood as reflected in these interviews is not left to smoulder."

(b) and (c). The principalities of Hunza, Nagar and Punial have always been and are part of the Jammu and Kashmir State. They are at present in the occupation of Pakistan.

6. To C.C.Desai¹

New Delhi
27 May 1956

My dear C.C.,²

I have just seen your letter of May 24th addressed to M.J. Desai. In this letter, you refer to the recent proposal made by me for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the ceasefire line.

You are quite justified in referring to this in private but I should like to tell you what the present position is.

The statement I read out in the Lok Sabha some time ago in regard to Kashmir represents our official position.³ Subsequently, I elaborated this a little at a public meeting in Delhi⁴ when I said that, in order to have a peaceful and final settlement, I had even gone so far as to make an offer to the Pakistan Prime Minister last year that we should accept, broadly speaking, the ceasefire line as the basis of settlement.⁵ This had been rejected then. After my speech, the Pakistan leaders again rejected this. There the matter ends so far as this offer is concerned, and I do not propose to repeat it or in any way to weaken our stand in regard to Kashmir.

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Commonwealth Secretary.
2. High Commissioner for India in Pakistan.
3. On 29 March 1956. Tracing the history of the Kashmir dispute, Nehru stated that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had passed important measures; that the State had never been so prosperous before; that he had told the Pakistani Premier in May 1955 that he might talk about plebiscite but it was no good ignoring existing facts and a settlement along the ceasefire line could be considered; that US military aid to Pakistan and her entry into Baghdad Pact and SEATO had made procedure followed hitherto out of date; and that it was better to have a problem pending than to go to war for it.
4. On 13 April 1956.
5. Nehru had suggested this to Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza during their talks from 14 to 17 May 1955 in New Delhi. For minutes of their talks on 17 May, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 260-263.

The Kashmir issue is likely to come up in the Security Council some time or other. If so, we shall base our case on our full rights and on the basic points emerging from the accession of the full State to India, Pakistan's aggression and subsequent happenings. We do not propose to tone down this in any way.

I wanted to make this clear to you so that you might not say anything which might perhaps later conflict with the attitude we take up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Subhadra Joshi¹

New Delhi
27 May 1956

My dear Subhadra,²

The Jana Sangh and others, as you know, have been carrying on some kind of an agitation because I said at the public meeting that I was prepared to accept the ceasefire line in Kashmir as a basis of settlement of the Kashmir issue. Some Congress meetings were held in support of what I said.

I want you to understand exactly what the present position is. You will remember that I made a formal statement in the Lok Sabha on the Kashmir issue. That is the correct position we have taken up. Subsequently, I elaborated this a little at the public meeting in the Ramlila Grounds and made a suggestion referred to above. Having made that suggestion, I do not propose to refer to it again and there is no need for anyone else to refer to it. If that question arises and a question is asked, the reply should be that in my desire to have a peaceful and final settlement, I had made that proposal. But the proposal not having been accepted, has lapsed and we stand by the statement I made in the Lok Sabha.

I do not want great stress to be laid on that proposal now. The matter may be raised in the Security Council and elsewhere and we should stand by our full rights there.

1. JN Collection.

2. President, Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee.

You might informally and confidentially of course, explain this situation to those who may be speaking in public on Congress platforms.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
28 May 1956

My dear Bakhshi,

I was hoping to meet you in Bombay, but I have just heard that you will not be coming there.

I had an interview today with Kashyap Bandhu.² This did not yield any very substantial result, though it helped me to form some idea of Shaikh Saheb's mind. He is obviously smarting under a deep sense of injury. At the same time Kashyap Bandhu said that Shaikh Saheb would probably like to meet me and that I might be able to influence him. I told him that I suppose some time or other I shall meet him, but there was no likelihood of this taking place in the near future.

I still think that it would be desirable for some people of your choice gradually to begin seeing Shaikh Abdullah at Kud.

I wanted to talk to you especially and to find out from you, about the state of your big organization, the National Conference. In the ultimate analysis, it is that organization that counts. Our position in India, in spite of many things being in our favour, would become very weak if the Congress organization became weak. We are, therefore, working hard to build this up both directly and indirectly through women and youth organizations. I suggest to you that you should pay full attention to this aspect and increase the basic strength of the organization among all creeds and classes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Kashyap Bandhu, a senior officer of the Kashmir Government, was arrested with Shaikh Abdullah on 8 August 1953. He was released in April 1956.

9. Suzerainty over Chitral¹

The accession of the Jammu & Kashmir State to India meant that India succeeded to such powers as the Maharaja possessed at the time. He could not give more to us and he did not give less. These powers include any kind of suzerainty, however vague this might be, over Chitral. Probably, his suzerainty over Chitral was rather vague. But, according to our information, it existed in some form or other.

2. In the reply I gave in Parliament,² therefore, I stated this bare fact.³ I could not accept a position that the accession of the Jammu & Kashmir State to India gave us something less than what the Maharaja at that time possessed.

3. The question, therefore, that has to be considered is: what was the authority of the Maharaja over Chitral at the time of accession? Chitral was not directly under his rule. Was it in any way under his suzerainty?

4. What in practice we might do later is another matter, and, as a matter of settlement, we may give up what we possess in law. But, there is no reason why we should not mention our legal claim or clarify a legal position. If there is going to be a controversy in the Security Council or elsewhere, we shall have to deal with the accession as a whole, whatever that may signify.

5. Quite apart from any desire on our part to have Chitral back in the Jammu & Kashmir State, another question may well arise. How is Chitral being used? Is it being developed as a base for attack? According to some information that we have received, the US treat Chitral more or less as a base. Our statement about Chitral is, therefore, some kind of a warning to foreign powers.

1. Note to Secretary General and Commonwealth Secretary, 30 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. On 26 May. See *ante*, pp. 382-383.

3. In a note to the Foreign Secretary on 3 June 1956, Nehru wrote that he gave the strictly legal position that Chitral had been under the suzerainty of the Jammu and Kashmir State which had acceded to India.

10. Kashmir at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference¹

I met the High Commissioner of the UK² today. Among other subjects, he referred to Kashmir. He said that Sir Anthony Eden would like to talk to me about it. Also, that perhaps I could meet Sir Anthony Eden and Premier Mohammad Ali together. I made it quite clear to him that I would not be agreeable to meet these two together. If Mohammad Ali wished to talk to me, he could come here to Delhi. If Sir Anthony Eden wanted to talk to me, naturally I was willing. But I was not prepared to discuss this matter with both of them together.

I also made it clear that I would strongly disapprove of any mention being made of this in the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.³ The High Commissioner said that in this matter Sir Anthony Eden did not wish to do anything against my wishes, but in any event, if this matter came up before the Security Council, he had to send some instructions to his representative there and he wished to discuss this with me. The High Commissioner added that this would not be brought up before the Security Council till the middle of July at least, that is, after I had left Washington.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 30 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Malcolm MacDonald.
3. Held in London from 28 June to 6 July 1956.

11. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

Camp: Bombay
3 June 1956

My dear Bakhshi.

Thank you for your letter of May 31st.

Dr Subbaroyan, who as you know, will be going to Srinagar as a Member of the Official Language Commission, wrote to me today. He said that while in

1. JN Collection.

Jammu & Kashmir State, he would like to pay a visit to Shaikh Abdullah at Kud. He wanted my advice in the matter. I consulted Sadiq.² I myself am of the opinion that it would be a good thing to allow Dr Subbaroyan to see Shaikh Abdullah. Sadiq agreed subject to your approval being taken.

I am writing to Dr Subbaroyan that so far as I am concerned, there is no objection to his seeing Shaikh Abdullah, but it would be desirable for him to discuss this matter with you when he goes to Srinagar and then decide according to your wishes.³

I think, it would be a good thing on the whole for you to give facilities to Dr Subbaroyan to see Shaikh Abdullah.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. G.M. Sadiq was the President of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, and Health and Education Minister in the Kashmir Government.
3. Nehru advised (not printed) Subbaroyan on 14 June, who was visiting Srinagar in connection with the work of the Official Language Commission, to discuss this matter with Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammād.
4. Though Bakhshi told Subbaroyan that he could go there, he did not relish the idea much because of its possible repercussion.

12. The Kashmir Issue¹

I have read this correspondence and the note by Mr Pathak.² I think that you should write to the Attorney General³ again and tell him that if he wants you to send him all the previous material as contained in the printed volume, you will send it to him. Or else if he wants some parts dealing with some particular period you can send them. It is for him to decide what he wants and we should not make him think that we are keeping these papers away from him.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 5 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. G.S. Pathak, a member of the Indian delegation to the UN.
3. M.C. Setalvad.

2. At some convenient stage, Shri Pathak should see the Attorney General and discuss the matter fully. As far as we can see, this matter is not coming up before the Security Council for the next five weeks or more,⁴ that is, till after my visit to the United States. Whether it will come up then I do not know. Anyhow, we should be perfectly prepared for it. We can utilize this time to complete our preparations. So far as the legal aspect is concerned, this involves Shri Pathak meeting the Attorney General and discussing the matter fully with him. It would be a good thing if the Attorney General could at that stage write a note for our guidance.

3. In writing to the Attorney General, you might indicate our wish that Shri Pathak should meet him when it is convenient to him. You might also mention that there is little likelihood of this question coming up before the Security Council before the middle of July.

4. The Kashmir question finally came up before the Security Council in January 1957.

13. Inclusion of Kashmiris in Services and Foreign Delegations¹

I do not know what the possibilities are of any kind of a special tourist service to India by air. But we may pass the idea on to Air India.²

2. I am surprised to learn that Kashmiris are not eligible for the IAS competition or for the Armed Forces.³ It is true that this was so at an earlier

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 9 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. In a note on 8 June 1956 to Nehru, Mohammad Yunus, a senior official of the MEA, suggested steps to counteract pro-Pakistani propaganda in Kashmir. He explained that by connecting Kashmir with West Asia and East Europe by air during summer, India could attract tourists from these countries and counter the pro-Pakistani prejudices of the British and the American tourists which was publicized by Pakistan. In his opinion, the political aspect "warrants that such a service should even be subsidized for a year or two."

3. Yunus wrote about the frustration of the educated Kashmiris owing to lack of opportunities in the All India Services and the Armed Forces. This was fully exploited by Pakistan. He suggested that few young men should be recruited in the Central Services.

stage for political reasons. The Kashmir Government itself did not want this close integration with India. But I do not think there is any objection on our part to allow Kashmiris from appearing in the examinations and tests for the Central Services, civil or military. It may be that while there is no objection on our side, no steps have been taken to let this be known. Attention might be drawn to this fact by the Home Ministry.

3. Where possible, Kashmiris should certainly be included in delegations going abroad.⁴ As a matter of fact, wherever the greater number of our delegations are expert ones from some particular Ministries—there is the UN and UNESCO—it might be possible to send Kashmiris. I understand that a Kashmiri has been included in the Planning Commission's delegation to China to study cooperatives.⁵

4. I really do not understand this comment that no Muslims from India should seek service in Kashmir lest this may cause the pro-Pakistanis to criticize.⁶ Sometimes, we have ourselves deliberately sent some competent Muslims there. Our objective is to get work done there properly and not merely to adapt ourselves to Pakistani comments.

4. Yunus stated that the Kashmiris had not been included in any of the delegations going abroad. Their inclusion could give them a sense of partnership, make them feel proud of their association of India, and have excellent results for the country politically.
5. Syed Mir Qasim, a minister in the Jammu & Kashmir Government at this time, was included in the Agrarian Cooperative Delegation going to China. However, he opted out of it, as he felt that he had to be in Kashmir where the constitution was being framed.
6. Yunus wrote that when two or three Muslims from UP (son of Ali Zaheer and son-in-law of Zakir Husain) secured employment in Kashmir, the pro-Pakistanis exploited it by saying that even the leading Muslims had no scope in India and they were finding shelter in Kashmir, no chance "for us to get a job in India". Yunus also wrote that since no Kashmiri Muslim had been employed in the All India Service, these instances lent propaganda material to the Pakistanis.

14. To Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
20 June 1956

My dear Bakhshi,

Thank you for your letter of June 19th.

It was not a matter of great consequence as to whether Dr Subbaroyan went to Kud or not. As I wrote to you, on the whole I rather favoured the idea, but naturally I thought that you would be the best judge. However, as he has gone there, this matter ends.

I am sorry you could not come here because of bad weather. I was looking forward to meeting you. There was nothing very special to talk about as no new developments have taken place. I do not think that the Kashmir issue is likely to come up before the Security Council, for some time at least. If it does, we are fully prepared for it.

I heard that the UK High Commissioner in Pakistan² made a remark the other day that Pakistan was foolish in trying to take this matter up in the Security Council now. Apart from their internal troubles, they had no competent person to deal with it or to be anywhere near a match for Krishna Menon.

Azim Husain,³ who spent three weeks in Kashmir, gave us a good account of the progress made there and the good economic conditions.⁴

All good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Alexander Symon.
3. Joint Secretary and Director, UN Division and European Division, MEA, Government of India.
4. Some indicators of the progress made by the State since 1947 were: (1) resumption of *jagirs* without payment of compensation; (2) abolition of tuition fees at all levels in 1953; (3) three-time increase in electricity consumption; (4) extension of road mileage from 1,003 in 1947 to 2,169 in March 1956; (5) considerable increase in employment in government-owned industries and in average earnings; (6) increase in number of tourists from 3,746 in 1949 to 70,000 in 1956.

1. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegrams 1375 and 1376 to Pillai.² I am glad you have met Eden and others and discussed Korean, Indo-China and other problems explaining our viewpoint. I am glad also that there will be no further difficulty about the Canberras.³

2. Regarding Hunters, I am afraid that there is much misunderstanding. We had decided about taking Mysteres even when Pineau came here and I told him so. In fact, we discussed with him the question of transport of Mysteres to India. Later, we went into this matter more fully and our Air Force people were firmly of opinion that we should obtain Mysteres. When Mountbatten saw me with the British High Commissioner and a representative of the UK Supply Mission, I told them so.⁴ Mountbatten said that in his opinion the Hunters were very good, but of course, if we chose the Mysteres, there was nothing more to be said about it and they could not object.

3. Since then this question of purchase of Mysteres has been finalized and the French Government informed. Only the formal signing of the contract remains, and this is likely to take place within a few days.⁵ It would be exceedingly embarrassing for us to withdraw at this stage when both Governments have arrived at a final agreement.

1. New Delhi, 9 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. Krishna Menon's two telegrams of 8 June 1956 dealt with his discussions with the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden on the 'political impediments' in the way of purchase of military aircraft from the UK. He suggested suspension of final judgement (on the purchase of Mystere fighter aircraft from France) until the outcome of Eden's talks with Nehru in London.

3. Anthony Eden assured Krishna Menon that there would be no political difficulty about the supply of Canberras and had already cleared this sale with the United States. Krishna Menon also informed that the manufacturers of the Canberra—English Electric assured him that the Canberras were not 'obsolescent' in the UK as reported to him by the IAF personnel then in London. Interestingly, Menon quotes the IAF personnel as saying: "They were quite prepared to make the best out of a proposition (meaning the Canberras) which was not quite what should be and are prepared to take the risk."

4. Mountbatten visited India from 14 to 21 March 1956. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 290-291, for Nehru's talks with Mountbatten.

5. This occurred on 11 June 1956 in Paris.

4. It is true that when our Air Mission went to London to see the Canberras it was suggested to them to see the Hunters also. They agreed to do so. But that did not involve our holding up something which we had decided upon. Our Air Force people are wholly in favour of Mysteres. But the point is that we have finalized this with the French Government and cannot go back upon it.

2. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your telegram 1417 June 12th. Please inform Monckton that I am exceedingly sorry for any misunderstanding which has arisen.² Our purchase of Mysteres was practically settled some time ago, when Pineau, French Foreign Minister, came to Delhi³ and I spoke to him about it. Later, French team came here and after prolonged discussions draft agreement was finally agreed to. Even date of signing in Paris was fixed. Team went back some days ago and it is expected that formal signing of agreement will take place in a day or two. For us not to do so now or to postpone it would be breach of faith with French Government. We cannot even postpone this as there have been several postponements previously and this was last date. I am sure that Monckton will appreciate that in circumstances it would be improper for us to go back on our word to France.

2. Independently of this, we can always consider question of Hunters for future.⁴

1. New Delhi, 13 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. After his meetings in London with Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Defence Minister Monckton, Krishna Menon informed Nehru on 8 June, "Eden may suggest to you that he has talk with you before we take final decision (about the purchase of fighter aircraft)... although I found that he was very anxious that it should not be felt by you that they were interfering".

3. Christian Pineau came to New Delhi on 11 March 1956 for two days. For Nehru's talks with Pineau, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 387-396.

4. On 15 June, Eden sent a message to Nehru requesting him to defer a decision on the purchase of the aircraft "until we have had a talk here". In his reply sent on the same day, Nehru regretted "the misunderstandings that appear to have arisen" in this matter and said that the arrangement with the French Government had already been finalised and "the various contracts were signed in Paris on the 11th June, although I heard about this only two or three days later".

FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

1. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
8 May 1956

My dear Morarji,²

The *Blitz* of May 5th, page five, has something about the Vatican's interference in India. It refers to some kind of a directive.³ In the course of the article, some reference is made to the Jesuits in Bombay not liking Cardinal Gracias.⁴

What shall we do about all this?⁵ I think it will be a good thing to put this straight to the Catholic leaders in Bombay as well as here. Even Cardinal Gracias might be asked informally what he thinks of all this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Bombay
3. The Vatican had issued a secret directive to all Indian Bishops not to favour India in the case of Goa. For a similar reference, see *ante*, pp. 276-277.
4. Cardinal Valerian Gracias, Bishop of Bombay since 1950, and President of the All India Bishops' Conference.
5. On the same day Nehru wrote to the Secretary General and Foreign Secretary (not printed) saying, "I think it is always good to be vigilant and to give expression to our feelings, privately of course, but effectively."

2. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
14 May 1956

My dear Morarji,

Yesterday I was considering a report on the Goa border. Apart from many minor points raised in it, there was a major issue. Who is to be responsible for

1. JN Collection.

the various arrangements on the border after the splitting up of the states and the formation of new states. At present, Bombay and, to some small extent, Saurashtra are responsible. After the changeover, there will be the Maharashtra State and Mysore, and of course, in Bombay city there will be a large number of Goans, and in the north, there will be Gujarat. It will be difficult to carry on any uniform policy. The recommendation made by our Ministry, therefore, is that it would be better for the Centre to take charge of these border arrangements and supply the police, etc. Prima facie, this seems to be the right course. It will mean some additional burden on the Centre, both in men and in money.

I propose to discuss this matter with Pantji when he comes back. I have written to him about it.² I should like to have your advice.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 13 May, Nehru wrote to G.B. Pant (not printed) that the Central Government would take over the duties appertaining to the Portuguese borders and added that Morarji Desai had suggested that the Centre should bear the expense of this.

3. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
14 May 1956

My dear Morarji,

You will remember my drawing your attention to an article in the *Blitz* about the Vatican and Goa and about a directive issued by the Vatican.² Our Foreign Secretary wrote to Father D'Souza³ about it (who is in Poona). Father D'Souza has written at great length in reply saying that this whole thing is a fabrication and that the Vatican or the Jesuits have not done any of the things attributed to them in the *Blitz* article. He quotes some Jesuits, more especially,

1. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, p. 399.

3. Andrew D'Souza was the Bishop of Pune.

Father Arelano of Ahmedabad, who said that Goa should go to India. He also mentions some Catholic publications of New York and Paris which have supported India's case in Goa.

I am briefly letting you know about this as I wrote to you previously on this subject. The Papal Internuncio also called on the Foreign Secretary⁴ and said that the so-called directive from Vatican was false from beginning to end. The *Blitz* had invented it to malign the Holy See and the Catholics in India. He indicated that he would make an official protest about this. Also, the Cardinal, as the Chairman of the Bishops' Conference, would issue a contradiction.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Martin H. Lucas (b. 1894), met Subimal Dutt on 14 May 1956.

4. The Case of Sudha Joshi¹

I enclose a letter from Shri Deogirikar,² MP, about Shrimati Sudha Joshi.³ I would like you to get in touch with the Egyptian Embassy about this case. Request them to take such action as they can not only about Sudha Joshi but about the other women prisoners who are locked up all day in a small cell. At this time of the year, particularly, this is a torture, and they have suffered for it in physical health.

1. Note to Azim Husain, Joint Secretary, MEA, 16 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Deogirikar, had complained that Sudha Joshi, imprisoned in Goa, was being treated as a Goan national, and was made to share a small cell with five female prisoners. He requested Nehru to take steps to remove this "apparently petty grievance?"
3. Sudha Joshi, an active member of the Goa National Congress, participated in the Satyagraha of 1955. She was convicted to twelve years of imprisonment where she undertook a hunger strike to obtain better conditions for women in Goan jails. She was released in May 1959.

2. Secondly, point out that Sudha Joshi claims to be an Indian national and has apparently submitted a certificate of the Collector of Poona to this effect.⁴ She should be treated as such.

3. Thirdly, please get in touch with the Red Cross organization here and ask them to help in this matter.

4. Deogirikar wrote that despite this certificate, the Portuguese authorities claimed that she was not an Indian national.

5. Treaty of Cession of French Establishments¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: I should like to inform the House that this morning at 10 o'clock, the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of France signed the Treaty of Cession of certain French establishments.² I am laying copies of this Treaty on the Table of the House.

The House may remember that it was nearly nineteen months ago, I think on the 21st October 1954, the de facto transfer of these French establishments, Pondicherry and other places, took place and they were placed under the control of the Government of India.³ Since then talks have been taking place in regard to the Treaty of Cession so as to complete the de jure transfer. Although it has taken some time, I am glad to say that throughout this period, our conversations, that is, between the Government of India and the Government of France, were of a friendly and cooperative character and I am very happy that they have

1. Speech, 28 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, Vol. V, Part II, cols. 9711-9713. Extracts.

2. This treaty provided for the de jure transfer to India of the French territories of Pondicherry, Karaikal and Yanam (on the east coast), and Mahe on the west coast, and was ratified by the Government of India on the same day.

3. This treaty provided for the de facto transfer of French territories with effect from 1 November 1954. It provided for maintenance of status quo in all matters and included a provision that any constitutional changes in the status of these territories shall be made after ascertaining the wishes of the people. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 220.

concluded successfully with the signing of this Treaty today. The necessary ratification, according to the respective Constitutions of the two countries, will take place before long, I take it; so far as we are concerned, it will not take very long. So far as the Government of France is concerned, it will have to follow its constitutional procedures and I do not expect it to take long.⁴ Although in a sense, this is only something *de jure*, confirming what has actually happened *de facto* nearly nineteen months ago, nevertheless, it is a matter of some importance and I am sure the House will be happy to learn that this chapter has concluded successfully resulting in the formal and *de jure* addition of these territories to the Union of India. We have in these past eight or nine years, as the House knows, proceeded with great patience in regard to some of the foreign establishments in this country. That patience has borne results in regard to the French establishments.

Thus far results have not been achieved in regard to the Portuguese establishments. Anyhow, the process of completing the political unity of India proceeds apace and I have no doubt that the time may come when it will be my privilege to report to this House that the Portuguese establishments have also been transferred to the Union of India. I should like to express my high appreciation to the Government of France in this matter. In the past period, the Government of France has had to face big problems and naturally these rather delayed the consideration of this matter. Nevertheless, they have found time to take this up and ultimately to finalise this. ...

Sadhan Gupta (CPI-Calcutta South East): May I have a clarification? As a result of this Treaty will the people of Pondicherry be able to participate in the next general elections as citizens of India? Secondly, what would be the position of Pondicherry in the scheme of states reorganization? Has any thought been given to that?

J N: Firstly, these have to be ratified before they take effect. It may be that the ratification takes place in a month or a few weeks. After that, Pondicherry and other establishments will continue their separate existence in accordance with the Treaty itself and also in accordance with our assurance given to them. We cannot make a change in their status without their own consent—that is, the consent of the people. Therefore, it is not proposed to make any change at this stage. They will continue separately and not be absorbed or merged into any other state. I am talking about the major parts of territories.

4. The Government of France did so on 27 July 1962.

What exactly will be done to others, I cannot say, may be some small part and it is difficult to keep that part. As for the type of Government that may be established there, that is a matter for separate consideration....

6. French Territories in India ¹

The Prime Minister spoke to me later this morning. And, I told him about what I had mentioned in my previous note. He was first inclined to think that Yanam and Mahe might be included in Andhra and Kerala respectively in SRC Bill but on further consideration he decided that it would be better not to integrate the small bits into the existing states immediately lest it should be considered rather rushing things in indecent haste. There are the susceptibilities of the local population to be taken into consideration and we have promised to consult the local people before any major change is made.² On these considerations, he decided that we might let things remain as they are for the present.

2. He was, however, anxious that action should be taken early for
 - (i) making arrangements even now for the de jure change over; and
 - (ii) representation of Pondicherry in Lok Sabha.

He asked me to discuss these matters with Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, Shri Kewal Singh,³ who is here today.

1. Note recorded by A.V. Pai, Home Secretary, 29 May 1956. File No.6/48/56-F.I., MHA.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 224-226.
3. Chief Commissioner of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam, 1954-57.

7. Freedom of Goa¹

Friends and comrades,

I am very glad of this opportunity to meet you all here and to say a few words to you, about this question of Goa, or what are called the Portuguese possessions in India.

This problem affects you intimately. But all of us are also interested very greatly in this problem which has become an international problem of some importance. The importance of a problem does not depend on the size of a territory involved, but rather on its wider implications. Only two or three days ago, you must have read a report of a speech delivered by the Prime Minister of Portugal, Dr Salazar.² It is not right or proper for me to enter into public controversies with foreign ministers and prime ministers of other countries. I do not propose to do so except to say that we utterly, absolutely differ with Salazar. I was a little astonished to read much that he said, which was so utterly baseless, that I wonder what his sources of information are. He talked of India "resorting to acts of terrorism, murders, assaults, robbery, sequestration, sabotage," also about "arrests and dismissals and violence against the Goan people in Bombay and other parts of India". Now, whatever our differences might be, I should have thought that the prime minister of a country, even of a country which has an authoritarian regime and there is no one to criticize him there, should not indulge in such rabid and absolutely false statements.

I do not have to say much in denial of them. He refers, more especially, to the Government of India and the Bombay Government committing, I quote "acts of terrorism, murders, assaults, robbery, sequestration and sabotage against Goans in Bombay and in the rest of India, also, dismissals from service, and arrests and violence against them." Well, this is one of the most extraordinary statements I have ever read. I could have understood him if he had complained against the economic blockade and the restriction on traffic and money

1. Address to a rally of Goans, Mumbai, 4 June 1956, AIR tapes, NMML.
2. At the opening of the Congress of the National Union to commemorate the 30th anniversary of the revolution of 1926, Dr Antonio de Oliveira Salazar said in Lisbon on 30 May 1956 that Portugal was determined to maintain her sovereignty and her possessions in India. Goa, he said, "deserves every sacrifice not only because it is a part of Portugal, but also because of what it stands for in the history of the expansion of western civilization."

transactions, which in fact we have done.³ But the other assertions he has made show the kind of world the Portuguese Prime Minister and his colleagues live in.

When we first tried to have discussions with the Portuguese Government over the question of Goa and other Portuguese possessions in India, I realised to my amazement how different were the worlds in which we lived, they and we. There was no common ground to talk about. The Portuguese Government insisted on talking to us as if we lived in the 15th century. In fact, they referred to papers of the 15th century to justify their position. There was not much common ground between us. Still, we discussed and as you know, we found that there was not much profit in discussing with them. They would not even accept our notes, our aide-memoires, and so we called back our representative in Lisbon.⁴ Even so, we did not formally close our Legation there. It was only later, a year or so ago, that we closed our Legation and asked for the withdrawal of the Portuguese Minister from India.⁵

I should like you to go into the background. For generations, we fought against the British for the freedom of India. We didn't specifically raise the question of the French possessions or the Portuguese possessions. Indeed, if you may remember, we did not even raise the question of the Princely States within India. We took it for granted that the freedom of India meant the freedom of every part of India, certainly of the Indian States, as well as the French and Portuguese possessions. Reference was often made to this fact in our speeches in those days. In regard to the Indian States, Gandhiji advised us that while it was perfectly right for the people of the Indian States to struggle for their freedom from the autocratic rule of their princes, we should not trouble ourselves about it but concentrate on the fight against British rule. It was inconceivable to us that once British India was free, all these big and small Indian States could remain autocratic. In those states, we did not come in direct conflict with the British Government. The real basis of the power of the Indian princes, was British strength. And, we didn't want to fight somebody who was not the real power. So, deliberately, the Indian National Congress did not directly organize powerful movements in the Indian States.

3. Economic sanctions against Goa included restrictions on money transfer, stricter control on import of essential goods, such as steel, textile, etc., and ban on the import of Indian labour.
4. India withdrew its representative from Lisbon in June 1953 and sought the closure of the Legation there. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 23, p. 548.
5. On 8 August 1955.

Now, what happened when freedom came to us? The British Government did something which we did not like at all. They hinted that, when India was going to become free on the 15 August 1947, the treaties between the Indian States and the British Government would lapse and therefore the Indian States might be considered to be independent. They added, that they hoped that the States would come to an agreement with India and thereby become parts of the Indian Union. But, as it was, they had left a big loophole for any Indian state that wanted to be troublesome. As a matter of fact, I would say this that the British representative who was here in those days originally as Viceroy, then as Governor General, Lord Mountbatten helped our new Government in every way to settle the problem of the States, and under Sardar Patel's guidance and strong hand, the problem was solved within a few months except for one or two States which gave trouble like Hyderabad. Some other States were privately very troublesome. But why did they give in? Because they found that although the British Government had given them legal and constitutional loopholes they had no strength to stand up. All their pomp and ceremony had no strength behind it. When the strength of the British Government was removed the major prop went. The only way they could possibly have continued for a while was if they had popular goodwill with them. But that was also against them and with the removal of British power, there was nothing left for them to rely upon and they had to give in whether they liked it or not. You may remember that the popular discontent against some of the ruling princes was so great in the last days of British rule here, the people of one or two States forcibly ejected the rulers and the Government of India had to give them some protection. But the whole Indian States system collapsed because it was an artificial creation of the British. The moment this main prop went away, this system which seemed so well-established for a hundred years or more, collapsed.

We have always considered the French possessions and the Portuguese possessions in India almost as we considered the Indian States, that is dependent on the protection of the British power for their very existence. I don't mean to say that France is a small power, France is a great power. But what I mean is this, that the French possessions here obviously could not have continued except with the friendship and goodwill of the British power. In the Napoleonic wars and other times, they were taken away from France and they were returned. This applies much more so to the Portuguese possessions. They could not possibly have continued here as Portuguese possessions except with the goodwill and protection of the British power. There can be no doubt about it.

Quite apart from the fact that Portugal in the course of the last two hundred years had lost its former power and had become a weak country in terms of national power, it was not possible in this huge country of India for any foreign power, apart from the British, to maintain possessions except with their goodwill and protection. These were left over relics of the French power in India—the Portuguese never had much in India—because they were no danger to the British. It didn't matter to them. When they wanted, they could take them over. So they remained and we looked upon them also in a sense as outgrowths or consequences of the British power in India. We didn't trouble ourselves about them because we felt that the moment the British power in India was removed, automatically and inevitably these other enclaves, or little bits of territory, whether under the French or Portuguese, would revert to the motherland. There was no doubt in us. And, I must confess to you, it never struck me for an instant in those old days that we had any controversy over the French or Portuguese Governments about it. So far as the Portuguese were concerned, I must confess that we were not much acquainted with the Portuguese Government. But, we were fairly well acquainted with French history, with French development, French thought, the French Revolution, and so we were quite convinced that the moment India became free from British rule, the French Government and free India would decide about Pondicherry and Chandernagore and other French establishments in this country in a friendly way. It was inconceivable for bits of colonial territory to continue as islands in a free India.

When we became free, we started talking with the French Government with full confidence and with the Portuguese Government a little later. Though we did not know enough about the Portuguese Government, we knew it was likely to be a little less reasonable than the French, because we knew the internal conditions in Portugal itself were not free. Now, I do not wish to criticize internal conditions in any country, but, the fact remains a fact. Therefore, the argument of freedom would probably not appeal to an authoritarian Portuguese Government as it would to the Government of France. Whether that argument appealed to them or not, the force of circumstances would have to be recognized.

Well, we had not realized that the Portuguese Government had not outgrown the 15th century. And I must say, we found it, to begin with, very difficult to talk to a mind of the 15th century. With the French Government, it was different. It has taken many years to solve the problem of the French settlements, but throughout these years we have discussed this problem in a friendly way. We knew their difficulties, they recognized our position. We realized from the beginning that it was infinitely better for us to solve this problem in a friendly

way with France, even though it might take a few years more. We valued the friendship of France, it is a great country. We valued French culture and in fact, we wanted the French settlements in India to maintain that French culture and French language. So, although it took about six or seven years for us to come to a settlement, we were patient and we came to a settlement after negotiations. This was a little over two years ago. And that settlement was for a de facto transfer of the French settlements here. Even before that, some parts of the French settlements had been transferred like Chandernagore and other small enclaves.⁶ Ultimately, about two years ago, the remaining French settlements, Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe, Yanam were also de facto transferred to us—not in law, de jure. But the main thing was done. And the rest was really working it out in law. That has taken longer than I expected—two years because, the French Government was rather busily occupied with other problems. We reminded them, but in a friendly way, because we realized their difficulties. And as you know, about ten days ago or so, the formal treaty of cession of the French settlements in India was signed on behalf of France and India.

We would have liked to follow the same course with Portugal. But as I have pointed out to you, the Portuguese Government made it impossible for us to follow that course. They wouldn't talk to us, they wouldn't accept the memoranda we presented to them. Whenever they did say anything, it had no relevance to the present age or century. Long ago, we stated what our intentions were in regard to both the French settlements and the Portuguese settlements.⁷ We pointed that it was inconceivable for any foreign power to have a foothold in this country. Our national interests would be exposed to all kinds of dangers and difficulties. Here is Portugal, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I do not mean to say that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are hostile to India. But many things may happen in the future. Suppose, God forbid, there is war. We do not propose to be party to it. If Portugal is a party to it, if the war is going to come to the shores of India, is it going to distinguish between that little bit of a territory and some other place? If Goa is to be made a base for attack or defence, immediately we are dragged into the picture, and poor Goa suffers. Because, if Goa is made into a part of

6. Chandernagore in Bengal became a part of India de jure on 9 June 1952, when the ratification instruments of the Franco-Indian Treaty of Cession of Chandernagore were exchanged in Paris.

7. This was embodied in a resolution drafted by Nehru and adopted at the Jaipur session of the Congress on 19 December 1948. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 8, pp. 426-427.

the war area, Goa would be bombed, Goa would be attacked and so on and so forth. And India would be put in an exceedingly embarrassing position, an intolerable position. We would never tolerate that.

When I refer to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, I am not talking in the air. You might recall that Portugal has herself appealed to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for help against India. The answers of the countries of that Organization have not always been quite candid and clear. Generally, they have said: "Oh, we have no North Atlantic Treaty. We are not hostile to India." But they admit that, "if Portugal brings this matter before us in NATO, then we shall have to consider it. What we do is another matter." In other words, in some ways, if not directly, then indirectly, this question of Goa in India can be brought up before the NATO Council even in peace and more so perhaps in war. These are vital matters concerning India's national interests and safety.

I have spoken to you thus far on the basis of India's national interest, because I wanted to be quite frank with you. There is nothing to hide about it. There are two sides to this problem, and there is no conflict between the two. One is India's national interest. I am quite convinced in my mind that the interests of the people living in Goa are similar or even identical to the interests of India. Therefore, no conflict arises between the two.

The other aspect of the question is of the freedom of the people of Goa. Again, I am going to be completely frank with you about this matter. Everybody in India wants the removal of Portuguese authority from India—any foreign authority, not a question of Portuguese. All of us want every part of this country to be free in the normal sense of the word, to have democratic liberties, civil liberties, freedom to progress and so on. But, suppose the question was asked me, "Oh! Are you going forcibly to extend the authority of the Indian Union to Goa against the wishes of the people of Goa?" What will my answer be? I will tell you what my answer would be. I would say, "No". Again I want to explain myself. If the people of Goa, when the Portuguese Government goes, people deliberately wish to retain their separate identity, I am not going to bring them by processes of compulsion or coercion into the Indian Union. I want them to come and I am quite certain they want to come too. But that is not the point. I merely say that my national interest involves the removal of the Portuguese from Goa and not the use of any coercion in bringing about the union of Goa into India, although I wish it, I desire it and I think, it is the only solution. That is a different matter, but that is a matter ultimately for the people of Goa to decide. It is obvious, you yourself realize that a small territory like Goa with thousands of intimate contacts with the rest of India, cannot flourish, cannot

advance or progress as an isolated small entity. That is a practical reason. But, theoretically, I want to make it perfectly clear that I have no desire to force Goa to join India against the wishes of the people of Goa.

Take another aspect of this question. When Goa and the other Portuguese possessions in India join the Indian Union, as I am sure inevitably they will, then what will be the status of these territories? I need not give you a specific answer. You have the practical example of what we have done in the case of the French Settlements. What have we done with them. First of all, we have maintained their identity. We could have easily absorbed them into the State of Madras or some district of Madras. Pondicherry can be absorbed into some neighbouring district of Madras. We don't propose to do that, because we want to maintain the individuality of Pondicherry and Karaikal. We want to maintain the type of French language and French culture that has developed there. They have complete freedom to continue their own laws, their educational apparatus and everything. That is to say, we have given them freedom to continue as they want to. And in fact, it is an article in the Treaty between us, the Government of India and the Government of France, that we shall not make a change there except with the approval and consent of the people there. We have no intention of making any changes—not only because the people there might not wish it, but for our own sake, because we want a centre in India of French language and culture. It is a great language and a great culture, and it is of advantage to India to have a centre here, representative of that language and culture. But apart from that, the point is that, it is for the people of Pondicherry and Karaikal to decide what changes should be brought about and when. There is going to be no compulsion, no merger, I might say, of them into a district or state. They will maintain their separate identity so long as they wish, and I have no desire to hurry the process. I need not mention, of course, the question of religion, of worship and all that. Naturally, they are completely free there in matters of worship, in religion, as well as in cultural and other matters.

So, here is an example for you of what obviously would be applied by us to Goa when the time comes. And, now what I have stated previously in the shape of assurances about various matters like religion, like freedom of conscience, practice of religion and cultural matters, or language or service matters, or customs can be viewed in terms of the actual examples of Pondicherry, Karaikal, etc. It is not merely an academic question but of what we have done in practice.

I am saying all this to you, because some people are misled either by false propaganda or by over-enthusiasm and say, "Oh! Goa would be joined on to Maharashtra as a district or to Karnataka". Well, you are close neighbours of

Maharashtra and the new Karnataka province. And, I hope you would be very friendly and cooperative neighbours. But the point is that we feel that Goa's individuality should remain. Whenever the time comes for any changes, internal or other, it will be for the people of Goa acting freely to decide upon them.

Having disposed of this important matter, I should like to refer to Dr Salazar's recent speech. He has often mentioned as Goa being an outpost of Western civilization. Well, we have welcomed Western civilization in this country, at least the good part of it, and we have resisted its evil parts. Its principal evil part was its colonial character, and it is that evil part in Goa that we have to liquidate and push out. I do not wish to enter into any argument, but it does seem strange to me that Portugal or anybody in Portugal should stand out today as the standard bearer of European civilization. Whatever Portugal might have been six hundred years ago, I fear the civilizing mission of Portugal in India even four hundred years ago doesn't make very pleasant reading. It is a bad record, a terrible record. However, we needn't bother about today what happened in the past. For the Prime Minister of Portugal to say today that he is the torch-bearer of European civilization in India deserves, I think, not so much an answer from us but from the other countries of Europe. Do they accept that Portugal is the standard-bearer of European civilization? Does England, does France, does Germany, does Italy, does the United States of America—I only refer to the Western powers, not to the communists—consider the Portuguese system of government today, the lack of civil liberties, the authoritarianism of Portugal, as a symbol of present-day European civilization? Do they admire it? When they talk so much of democracy and the democratic process, what exactly do they mean? I know they include Portugal in their NATO councils. I know and you know that some months back the American Secretary of State, Mr Dulles, issued a joint statement with Mr Da Cunha,⁸ the Foreign Minister of Portugal, in which reference was made to Goa, a reference which we in India thought highly objectionable and improper. Let us be clear about it. Leave out political and other aspects. I should like these European countries to state clearly whether they admit this kind of claim of Portugal to be a standard-bearer of European civilization and all that in the East, and whether they admit that Portugal has a right to have a colony merely by calling it a part of Portugal, which is six thousand miles away. Mr Dulles practically said that. It was an extraordinary statement to be made by the responsible head of the Foreign Office of this great country, America. I am astonished at this. Do

8. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 423-424.

we live in two different worlds of thought and action? I should not speak of Dr Salazar and the Portuguese Government because I said we live in different worlds of thought and action.

Dr Salazar referred to the dispute between India and Portugal over Goa being based on a divergence of political and moral views. The question is, which political and moral views are accepted by the United States of America, the United Kingdom or France or other countries of Western Europe? Dr Salazar's political and moral views or those expounded in our Constitution of India? I am not quite sure whether Portugal has a constitution, but whatever constitution they have, do they accept that as the right philosophy, or, do they accept the philosophy and the line of our Constitution? I am not referring to what I think or you may think. The Constitution is a fixed sacred document representing the outlook of India. Many of us may not live up to it. That is a different matter, but we try to live up to it. Therefore, we want a clear answer. Why this hedging and why this business of anybody coming and telling me that: "Oh, we are neutral in regard to this matter. Neutralism!"

You know that one of the chief criticisms in some countries of the West about India is that we are neutralist. We are not neutralist. It is only a lack of understanding that calls our policy neutralist or passive: it is an active, dynamic policy pursuing its own aims and objectives. The use of the word 'neutral' has no meaning except when you think in terms of war. We use the words 'neutral, belligerent' when there is a war. Nobody ever heard before this era of cold war the use of the word 'neutral' in times of peace. It is because unfortunately, many countries have got so wrapped up in thinking always in terms of war that they bring in these words.

Why do they call us neutralist? Because they think that every right-minded person and every right-minded country should line up with them in this cold war. Because we don't, they call us neutralist. The analogy is quite opposite. But suppose, I said to some of these countries which object to our being neutralist: "Why are you neutralist about Goa? What is your opinion about it? It is not merely a question of Goa, important though it is for you and me. It is a basic question of colonialism. Why are many of these countries, well, so quiet! They are not neutral, they are very colonial. I should like to have their answer. When they talk about not taking sides on the Goa issue, they are trying to hide what they think, and they dare not say what they feel about it. It is a clear issue of colonialism. And I do say, it is the worst type of colonialism. For me, to be told that the Portuguese have been there for four hundred or five hundred years, therefore, they have established some kind of right to remain there for ever or for the future, it is really quibbling. That kind of argument

will justify any colonial rule, any kind of tyrant's rule anywhere. The only reply to that argument is that they have been much too long here, and they have to get out soon.

You all know the state of freedom and liberty that people in Goa enjoy or do not enjoy. You know that there is an utter, absolute lack of civil liberty. They cannot do anything without permission. They cannot hold a public meeting. Even a prayer meeting, I believe, requires permission.

Now, for us in India who have got out of this colonial condition and who are tied up with our Constitution with its fundamental rights and civil liberties, and who try to maintain them even in times of civil uproar as far as we can, it is really extraordinary that this backward, somnolent area, under the Portuguese authorities should advance these curious arguments of being defenders of civilization, culture, etc. You know what happened on the borders of Goa a little more than a year ago when a number of persons went peacefully across the border and were shot down.⁹ Many of them were imprisoned. Within Goa, thousands of persons who faced the Portuguese authorities, have been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and even exiled to the other colonies, such as Angola. You know that even now large numbers of political prisoners, both Goans in the sense of being Portuguese nationals and Indian nationals are imprisoned. For what offence? For peacefully walking into Goa, most of them have been sentenced for 10 years and 20 years. I should like really for the champions of European civilization to tell me in whatever country they might be, whether America or England or France or anywhere, whether this business of sentencing people, who have not committed the least violence, but peacefully breached the law by walking in, to 10 and 20 years of imprisonment and keeping them in foul inhuman prisons—is that a symbol of European culture and European civilization? Leave out the bigger questions. I think, the way political prisoners have been and are being treated in Goa, is scandalous in the extreme, and people in other countries, should realize what is happening in Goa and should at least condemn this thing. It is a barbarity which no decent or civilized nation can endure, and yet this is being done by these champions of Europe in India.

More especially the treatment of women. You heard recently of the hunger strike of Mrs Sudha Joshi and others.¹⁰ Mrs Sudha Joshi according to us is an

9. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 410-414.

10. Nehru informed the Lok Sabha on 22 May that Sindhu Deshpande and four other Goan women prisoners embarked on a hunger strike on 9 March and Sudha Joshi joined them on 14 May.

Indian national.¹¹ They won't admit it. But leave that out. Whatever her nationality, she is a human being as others are. They were kept in police lock-ups for years, I believe they have been removed now recently. In the course of the last many months, we have continually drawn the attention of the Portuguese Government to this. We cannot do it directly, because we have no relations now, but we do it through the Egyptian Embassy which has been good enough to undertake protection of our interests vis-à-vis Portugal, and through the Brazilian Embassy which represents Portuguese interests here.¹² But there is no reply and no improvement. I feel sorely tired by all this and yet we cannot allow ourselves to be driven to wrong courses of action, because of anger. We are after big prizes, which are the advancement of the millions of India; and peace and friendly relations with other countries. We must not lose sight of these big things in a fit of temper, even though the temper might be justified. Therefore, in keeping with our larger policies, we have pursued peaceful methods in regard to Goa. It has been a difficult choice for us, because the provocation has been very great. But, we have deliberately accepted that path, not only because of the larger considerations that I have mentioned but because we feel that the solution of any problem brought about by wrong methods produces other problems and other difficulties.

Take the solution of the Pondicherry problem. It is a problem which has been solved leaving no other problem and actually leading to greater friendship and cooperation between France and India. That is what I call a real solution. Proceeding along right methods may appear to be tedious and slow sometimes but ultimately, in terms of solving a problem fully, and completely, they are quick. Whatever reputation we have built up in the world about our foreign policy is due to the fact that the world has recognized in some measure that we do not act in haste, that we give mature consideration to problems, we function as a mature nation, and not an immature nation getting excited and shouting and rushing in here and there. The world pays attention to what we say. We

11. Nehru informed the Lok Sabha on 22 May that, "Sudha Joshi, though born in Goa and married to a Goan has been domiciled in Bombay for nearly 20 years and is a registered voter in Bombay State. She has thus acquired Indian nationality under our law. These facts and the legal position in respect of Smt. Joshi were placed before the Portuguese authorities when Smt. Joshi was being tried."
12. Indian Government requested Egypt to look after India's interests in Portugal in October 1955. In November 1955, India and Portugal entered into a reciprocal arrangement whereby Egypt was allowed to look after India's interests in the Portuguese possessions, while Brazil was allowed to look after Portugal's interests.

have no armies, no wealth and no financial position to impress the world with. We are a poor country struggling hard with all our might and with our own resources to build ourselves up and making good in the process. We have enormous difficulties. And among the greatest difficulties are, as always, our own weaknesses and failings, not difficulties created by some external country. However, we are making good, and the world pays increasing attention to what we may think or what we may do. You know, and I know, and I shall venture to say Dr Salazar knows quite well, that it is inevitable that Goa must come to India. But, an authoritarian regime depends so much on its prestige that it cannot afford to take a straightforward logical action. I meet many leading and prominent statesmen in the world and I can tell you that whenever I have talked to them about Goa, even those who are tied up in NATO with Portugal, they have said, "Of course, Goa will come to you. Can't you wait a few years?" We have been waiting for a long time. Now, the question really before us is: what we are to do? So far as the Government of India is concerned, its policy is quite clear, things may be slightly varied now and then. It is a policy of peaceful negotiation and settlement. We consider ourselves entitled to bring economic and like pressures. We know that these economic pressures by themselves may not be adequate to solve this problem. We know that. Nevertheless, they make a difference and they will continue. There are other steps also of that type which we may take. In the main, we shall pursue the policy we have pursued. That policy, I believe, has had considerable effect on many great countries abroad in the international sphere. They are beginning to realize more and more both the justice of our position, the inevitability of our position and the patience that we are showing, because of our love of peace. All that is to the good. Because, remember, that just as the Indian States collapsed in India when the British power went, if the international support of the Portuguese Government in regard to Goa went, it would be very difficult for Dr Salazar to repeat those grave words that he goes on repeating.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that freedom is not a gift from outside. It has to be earned and sacrifices have to be made for it. Nothing is worth having unless you pay for it. These doles and gifts cause an enormity of trouble afterwards; we begin to depend on doles and gifts and not develop our own strength. Fortunately for us in India, one of the basic lessons that we learnt at the feet of Mahatma Gandhi was to depend upon ourselves, not to look to others. Although, we wanted to be friendly with others and we welcomed the sympathy of others, we looked to ourselves always, and because of that we built up some strength in India and produced a rather remarkable example of a peaceful people standing up to a proud and armed Empire. In these days of

some unfortunate trouble in the streets of Bombay, I should like to remind you of the days when I was younger and when we carried on our struggle. At a time when passions ran high, whether it was in Bombay or Delhi, or Allahabad, when police firing had taken place and our people had died, an Englishman could walk through the biggest crowd in India without being touched. That was the discipline that Gandhiji had taught us and which, the people of India imbibed to an extraordinary extent. What then are we to do now? Leave out the Government. The Government will do what it can in its own way. But what are you Goans in India and, more especially, in Bombay to do? The burden rests chiefly on the people in Goa. In spite of all the oppressive measures and the terrorism of the Portuguese Government, the people of Goa, I mean, have at no time given up the struggle. They have carried it on in spite of all difficulties. Many people from Bombay have joined the struggle in various ways. Nevertheless, you will permit me to say that the Goans in Bombay have not come up to scratch. Goans in Bombay occupy a highly important and strategic position in the struggle for Goa's freedom. There is a large community of Goans in Bombay. I know that they are busy with their businesses, occupations and all that and normally people engaged in those businesses, do not indulge in politics. But when you face big problems, you have to take up that responsibility. You have done it but I say you have to do it in a much bigger way. You know better than I do that a number of Goan organizations here spend a fair amount of their energy in quarrelling with each other. It is about time that some measure of unity was evolved.

You have got a large number of clubs here, not political clubs, but other types of clubs. I know that in the past, those clubs were used to be exploited on behalf of the Portuguese authorities. There is much less of it now, I believe. Even so, there is a good deal of pro-Portuguese activity in Bombay. We know it but being a free country, we permit it. It is the time that Goans and their organizations here made a dead set against these Portuguese activities in Bombay and in other parts of India. In this connection, I should like to pay a tribute to many Catholic missionaries and priests who have sympathized with and helped the Goan liberation movement. But, I should also like to point out that there are other priests who work for the Portuguese, and I am afraid the Patriarch of Goa¹³ spreads out his tentacles outside Goa too—tentacles in the religious sense—and tries to do a good bit of Portuguese propaganda through his religious authority. This is highly improper. It is open to him, of course, as

13. Dr Jose Alvernaz.

a religious dignitary, to say what he likes, to behave as he likes in the field of religion, but if he functions in the political field, then he functions wrongly.

I shall tell you an old story about Christianity in India. Many of you must know that Christianity came to India in the first century long before Portugal was Christian. It came briefly to the south of India and there it is well-established and well-respected in that part of the country. When many hundreds of years ago, Jesuit missionaries came to India at the time of the Mughals, they came quietly and went to Central and South India. They did their work quietly and they were generally accepted and respected for their learning and piety. The point is that when Christianity was brought to South India by the Syrian Church in the first century and by the Roman Catholic church in the Mughal times, it did not come supported by the bayonets of a colonial authority. Therefore, it was respected as a religion. But the British brought the religion supported by the bayonets, with the result that the religion that came with the British troops came as a part of colonialism to India. I have no complaint against the Church of England—but I am pointing out that the reaction of the people to the Christianity that came with the British colonial authority was different from the reaction of the people to the Catholic missionaries or the Syrian missionaries, because the two previous ones were not connected with colonialism, and came as a religion, pure and simple. Therefore, if you go to North India, you will find a prejudice, against that type of Christianity which was supported by the British bayonet. That prejudice is now vanishing, because British colonial authority has gone.

Now, apply that to Portugal and Goa, the colonial authority and the arguments that Dr Salazar is using essentially mix up colonialism with the Catholic Church. That makes the religion lose its force in the eyes of the people. It is a bad thing for any Church or any religion to be tied up with political authority in this way, and especially, colonial authority. And, it is a bad thing for the leaders of that religion, bishops and archbishops and patriarchs to get tied up with colonialism in any way. We don't want priests to take part in political matters—priests of any religion, whether Hindu, or Muslim or Christian, whatever it may be. There is difference, however, when India fought for her freedom, you might have called it a political question, but it was something much bigger than a political question. It was a question of human freedom, and therefore, it was perfectly right for priests and the like to take part and encourage that struggle of freedom. In fact, it was the duty of every right-thinking man, priest or other, to support the struggle for freedom. And, you

will remember—was it last year—at Christmas time (I forget) a message¹⁴ of His Holiness the Pope in which he used his powerful voice against colonialism. Now, if any international Church, whether it is Catholic Church, whether it is Islam, whether it is Buddhism, begins to support a colonial authority, then it sows the seeds which disrupt its international character. If the Catholic patriarch of Goa functions as a political symbol of colonialism, he is doing great injury to the Church of which he is a great leader. I think, the way should be completely clear for any priest or churchmen, as for any layman to support the cause of freedom everywhere. A person who does not support the cause of freedom fails in his duty both to his country and to his church. For him to take up that middle of the road attitude in such matters would involve the risk of doubts being cast on his bona fides. If he is an Indian national, I expect him to behave like an Indian national whether he is a Muslim, or a Parsee, Christian or Catholic or anybody. An international Church like the Catholic Church has to function nationally in the political domain wherever it is. Or else it becomes a colonial Church. The Church of England in India was a colonial Church upholding colonial authority. Therefore, it was no real Church in India, so any Church that upholds a colonial authority actively or passively, ceases to be a real Church; it is only an agent of colonialism.

Well, I have taken up a lot of your time I have now got to rush off, to meet the Prime Minister of Australia,¹⁵ who is passing through Bombay this evening on his way to England. He is just stopping for the night. But since I had this privilege of meeting you today, I have spoken to you many things that I had in mind, which have a bearing on this question of Goa and on what our duties and what your duties are. I have no doubt at all that you can make a tremendous difference to this Goan question if all of you function in a united way. You must have read, the resolution that the AICC passed on Goa yesterday,¹⁶ or the day before? It is a fairly comprehensive resolution. I want you to realize that this question of Goa is not going to be solved in some adventurous way. We

14. Pope Pius XII, on 24 December 1955, said: "In last year's Christmas message we indicated the points of dispute in the relations between Europeans and those non-Europeans who aspire to full political independence. Can these disputes be allowed to run their own course, so to speak—a procedure which might easily increase their gravity, sow hatred in men's souls and create so-called traditional enmities? And might not a third party come to profit from such enmities... At any rate let not those peoples be denied a fair and progressive freedom...."

15. R.G. Menzies.

16. See *ante*, pp. 325-326.

have to function as a mature nation, thinking well and wisely, and taking firm steps from which we do not withdraw. We have to function in the international field and in the national field, and we have to be consistent in both. We cannot do something in one place and something else in another. That will take away our consistency, our dignity and our bona fides. I know that people in Goa especially, have to suffer, they have to suffer not only because of the Portuguese rule, but also because of some of the economic sanctions that we have imposed. I am sorry for that, but there is no escape from it.

In conclusion, I should like to welcome back to India two of our compatriots who have spent nearly ten years in Lisbon or in Portugal. One of them opened this meeting, Dr Hedge. The other, Mr Kakodkar,¹⁷ is also back with us after nine or ten years.¹⁸ When I met him, he reminded me of meeting me ten years ago and discussing these problems. Well, ten years in prison in Portugal have not damped their ardour and they are young and vigorous. And I hope their return here will add to the strength of those who are working for the freedom of Goa.

Thank you. *Jai Hind !*

17. Purushottam Kakodkar (1913-1998); nationalist leader from Goa; imprisoned during Quit India movement; founder-member, Goa National Congress; arrested in Goa in 1946 and imprisoned in Lisbon; released in 1952 but was sent to India in 1956; President, Goa, Pradesh Congress Committee, 1963 and 1968; elected to Lok Sabha, 1971
18. Dr Ram Hedge and Purushottam Kakodkar participated in the first civil disobedience movement in Goa, in June 1946. In January 1947, they were deported to Lisbon and imprisoned there.

PRIVY PURSE

1. To K.C. Singh Mandhata¹

New Delhi

19 May 1956

Dear Raja Sahib,²

I received your letter of May 9, 1956, some days ago. I did not answer it immediately as I wished to enquire into this matter more fully before writing to you.

I appreciate what you have written about the steps you took in your State in favour of the people. But I am sure you understand that this has little relation to the principles we should lay down for calculating the privy purse.³ Also, the fact that the elected Ministers of the State at that early time voted a certain sum has no great relevance. You mention that Shri V.P. Menon agreed to the figure fixed by your Ministers. We have no record of this in our Ministry and possibly there was some misunderstanding. It was Shri V.P. Menon himself who was responsible a little later for fixing privy purses in accordance with some principles which had been laid down. Obviously, in this matter we have to proceed on the basis of some principle and not in an ad hoc way. If we depart from this principle, then there is no yardstick to measure things by and everyone concerned can ask for special consideration. This would amount to discrimination and would create dissatisfaction.

No doubt you know that there has been a good deal of criticism and dissatisfaction in our Parliament and in the country at the fixation of privy purses generally at a rather high level, which is so high, out of keeping with our general approach now, and the socialist pattern of society we aim at. Even our President's salary, after income tax etc., is far below most of the privy purses which have to pay no income tax.

As you know, you put forward your request for a revision in 1949 and this was carefully considered at the time and it could not be agreed to. We have again considered this matter and are unable to revise the old decision.

1. JN Collection.
2. Krishna Chandra Singh Mandhata (b. 1911); ruler of Nayagarh State in Orissa; invested with full ruling powers on 20 July 1933.
3. The privy purse of a ruler of a State was fixed on the basis of a percentage of the average annual revenues of that State, subject to a ceiling of Rs. 10 lakhs. Besides, due consultations were made with either the responsible Ministries or the popular political leaders of the concerned State. The above ceiling, however, was not applied to the 11 major States like Hyderabad and Gwalior.

I should like you to consider this question from the larger point of view also. There is no question of wrongs being redressed. The primary claim is not of the individual, although the individual's rights have to be respected, but rather of the social group. Inevitably, those few of us, who had very high standards of living, compared to the vast masses of people, have to bring down those standards somewhat. In fact, we are aiming at a progressive equality. My regret is that this progress is somewhat slow.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Utility of Privy Purses¹

I do not wish to get entangled in this matter. I hope that the Home Secretary will deal with it directly. I do not understand why we should be so meticulous and soft with young Princes who receive heavy privy purses and misbehave. Nor do I think that the disposal of the privy purse or the property of the Prince is entirely a private matter. I cannot give an opinion about this particular case. But, broadly speaking, a privy purse is meant for the whole family and not for one individual to do what he likes with it.

If the Maharaja² owes money to the Pepsu Government, I see no reason why it should not be deducted from his privy purse in suitable instalments. He is apparently residing in England now and wasting large sums. Why should privy purses be allowed to be spent outside India except on special occasions?

1. Note to A.V. Pai, Union Home Secretary, 28 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. Yadavendra Singh of Patiala.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

I. PAKISTAN

1. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
10 May 1956

My dear C.P.N.,

Your letter of May 9th about the demarcation of the frontier of India and Pakistan.

We gave a good deal of consideration to this matter, in consultation with the Defence Ministry, when the question of appointing Surveyors-General came up before us some time ago.² It was clear that if we followed the Radcliffe line closely, we would suffer a disadvantage, from the military point of view, in some places, more especially, in Gurdaspur district. But we cannot advance an argument of this kind in order to retain possession of a particular area. Whether the result is advantageous or disadvantageous to us, we have to abide by some principle. We have accepted the Radcliffe line as the basic approach to this problem and we have to abide by it. We have added, however, that we can vary this Radcliffe line by agreement between the two countries. This is the only straightforward position we can take up, whatever the results might be.

We have informed our Surveyor-General³ that where any major question of dispute arises, the Surveyors-General will refer the matter to their respective Governments for decision.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to M.K. Vellodi, Defence Secretary.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 319.
3. I.H.R. Wilson.

2. Migrations from East Bengal¹

It is clear from all these accounts that the person responsible for grant of migration certificates in East Bengal has done his work most inadequately and perfunctorily.² For the last many months we have been laying stress on restricting the number of migrants.³ If, in spite of this, no proper examination of applications was made, it does not speak well for our office at Dacca.

I think that efficient arrangements should be made for thorough scrutiny and checking in each case before a migration certificate is issued. If both Dr Roy and Shri Mehr Chand Khanna disapprove of the appointment of Professor P.C. Mukerjee as Migration Officer, he should not be sent.⁴ Some capable young man should go and should have an adequate staff for this purpose. By our spending some money on the staff, we may save a great deal later.

I do not myself see why we should not give up the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact as originally framed.⁵ It has little relevance today. Of course, something else should take its place.

Nor do I understand why we should be so much averse to allowing the Pakistan people to see our migration applications.⁶ I suppose the idea is that

1. Note to M. J. Desai, Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 11 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Anil K. Chanda, Deputy Minister, MEA, after attending the Indo-Pakistan Ministerial conference on minority exodus from East Pakistan held at Dhaka on 5 and 6 May, reported to the Prime Minister on 10 May that the Pakistan delegation tried to blame India for encouraging migrations from East Pakistan. He added that B.C. Roy had also bitterly complained to Mehr Chand Khanna, Union Rehabilitation Minister, that migration certificates had been indiscriminately issued and had suggested the setting up of an efficient organization to ensure the granting of certificates only in deserving cases.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 309.
4. In fact, the reference is to P.C. Chakravarty, a former professor of the Dhaka University. Mehr Chand Khanna was against his appointment as Migration Officer at Dhaka.
5. The Pakistan delegation suggested that the Nehru-Liaquat Ali Pact owed its origin to very peculiar circumstances prevailing in 1950, and could be scrapped altogether. The Indian side, however, maintained that so long as the Pact stood, India was morally bound to permit migrations if Hindus in East Pakistan genuinely felt that they could not remain there.
6. The Pakistan delegation wanted to know whether India would be willing to associate Pakistani officers in the scrutinizing of migration applications and to give them a copy of the migration certificate so that the Pakistan authorities might be aware of the going away of some of their nationals to India.

people who are not allowed to go will be later harassed. In any event, information about migrants should certainly be given to the Pakistan Government.

3. Gift of Rice to East Pakistan¹

Probably, in another day or two we shall know the result of the meeting of the West Pakistan Assembly.² The crisis in East Pakistan will take some little more time to come to a head.³

I think that we should certainly give as much help as we can, in the shape of supplying foodgrains, to East Pakistan.⁴ We should agree, to the best of our ability, to transport foodgrains from Karachi to East Pakistan or from Calcutta Port.

In addition to this, I think, we should make a gift. I know that we are ourselves in short supply. Nevertheless, I think we should send 10,000 tons, preferably of rice or possibly of rice and wheat. We should not wait for an absolute collapse and urgent appeals to us. The Food Ministry should be asked how far it is possible to do so.

I have just telephoned to the Food Minister⁵ and asked him if he could supply as a gift some rice to East Pakistan. He informed me that thus far they had sent 15,000 tons of rice and 10,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan. These are on loan to be returned in kind later. Also, we have supplied some fertilizers. He said further that he was prepared to send a quantity of rice if it was so decided. So far as the quantity is concerned, he could send 10,000 tons, although we are ourselves making rice purchase in a hurry. 10,000 tons of rice will cost

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 19 May 1956. File No. 4-1/56-Pak-I, Part I, MEA.
2. The West Pakistan Assembly met on 20 May 1956 to elect its Speaker. Fazal Elahi of the Republican Party and Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur of the Muslim League polled 148 votes each. But Fazal Elahi was elected Speaker by the Chairman's casting vote.
3. Floods in August-September 1955 and hailstorm in March 1956 created a serious shortage of foodgrains in East Pakistan.
4. On 9 June 1956 the Government of India made a gift of 5000 tons of rice to East Pakistan.
5. A.P. Jain.

approximately Rs. 50 lakhs. This is a large sum. He suggested that we might send 5,000 tons to begin with at least, as a gift on condition that this is distributed free, because there is no point in our making a gift and people not getting it free there. I have asked him to consult the Finance Minister about it tomorrow and let us know.

If the Finance Minister also agrees, then we might make an immediate offer of 5,000 tons of rice for East Pakistan as a gift for free distribution.

4. To Surendra Mohanty¹

New Delhi

25 May 1956

My dear Mohanty,²

Your letter of the 25th May. I must confess that I did not understand your question when you referred to other Indo-Pakistan issues.³ The only other major Indo-Pakistan issues, apart from Kashmir, are:

- 1) Canal Waters
- 2) Evacuee Property
- 3) Public debt and financial adjustments

None of these have come up before the Security Council in any way and, therefore, I said that the answer was 'No'.⁴

1. JN Collection.
2. Surendra Mohanty (1922-1990); author and journalist; managing editor, *Observer* (Cuttack), 1945-56; founder editor, *Janata* (Cuttack), 1946-51; editor, *Oriya daily Ganatantra*, 1955-60, and *Kalinga*, 1962-71; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-57 and 1978-84; Member, Lok Sabha, 1957-62 and 1971-77; Member, AICC, 1962-69; author of *Mahanagarir Ratri* (1950), *Krishnachuda* (1951) and *Sesha Kabita* (1955).
3. Mohanty asked in the Rajya Sabha on 23 May whether in the Security Council, "the Indian delegation have committed to discuss the gamut of Indo-Pakistan questions" including Kashmir. Nehru answered: "This question has never arisen in that way. I do not think any other question apart from the Kashmir issue has arisen in the Security Council. It may have been referred to by some speaker. That is a different matter."
4. When Mohanty asked "whether, after this (Kashmir) issue was referred to the Security Council by Lord Mountbatten as the head of the Government of India at that time, the Indian delegation to the Security Council agreed to widen the Kashmir dispute and include all items of Indo-Pakistan difference", Nehru replied in the negative.

So far as the question of Canal Waters is concerned, this is being dealt with in Washington by the World Bank and talks have gone on for a considerably long time. Still they continue. I hope that before very long something definite will emerge from them. As for Evacuee Property, we have all along dealt directly with the Pakistan Government. There has been no major solution of the problem, but some little advance has been made from time to time, for instance, in regard to moveable properties. Public debt and financial adjustments have also been dealt with directly though little progress has been made thus far.

The other questions to which you refer, are genocide, Junagadh, Hyderabad and one or two other minor questions. It is perfectly true that Zafrulla Khan⁵ referred to these in his initial statements before the Security Council in 1948.⁶ Nobody has taken these seriously. I cannot say what the formal position might be. But, so far as we are concerned, these matters do not arise.

Once a formal reference is made to the Security Council, I do not think it can be withdrawn. It may remain undealt with and gradually lapse. Apart from this, there are, in effect, two references to the Security Council, one by us and the other by Pakistan.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. At this time, Judge, International Court of Justice, The Hague.

6. For details, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p.534.

7. India, while presenting its case on 1 January 1948, requested the Security Council to instruct Pakistan to desist from meddling in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. India also argued that Pakistan had no right to aid the tribesmen or permit its nationals to take part in the Kashmir fighting. The Indian argument was based on the validity of the Maharaja's accession to India. On the other hand, Pakistan in its reference requested the Council to set up a Commission which would arrange for a ceasefire, followed by the withdrawal of all troops and hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the people of the state.

5. To C.C. Desai¹

New Delhi
27 May 1956

My dear C.C.,

I have just seen your letter of May 24th addressed to M.J. Desai. In this letter, you refer to the recent proposal made by me for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute on the basis of the ceasefire line.

You are quite justified in referring to this in private but I should like to tell you what the present position is.

The statement I read out in the Lok Sabha some time ago in regard to Kashmir represents our official position.² Subsequently, I elaborated this a little at a public meeting in Delhi³ when I said that, in order to have a peaceful and final settlement, I had even gone so far as to make an offer to the Pakistan Prime Minister last year that we should accept, broadly speaking, the ceasefire line as the basis of settlement.⁴ This had been rejected then. After my speech, the Pakistan leaders again rejected this.⁵ There the matter ends so far as this offer is concerned, and I do not propose to repeat it or in any way to weaken our stand in regard to Kashmir.

The Kashmir issue is likely to come up in the Security Council some time or other. If so, we shall base our case on our full rights and on the basic points emerging from the accession of the full State to India, Pakistan's aggression and subsequent happenings. We do not propose to tone down this in any way.

I wanted to make this clear to you so that you might not say anything which might perhaps later conflict with the attitude we take up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. GI/2/NGO/56, MEA.
2. On 29 March 1956. See *ante*, p. 383.
3. On 13 April 1956.
4. In May 1955. For Nehru's talks with Mohammad Ali and Iskandar Mirza, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 246-263.
5. Mohammad Ali, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, told the Associated Press of Pakistan on 14 April that Pakistan "cannot accept partition" as the basis of settlement of the Kashmir dispute and said that there was no question "of Pakistan ever considering such a preposterous proposal."

6. Talks with World Bank on Indus Waters¹

I have read your note. These talks with the World Bank have now been going on for nearly three years.² We have agreed to various proposals from time to time while Pakistan has made no commitment and goes on asking for more.³ Thus far this has been considered chiefly from the engineering point of view, but obviously it has an important political significance. This is so, more particularly, when Kashmir and the Jhelum river in Kashmir are brought into the picture.

2. I do not know if Shri Krishna Menon is acquainted with this subject. I think, he should see these papers so as to have some broad knowledge of how things have proceeded. This is especially necessary for Kashmir is likely to be in the picture.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 29 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. India and Pakistan had not been able to agree on a common approach to the actual engineering features of a comprehensive plan envisaged in the World Bank proposals of 1954. The Bank, in its aide memoire of 21 May 1956, inter alia suggested an adjustment in its proposal whereby the cost of providing some storage on the Western rivers would be included in the cost of replacement works for which India would pay in proportion to the benefits to be received by her therefrom. On this basis, the Bank proposed "a continuance of the period of the cooperative work until 31st March 1957."
3. For a speedy settlement of the question, India conveyed in March 1954 her acceptance of the general principles of the World Bank proposals of 5 February 1954 as the basis for agreement, even though the proposals required heavy sacrifices on her part. Pakistan also accepted, on 28 July 1954, the Bank proposals in principle, but it later emerged that her acceptance was based on an incorrect assumption. Pakistan was also reluctant to accept the basic principle of "division of the waters" contemplated by the Bank proposals.

7. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
30 May 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your D.O. letter No. 403/MA/56 dated 19th May 1956 regarding the Nekowal incident.²

2. In the greater part of your letter you have again stated your reasons for your inability to take severe action against your Border Police responsible for the incident.³ We have argued this matter at great length in our previous correspondence on this subject and I do not think it would serve any useful purpose for me to repeat the arguments I have already placed before you. It is understandable that your views on the merits of an incident of this kind may differ from our views. In the present case, however, it was not a question of your views or our views. We have the independent findings of the UN Observers⁴ who cannot be said to be partial to either party in this matter. All I had asked for was that the findings of the UN Observers should be accepted and action taken to punish those who had been found responsible for the incident by the UN Observers.

3. The Nekowal incident was, as you know, a very serious one, involving the killing of twelve Indian personnel. This can hardly be compared to relatively

1. File No. 11(29)-Pak-III/55, Vol. III, MEA. Also available in JN Collection and File No. KS-42/55, MHA.
2. Mohammad Ali's letter was in reply to Nehru's letter of 28 April 1956, which has been printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 328-331. On 7 May 1955, twelve Indian Army personnel including one officer were killed in an attack by Pakistan Border Police on a working party of the Central Tractor Organization of India at Nekowal in Jammu district.
3. Mohammad Ali pointed out that the Indian Army had violated the 1954 agreement between the Indian and Pakistani Army Commanders when they entered the land of Nekowalis along with an Indian mechanized farm unit and started cultivating there. It led to an altercation between the Indian Party and the Nekowalis in course of which a Pakistani girl was killed and the encounter between the Pakistani Border Police and the Indian Army followed which precipitated the incident. He added that in view of the facts "I do not see what severe action could have been justifiably taken against the members of the Border Police...."
4. The UN Military Observers Group gave their findings on 14 May 1955. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 328-330.

minor incidents.⁵ I do not understand the relevance of the statement in the concluding part of paragraph 11 of your letter.⁶ The question of the sovereignty of India over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir has no direct bearing on this question, which is covered by the ceasefire agreement between our two commands. As, however, you have raised this question, I would like to make it clear that, in so far as the Government of India are concerned, they have consistently maintained that the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir State is legally and constitutionally a part of the Indian Union. The acceptance by us of the ceasefire agreement, in the interests of furthering a peaceful settlement, does not in any way detract from that position.

4. In your letter you have indicated your acceptance of my proposal that, in accordance with international conventions and in order to impose a salutary check on such border incidents in the future, we should agree to payment of compensation by the side adjudged as the guilty party in a serious incident of this nature. You have suggested that a committee of Indian and Pakistani officials might go into this matter and devise a rough and ready formula which would meet these difficulties. I do not quite understand what you have in mind. There are international conventions governing such matters. For the rest, it is a question of fact. If you have anything special in mind, I shall be glad to know what it is.

5. I appreciate the offer made in paragraph 13 of your letter to make an ex-gratia contribution of Rs.100,000/- towards the rehabilitation of the relatives of those who lost their lives in the Nekowal border incident, and I accept it. You have added, however, that there should be a joint statement to the effect that this contribution does not imply admission of any liability on Pakistan's part on account of this incident.

6. You are aware that in this matter, as our lengthy correspondence has shown, there is a difference of opinion between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. While it is open to the Pakistan Government to state their viewpoint, this will not be in keeping with our approach to the question. We could not, therefore, be parties to a joint statement which gives expression to the Pakistan Government's point of view only. If, however, you

5. Mohammad Ali argued that in none of the incidents of this nature in the past had compensation been paid by either Government.

6. Mohammad Ali wrote, "I must also make it quite clear that we do not consider residents of Jammu and Kashmir to be 'Indian nationals' or that that part of the State territory which is in Indian occupation as 'Indian territory'."

wish some joint statement to be made, it might be on the following lines:

“ While the Pakistan Government do not accept entire responsibility for this sad incident, they have accepted the findings of the UN Observers in this case, and guided by a desire to relieve human suffering, they have offered, and the Government of India have accepted, a contribution of Rs.100,000/- towards the rehabilitation of the relatives of those who lost their lives on the Indian side of the ceasefire line as a result of this incident.”

7. I note that you have no objection to publishing our correspondence on the Nekowal incident. As regards the difficulties mentioned in paragraph 14 of your letter,⁷ we consulted the office of the UN Secretary General through our Permanent Representative⁸ in New York, and were informed that there would be no reason at all for the UN Secretary General to raise any objection if the two Prime Ministers mutually agreed to release their correspondence. As we are not publishing the whole of the UN Observers' report but only excerpts quoted in our correspondence as part of the correspondence, the other difficulties mentioned in your letter will not arise. I shall, therefore, be grateful if you will indicate an agreed date for the simultaneous publication of our correspondence, in this case in Delhi and Karachi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Mohammad Ali wrote that it would be necessary to publish the UN Observers' report as well since their correspondence contained excerpts from it, and the report being secret, the concurrence of the UN Secretary General would have to be obtained first.

8. Arthur S. Lal.

8. To V.K.R.V. Rao¹

New Delhi

5 June 1956

My dear Rao,²

I have just received your letter of the 29th May.³ I have read it with interest. The arguments you have used in regard to American arms aid to Pakistan⁴ and a plebiscite in Kashmir⁵ are, of course, thoroughly sound and practical.

I shall be glad to meet you in London.⁶ I think that it will be better for you to stay on in London to meet me than to have to come back from Germany. I am reaching London on the evening of the 22nd June and I shall be there for the greater part of the 23rd....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Eminent economist and Director, Delhi School of Economics.
3. Giving his impressions of the discussions he had on Indo-American issues with a number of people in the US, where he had gone to attend a UNESCO seminar on human values and social change, Rao wrote that he had found there a readiness to understand the anti-Indian implications of the flow of military aid to Pakistan and the inadvisability of holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. He added, "In fact... a pragmatic and practical approach makes a better appeal than one based on general principle.... People...feel more at home when Indian action is explained in practical and in national terms."
4. In the course of his talks on Indo-American issues in the US Rao argued: While the USA and the Western powers were so anxious for the restoration of military balance in West Asia after the sale of arms to Egypt by Czechoslovakia, how could India tolerate the arms build-up of an openly hostile Pakistan? Rao maintained that any step taken by India to strengthen herself militarily to counter Pakistan's growing power would adversely affect her economic development without adding to the political stability in the region or securing it against communist influence. He also pointed out that because of the supply of US arms to Pakistan, the Indian masses were beginning to dislike the US.
5. Rao reasoned that if a plebiscite was held, Pakistan was bound to use the argument of a Muslim majority in Kashmir and, as a result, "the Hindu majority in India will again become restive and start agitating" jeopardizing the achievements made since Independence, specially a secular State and also political stability and economic development, and the sub-continent would be in an uproar. "And that will not be good either for India or for Pakistan or for USA."
6. Rao wanted to present a personal report to Nehru on his impressions and on the study of German post-war economic development.

9. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
5 June 1956

My dear Mehr Chand,

Your letter of June 1st. I agree with you that we should accept the Pakistan suggestion on the basis, of course, of reciprocity.

I do not see why the Home Ministry is afraid of a few undesirables coming here. There are quite enough undesirables in India already. Also it is fairly easy for persons to get a visa now. Those who come will necessarily have to get our visas. If we have a particular objection to any person, we can point this out to the Pakistan authorities.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

10. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
10 June 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your message conveyed through your High Commissioner² on 6 June in reply to my message conveyed by our High Commissioner on 17th April.³

I am glad to learn that you are issuing instructions to include the demarcation of the Ferozepur District-Bahawalpur State boundary in the demarcation work that the Surveyors-General will be undertaking along the Punjab (I) and former Punjab (P) boundary from 1st October. We are informing our Surveyor-General of this decision.

1. JN Collection.
2. Ghazanfar Ali Khan.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 325-326.

As you state, I have agreed, in paragraph 5 of my message sent to you through our High Commissioner on 17th April, to consider the reference of any disputes that may remain unresolved, so far as the interpretation of the Radcliffe Award is concerned, to an impartial tribunal in terms of the Steering Committee's decision. I hope, however, that with goodwill on both sides points of dispute will be settled in a simpler way by discussions at governmental level.

I am surprised that in para 5 of your message you have again raised the question of the restoration of status quo in the case of Chhad Bet. We have since examined Pakistan Government's note of April 9 on the subject of Chhad Bet⁴ and a full reply to this note is being sent through our High Commissioner in Karachi. Our previous communications on the subject and the latest reply to Pakistan Government's note of 9th April establish beyond dispute that Chhad Bet has always been Indian territory, that there has been no border dispute of any kind in relation to it and that the incident which occurred in February was a clear violation of our border by Pakistani forces.⁵ This violation has been terminated by the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces and status quo has been restored. I am enclosing herewith a copy of my Government's reply to Pakistan Government's note of 9th April which fully explains the position. I would, in this connection, repeat the suggestion in the concluding portion of paragraph 7 of my last message to you "that, as stated by you, we do not argue about the past but look to the future and concentrate on completing demarcation of the frontier as expeditiously as possible".⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The Government of Pakistan claimed that Chhad Bet was part of Nagarparkar taluqa in the Tharparkar district of the Hyderabad (Sind) division and therefore belonged to Pakistan.

5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 310.

6. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 326.

11. To Mouli Chandra Sharma¹

New Delhi
12 June 1956

My dear Mouli Chandraji,²

Some Congressmen in Delhi have come and told me of the big and successful meeting you had here the other day.³ They were pleased with the success of the meeting but they were rather worried about some statements that you made which were opposed to our policy as frequently stated by me and others.

They mentioned two matters. One was that you stated that the river Ravi was no boundary and that Pakistan will have to join India some time or other. The other was your belief in the two-nation theory.

So far as the first matter is concerned, we have very clearly stated that we want Pakistan to remain an independent separate State. Indeed, I have gone so far as to say that if Pakistan wanted to join us, we would not agree. I am quite sure that it would be very harmful to us if any such thing occurred. Anyhow, for us even to hint at the fact that we want Pakistan to join India gives a pretext to the press and people in Pakistan to say that we are intriguing to bring them down. Therefore, from both points of view it is harmful for us to talk about Pakistan joining India. It is not only harmful here, but it will have a bad effect in other countries.

So far as the two-nation theory is concerned, we have never accepted the fact that Pakistan was a result of the two-nation theory. It may be so in the minds of the people of Pakistan but we did not agree to it even then. Our position has been that we cannot consider a nation and a religious community as the same thing. Nations contain more than one religious community. Even if all the Muslims in India believed in this theory, we would not accept it or even if all the Hindus believed in it. In practice, we may be compelled by circumstances but we cannot give up a right theory because of pressure of circumstances.

1. JN Collection.

2. Congressman and a member of the Official Language Commission. He was President of the Delhi State Jana Sangh before joining the Congress in 1956.

3. Sharma spoke at a public meeting organized by the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee on 3 June.

I am writing to you, specially because if you mention these matters in Kashmir,⁴ it would be definitely harmful to us. I hope, therefore, that you will not do so.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Sharma was on a visit to Srinagar at this time.
5. Sharma, in his reply to Nehru on 16 June, informed that in his speech at the meeting in Delhi on 3 June he had said that Ravi or Eastern Bengal had never been a national boundary throughout history and people of both sides of that border had always been one people "and whatever our brethren on the other side of border might say, we continue to look upon them as the same people and wish to live in peace and friendship with them." He had also spoken that the Pakistan press and leaders called India an enemy as they were against solution of Kashmir problem amicably in order to use this emotive issue to divert their people's attention from their frustrations in political and economic spheres but, one day this phase would be over when they would realize that their approach was wrong and futile. There could be no question of his pleading for Pakistan to join India, he added. Regarding two-nation theory he had said that this theory of the Muslim League backed by the British was never countenanced by the Congress and the Partition, when it came, had been accepted as inevitable but the two-nation theory was not.

12. Indus Waters Negotiations¹

I have read the draft letter addressed to Mr Iliff.² I have no objection to its being sent except that I think the following sentence should be omitted.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 14 June 1956. JN Collection. Also available in File No. F. 38(1)-CWD/51, Vol. XV, Ministry of Irrigation.
2. William A.B. Iliff (1898-1972); British international banker; UK treasury representative in the Middle East, 1944-48; Vice-President of the World Bank, 1956-62; as Assistant to the World Bank President and later, as the designated Bank representative for six years, he was associated with the Bank's good offices and mediatory role in the Indus waters dispute.

The draft letter to Iliff was to be sent on behalf of N.D. Gulhati, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation and Power. See also *ante*, p. 433.

Page 2, end of paragraph 2, sentence to be omitted:

"The Government of India will continue to cooperate with the Bank as long as there is any prospect of a practical and constructive settlement of the dispute."

I do not see why we should commit ourselves to an indefinite future of talks without end with the Bank. I think that our general attitude in this matter, though correct, has been too accommodating and I can understand our desire to win the goodwill of the Bank. But there is the other side to this that the Bank feels that the only tough party is Pakistan and that they can always get round us within limits. And so we are carrying on from year to year assuring of our goodwill and our infinite desire to cooperate and wait for developments. This is not good tactics even.

I think that we should gradually let it be known to the Bank people that we cannot wait for ever. Things are happening to our disadvantage and we must have a clear answer by some definite date.

I gather from your note that the Minister of Irrigation & Power³ and the Minister of Finance are seeing this draft letter. That is right. It is not necessary to put the letter up before the Cabinet meeting, but the matter should be mentioned.

I am not sure if there will be a Cabinet meeting on the 20th June. There will be one on the 19th.

Please send a copy of this note of mine to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Irrigation and Power.⁴

3. Gulzarilal Nanda.

4. The letter to Iliff was sent by Gulhati on 18 June. After referring to the Indian acceptance of the principles of the Bank proposal, it was emphasized that India had agreed to meet her share of the costs involved only in respect of the replacement works for the uses listed in para 2 of the terms of reference of the Bank proposal of 1954. The letter also stated: "In order... that both sides have a clearly defined objective for the new phase of negotiations,...it would appear necessary that the Government of Pakistan should first accept the 'division of the waters' contemplated by the Bank Proposal of February 1954 which the Bank have now reaffirmed as the necessary basis for a settlement between the parties". It was also pointed out that a number of statements in the Bank's aide memoire with which the Government of India could not fully agree would be explained "in the course of further cooperative work".

13. To Mohammad Ali¹

New Delhi
20 June 1956

My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you for your letter of 12th June which reached me on the 15th June. This is on the subject of a "No War" declaration.²

I have been, as indeed you must be, very heavily engaged because of my approaching departure for London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. During the last few days I have also been out of Delhi. I shall be leaving Delhi within a few hours for London, but I do not wish to go away without sending you an answer to your letter.

You will forgive me if I write somewhat briefly on this subject of our correspondence. Indeed, there is little new that I could add to the previous letters that I have written in regard to a "No War" declaration.³

A "No War" declaration by itself need not necessarily solve a problem, but it creates the necessary atmosphere which helps in its solution. The mere fact of a declaration of faith abandoning war for any purpose must go a long way to create this atmosphere.

You are right in saying that it is necessary to devise means for a settlement of international disputes. The United Nations Charter itself mentions various methods for this purpose. So does the Bandung Declaration. Indeed, in my previous letters on this subject, I have myself suggested a number of methods. Arbitration is not ruled out and may well be applied in a number of cases, but the methods of peaceful settlement must necessarily vary according to the nature of the dispute, the stage of settlement reached in negotiations and the known points of difference. It is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down some rigid code to settle every dispute in a particular way. Perhaps, when the

1. JN Collection.

2. Mohammad Ali wrote that he was "firmly of the view that unless we agree that in respect of all disputes arbitration should be resorted to if other alternatives fail....there will be no assurance that a particular dispute will in fact be ever resolved and the danger of war must inevitably remain... When we are both agreed that disputes must be solved by peaceful means and when you concede that arbitration may be resorted to in certain cases when negotiation and mediation prove fruitless, I must say I find it difficult to understand your reluctance to accept the principles of arbitration in *all* cases."

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 320 and 324.

world has developed much more than it is at present, better methods of settling disputes would be found. At present, we have quite a number of grave international disputes between different countries and, in spite of the United Nations Charter, they have not been settled. In the nature of things, so long as we have absolutely independent and sovereign States, it will not be possible to make them submit to a rigid procedure which might infringe their sovereignty. Thus, the process of arbitration is not suitable in certain types of cases at present. It may be suitable in others. You and I know well that in a number of world disputes today, the parties concerned would never agree to arbitration. Much less would they agree to any rigid procedure for every dispute in the future.

It seems to me that the right way to approach this problem is to have a "No War" declaration by India and Pakistan, more or less on the lines suggested by me in my letter dated 29th August 1950.⁴ I have no doubt that if we made such a declaration, it would not only remove the tensions that exist today between our two countries, but would also create a new climate of peace and cooperation between India and Pakistan. It is this climate that I earnestly hope for.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 15 Part I, pp. 316-317.

II. NEPAL

1. Conditions in Nepal¹

I had a talk also with Shri B.K. Gokhale² after his return from Nepal and he repeated much that is said in the note given here except for one thing. He did

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 14 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. Indian Ambassador to Nepal, 1952-54, and at this time Chairman, Tungabhadra Project.

say that a suggestion had been made that a British Chief Justice should be appointed,³ but he did not say to me that this suggestion came from the Indian Embassy. I am quite certain that such a suggestion could never have come from the Indian Embassy.

2. This statement by Shri Gokhale makes me discount much that he said.

In fact, I was not impressed by his talk at all. He was talking in exactly same terms as he did when he was Ambassador there. There was a certain sub-conscious hint that things have worsened in Nepal since he was in charge of our Embassy there. Even when he was there, his appraisal of the situation was not a very correct one.

3. Of course, much that he has said here is correct or partly correct and there are no two opinions about it. But the whole trend of his remarks is rather against my own impression of conditions in Nepal and, I think, the appraisal of our present Ambassador.⁴ It seems obvious that Shri Gokhale has had some talks with odd individuals whom he knew previously and who are entirely opposed to the present set-up. He has uncritically accepted what he was told by them and repeated it.

4. I doubt if at any recent period in Nepal India's position was stronger than it is today. That does not mean that the anti-Indian element is not functioning there nor does it mean that the Ranas are not strong and trying always to increase their strength. The King⁵ and the Prime Minister⁶ are certainly much in favour of India. Gunjaman Singh⁷ is a strong element in the Cabinet and is rather an undesirable man. He is rather anti-India.

5. So far as I have heard, during the coronation celebrations India was always given the first place.⁸ In fact, the Americans and the British were treated almost with scant courtesy. The Chinese were treated courteously but no special attention was paid to them.

3. On 26 April 1956, a new Act was passed dealing with the authority and the jurisdiction of Nepal's Supreme Court. On the same day, the King by a proclamation constituted the Supreme Court with Anirudh Prasad Singh as the Chief Justice.

4. Bhagwan Sahay, Indian Ambassador to Nepal, 1955-59.

5. Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva.

6. Tanka Prasad, leader of the Praja Parishad party, was the Prime Minister of Nepal from January 1956 to July 1957.

7. Held the portfolio of finance and planning in the Tanka Prasad Cabinet. He was Principal Advisor, Royal Advisory Government, from April 1955 to January 1956.

8. S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President led the Indian delegation to the coronation ceremonies of King Mahendra held at Kathmandu on 2 May 1956.

6. In the note of Shri Gokhale's talks, it is stated that the Americans have lost ground; so have the British and the Indian Embassy. While it is perfectly true from all accounts that the Americans and the British have lost ground, I was under the impression that the Indian Embassy was greatly respected and in a strong position. If everybody has lost ground, who has gained it? Surely not the Chinese⁹ or any other foreign country. Shri Gokhale appears to think that only the Ranas have gained and everybody else has lost. The Ranas are in a strong position in Nepal and, more particularly, the King's father-in-law.¹⁰ It is quite likely that there are strong elements in favour of postponing the elections.

7. I would like much stronger evidence than vague rumour to believe that Tanka Prasad has been bought over by the Ranas. As for K.I. Singh,¹¹ he is a rather mysterious person still, though the mystery surrounding him is more in the north. He may create trouble. Some information I received was to the effect that his influence is somewhat less than it was.

8. It seems to me odd that Shri Gokhale should not have discussed some of the matters he mentions here with our Ambassador in Kathmandu. That would have been the normal thing to do.

9. I agree that FS might write to Shri Bhagwan Sahay, without mentioning Shri Gokhale's name, and ask him about some of the matters mentioned by Gokhale. More particularly about the Chief Justice and the proposal to dismiss all the High Court Judges. Also about Tanka Prasad and the Ranas and Gunjaman Singh's position and influence in the Government. The possibility of the elections being held or not held should also be enquired into.¹²

9. An agreement between Nepal and China was signed on 1 August 1955 providing for the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries on the basis of *Panchsheel*, the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

10. Hari Shumshere.

11. A former rebel leader who made an unsuccessful coup attempt in January 1952, escaped into Tibet and then to China; he returned to Kathmandu in September 1955 with a royal pardon.

12. In February 1951, King Tribhuvan had announced that Nepal would in the future be governed by elected representatives under a constitution framed by a constituent assembly. On 8 August 1955, King Mahendra announced that general elections would be held in October 1957. In June 1956, in an address to the Praja Parishad Party congress, Tanka Prasad broached his proposal for a parliament with limited powers operating under a constitution granted by the King, arguing that two sovereigns could not coexist in the country and that the people were not quite prepared for a full-fledged democracy. Most of the other political parties demanded that elections be held for a constituent assembly. On 6 October 1957, the King announced postponement of elections. Elections were eventually held for a parliament from February to May 1959.

III. MYANMAR

1. To U Nu¹

New Delhi

6 May 1956

My dear U Nu,

I am very happy to know of the results of the Burmese elections and of your great success.² Of course, we all expected this. Nevertheless, the news is heartening.

So far as we are concerned here in India, we face a very odd and somewhat distressing position. Over the major questions of policy— international policy, domestic policy, Second Five Year Plan, etc.—there is full support for us in the country. In fact, there is hardly any other policy in the field. Even the Communists have been compelled to support us in a large measure, though they continue to criticize and even create trouble in local areas. But, we have got into a complete mess because of the proposals for reorganization of states or provinces. This is giving us a great deal of trouble, and I yet do not know what the ultimate consequences might be....

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,

Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the ruling party in Myanmar since the country became independent in 1948, returned to power with a considerable majority in the general elections for the Chamber of Deputies held on 27 April 1956.

2. Commercial Relations with Myanmar¹

Minister Raschid is reaching Delhi tomorrow.² Probably, his stay will be a fairly short one as his election will take place later in this month.

It is obviously desirable that there should be full coordination between the Ministries concerned in our talks with Minister Raschid and his party. I should like the Minister for Commerce & Industry³ to take interest in these talks himself and to be present at some of the meetings.

I agree broadly with the six points in Shri Jha's⁴ note of the 16th May. In this matter, the Minister of Food & Agriculture⁵ should be consulted and his general advice followed.

It is clear that the proper way for two countries to deal with each other as between Governments, is for some kind of an exchange of goods. No long term agreement can function satisfactorily on a one-sided basis. We may call this our need for foreign exchange. But it is something more than that. It is our desire to have stable and solid commercial relations with Burma. This means that we buy their rice and they buy something else. Of course, this need not balance each other completely.

Unfortunately, the Burmese have a way of looking at one side of the picture. If the other side is presented, they complain that pressure tactics are being employed. We should put our side as tactfully and in as friendly a manner as possible.

It may be that a long term agreement is not arrived at during the next few days of Minister Raschid's visit here. That might require more detailed discussion. But it would be worthwhile if we could have broad heads of agreement which could be worked out later. Also, we might take, let us say, 100,000 tons of rice in the near future and discuss further purchases a little later if necessary.⁶

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 16 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. M.A. Raschid, Trade Minister of Myanmar, visited New Delhi from 17 to 23 May.

3. T.T. Krishnamachari.

4. C.S. Jha, Joint Secretary, MEA.

5. A.P. Jain.

6. Pending the conclusion of an agreement with Myanmar for developing economic cooperation and expanding trade relations, the Government of India, on 22 May, entered into an arrangement for the purchase of two million tons of rice from Myanmar spread over a period of five years beginning from 1 June 1956.

I agree that we should not indicate that we are in difficulties about this matter. As a matter of fact, we are not and we have a fair supply of rice in stock.

3. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
30 May 1956

My dear U Nu,

This afternoon, I received your message² through your Ambassador³ in Delhi. It was a brief and simple message, but I felt greatly moved by it. It is not for me to give you any kind of advice in such a personal matter and, in any event, you have decided. Your not being Prime Minister creates a little void for me and, I have no doubt, for many others in Burma as outside. Burma will no doubt carry on, and in any event I presume, you will be there to give advice in your capacity as President of the AFPFL.

I know that you have often tried to get away from the Prime Ministership. I cannot compare myself with you for I am much more tied up to the world than you are. But, I have myself felt the urge repeatedly during past years, to get away from Prime Ministership. Indeed, about three years ago, I had practically decided to do so.⁴ I was then not only Prime Minister but also President of our Congress, and Defence Minister also. When I announced this, there was a bit of an upheaval in our Party and among my colleagues. I compromised, as one usually does, and continued to be Prime Minister, although I left the Presidentship of the Congress and the Defence Ministry. I have often wondered if I did right, and sometimes this urge comes back to me. It is extraordinary how we get entangled in the world's affairs and then cannot disentangle ourselves or perhaps find an excuse for not doing so. At the back of my mind, I feel that it would do me good and the country good if I was away for some period at least.

1. JN Collection.
2. U Nu informed Nehru of his decision to leave the prime ministership for one year, while continuing as President of the AFPFL. He stated that many times previously he had made such a proposal to his colleagues but failed; after the celebration of the Buddha Jayanti, however, he felt the urge for making a renunciation of his position in the Government more than ever irresistible.
3. U Aung Soe.
4. On 3 October 1954, Nehru declared his wish to relinquish the Prime Ministership. For details, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 312-317.

Need I tell you that you have all my affection and good wishes. It is a comfort to think that whether you are Prime Minister or not, you will be there as a tower of strength not only to your country but to others also.

In three weeks' time, I am going out on a lengthy tour abroad.⁵ I have seldom liked going out less than this time, but I cannot help it and have to fulfil my karma in this way. I shall go to England for about twelve days, then to Washington for four days.⁶ Afterwards, to Western Germany and a day with Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia. I am likely to meet Colonel Nasser in Yugoslavia and go with him, later, to Cairo.⁷

You must have seen that President Soekarno has been making frank and good speeches in the United States.⁸ I think that both the United States and the United Kingdom are in a state of much mental doubt about their policies. Even though they talk in the same old way, they are not at all sure that what they say is the right thing. My information is that Sir Antony Eden⁹ was much impressed by his talks with Bulganin and Khrushchev.¹⁰ In the United States, no change can take place till the Presidential elections are over.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Nehru was on an overseas tour from 21 June to 22 July.
6. Nehru's visit to Washington was postponed in view of Eisenhower's illness. He visited the US in December 1956.
7. The tripartite talks between Nehru, Tito of Yugoslavia, and Nasser of Egypt took place at Brioni from 18 to 19 July. Nehru and Nasser left together for Cairo on 19 July.
8. While addressing a joint session of the US Congress on 17 May Soekarno expressed that, for the peoples of Asia and Africa, nationalism was "a young and progressive creed" and the mainspring of their efforts. He added, "Fail to understand it, and no amount of thinking, no torrent of words, no Niagara of dollars, will produce anything but bitterness and disillusionment." Soekarno further pointed out that while assistance on terms of mutual benefit was welcome, "the idea of exchanging intellectual and spiritual independence or physical liberty for momentary advantages" was not acceptable.
9. Prime Minister of the UK.
10. Nikolai Bulganin, Prime Minister of the USSR, and Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, visited Britain from 18 to 27 April 1956.

4. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Your telegram 220 June 6th.² U Nu's retirement from Premiership.

U Nu had written to me about this some little time ago. He is not retiring from public life as he will continue to be the President of the National Organization and he has given an assurance that he will come back to the Premiership if need arises and in any event after a year.³

It is true that he has been wanting to retire for some years. There is a strong religious pull and this has been accentuated by the Buddha Jayanti.⁴ For the last two years, work has been done for the *Jayanti* in Burma. U Nu felt that one of his major tasks was completed.

But I think, there is another aspect of this. Although U Nu's party has succeeded easily in the elections, the success was not as great as U Nu confidently expected. He thinks that his opposition parties were indirectly helped from foreign sources, the Conservative Party, probably from American sources, the near-Communists by the Communist rebels who not only supplied much money but terrorized the voters in their particular areas. U Nu was much disturbed about these matters and possibly thinks that the Communists may have got assistance from some source in China.

One important reason for his retirement from the Premiership might thus be his wish to concentrate on strengthening his party of which he continues to be President.

This is for your information. You may give some indication at your discretion to Chou En-lai.

1. New Delhi, 7 June 1956. JN Collection. R.K. Nehru was India's Ambassador in China.
2. R.K. Nehru reported that Chang Wen-tien, Vice-Minister in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, had enquired whether the Press reports about U Nu's resigning from office were correct.
3. U Nu informed Nehru on 30 May that his colleagues had agreed to his leaving the prime ministership on the condition that he returned to the post at the end of one year.
4. Celebrations in connection with the 2,500th anniversary of the *parinirvana* or the passing away of Buddha were held in India, Myanmar and many other countries on 23 May 1956.

IV. SRI LANKA

1. To Bernard Aluwihare¹

New Delhi
6 May 1956

My dear Bernard,²

I received your letter of the 18th April some time ago. Whatever might have been behind your elections,³ the result created some kind of a sensation in the Western world.⁴ Sir John Kotelawala had perhaps slightly overdrawn the picture of a man of destiny.

I have a feeling, for which there is no great justification, that no great changes are likely to come off in Ceylon. Anyhow, that is a matter for the Ceylonese, and who am I to express any opinion....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. (1902-1961); Sri Lankan lawyer and politician; after education at Oxford came to India and was drawn into the Indian freedom movement; first met Nehru at Allahabad in 1929; member of State Council from 1936; of House of Representatives, 1952-56; left the Sri Lanka Freedom Party just before the 1956 elections and joined the United National Party; Minister of Education and Cultural Affairs, 1960.
3. General elections, held in Sri Lanka between 5-10 April 1956, resulted in a severe defeat for the ruling UNP. The People's United Front, led by Solomon Bandaranaike won an absolute majority and formed a new government on 12 April.
4. The *Washington Post*, on 9 April, quoted US officials as saying that they were "surprised" by the early results. It also said that "non-alignment" had won an impressive victory and commented that a continuation of the "remarkable degree of political stability" enjoyed in Sri Lanka depended on the stature of Bandaranaike. British correspondents attributed the defeat of the UNP to the vigorous campaign waged by the younger Buddhist monks alleging domination of Kotelawala's government by Christians, agreement among the parties constituting the People's United Front on advocating the proclamation of a republic, the withdrawal of British forces from bases in Sri Lanka, a "neutralist" foreign policy, and the nationalization of foreign-owned plantations, banks and insurance.

V.UK

1. To Hukam Singh¹New Delhi
10 May 1956My dear Sardar Hukam Singh,²

You will remember writing to me some days ago about the issue of passports to London. I pointed out then³ that we have had a great deal of difficulty in this matter and the British Government were greatly embarrassed by the large number of people who were going to the United Kingdom, chiefly from the Punjab, as hawkers, petty shopkeepers, etc. We had, therefore, to be a little careful in this matter. These people were creating not only political but racial problems in the United Kingdom. The consequence might well be the intensification of an anti- Indian feeling all over the United Kingdom.

The UK Government have recently informed our High Commission in London that a party of six or seven Sikh passengers going by Air France from Paris had been refused permission to land in London as the UK immigration authorities were not satisfied about the genuineness of their passports. We are enquiring into this matter.

But, apart from this particular case, it has come to our knowledge that there is a regular racket for the production of forged passports.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Deputy Speaker, Lok Sabha.
3. On 3 May.

2. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
22 May 1956

Nan dear,

Your letter of May 15th....

About Winston Churchill, of course, you can invite him to dinner when you like.²

You mention in your letter about our not taking fuller advantage of your presence.³ Certainly, we ought to, and I wish you would make some suggestions. You mention cultural exchanges and the like. This matter should be considered by us.⁴ As a matter of fact, we are so tired with the burden of these exchanges that we only arrange them under pressure from some country. You know that, in this matter, the communist countries are more favourably situated. It is the Government that invites and looks after the cultural delegation. In England and America, such governmental invitations do not come, and we have to take the initiative ourselves or, perhaps, some private group invites. Anyhow, this matter should be looked into....

I am surprised and sorry to learn that an invitation for you to visit Greece was never forwarded to you.⁵ This is very extraordinary, and I am enquiring into the matter.⁶

Love,

Yours,
Jawahar

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Mrs Pandit, High Commissioner of India in Britain, informed Nehru that Churchill had invited her several times to his home and his daughters had also "mentioned his great admiration for what is happening in India and more especially for you, and have gone on to hint that he would like to come to my house. I would very much like to invite him to dinner if there is no objection."
3. Mrs Pandit wrote that: "it would have been of great benefit to us if during my term of office, various cultural exchanges could have taken place. The English people are eager to know more about the new India.... Political problems must always exist, but artistic interpretation of our aspirations are so important to coexistence."
4. See *post*, pp. 503-505.
5. Mrs Pandit learnt about it only when Queen Elizabeth II mentioned to her that the Greek Queen had been distressed by her silence.
6. Nehru again wrote to Vijayalakshmi Pandit on 26 May that after an enquiry he found that Rajeshwar Dayal, India's Ambassador to Belgrade, had, on 19 September 1955, asked the MEA to pass it on to Mrs Pandit. Nehru added, "Of course, this should have been passed on to you and it was a grave lapse for this not to be done. You have already written to the Queen. I am afraid that in view of conditions in Greece and the bitterness against the British, this is no time to go there."

3. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
5 June 1956

Nan dear,

Your letter of June 1st.² I am not sending a reply by telegram as you will get this in good time.

I have already suggested to you that I should like to meet R.A. Butler³ and Lennox-Boyd.⁴ Walter Monckton⁵ I am meeting. As for Lord Salisbury⁶ and Harold Macmillan,⁷ of course, I shall be glad to meet them. It is for you to find out when I can do so. If you want me to meet Monckton again, apart from the lunch, you can try to fix this up.⁸ I have no idea how you will find time for all these people....

You have already invited Bandaranaike to lunch on Saturday, 23rd.⁹ So, if Dickie wants to see me before that, it will have to be either on the 22nd night or the 23rd morning. Probably, it will be better for me to see him on the 22nd night, say after dinner. I could go over to his place.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The letter was regarding Nehru's appointments with important persons during his forthcoming visit to Britain.
3. Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons.
4. Alan Tindal Lennox-Boyd (1904-1983); British Conservative politician; Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1951-52; Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 1952-54; Secretary of State for Colonies, 1954-59.
5. British Minister of Defence, December 1955-October 1956.
6. Robert Arthur James Gascoyne-Cecil, fifth Marquess of Salisbury (1893-1972); British Conservative politician; Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 1940-42 and 1943-45; Secretary of State for Colonies, 1942-43; Lord Privy Seal, 1942-43 and 1951-52; Leader, House of Lords, 1942-45 and 1951-57; Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1952; Lord President of the Council, 1952-57.
7. British Chancellor of the Exchequer.
8. Mrs Pandit wrote: "Monckton is by far the most important person in the Cabinet. More and more he is playing a leading role and his advice is listened to with respect.... I think there would be no harm in a second visit with him."
9. Nehru had written to Mrs Pandit on 24 May that he should like to invite the Sri Lanka Prime Minister Bandaranaike "to a meal more or less by himself if possible. I want to have a little talk with him quietly." Mrs Pandit replied on 1 June: "I am arranging for Bandaranaike to come and lunch with you.... He had a long talk with Dickie (Mountbatten) in Colombo and Dickie would like fifteen minutes with you before you meet him."

Dr V.K.R.V. Rao will be coming to London from America and then going on to Bonn. He is anxious to meet me. I have, therefore, asked him to stay on for a day or two more in London.¹⁰ Otherwise, he will have had to come back from Bonn. I shall have to give him some time on the 23rd morning. He wants a full hour. He might go to India House that morning. We can meet there.

Love,

Yours,
Jawahar

10. See *ante*, p. 437.

VI. USA

1. To Dorothy Norman¹

New Delhi
7 May 1956

My dear Dorothy²

I have not even acknowledged the letter and the telegram you sent me many weeks ago. My credit with you must have attained a low level. But you are generous and understanding and so perhaps you will forgive me.

It is now more or less fixed up that I go to Washington for four days.³ It has been difficult to fit this visit in between other programmes which had already been fixed up. I have to be in England and then I have to go to Western Germany. I found four days in between with some difficulty.

1. JN Collection.

2. Dorothy Norman (1905-1997); American civil rights advocate, writer, photographer and a patron of the arts; in 1938, she published and edited *Twice a Year*, a literary journal; columnist for the *New York Post*, 1942-49; founded the American Citizens' Committee for Economic Aid Abroad and the American Emergency Food Committee for India, and involved in other work for India during the 1940s and 1950s; author of, among others, *Nehru: The First Sixty Years*, two volumes (1965), *The Hero: Myth, Image and Symbol* (1969), *Alfred Stieglitz: An American Seer* (1973), *Indira Gandhi: Letters to a Friend 1950-1984* (1985) and *Encounters: A Memoir* (1987).

3. Nehru was scheduled to visit Washington from 7 to 10 July but the visit was postponed to December 1956 due to Eisenhower's illness.

My visit will be almost entirely devoted to talks with the President. I have avoided all other engagements and I shall not even go to New York. It may be that the President takes me somewhere outside Washington for a couple of days. I am entirely in his hands in this matter.

My fourth and last day will be spent in our Embassy in Washington and I believe our Ambassador⁴ is fixing up one or two functions. I shall, of course, be very happy to meet you, but that can only be in Washington. I hope I shall have a glimpse of you.

Indira will probably be coming with me, though I am not quite certain yet.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. G.L. Mehta.

2. Policy Regarding Purchase of Rice¹

I agree. Evidently our needs are growing.

2. But I do not like the idea of our obtaining rice from the US unless we are forced to do so by circumstances beyond our control. I think, we should try our best to get it from Burma. We are thinking in terms of a long term arrangement with Burma. If we can get this on favourable terms, it is far better than ad hoc arrangements made with the US. In the course of the next two or three weeks, the Burmese Food Minister is coming here with a team to discuss this question.² We should await the results of this discussion before trying to get any rice, even under some concessional terms, from the USA.

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 10 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, p. 448.

3. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
11 May 1956

My dear Ajit,

I saw a file about purchase of wheat and rice yesterday and added a note² to it which you will no doubt have seen.

As you know, I shall be visiting the United States early in July to see President Eisenhower. I do not want my visit to be connected in any way with demands or gifts from the United States. The United States State Department and the press there have a habit of playing this kind of thing up. I should like you to bear this in mind.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. A.P. Jain Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.

4. Agenda for Discussion with US President¹

Paragraph 1 of your note containing the information about the delivery by the US to Pakistan of 30 new jet fighters² should be sent to the Defence Secretary for his information.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of your note,³ you might inform the US Embassy here that while I have no particular subjects to discuss with the

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 11 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. S. Dutt was informed by Frederic P. Bartlett, US Charge d'affaires, on 11 June that 30 F-86 jet fighters would be delivered to Pakistan around 24 June as part of the US-Pakistan Agreement of 1954 under the Mutual Security Act. Bartlett also said that US Government were keeping the Government of India informed in accordance with the assurance given by Dulles during his talks with Nehru.
3. Dutt stated that Bartlett had told him that the US Government would like to know if the Prime Minister wished to discuss any particular subject with President Eisenhower during his visit to Washington so that the President could be properly briefed in advance.

President, I would be glad to discuss the general international situation and to represent to him our broad approach to these questions as well as, what we think is, the general reaction in Asia or, at any rate, in many countries in Asia. We are naturally greatly interested, as the President is, in the maintenance of peace and a diversion of people's minds, activities and resources from those of and preparation for war to constructive efforts in their own countries. We feel that recent changes in the Soviet Union are significant in regard to these matters, and the climate of world opinion could now be changed more easily towards peace and construction, and away from war. Disarmament and many other important problems of the world are related to this general approach. We are naturally concerned with developments in Korea and South East Asia, more specially, Vietnam, where we are associated as Chairman with the International Commission.

3. We are also concerned with the military aid being given to Pakistan by the US which has produced powerful reactions in India.

4. As for Kashmir, our position has been stated clearly. If the President so wishes, I shall explain it to him.

5. So far as Singapore is concerned, we are naturally interested in any development in South East Asia and in the colonial territories there, but we have not, in any way, interfered with Singapore affairs.⁴ Mr Marshall broke his journey in Delhi at his own request and he gave us an account of his talks with the UK Government.⁵ We did not offer him any advice on the subject.

6. Broadly speaking, as the President knows, we feel that the continuance of colonialism is not only an anomaly in the present age, but is a constant source of friction and of conflict. We realize the difficulties in making sudden changes and we have always advised our friends in other countries concerned to approach this question in a peaceful and cooperative way. But delay in solution of these problems or in taking a marked step towards solution adds to the difficulties of the situation and leads to great bitterness. Thus, in regard to Algeria, we ventured to put forward some suggestions for a ceasefire and for negotiations for a peaceful settlement.⁶ We did not suggest what the settlement

4. Bartlett had told Dutt that in connection with the recent talks between Nehru and David Marshall, the Chief Minister of Singapore, the US Government would like to know the attitude of the Government of India towards the question of Singapore's independence. Marshall met Nehru in New Delhi on 23 May on his way back from London.

5. See *post*, pp. 490-491.

6. See *post*, p. 492.

should be. We had in view the difficulties of the French Government. But we also felt strongly about the rapidly deteriorating situation there. As the President must know, there has been strong feeling in Asian countries and elsewhere on the subject of Algeria, and attempts have been made to bring the matter up before the Security Council of the UN. We have resisted these attempts because we felt that a consideration by the Security Council could not improve the situation and might well make it worse.⁷

7. See *post*, pp. 481-485.

5. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Mehta has asked me what your programme will be during my visit to Washington. Your programme will naturally depend on your engagements in the Trusteeship Council session in New York. I do not think it will be fit for you to join me in my visit to Washington. President has invited me and Indira only apart from staff accompanying me. If you are in New York then you of course, come to Washington to meet me and possibly join some function(s) there. It does not appear desirable for you to accompany me from London in the President's aircraft which will mean that you are a member of our official party visiting President. I am informing Mehta accordingly.²

1. New Delhi, 14 June 1956. JN Collection. Also available in V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Krishna Menon was in New York at this time.
2. Krishna Menon replied the same day: "I have always understood the position to be as you have set out. When you discussed your visit to US you had only suggested (or asked) that I could or should be at hand during your visit and I said I could be about. I would have told Mehta all this if he had asked me. I did not think, however, the question arose and, therefore, did not do so myself".

6. Financing of Press by Foreign Sources¹

My speech in regard to this matter was not quite correctly reported in the papers.² I said that monies were obtained by some Indian newspapers from foreign sources. I expressly said that I was not referring to any government. Nor, of course, did I mention the name of any country. So far as our knowledge is concerned, it refers to several types of sources, mostly non-official or organizations which are supposed to be non-official. I referred in this connection to rumours in Ceylon and Burma of interference by others by payment of money chiefly.³

2. I did not have the American publicity officers in mind.⁴ That is a separate question which was raised sometime ago and which is referred to in SG's notes. Our position in regard to the publicity officers is exactly the same as it was then. SG suggested, and I agreed, that we might go slow in this matter.⁵ That is all.

3. I do not wish to say anything more definite on this subject. But I might mention for your information that I had both comunist sources and some American agencies, which are not official, in mind. As a matter of fact, we get some information about the USIS too. Naturally, there can be no

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 15 June 1956. JN Collection.

2. Addressing a public meeting at Rohtak on 14 June, Nehru stated that certain newspapers, particularly in Delhi and Punjab, encouraged chaos and conflict in the country and were being financed by some foreign countries. Nehru added that the policies of the Government of India were not liked by these countries and they wanted to weaken the Government. On 15 June, Bartlett, the US Charge d'affaires, met Dutt and said that according to his information the story had been going around among Indian newspapermen in Delhi that the "power" Nehru had in mind was the US. Bartlett wanted to clarify the position on behalf of the US.

3. Nehru mentioned this in his address at Rohtak that newspapers in Sri Lanka had remarked about the role of foreign money in the recent disturbances in that country over the language issue. They had stated, Nehru added, that the countries which supplied this money hated to see Asian nations growing and becoming prosperous. See also *ante*, pp. 251-253.

4. Bartlett had told Dutt that the activities of the US Embassy were open and that the USIS, apart from publishing a newspaper, the *American Reporter*, sent material, like other embassies in India, to newspapers and individuals in the country.

5. See Nehru's notes of 5 and 14 April 1955, printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, p. 282.

definite proof, but the presumption was a strong one.⁶ To say that Secretary General or I was convinced is hardly correct.⁷ But it is correct to say that we did not bring any charge against the US Embassy as such. We know that the US Embassy and the USIS function quite separately.

4. Our information was and is based on reports from intelligence and other sources. You need not say anything about all this to the US Charge except to say that I had in mind several sources. These had nothing to do with a government or an embassy.

6. See Nehru's note of 15 May 1955 printed in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 28, pp. 534-536.
7. Dutt recorded in his note of 15 June 1956 that Bartlett had told him that about a year ago Secretary General N.R. Pillai "had spoken to Ambassador Cooper about the Government of India's suspicion that the US Embassy was subsidising the newspaper *Pratap* in Delhi. There were full discussions on the subject and Mr Bartlett said that Ambassador Cooper was able to convince Secretary General that the US Government or US Embassy in India was not giving any subsidy direct or indirect to any newspaper in India".

VII. USSR

1. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
11 May 1956

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 11th May about the Russian Trade Agreement.² I am glad that matters are proceeding satisfactorily.

The proposal you make of giving credit to the Soviet, appears to me a right one. I also think that it would be odd for us to charge them at a higher rate of interest than we are paying them for what they supply to us.

1. JN Collection.
2. India and the Soviet Union signed a Trade Agreement on 6 April 1956 which provided for establishment of a regular shipping service between Indian and Russian ports.

You mention something about our buying drills and mining equipment from them. I have heard talk about this for a long time but, somehow, it had stuck up somewhere. I am enquiring.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. An agreement was signed in New Delhi on 21 May 1956 providing for the supply by the USSR of oil drilling equipment worth Rs. 7,400,000 to India.

2. Debate in USSR on Stalin's Failings¹

In this letter² reference is made to an article in the *Military Messenger* deflating Stalin and charging him for failing to take adequate steps for defence against Hitler's attack. Subsequently, the *Red Star*³ wrote an answer to the article in the *Military Messenger* and did not agree with it.

I might mention that when Mr Mikoyan was here, he spoke to me more or less on the lines of the article in the *Military Messenger* in regard to Stalin and his refusal to listen to anyone who told him that a German invasion was evident. He just would not believe it and was therefore not prepared for it.⁴

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 15 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. P. Ratnam, Indian Counsellor at Moscow, in his letter of 3 May 1956 to Foreign Secretary, referred to an article in the *Military Messenger*, the official organ of the Soviet defence ministry, published in its issue of April 1956.
3. A military and general political daily newspaper published by the Soviet Defence Ministry.
4. A.I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR, visited New Delhi for four days from 26 March 1956. For Nehru's talks with him, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 397-407.

VIII. INDO-CHINA AND KOREA

1. Development Relating to Indo-China¹

H.V. Kamath (Praja Socialist Party, Hoshangabad): On what grounds has the UK Government come to the conclusion that South Vietnam is not bound by the terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1954?² Have those grounds been communicated to Government, and if so, do those grounds appear or sound reasonable to the Prime Minister?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I would prefer not to enter into an argument about this matter at this stage. There are the two Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.³ They are still meeting in London and considering the subject of Indo-China. We are in communication with them and so are the Chairmen of the International Commissions.⁴ Therefore, I submit that it would not be desirable for me to enter into a controversy at this stage with any of the Governments concerned.

HVK: Is it a fact that the French forces have pulled out, or are perhaps shortly pulling out, of South Vietnam, and has India, as Chairman of the International Supervisory Commission, been requested by the Co-Chairman of the UK Government to continue to function in South Vietnam or Vietnam, even beyond the deadline when elections are scheduled to take place?

JN: It is true that the French forces have withdrawn. It is also true that the International Commissions have been requested by the two Co-Chairmen to continue⁵ and the International Commissions have agreed to do so for the time

1. Reply to questions in Parliament, 4 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1956, Vol. III, Part I, cols. 3332-3333. Extracts.
2. Earlier Sadath Ali Khan, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs, replied in affirmative to the question from H.V. Kamath whether India had been informed by the UK Government of their view that South Vietnam was not bound by the terms of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 on Indo-China. There was a Reuter report from London dated 10 April 1956 about Britain taking such a view.
3. Britain and the USSR.
4. India was Chairman of the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
5. India had written to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference pointing out the consequences of the decision of the French Government to withdraw their forces from Indo-China by 28 April and urging that some decision must be taken if the Commission was to perform the task allotted to it.

being pending the solution of certain problems which they have posed to the two Co-Chairmen; that is, the Chairmen of the International Commissions have pointed out that unless certain satisfactory steps are taken, it will not be possible for them to function properly. It is no good their saying they can function, if they cannot function. Therefore, they are waiting for the two Co-Chairmen to come to some conclusion about it.

HVK: Is it a fact that the Prime Minister has suggested to the two Co-Chairmen that the elections in South Vietnam and North Vietnam might be held at a later date, if not in July, 1956? I want to know whether such a proposal has been made.

JN: That is not for me to suggest, but I believe the idea was thrown out that if the obligations of the Geneva Agreement and the principles were accepted, it might be conveniently arranged to have the actual giving effect to the elections later on....⁶

6. In the meantime the two Co-Chairmen informed the Government of India that they had asked the authorities in North and South Vietnam to inform them as soon as possible of the time required for the holding of nationwide elections as means of achieving the unification of Vietnam. Nehru informed the Lok Sabha on 26 May 1956 that the International Commission was considering the developments arising from the Co-Chairmen's messages and continuing its activities.

2. To Pham Van Dong¹

New Delhi
9 May 1956

Dear Mr Prime Minister,²

Thank you for your letter dated the 10th April, 1956, sent to me through the Consulate General of India in Hanoi.

You are aware of the Government of India's views on the question of implementation of the Geneva Agreement. It has been our earnest endeavour to promote a solution on the basis of that Agreement. Serious difficulties have

1. File No. 1(5)-IC/56, Vol. II, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Pham Van Dong was the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

unfortunately arisen in the working of the Agreement in Vietnam. It was after careful examination of all the circumstances that the Government of India suggested to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference that they should meet at the earliest opportunity to consider the situation as it has arisen in Vietnam and to devise lines of action for the future. The representatives of the Co-Chairmen are now meeting in London. We sincerely hope that their discussions will result in finding a way out of the difficulties in conformity with the spirit of the Geneva Agreements.

Please accept, dear Prime Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Message to Selwyn Lloyd¹

I have been somewhat concerned about the steps reported to have been taken in regard to the work of the Supervisory Commission in Korea by the UN Command Powers.² It virtually has the effect of bringing the Neutral Supervisory Commission to an end. It appears from all the reports that the step is a unilateral one *vis-a-vis* the two parties to the armistice.³ I am concerned about the results of this on the armistice in Korea. Public opinion here also would feel that not only in view of its general consequences but also on account of the special responsibilities that India undertook any step that may lead to breakdown of armistice is a grave one.

1. Camp: Mumbai, 4 June 1956. JN Collection. The message was sent through the Indian High Commissioner in London.
2. The UN Command announced on 31 May the suspension of the work of its Supervisory Commission in South Korea in view of the "systematic frustration" of the Commission's functions by the North Korean and Chinese authorities. It ordered the truce inspectors of the Communist countries to leave the country within one week.
3. An agreement ending the fighting in Korea was signed at Panmunjom by the UN and the Communist Commands on 27 July 1953. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission consisting of groups of Swedish, Swiss, Polish and Czechoslovak officers was established to supervise the replacements of military equipment and military movements in Korea after armistice.

2. I have also had reports that United States has decided to give arms aid to South Vietnam on the ground that such aid is flowing into the North from China. Obviously, this is a matter for the Commission and a step of this kind is likely to have grave consequences. In view of all this we would like to obtain the United Kingdom Government's views on these issues. I, therefore, have asked Krishna Menon, our Minister without Portfolio, who will be seeing you in the course of the week, to talk them over with you.⁴

4. After meeting Selwyn Lloyd, Krishna Menon reported to Nehru on 8 June that, Lloyd did not know the facts and called an official who "explained that it was a US decision and there was little that could be done as the UN Command was the United States. Lloyd, however, thinks the implications have to be examined and will....discuss the matter again...."

IX. SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1. Sino-US Deadlock¹

Please see attached letter from our Ambassador in Washington.² There has been a complete deadlock in the talks between the USA and Chinese Ambassadors at Geneva.³ I have no doubt that each party is delaying action

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, and Foreign Secretary, 18 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. G.L. Mehta, India's Ambassador in Washington, suggested that India might try to persuade the Chinese Government to deport or otherwise repatriate the thirteen Americans who were imprisoned in China. He pointed out that in the prevailing mood of reappraisal of US external policies, release of these Americans might help to smoothen the course of the current Sino-American ambassadorial talks at Geneva and pave the way for a Conference at higher level. He also indicated that such release, through the initiative taken by India before Nehru's forthcoming visit to the US, would also enable India to exercise some influence on the US Government.
3. Following the agreement in September 1955 on the return of US and Chinese civilians to their respective countries, the talks in Geneva between Alexis Johnson, US Ambassador in Prague, and Wang Ping-nan, Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw, became deadlocked, principally over the question of Taiwan. The talks started on 1 August 1955 and the forty-sixth meeting in the series was held on 11 May 1956.

just to bring pressure on the other. Certainly, the Chinese are doing that. I do not quite know what I can do about it. We have repeatedly expressed our opinion in gentle language to the Chinese Government.

I think that you might send a brief telegraphic message to our Ambassador in Peking telling him of this message from Washington. You may leave it to him whether or not to approach the Chinese Government on this question and, if so, the manner of doing so. It should in any event be informal.

It might be hinted at that owing to the recent favourable turn in international affairs, some such step would probably meet with a good response in the world. I shall be going to the United States in the second week of July and I certainly propose to talk to President Eisenhower about China and the Far Eastern question.⁴

4. As directed by Prime Minister, a telegram was sent to R.K. Nehru, India's Ambassador in Beijing, on 20 May 1956.

2. Issue of Release of US and Chinese Prisoners¹

You will remember sending a telegram to our Ambassador in Peking, at my request, in regard to the American prisoners there and the message that we had received from our Ambassador in Washington.² There is one aspect of it which was pointed out to me by Shri Krishna Menon this evening. We must not give any impression to the Chinese Government that we are doing this at the instance of the US Government or because we have some information that the US Government is likely to take some step favourable to China. Any such impression will not be justified and would embarrass us later because we do not know what the US Government is likely to do. Twice on previous occasions, the Chinese Government released some American prisoners. This was not

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 20 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

followed on the US side by any comparable action.³ It is because of this, no doubt, that the Chinese Government have refused to take any further step in regard to release. Interminable talks have been going on between the US and Chinese Ambassadors at Geneva chiefly about these releases, etc. They still continue. Our coming into the picture at this stage should not lead to any misunderstanding.

2. Therefore, if our Ambassador mentions this, it should be not only casually but so as not to create any misunderstanding or false hope.

3. You might have a talk with Shri Krishna Menon and me tomorrow morning so that we can send a further telegram⁴ to our Ambassador in Peking clarifying the position.

3. In his telegram of 22 May, R.K. Nehru explained that the Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai had mentioned to him in December 1955 that at an earlier stage the Chinese had taken a liberal view and released some prisoners though they were not bound to do so. They had done this, R.K. Nehru added, as they were guided by the Indian view that this might pave the way for a conference.
4. See the next item.

3. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Please refer to our telegram 28403 dated 20th May.² On further considering position arising from Ambassador Mehta's letter to me, I feel that we should not in any way lead the Chinese Government into the error of thinking that we have received some encouragement from the United States to warrant our initiative or alternately that we imply that the blame for the present impasse rests with China. We would also not like the Chinese Government to think that we are intruding into the hard bargaining and protracted negotiations at Geneva. Any initiative from our side to obtain a change in the Chinese position must be related to our judgment of a similar change in the attitude of the US Government

1. New Delhi, 22 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. See ante, p. 468.

or to a reasonable expectation of such a change. We know nothing at present to justify such a judgment on our part.

2. Our position in regard to the Sino-US deadlock has been that there should be direct negotiations. To a small extent we succeeded in assisting to bring about the present direct talks at Geneva.³ Third party intervention at this stage may come in the way of this direct relationship and perhaps provide a release from it for one side or the other and thus put the clock back.

3. We think, therefore, that you should confine your interest at present to discovering whether there is any indication that the Chinese Government is likely to move forward in respect of this matter on their own or whether they have any desire for some suggestion about it to emerge from a friendly party like ourselves which will enable them to modify their attitude as a response to such suggestion. You might express our interest in the Geneva negotiations and in seeking to ascertain for our information what progress is in prospect. This may perhaps also give the Chinese Government encouragement to give us any indication they desire of any probable change in their attitude.

4. You should tell the Chinese Government, in passing, that the Prime Minister is sure to talk to President Eisenhower about China and the Far Eastern question and inform us of any reactions.

5. If circumstances change and we feel that any move by us is desirable, we will inform you.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 29, pp. 378 and 381.

4. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Your telegram 202 of 24th May.²

2. Although Ambassador Mehta referred to some trends in American opinion, none of these justifies any inference that we can confidently expect a reciprocal response from the United States. Our view is that the official US attitude towards China has not changed and in fact has probably hardened. In these circumstances, any indication by us to the Chinese Government as to how they should act, might well prove embarrassing to us later. There might be no response at all from the United States and Dulles³ might say something that irritates the Chinese who may feel that our judgment is wrong or that we have no influence with the Americans and are just putting pressure on the Chinese. We have, therefore, to be cautious about any suggestions. An approach to Chou En-lai would probably be helpful when we have some indication of a change in US Government's attitude. I shall be meeting President Eisenhower in July and will then be in a better position to form a judgment and to take some steps on the basis of that.

3. You may of course discuss the situation with Chou En-lai in its various aspects, but avoiding any particular suggestion on our behalf.

1. New Delhi, 27 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. R.K. Nehru thought that the Chinese were not likely to depart from a strict interpretation of agreement in regard to the return of prisoners unless there was some prospect of change in the US attitude, but they might release some more prisoners if they felt that liberal interpretation in a few cases would facilitate Nehru's talks with Eisenhower and also strengthen new trends in the US. He suggested that Chou En-lai might be told about "these trends as reported by our Ambassador."

3. John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State.

5. Indian Ambassador's Talks with Chou En-lai¹

From the telegram from our Ambassador in Peking, it appears that he has already had some talks with Premier Chou En-lai and that further talks are going to take place on the 10th of this month.² I do not think that he should make any formal suggestions to Chou En-lai. Of course, he would refer to this new development in America and ask Premier Chou En-lai what his reaction to it is, that is to say, he can bring the matter up in his talks without making any formal suggestions. If he thinks that some hint would not be misunderstood in the circumstances, he can make such a hint and see the reaction to it. The point is that he should not create any misunderstanding in Chou En-lai's mind about further happenings in America.

Recent developments in Korea and Vietnam³ are not encouraging and will influence Chou En-lai's mind. These Chinese criminals being released in the US, will probably return to China and the US will then make capital out of this.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, Camp: Mumbai, 3 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. The subjects covered in the talk held on 31 May at the invitation of Chou En-lai were: Korea, Indo-China, Hong Kong, Sino-British relations and Sino-US ambassadorial talks at Geneva especially in relation to Taiwan.
3. See *ante*, p. 464-467.

6. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

Please refer to your telegram² No. 234 of June 15 on your talk with Chou En-lai. As we have already told you, at an earlier stage we approached the US Government at the instance of the Government of China for full information about the Chinese prisoners and for facilities to our Embassy in Washington to

1. New Delhi, 19 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. R.K. Nehru reported on his talk with Chou En-lai held on 14 June.

interview them.³ In this matter, however, our Embassy can only act in accordance with the wishes of the Chinese Government and since they are no longer interested in pursuing this question, our Embassy will not take any further step.

2. We have found it difficult to follow the various drafts and counter-drafts of the proposals discussed by the Chinese and US Ambassadors in Geneva. Our information is based on informal communication to us by the Chinese Ambassador.⁴ It is clear, however, that the Chinese are keen on a meeting of the Foreign Ministers and would agree to discuss the Taiwan problem only at this meeting.⁵ On the other hand the US Government seem anxious to secure Chinese consent to their proposition that the right of self-defence should extend specifically to their maintaining the status quo in Taiwan; and until they can secure the Chinese agreement on this point, they are unwilling to commit themselves to a Foreign Ministers' meeting. They seem also anxious to secure the release of the US prisoners before they subscribe to an agreement on a meeting of Foreign Ministers.

3. We are inclined to the view that the Americans cannot claim the right of self-defence in Taiwan and the proposal to discuss the Taiwan situation at the Foreign Ministers' meeting is reasonable. However, we would not like you to convey this view, specifically to the Chinese Government. You should inform the Chinese Premier generally that in our view the discussions at Geneva, although they have continued for so many months, should not be interrupted and the search for a mutually acceptable formula should continue. It is possible that the Americans may be prolonging these talks in order to avoid any definite commitment until after the Presidential election is over. We can appreciate the

3. With regard to US Government's recent proposal that the Indian Embassy in Washington should interview Chinese prisoners in the US, Chou En-lai's view was that either (a) some "preparatory work" had been carried out so that when the Embassy interviewed them they might declare that they were unwilling to go to China or (b) if they declared they were willing, then the US might use this as "a pretext to demand release of the remaining US prisoners." Chou En-lai also said that all Chinese prisoners must be released so as to enable them to decide freely about repatriation after release.
4. Pan Tzu-li, Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi.
5. Chou En-lai said that China would favour "a compromise solution which would be beneficial to both sides, i.e., a statement which will not affect present policies of either side while leaving specific solution to a Foreign Ministers' Conference." Regarding the provision for self defence in the US draft for a joint declaration on the Geneva talks, Chou En-lai remarked that if the Chinese were to suggest that the right of self defence should be specifically limited to "one's own territory", the US would "surely disagree".

irritation of the Chinese Government.⁶ At the same time if the talks were to be interrupted now, the situation might speedily deteriorate and the consequence is bound to be a hardening of the international situation if nothing worse happens. This would be unfortunate in the context of the encouraging developments in the USSR and elsewhere. Therefore, however trying the discussions at Geneva may be, we would counsel patience for some time more.

4. The situation in Korea and Vietnam, the Chinese Premier knows, is also not free from anxiety. We understand however that the NNSC in Korea has unanimously agreed to withdraw the inspection teams to the demilitarized zone. As you have said in one of your recent telegrams, this position has been agreed to by the Chinese Government also. The NNSC has not functioned effectively for some months. All the same, its presence on the Korean soil is itself a guarantee against the worsening of the situation. We hope that it will be made possible for the NNSC to continue to function whatever the handicap.

5. We are convinced that the recent developments in the USSR signify desire on the part of the Soviet Government to follow a peaceful policy and go to the utmost possible length to secure relaxation of international tension.⁷ This is generally appreciated in most countries in the world, including most countries in West Europe and even in the United Kingdom. There seem also some fresh thinking on the subject even in the United States despite Mr Dulles. Unfortunately, politics in that country must remain abnormal until the Presidential elections are over. President's sudden illness has also made constructive thinking in Government circles in the United States more than ordinarily difficult.

6. I should like you to communicate the substance of paragraphs 3, 4 & 5 to Premier Chou En-lai.

6. Chou En-lai said that the US had lost the initiative in many matters and was trying to find some way of prolonging talks till the Presidential election, but China would continue the talks only if there was some advantage in this.

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 334.

X. CHINA AND TIBET

1. Chinese Maps of the Frontier with India¹

You know that, in Chinese maps, quite a good part of Assam is shown as if it belonged to Tibet. Also, a bit of the UP, bordering on Tibet. Some two or three years ago, we drew the attention of the Chinese Government to this. Their reply was that these maps were old maps from Chiang Kai-shek's² time and that they had had no time to revise them. Recently, a new set of maps has been printed. They are exactly as the old ones except for a note that they are reproductions of the old maps.

2. We had decided previously not to raise the question of our frontier with China because, so far as we were concerned, there was no dispute. The Tibet frontier ran along the MacMahon Line and we consider it a firm frontier.³ I stated this more than once in Parliament.⁴

3. Even when I went to China, I casually mentioned Chinese maps to Chou En-lai and, so far as I remember, he said something about the maps being old and that we can settle frontier questions in a friendly way later.⁵ In effect, therefore, China never clearly accepted our frontier as it is. All that they have said is that the old maps are not reliable. We have stated to them and in Parliament that our frontier is as given in our maps.

4. At the time of the agreement with China about Tibetan questions,⁶ it was taken for granted by us that all pending questions between India and

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon 6 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. Head of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist People's Party, which ruled China since 1926. Chiang Kai-shek withdrew to Taiwan after military defeat of his party by the Communists and proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 15 Part I, p. 442.

4. For Nehru's answer to a question in Parliament, 20 November 1950, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 15 Part II, p. 348.

5. See the minutes of Nehru's talks with the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, in Beijing on 20 October 1954, in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 17, 19-20 and 81-82.

6. Under an agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet and India, signed by China and India in Beijing on 29 April 1954, India gave up all the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by the British Government of India in Tibet. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 25, pp. 468-469.

China had been settled.⁷ In some of our communications too, stress was laid on this. But, China has never admitted this clearly, though they did not deny it either.

5. I find that the Russian maps (and we have good Soviet atlases which were given to us in Moscow)⁸ also reproduce the Chinese maps in regard to the Indian border and show a part of India as being in Tibet.

6. Every year, there are petty incidents on our UP-Tibet border. Some Chinese soldiers come across up to ten or fifteen miles or even more. There has been no actual conflict but there has been some friction. They have ultimately withdrawn. We have small checkposts here and there. Our communications are bad and it takes quite a long time for our people to reach the UP-Tibet frontier. Quite recently, there was another incident there.⁹

7. As a matter of fact, long before the Chinese came to Tibet,¹⁰ there used to be such incidents. The local Tibetan Governor would send a group of persons to a village across the border and even collect some taxes. It took weeks and months for any of our people to reach there. By that time, the Tibetans had retired. I think, something like this happened even in British times.

8. The question arises as to what we should do in these circumstances. When an actual incursion like this has taken place into our territory, we have, of course, protested in Peking. We did this only a few days ago.¹¹ But, should we take any other action? That is, should we definitely raise the question of the frontier with the Chinese Government? This frontier is not clearly demarcated, and some doubt may arise about some point along it. The question is not, however, about some doubtful points but rather about a much wider territory which the Chinese maps show.

7. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 26, pp. 482 and 558.

8. When Nehru visited the Soviet Union in June 1955.

9. According to the Commander of the Border Security Force at Nilang, close to the source of the Ganges at Gangotri, twelve Chinese soldiers including one officer were seen half a mile east of Nilang on 28 April 1956.

10. Chinese troops entered Tibet in October 1950. The Chinese authorities had declared on 1 January 1950 that Tibet's liberation was the basic mission of the People's Liberation Army.

11. Expressing their "surprises and regret" at the Chinese incursion on 28 April, the Government of India, in a note given to the Chinese Counsellor in New Delhi on 2 May, stated that Nilang and the area right up to Tsang Chokla pass was clearly within the Indian territory.

9. On the Tibetan side, roads and airports are being built. That is, I think, natural because the Chinese wish to develop Tibet and to improve communications. This does not necessarily mean any hostile or aggressive intention against India, but this, taken together with occasional petty raids and the maps which continue as they were, does produce a sense of disquiet.

10. I mentioned this matter to our Ambassador in Peking when he was here recently. He seemed to think that we should bide our time and not take any active step.

11. I should like this question to be considered more fully amongst ourselves.

2. Countering Chinese Moves on the Frontier¹

These are rather old reports which I had not seen previously. Since these reports were received, there have been rumours about fairly widespread uprisings in Tibet against the Chinese, which were bombed and crushed by the Chinese authorities.² It is difficult to say how far these reports are correct. Probably, there is some exaggeration in them but, at the same time, there is also some measure of truth.

2. The building of roads and air strips by the Chinese in Tibet appears to me to be a natural development from the Chinese point of view. In order to hold and develop Tibet, they must have these communications.

3. It is true that roads right up to our border and air strips near our border create a new situation for us, which we must bear in mind. I rule out any kind of physical or aerial attack on India for a considerable time to come at least. So far as infiltration etc., are concerned, they have to be met by other means.

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, and T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, MEA, 12 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. According to reports published in the Indian press in the first week of May, a serious uprising had occurred two months earlier among the Golok tribesmen of eastern Tibet. The tribesmen were stated to have massacred an entire Chinese garrison of 800-900 men, leading to retaliatory Chinese military action in which a number of Golok villages were reported to have been bombed with heavy civilian casualties. The reasons for the rising were said to have included high taxation imposed by Chinese authorities, resentment at inroads made on the Dalai Lama's authority, the compulsory indoctrination of youth, and requisitioning of grain for the Chinese Army.

Proper check posts on the border and a certain vigilance right along the border, development of communications on our side and general economic and like development of our areas which, of course, is rather a long term programme.

4. What worries me a little is the persistence of the Chinese maps indicating parts of our territory as being in the Chinese State.³ I think that we shall have to take up this matter some time or other. We can consider this separately. In this connection, however, I think that we should take up with the Soviet Government, their maps of this border area, which appear to be a copy of the Chinese maps.

5. From a military point of view, we can do little except

- (1) check posts at all suitable points on the border;
- (2) giving efficient training to our men in mountain warfare; and
- (3) developing roads and other communications.

6. I do not accept the suggestion that we should have long-range bombers. This is against our basic approach to the problem of defence. They are too costly and, if we get them, it means that we do not equip ourselves with more useful aircraft and delay, to some extent, our industrial development. The basic strength that India should aim at will only come through rapid industrial development. For the moment, this means fulfilling the Second Five Year Plan.

7. I am astonished to see from the letter of Apa Pant,⁴ dated March 7th, that he estimates Chinese troops in various areas of Tibet as one hundred twenty thousand. Apart from this figure being much too big to be easily accepted, the difference between this figure and Menon's⁵ figure of forty-five thousand is very great. I think, we should ask Apa Pant on what basis he has suggested his figure.

3. See the preceding item.

4. Political Officer of India in Sikkim and Bhutan.

5. P.N. Menon (b. 1920); joined the Indian Foreign Service as a War Service Officer, 1947; Consul-General of India, Lhasa, October 1954-November 1956; First Secretary, Indian Embassy, Rome, April 1957-May 1958; Consul-General of India, Damascus, June 1958-February 1959; Director (External Publicity), MEA, 1959-62; Consul-General, San Francisco, 1962-65; Ambassador to Cambodia, 1965-68; Joint Secretary, Additional Secretary and Secretary, MEA, 1968-72.

3. Cable to R.K. Nehru¹

I have seen your telegram 195 May 18 to Food Minister.² I have consulted him and also Planning Commission.

2. It is true that two subjects are interrelated. At the same time they are two different branches of enquiry. Food delegation intended staying in China for two or three weeks and would have gone in June.³ Planning Commission delegation intends spending about two months there.

3. However for reasons mentioned by you and to suit convenience of Chinese Government it is proposed to send both these delegations together early in July. Possibly food team may go three or four days earlier for some talks on their special subjects. They would then join the other team and work with them or, where necessary, separately. They would come back after two or three weeks while the rest of the team from the Planning Commission would stay on for closer study of agrarian cooperatives and allied matters.

4. I hope this will suit Chinese Government.

1. New Delhi, 19 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. With regard to the two delegations, one to study the Chinese techniques of agricultural planning, and the other, a larger one, for the study of producer cooperatives, R.K. Nehru, India's Ambassador, suggested that an expert for agricultural planning might be attached to the larger delegation and that only one delegation might be sent. He opined that two separate delegations covering the same ground might cause inconvenience to the Chinese Government. A.P. Jain, Minister for Food and Agriculture, had suggested, in his telegram of 17 May to R.K. Nehru, that the two studies should be carried out separately.

3. See *ante*, p. 111.

XI. THE ALGERIAN QUESTION

1. The Asian-African Group in the UN¹

This telegram might be sent,² but I should like you to add at the end two paragraphs as follows:

“3. We should like you to bear in mind that while informal and individual approaches are perfectly in order, a joint or concerted approach by a group of government representatives is quite another matter, and it can only be treated as official. It ceases to be informal. It might thus involve government in a major policy decision. We should not like the Asian-African group to develop into a policy-making body for a region. This may well cause grave embarrassment to the governments concerned.

4. When the Assembly is in session, the Group deals with items on the agenda about which general instructions have been received from governments. At other times, the position is different, and any commitments involving policy should be avoided.”³

1. Note to S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, 4 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. Arthur S. Lall, the Permanent Representative of India at the UN, sought instructions on the following action which the Asian-African group in the UN, at its meeting held in New York on 2 May, wanted the Representatives of the Asian-African countries to take: (1) Informal and individual approaches to Herve Alphand, the French Representative at the UN, expressing concern over the situation in Algeria; (2) A letter to be sent to the President and the members of the Security Council, calling attention to the continuance of bloodshed and French military action in Algeria. This would be as a follow-up of the letter of 12 April 1956 by 17 countries, including India, in which the President's attention was drawn to the deteriorating situation in Algeria. Dutt stated in his draft reply that while there was no objection to Lall's informally talking to Alphand, the request for circulation of the proposed letter “is a request for action and we shall need to consider the matter carefully...before we can authorize you”.

3. A revised telegram incorporating the above two paragraphs was sent to Lall on 5 May.

2. Policy towards Algeria¹

The Government of India view with deep concern and regret the grave developments in Algeria which have now reached the dimensions of a large-scale conflict with mounting violence, with considerable forces and arms engaged, and with no end of the conflict in sight.²

This conflict, it must be recognized, is one in which basically all the urges, the passions, the hopes, the aspirations and that mass upsurge of peoples which go to make the great movements of rising nationalism, are engaged. Too often are such movements and their consequences regarded as mere challenges to constituted authority which can and must be suppressed. The result has been violent conflicts and mounting hatreds which render peaceful settlements of them more difficult each day and less fruitful, when they may, at last, be reached.

The conflict in Algeria is part of the great wave of national upsurges that have swept Asia and Africa in the last two generations. Whatever view we may take of particular aspects of the present Algerian situation and, however, much we may recognize, as we must, the practical difficulties and complexities involved, we and all concerned may not fail to recognize this basic issue.

The position taken by the Government of India in regard to all such movements for national liberation, and specifically with reference to Algeria, has been repeatedly stated. It was also adopted by the Government of India, in unity with the other independent Governments of Asia and Africa, at Bandung last year when they joined in declaring their support of the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and appealing to the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of

1. Statement in the Lok Sabha, 22 May 1956. *Lok Sabha Debates*, 1956, Vol. V Part II, cols. 9107-9109.
2. A rebellion led by young Algerian Muslims and organized under the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), broke out in Algeria on 1 November 1954 after demands by nationalists for effective participation in the government were consistently blocked by the ruling white settler population. The rebellion gained momentum on 20 August 1955, when guerrillas touched off a popular insurrection against 26 European centres in the region of Constantine, and the rebel attacks followed by reprisals by the Europeans, resulting in a heavy toll of lives. As the internecine war continued, the French army sought to suppress the FLN and pacify the country.

the issue without delay.³ This approach has two essential aspects which must both be always remembered—our support to freedom movements and our adherence to a peaceful approach.

The Government of India take this opportunity of according their full recognition of the wisdom and statesmanship of the Government of France and the generosity of all the parties concerned, in bringing about a solution of the problem of Morocco and Tunisia. They hope that the independence of the two countries, now recognized by France,⁴ will soon be well established and that they will soon become members of the United Nations.⁵

The Government of India realize that there are special factors and complexities in the Algerian situation, but they should, however, not be permitted to bar settlements. They call for negotiation and accommodation.

The Government of India are happy to think that their recent contacts with French statesmen⁶ lead them to believe that in France there is an increasing recognition that the claims of Algerian nationalism have to be met. At the same time, there is the grim fact that large forces are deployed in Algeria⁷ and violent conflict rages. It should be our endeavour to assist the forces of a constructive settlement by urging the fuller recognition of national aspirations and at the same time by not encouraging hatred and violence by either side.

The Government of India consider that the first step to peace and settlement in Algeria is the stopping of violence and bloodshed. They, therefore, venture to appeal to all concerned to initiate and to respond to any moves to this end.

A cessation of fighting in Algeria, the desires for which have recently been expressed in diverse quarters, including the two sides, is the first and essential step. We hope that the French Government will pursue in Algeria the path which yielded helpful results in Morocco and Tunisia, and that the Algerian people will be ready to respond.

3. The Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung in April 1955.

4. The French and Spanish protectorates in Morocco were terminated on 2 March 1956 and 7 April 1956 respectively, and France recognized Morocco's independence on 28 May 1956.

5. Morocco and Tunisia became members of the UN on 20 July and 26 July 1956 respectively.

6. For the minutes of Nehru's meeting with M. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, in New Delhi in March 1956, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 390-391. For the statements and talks of French statesmen thereafter, see *ibid*, pp. 346-348.

7. M. Lejeune, the French State Secretary for the Armed Forces, stated in the National Assembly on 2 June 1956, that the French forces in Algeria had been raised to 300,000 and would soon exceed 400,000.

In their desire to help resolve this conflict and promote a negotiated settlement which will bind the parties in friendship and cooperation, the Government of India venture to make the following suggestions, viz.,

- (i) the atmosphere of peaceful approach be promoted by formal declarations by both sides of the substance of their recent statements in favour of ending violence,
- (ii) the national entity and personality of Algeria be recognized by the French Government on the basis of freedom,
- (iii) the equality of the peoples in Algeria irrespective of races be recognized by all concerned,
- (iv) recognition that Algeria is the homeland of all the people in Algeria, irrespective of race, and they shall all be entitled to the benefits and share the burdens arising from the recognition of the Algerian national entity and personality and freedom,
- (v) direct negotiations based on the above basic ideas and in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations be inaugurated.

The Government of India have the highest regard for the traditions of France and are happy to regard themselves as in very friendly relations with that great country. They share with the Algerian people the faith in the justice of the cause of national freedom and feel bound to them in this common aspiration. They, therefore, express the fervent hope that no further time will be lost by either side to respond to the call for peace.

The House will recall that in Indo-China, the first step towards termination of a long conflict began with cessation of hostilities,⁸ and that a similar appeal as the present one evoked the unanimous approval of the House⁹ and helpful response elsewhere. It is our hope that in a situation no less fraught with danger to the parties and to international peace than the war in Indo-China, now happily ended, this fervent appeal will reach the friendly ears of the parties to the present conflict, both of whom we regard as our friends and for whose cooperation and friendship with each other and with ourselves we are dedicated.

8. Ceasefire agreements for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were concluded on 20 July 1954 at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.

9. Speaking in the House of the People on 22 February 1954, Nehru made an earnest appeal to the concerned powers to strive for a ceasefire in Indo-China, without any party giving up its own position. The Geneva Conference was held two months later. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 25, p. 437.

3. Message to U Nu¹

You may have seen the text of statement I made in our Parliament on the Algerian question. I am asking our Ambassador to hand you a copy. My statement is based on the desire to bring about stopping of the fighting. It is an appeal to both sides, but perhaps more especially to the French. It does not however express any alteration in our support to Algerian nationalism. We have always considered that self-government or independence for dependent territories cannot be based upon inequality as between present colonial people and people of metropolitan stock,² but only on recognition of equality with each other. On the other hand, self-government for dependent territories must mean also that all those who are in that territory—whether Asian, Arab or European—must equally come under its benefits. Europeans who have Algeria as their homeland cannot be excluded or discriminated against. This is neither practical nor just. We have felt that it would be little use making an appeal without both these aspects being recognised.

While no immediate response, much less an acceptance, by either side can be expected, it is not impossible that a cessation of fighting may be more seriously considered. In any case, you will agree that this is the peaceful approach.

We have been informed of various moves discussed by the Asian-African group of the UN in New York.³ We have not objected to the general discussion

1. New Delhi, 27 May 1956. JN Collection. This message was sent through India's ambassador.
2. Algeria rapidly attracted non-Muslim European settlers after France started occupying it in 1834. By 1955, Algeria's settler element, consisting of more than a million Europeans, formed 11 per cent of the total population, owned more than 25 per cent of the arable land and earned over 50 per cent of the income derived from agriculture of Algeria and some 90 per cent from that exports.
3. The representatives of the Asian-African group at the UN suggested on 2 May informal approaches to the French representative and sending a letter from the chairman of their group, to the President of the Security Council, conveying their concern. Some of them wanted immediate decision of the Security Council on the course of action or calling a special session of the General Assembly. However, on the suggestions of the representatives of India and some other countries a standing committee of nine members with India as its convener, was formed to study these options before taking any action on the Algerian question.

of this and our general support to the Algerian position. However we have not been in agreement with the idea of referring this problem to the United Nations at this time. The idea of calling a special session to which we did not subscribe has now been dropped. We now learn that some of the countries are pressing to send a memorandum for placing this matter before the Security Council.⁴ This would be by way of a complaint against France which, however deserving it may be, cannot in the present circumstances help towards a settlement.

So far as India is concerned it would be very inappropriate and inconsistent for us to join in charging one side when we have just made an appeal to both. We shall therefore not be able to support the moves to place the matter before the Security Council just now, although our support for Algerian nationalism remains unaltered.

I am anxious that you should know our position and I feel sure that you will take such steps as you think are justified to help the common objective. The Security Council taking up this question at this stage will not yield beneficial results but may have adverse consequences either from ultimate or even from a propaganda point of view.

4. The representatives of the Arab States informed the Asian-African group on 25 May that they had decided to bring the Algerian question before the Security Council. Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran were reported to be ready to approve the step.

4. Message to S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike¹

You may have seen the statement on Algeria I made in our Parliament. I am asking our High Commissioner to hand you a copy. The emphasis in the statement is on ending the fighting for which you also appealed some days ago. The other suggestions in this statement reflect our understanding of what may be possible basis to lead to negotiations. These suggestions seek to reconcile the demands of Algerian nationalism which the French Government

1. New Delhi, 28 May 1956. JN Collection. This message was sent through India's ambassador.

should meet, and the special factors in the situation, more especially the existence of one and a half million French Algerians who are natives of Algeria. We think, from our recent contacts with the French, that while our suggestions go further than the French Government's present position,² it could provide an honourable basis for both sides for rapprochement.

There have been moves in the Asian-African group in New York to summon a special session of the Assembly. This, even if desirable, would not have succeeded. It has now been dropped but there is a proposal to invoke the Security Council on the initiative of the Governments in the group. This will be by way of a complaint against France which, however deserved, cannot in the present circumstances help to promote a settlement. Our position is that it will be very inappropriate and inconsistent for us to join in charging one side when we have just made an appeal to both. We also think that such a move would yield no beneficial results, and may only add to the difficulties in promoting negotiations. Its propaganda value will also be adverse. We shall therefore not be able to support the move to place this matter before the Security Council just now although our support for Algerian nationalism remains unaltered.

I am anxious that you should know our position. We feel sure that you will take such steps as you think are justified to help the common objective.³

2. Prime Minister Guy Mollet rejected the idea of an Algerian State, during a debate in the French National Assembly in March 1956, and recommended the transformation of "all the inhabitants of Algeria into free and equal French citizens of a just and fraternal republic". He said that "France, perhaps because of certain Frenchmen in Algeria, has been unwilling or unable to do so... Because it contains 8,000,000 unassimilated Moslems, Algeria is not a French province like Artois or Normandy". At the same time, because Algeria had 1,000,000 Frenchmen of metropolitan origin, it could not be a Muslim national State. Arguing that the restoration of order could not be the only objective or a precondition for reforms and pointing out that "the great majority of Moslems... (were) seeking anxiously for reasons for hope", Mollet warned that "we shall not keep Algeria unless we abandon our conservatism".
3. On 13 June, the Representatives of 13 countries belonging to the Asian-African group wrote to the President of the Security Council asking for an early meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation in Algeria under Article 35, paragraph 1, of the UN Charter. India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka did not sign this letter. R.S.S. Gunewardene of Sri Lanka, the chairman of the group at this time, said on 14 June that instead of asking the Security Council to consider the Algerian situation, the Asian-African group should take some other steps in this matter. He added that Sri Lanka had completely identified itself with the Indian point of view.

5. Message to H.S.Malik¹

Prime Minister has seen your telegram² on Algeria. In the circumstances you have reported, Krishna Menon will not stop in Paris as arranged.³ Since both we here and you have informed the French Government of Krishna Menon's visit, it should be explained that the change in his plans is on your advice that the visit is not timely. It should also be pointed out that Prime Minister's statement has had considerable effect in many quarters of slowing down the demand for Security Council action and had improved the attitude towards the French in regard to this question. It also shifted the emphasis towards Arab and Asian countries to the ending of the fighting and negotiation and the recognition of the special circumstances of Algeria.

We have at present advised the French that Prime Minister's statement is not only addressed to both sides, but that the appeal is largely based upon what he himself has learnt from Pineau and the statements and talks of French statesmen thereafter.

It is clear to us that there will be further deterioration in the situation if the French continue to wage war in Algeria, whatever views Lacoste⁴ may have

1. Message received from Nehru on the telephone from Mumbai on 2 June 1956, for onward transmission to H.S. Malik, the Ambassador of India in Paris, on behalf of N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA. JN Collection.
2. Malik, in his telegram of 31 May to Pillai, stated that Robert Lacoste, the French Resident-Minister in Algeria, had recently emphasized the following two points: (i) that Algeria would remain French, and (ii) that no interference from outside was acceptable. Malik added that Guy Mollet's Government strongly supported Lacoste's policy. He also pointed out that the press comments on Krishna Menon's impending visit to Paris for discussions with the French leaders on Algeria were generally not favourable. Malik therefore suggested that the follow-up in Paris of Prime Minister's proposals regarding Algeria might be postponed till Prime Minister's visit to Paris in July by which time, he felt, Lacoste's policy would have been demonstrated as a failure.
3. Nehru desired, in his telephonic message, that Pillai should inform Count Stanislas Ostrorog, the French Ambassador in New Delhi, about the change in Krishna Menon's programme.
4. Robert Lacoste (1898-1989); French socialist politician; during the World War II, he organized the first trade union resistance group; held various ministerial posts; Resident-Minister, Algeria, 1956-58.

about ultimate policies.⁵ We fear also that there will be a setback in the hopes of improvement and renewed demand for other type of action once it is known that the French reaction to our suggestion is unreceptive in character.

We would like to know, for our information, how Pineau himself and others reacted when you informed them of Prime Minister's statement and Krishna Menon's visit and also whether the impressions you have conveyed are to any extent from reliable sources. Our information is that as a result of Prime Minister's statement, Arab opinion, at first cautious, has begun to react favourably⁶ and would be doing more and more so should a more moderate attitude have been made known to Algerians. All this is in the expectation that some progress will ensue.

You will in any event inform the French Government that both Prime Minister's statement and Krishna Menon's visit were not, so far as we were concerned, by way of interference and arose solely out of our own concern and because we felt that it provided an honourable basis for the initiative of the parties themselves. Krishna Menon will now go direct to London where he has heavy programme. This will explain his not halting in Paris.⁷

5. Malik reported that Lacoste, in his conversations with the leaders of the centrist political parties, had argued that the Europeans in Algeria were too powerful to permit any satisfactory settlement, and it could "only be achieved if strong action taken against rebels at same time as land (and other social) reforms carried out". Malik added that Lacoste was "gradually but surely nobbling away at the power of European extremists in Algeria" and was hopeful that if given three months he could "bring Europeans...to more reasonable frame of mind and Algerians to accept reasonable settlement as against extreme demands of both at present".
6. Malik stated that the Representatives of the Middle East and North African countries in Paris were completely non-committal in their reactions to Nehru's proposals regarding Algeria.
7. Pillai informed Malik on 2 June that Pineau, in a message had stated that he would be "most happy" to meet Krishna Menon and have a talk with him on 5 June. In view of this, Pillai said, "we think and you will no doubt agree that Krishna Menon should adhere to his present programme". Eventually, Krishna Menon made a halt in Paris and met Pineau on 5 June. See also the next item.

6. Recognizing Algeria's Distinctive Personality¹

Selim Malek: Mr Prime Minister, in the light of Mr Krishna Menon's talks with the French Foreign Minister in Paris regarding your plan for the settlement of the Algerian problem, do you feel that there is any chance that France will accept your proposals and if not, what attitude would India take with regard to raising the issue now in the Security Council.

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is, of course, no question that we are all in favour of the freedom of Algeria. What we suggested was that the killings should stop. There should be an immediate ceasefire because no progress can be made while massacres are going on. Otherwise, the situation worsens and any settlement becomes very difficult. Therefore, what we suggested was for the Algerians and the French to start discussions based on the recognition of the separate entity and personality of Algeria. I cannot say now what are the reactions of the French or the Algerians. They have neither accepted nor rejected our suggestions.² It is for the parties concerned to take advantage or not of this opportunity to reach an understanding.

Since India made the suggestion for direct talks between the two parties, it would not be fitting for us at the same time to go to the Security Council. Let us be practical. The Security Council is not likely to do much even if you succeed in placing the issue on the agenda which is itself most improbable. This would put new barriers to mutual talks. We hope that a move in the Security Council will not be undertaken now.³

1. Interview with Selim Malek, special correspondent of *Al Gomhouria* (Cairo). *National Herald*, 16 June 1956. The interview was given a few days earlier in New Delhi.
2. Speaking in the French National Assembly on 5 June, Mollet said that Nehru's five-point suggestion for the settlement of the Algerian question was unacceptable to France because it introduced the idea of a mediator, though he was convinced, he added, that Nehru had made the proposal with the greatest respect for France's position. Pineau, in a statement issued after his talks with Krishna Menon on 5 June, said that he and Menon had discussed the points raised by Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 22 May; that he (Pineau) had explained to Menon the difficulties confronting the French Government in Algeria; and that Menon had stressed the need for a pacific settlement of the problem in a manner which would take French interests in Algeria into account. Menon also said that no "practical conclusions" had been arrived at.
3. The UN Security Council, meeting on 26 June 1956, rejected a request put forward by 13 Asian-African countries that it should debate the Algerian situation.

SM: Do you intend to discuss this question with the French and Egyptian leaders when you visit their respective capitals shortly?

JN: Certainly, this will be one of the questions to be discussed. As far as Egypt is concerned, my talks with Col. Nasser will cover a wide range of subjects, including Algeria. His advice will be very valuable.

SM: You stated recently that military alliances have increased world tension. In view of the recent developments in the world, particularly the easing of tension among the big powers, what future do you envisage for such alliances?

JN: I think that the tendency in the future will be away from such alliances. They may continue in name but not in substance and importance. They will gradually fade away.

SM: Does India have any plan to exchange diplomatic missions with Israel?

JN: There is no proposal for the exchange of diplomatic missions with Israel at present.

XII. SINGAPORE

1. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your telegram 1111 May 10th about David Marshall.²

2. It is difficult for us to advise Marshall and make ourselves in any sense

1. New Delhi, 11 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. David Saul Marshall (b. 1908); Singapore politician and diplomatist; Chief Minister of Singapore, 1955-56; Ambassador to France, 1978-93, to Portugal and Spain, 1981-93 and to Switzerland, 1990-93.

responsible for his decision and consequences that would flow from it.³ As you point out, his own colleagues pull in different directions. Because of this, Marshall's bargaining power must be very limited. His first endeavour should be to have some unity in his own delegation.⁴

3. In such matters, theoretical advice does not carry one far and I am not fully acquainted with Singapore situation to judge of practical results of any decision. I should imagine that Colonial Office proposals would certainly be unacceptable to almost every major group in Singapore and would lead to internal crisis there. We cannot ask Marshall to tone down his demands which are moderate enough in the circumstances.⁵ On the other hand, we cannot take responsibility for encouraging him to break on this issue as this will put us in an embarrassing position.

4. Probably, the best course would be, as you suggest, that Malcolm MacDonald should explain Singapore situation and especially Marshall's viewpoint to UK Ministers.⁶

5. I would repeat that we should not get entangled in this matter.⁷

3. Marshall had led an all-party delegation to a conference on Singapore's constitutional future which opened in London on 23 April and met Mrs Pandit, India's High Commissioner to the UK, on 10 May. She stated in her telegram that Marshall had told her that while he had agreed to let Britain control defence and external affairs and suspend the constitution in the event of danger to defence and internal security, the Colonial Office insisted on overriding powers to issue Orders-in-Council in these situations. Marshall was unable to convince the Colonial Office that acceptance of the latter's formula or failure of the conference would play into communist hands and serious disorders would ensue. Mrs Pandit added, "Marshall asked my advice. I think he expects me to ask you as well".
4. Mrs Pandit stated: "Main opposition, People's Action Party, which is communist infiltration, is prepared to accept Colonial Office offer with view subverting and wrecking Constitution from within. It expects increase in strength as Marshall...himself would be discredited in Singapore due to failure to get real self-government. Some delegates belonging to Marshall's Labour Front are prepared to accept as alternative would be rioting and bloodshed. Right-wing Liberal-Socialist delegates are happy at anything they can get".
5. The Singapore Legislative Assembly adopted on 5 April, a resolution instructing the delegation visiting London to seek for Singapore "the status of an independent territory within the Commonwealth", while letting Britain control defence and external affairs.
6. Mrs Pandit stated that Malcolm MacDonald, UK High Commissioner to India, was in London and apparently understood Marshall's point of view "but according to Marshall, (MacDonald) has been asked by Colonial Office to press Marshall to accept the (British) formula". She thought Marshall might use MacDonald to place his point of view before Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary.
7. The London talks broke down on 15 May.

2. David Marshall's Visit to New Delhi¹

You might reply to this telegram² as follows:

“Marshall sent message to our Prime Minister that he would like to break journey in Delhi and have talks with him. Prime Minister replied that Marshall could do so and he would gladly meet him. While in Delhi, we would treat him as our guest.³

It is not correct to say that he was specially invited to come to Delhi. It is not necessary, however, for you to issue any contradiction. Prime Minister does not intend to get entangled in Singapore affairs. It was as a matter of courtesy that he agreed to Marshall breaking journey in Delhi.⁴

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 21 May 1956. File No. 258(M)-SEA/55, MEA.
2. R.K. Tandon, Indian Commissioner in Singapore and Federation of Malaya, informed that the *Straits Times* had on 21 May published a despatch from London saying that Marshall would break his journey in New Delhi “at the invitation of Government of India” to discuss the failure of the London talks.
3. Marshall had talks with Nehru on 23 May.
4. On 22 May, Nehru wrote to Mrs Pandit that if someone in the British Government asked her about Marshall's visit, she might say that it was at the instance of Marshall, and that there “was no question of any desire on my part to have talks with him about Singapore. Indeed, I have no wish to interfere in this matter”.

3. David Marshall's Proposed Visit to China¹

With reference to the attached telegram,² you might send the following reply:

Your telegram 10711 of June 11. It is very difficult for us to advise Marshall in this matter. Normally speaking, there can be no harm in his going to China, and it might even have some good results. If he went, probably it would be better to go in a trade delegation, but we are unable to appraise reactions in Singapore and how these reactions will affect the situation there. Perhaps, because of what you point out, the disadvantages of going might outweigh the advantages.³

In any event, it would be embarrassing for our name to be mentioned in this connection.⁴

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 12 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. R.K. Tandon had informed Desai that Marshall, who had resigned from Chief Ministership on 7 June, proposed visiting China "to persuade Chinese leaders (1) to advise local Chinese in Singapore and Malaya to identify themselves with these countries and (2) to ask the Malaya Communist Party to stop the violent movement". He further said that "Marshall feels his visit will lessen tension", and had "asked me to obtain your advice" if it would be proper for him to undertake the visit. Widespread rioting by Chinese students and a wave of strikes by communist dominated unions had led to a serious situation in Singapore during May and June.
3. Tandon indicated that Marshall's visit was not likely to have the support of Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malayan statesman and Chief Minister, and even of some Labour Front Ministers and would invite the wrath of the Americans and the British. He added: "Marshall, however, looks to long term relationship with China in view of large Chinese population here and close proximity of China...(and) believes that with this visit it will become easy for local Chinese to take out Singapore and (Malaya) Federation citizenships".
4. Marshall wanted Nehru to send a letter to Chou En-lai.

XIII. OTHER COUNTRIES

1. Conversation with the Ethiopian Ambassador¹

The Ethiopian Ambassador² came to see me this afternoon. I enquired from him about the visit of the Emperor to India. He said that he was likely to come here about the end of October and to spend three to four weeks in India.³

2. He then said that he had a special message for me from the Emperor. The Emperor wished to express his high regard for the Five Principles and the importance he attached to the Bandung Conference which had brought Asian and African nations closer to each other. He was anxious to strengthen the existing good relations between India and Ethiopia.

3. He said that he wished to discuss a number of points with me but he would do so later or, perhaps, he might discuss them first with one of our senior officers. I agreed and suggested that he might meet the Foreign Secretary. (I thought that the Foreign Secretary was in charge of Ethiopia. Subsequently, I discovered that this was in the charge of the Commonwealth Secretary).

4. I asked him to indicate the nature of points he wished to discuss with us. He referred to the difficulties Ethiopia was experiencing with her neighbouring countries. I asked him if Egypt was one of these countries. He seemed to agree. Then, I asked him about the Sudan. He said that their relations with the Sudan were very good. He said that the Emperor was anxious to live in friendship with the neighbouring countries and he would like us to help in removing some of their difficulties.

5. Another point he wished to discuss with me was the policy of colonial powers in Ethiopia.

6. I told him that we would be happy to help Ethiopia in so far as it lay in our power. It was obviously desirable for neighbouring countries to live in friendship with each other.

1. Note to V.K. Krishna Menon, Secretary General, Foreign Secretary, and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 7 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. Ras Haile Selassie Imru.

3. Haile Selassie I, the Emperor of Ethiopia, arrived in Mumbai on 25 October 1956 on a three-week State visit to India.

7. I told him that our Ambassador in Ethiopia, who was here, was leaving soon. Would he like him to join in these talks? The Ethiopian Ambassador said he would certainly like this and, unless it was urgently necessary for our Ambassador to go back to Ethiopia, he might stay on for these talks.

8. I then spoke to Shri Niranjan Singh Gill, our Ambassador. He told me that he intended leaving Delhi on the 10th May. At my suggestion, he has postponed his departure to the 13th May.

9. I have spoken to CS and asked him to fix up an early interview with the Ethiopian Ambassador and to ask Shri Niranjan Singh Gill to be present at it.

2. To Habib Bourguiba¹

New Delhi
13 May 1956

My dear Prime Minister,²

I was glad to receive your predecessor's³ letter of April 11, 1956. The Government and people of India sincerely rejoice with the people of Tunisia at their achievement of independence after a hard and bitter struggle, in which you yourself have taken such an outstanding part.⁴ We look forward to Tunisia's participation in the United Nations and its agencies.⁵ Immediately on receipt of your predecessor's letter, we issued instructions that our delegation should support Tunisia's candidature to full membership of the World Health Organization.

I am happy to see from press reports that Tunisia has since been admitted to full membership of the World Health Organization.

With personal regards and best wishes for the happiness and prosperity of your country.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Bourguiba became the Prime Minister of Tunisia on 15 April 1956.

3. Tahar Ben Ammar.

4. Bourguiba led a nationalist movement in Tunisia, which had been a protectorate of France since 1881. On 1 September 1955, Tunisia attained full internal autonomy and on 20 March 1956, France recognized Tunisia's independence.

5. Tunisia became a member of the UN on 26 July 1956.

3. To Obafemi Awolowo¹

New Delhi
15 May 1956

My dear Premier,²

I must apologize to you for the great delay that has occurred in my sending you a reply to your letter which reached me on the 7th March.³ As soon as I received it, I issued instructions for the officers you wanted to be selected. I thought this would be done without undue delay. I was so busy with other matters that I did not enquire about this.

As a matter of fact, we did select a good man to function as Adviser on Industrial Development. This took some time, as competent people are engaged in some undertaking and not easy to obtain. Ultimately, we did get a man who was quite suitable for your purposes. When everything was practically fixed up, he suddenly dropped out for personal reasons and left us in the lurch. I am very sorry for this delay.⁴ We are trying to find some other person now.

As for the Community Development Officer, we have chosen a man, Shri J. Mehta, and he will await your further directions. He can go to Nigeria as soon as you wish it. I have sent you a telegram⁵ to this effect.

We are anxious to help you to the best of our ability in regard to experts or technical personnel. But I must confess that sometimes it is a little difficult to

1. JN Collection.
2. Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1987); Nigerian politician; Minister of Local Government and leader of Government Business, Western Region, 1952-54; Premier, Western Region, 1954-59; leader of the Opposition in Federal Parliament, 1960-May-1962; detained, May 1962; on trial for treasonable felony and conspiracy from November 1962, and sentenced to ten years imprisonment, September 1963; released, August 1966; Vice-Chairman, Federal Executive Council, and in charge of Ministry of Finance, 1967-71; leader, Unity Party of Nigeria, since 1979; wrote, among others, *Path to Nigerian Freedom and Awo* (autobiography).
3. In his letter sent in February 1956, Awolowo asked for the services of two officers for the Government of the Western Region of Nigeria.
4. In a note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA on 14 May, Nehru expressed surprise that after "this long period of nine or ten weeks we can only suggest the name of a Community Development Officer and not an Advisor for Industrial Development". Nehru thought that the salary of 1,000 and other terms offered by Prime Minister Awolowo were generous, and added, "I am sorry that some of our officers are so money-conscious that they want to haggle for more. This is not a good trait or something to be commended".
5. Not printed.

find suitable men. Our own demands for them are great and increasing. We are just in the early stages of our Second Five Year Plan. In fact, I placed this Plan before our Parliament today. In this Plan we have undertaken a very big task indeed and we shall have to work very hard. Probably, the chief difficulty we shall find is lack of suitable trained people, whom we require by the thousand. We are trying to train them up rapidly.

I have noted with interest what you say about the constitutional developments in Nigeria. I need not tell you that we are following these developments with the greatest interest and we shall be happy to learn that your Region has obtained self-government within the Federation.

I remember with pleasure the visit you paid to us in Delhi.⁶

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Awolowo visited India for a fortnight from 11 November 1952 to study the electoral system and see the important factories, agricultural centres and scientific, educational and medical institutions.

4. Message to J.B. Tito¹

I have been greatly looking forward to meeting you and having talks with you. In fact, this was one of the reasons why we had decided to have our Conference of Heads of Missions at Bled. I now find that owing to important parliamentary work here in July,² I must return earlier. I have regretfully therefore to give up the idea of having our Conference at Bled.³ But if it is convenient to you, I

1. New Delhi, 16 May 1956. JN Collection. This message was sent through India's ambassador.
2. Nehru decided to return to India early to participate in the debate on States Reorganization Bill.
3. A conference of Heads of Indian Missions, proposed to be held at Bled, Yugoslavia, in July 1956, had to be cancelled due to the change in Nehru's programme.

would very much like to meet you. I suggest that we should reach Pula at noon on 18th July and spend about 24 hours at Brioni, leaving early afternoon on 19th July. I hope that this will be convenient to you and we shall have the pleasure of meeting you and Madame Broz then. My daughter will be accompanying me.⁴

4. On 29 May, Nehru telegraphed to Ali Yavar Jung, the Indian Ambassador in Egypt, that he had received a message from Tito suggesting that Nasser, who was visiting Yugoslavia, might conclude his visit so as to be at Brioni on 18 July.

5. To the King of Saudi Arabia¹

New Delhi
10 June 1956

Your Majesty,²

I am deeply moved by Your Majesty's gracious message of the 16th *Shawwal*, 1375,³ with which Your Majesty has sent the generous donation of a million rupees towards the establishment of a medical college and hospital by the Muslim University of Aligarh.⁴ This gift in a noble cause is further proof of Your Majesty's friendship and fraternal feelings for the people of India and will, I am sure, evoke deep appreciation not only in the Aligarh Muslim University but among all sections of the Indian people. So far as the Government of India is concerned, Your Majesty is already well aware of our interest in the cause of higher education and especially in the Aligarh Muslim University. We shall continue in the future, as we have done in the past, to do everything possible to assist the University in the realization of its noble aims. Your Majesty

1. JN Collection.

2. King Abdul Aziz Bin Ibn Saud.

3. Corresponding to 27 May 1956 of the Gregorian calendar. *Shawwal* is the tenth month of the Islamic calendar.

4. See also *ante*, p. 168.

may be assured that the scheme towards which Your Majesty has made such a great contribution will receive our full support.

I am grateful for Your Majesty's expression of pleasure at the happiness and advancement of the people of India who profess the Muslim faith and at the attention given to them by the Government of India. So far as we are concerned, our Muslim compatriots are as much an integral part of India's body politic as any other community or religious group. We treat them with respect and they enjoy the same rights, privileges and opportunities as other Indians. Our Government is determined that they shall always continue to do so.

Your Majesty's visit to India⁴ is still fresh in our memories. To the people of India and to me personally, it gave the opportunity and privilege to meet and to know Your Majesty. The solicitude and brotherly affection for our country which Your Majesty showed during the visit have bound us and our countries by indissoluble fraternal ties.

I send Your Majesty best wishes for Your Majesty's health and for the prosperity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. At the invitation of the Government of India, King Saud paid a State visit to India from 27 November to 13 December 1955 in the course of which he visited Delhi, Shimla, Agra, Aligarh, Banaras, Nagpur, Bangalore, Hyderabad and Mumbai.

6. Admission of Japan in the UN¹

The Japanese Ambassador² saw me this morning. He had really come with Mr Y. Maki,³ the leader of the expedition to Manaslu. After Mr Maki went away, the

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 15 June 1956. JN Collection.
2. Sejiro Yoshizawa.
3. Leader of the successful Japanese expedition to Manaslu in the Himalayas in May 1956 and a former president of the Japanese Alpine Association.

Japanese Ambassador stayed on and referred to Japan being taken into the United Nations. He said that this matter would come up in November next before the UN and he wanted our support. Already most of the Bandung nations had promised support and also the countries of the Commonwealth have been sympathetic.

2. I told him that we were anxious to have Japan inside the UN. In fact, we had expressed our regret that Japan was not taken in on the last occasion.⁴ Whenever this question comes up, we shall support the admission of Japan into the UN.⁵

4. In December 1955, Japan's application for membership of the UN was vetoed by the USSR.
5. Consequent upon the formal ending of the state of war between Japan and the USSR through a bilateral agreement which came into force on 12 December 1956, a Japanese application for membership of the UN was unanimously approved by the Security Council the same day.

XIV. GENERAL

1. Invitations from Foreign Organizations to Individuals and Organizations in India¹

We should make it known to foreign Governments through our Missions that the Government of India expect invitations to Indian nationals to come through the Government. We would discourage the practice of invitations being sent direct to individuals or organizations in India even if the organizations issuing the invitations are not under State control. This should be made known to our Missions abroad but they need not take up the matter immediately with the Governments. They can make our policy known when applications for visas are received by them. Our policy in this matter should also be made known to Ministries in the Government of India so that if applications for visas are

1. Directions given at a meeting with the Secretary General and some other senior Secretaries of the MEA, New Delhi, 10 May 1956, and recorded by S. Dutt, Foreign Secretary, the same day. File No.35-29/56-PVI, MEA.

sponsored by foreign Missions in India they should be dealt with in accordance with this general principle.

2 Invitations to students in India should be routed through the Vice-Chancellors. This should also be made known to foreign Governments through our Missions abroad and the Vice-Chancellors should be informed of our policy. Our passport officers in India should be informed of this policy decision. If any application for passport is received from a student or any other youngman to go to a foreign country on an invitation received from abroad it should be checked up whether such an invitation has been properly routed.

3 Vice-Chancellors should be told to consult university unions before they recommend any student for grant of passport facilities for going abroad in answer to invitations from foreign countries.

2. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
13 May 1956

My dear T.T.,

I had a talk with Syed Mahmud this evening, and he told me about his visit to various Arab countries.² In the Sudan, he said that there were hardly any Indian goods on display, although the merchants were Indians. On enquiry, they said that they used to get Indian textiles but now they cannot get them. So, their shops were full of textiles from Europe or even Pakistan. Also, Ceylon tea was in evidence everywhere and very well advertised all over the Arab world and, more especially, in Cairo. Indian tea was not mentioned in advertisements. In nearly all the Arab countries, there was a certain desire to purchase Indian goods rather than European or American, but they knew very little of what India produced or could sell. There was a great demand for small machines. They were much surprised to learn that we were producing many types of small machines.

1. JN Collection.

2. Syed Mahmud, Minister in the Ministry of External Affairs, made a four-week tour of West Asia and returned to India on 29 April 1956.

Syria apparently produces large quantities of cement and is putting up additional factories for cement. They are prepared to sell it to India.

In Cairo, we had a good showroom but the stuff on display has been there for a long time without change.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
17 May 1956

My dear Mahavir,²

Your letter of May 15th. Thank you for the maps of the border you have sent me. These will be very useful in considering these questions.

I note that in the big map the name 'Bharat' is used. The use of this should be avoided in our maps or indeed, in any international context. 'India' is the continuing international entity. You must have noticed that Pakisatan insists on calling our country Bharat. There is some meaning in this. Of course, colloquially or in Hindi we use the term Bharat.

I am handing over your maps to the External Affairs Ministry. I suppose they can keep them.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. Minister of Defence Organization.

4. To Homi J. Bhabha¹

New Delhi
20 May 1956

My dear Homi,²

Thank you for your two letters of May 18. I had read something about the Russian lecture at Harwell³ in the English papers.

As for Bertrand Russell's suggestion, these questions cannot be considered in isolation from one another. It is absurd to say that we should destroy the existing stocks of nuclear bombs and leave everything else where it is. The proposal to ban future experiments also represents much more a general reaction than a specific proposal. The general reaction is a good one and it includes many other things also. In fact, it includes the general lessening of tension all round.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, and Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India.
3. Igor Kurchatov, Russia's leading authority on atomic energy, lectured at the Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell, UK, on 25 April 1956. His lecture was arranged by the UK Atomic Energy Authority. Its substance was that the controlled release of energy by fusion or thermonuclear reactions might be secured.

5. Cultural Delegations to Foreign Countries¹

As I stated previously, I agreed with the general approach indicated in the Foreign Secretary's note of the 21st April. Since then, I received a letter from our High Commissioner in London pointing out that while we were sending cultural delegations to a number of countries like the USSR, China, South East Asia as well as some of the East European countries, a place like the United

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 5 June 1956. JN Collection.

Kingdom was left out of the picture, although such a delegation would not only be greatly appreciated there but would definitely help in bringing knowledge of India's culture to people who are eager to know something about it.² Also, there were thousands of Indian students there.

2. What the Education Minister had said about our forcing our delegations on countries which have declined to offer hospitality to them was, of course, completely right. As a matter of fact, as far as I remember, even some of these countries later changed their minds and offered hospitality.

3. But the question is not a simple one. In countries like the United Kingdom or France or the USA or Western Germany or some others in Western Europe it is not the practice for the State to invite cultural delegations. At the most some semi-official organization may invite them, but usually even this also is not done. In other words, the practice prevailing in communist countries and in some others is not applicable to these Western European or American countries. They have no provision for this kind of thing and they are not used to it, although they would undoubtedly welcome such delegations. We have, therefore, to decide as to whether we should rule out all such countries. I think that would be undesirable and we have to find some way of sending our leading artistes to these places.

4. The whole conception of a mixed cultural delegation is rather a novel one and has been started chiefly by the communist countries which function on a State basis in regard to these matters. If we have to send a troupe of artistes, say, to the UK, it will hardly be called a delegation of that type. It would consist of selected artistes capable of displaying certain aspects of Indian cultural activities to audiences there. Probably, this will not be a financial burden on us, though there may be some little deficit. Of course, if we encourage such a delegation or troupe to go there, we should previously find out if this is agreeable to the Government concerned. We cannot ask that Government to sponsor it directly and give it its hospitality as that is not the custom there. I would suggest that this matter might be worked out in some detail in connection with the UK and France and, may be, one or two other countries roundabout. In fact, when our High Commissioner in London suggested this, I asked her to frame some precise proposals. We could then consider them specifically and not vaguely as a matter of principle. There is hardly any principle involved in this.

2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, India's High Commissioner in the UK, expressed these views in her letter of 15 May 1956 to Nehru. See *ante*, p. 454.

5. Then there is the question, mentioned by the Foreign Secretary, about Indian communities in far off places like Fiji. Obviously, they are not in a position to invite. Nor can we expect the colonial authorities to do so. And yet, it is desirable to give them some glimpse of Indian cultural activities. This can be considered separately.

6. This matter can certainly be discussed at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee when it is held, as suggested by the Education Minister. No formal note need be prepared. Meanwhile, a copy of this note might be sent to the Education Minister.

6. Issue of Passports for Conferences¹

A day or two ago you asked me about some women's delegation which had been invited to go to Hungary. This was evidently some communist show there. We decided that we should not encourage this to go. This decision has apparently put out a number of women, chiefly connected with the Communist Party directly or indirectly, who had planned to go. It is not clear how they were going to pay for their passages according to our rules. It is evident that some of them at least find some way of getting this passage money paid through foreign sources.

I was given to understand, that some kind of vague assurance had been given to them previously that there would be no difficulty in getting passports. I do not know how this was done and who did it.

We have already laid down some broad rules governing the issue of passports for conferences and the like outside. I think, we should put them down clearly so that there should be no doubt left both in our Ministry as well as among those who normally require these facilities. It is true that no rules can be very rigidly applied. Nevertheless, the presence of these rules would be helpful.

Also, it should be clearly understood that we are not going to encourage at all, direct invitations from foreign countries to organizations here.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 10 June 1956. JN Collection.

13
INTERVIEWS

1. Remembering Motilal Nehru¹

K.G. Saiyidain: Panditji, people who came into contact with your illustrious father remember two outstanding traits of his personality. They remember him as a man of great resolution and strong convictions and also as one who cultivated the most refined tastes and savoured the cultured graces of life. Could you tell us something to illustrate how these two qualities blended into his personality?

Jawaharlal Nehru: It is very difficult for me to discuss my father. He created, naturally, a very great impression upon me, not only because he was my father but because he was what he was. I remember, after his death, among the many tributes paid to him, the chief justice of a high court, an Englishman, saying about him that wherever he sat at a table he became the head of a table.²

KGS: Very well put.

JN: Or you might say whenever he went to a gathering he became, in a sense, the centre of that gathering. He was a link, a bridge, or call it what you like, between different phases of history and social development. He combined in himself very much the mixed culture of Northern India affected by the new culture of the West. So, in that sense he was a mixed product. But more important than all these cultural accomplishments, which played an important part in his life, no doubt, was his personality.

KGS: What would you regard as the most dominant trait of his personality?

JN: He became a successful lawyer by perseverance, not because he was helped by others. In a sense, he was a self-made man. I have no doubt that he would have succeeded in any other walk of life he had undertaken. In normal times he remained a very successful lawyer and a successful politician.

KGS: Yes.

JN: But in abnormal times also he would have risen to the top. Maybe in earlier times of trouble, he might have been a captain and a founder of some principality.

1. Interview with K.G. Saiyidain, Secretary and Education Adviser to the Government of India, Ministry of Education. It was broadcast on 6 May 1956 on the occasion of the birth anniversary of Motilal Nehru, AIR tapes, NMML.
2. Grimwood Mears, Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, said this on 6 February 1931 while offering the condolences of the Bench to the bereaved family.

KGS: Intriguing thought!

JN: He was something like what is often called a Renaissance prince.

KGS: Yes.

JN: As it was, he came into contact with an overpowering personality like Gandhi and the new movement and the new historic sweep that came to India with Gandhi.

KGS: Yes.

JN: It was, I have no doubt, a tremendous struggle for him to uproot himself and to fit himself into this new environment.

KGS: And he was able to do it successfully?

JN: Yes, he faced that struggle and ultimately came to the decision that he must participate in it fully because that answered another important call on him, that, his pride, his dignity, his refusal to submit, whether as an individual or a group or a nation. And so he became, while remaining himself, a completely changed individual.

KGS: And a part of this new big national movement that was developing?

JN: A part, of course, but something much more than a part. Democracy is, on the whole, a great leveller.....

KGS: That is true.

JN: And persons like my father might have been in an ordinary democratic age a successful politician, a prime minister. But there are many prime ministers and many successful politicians and he had something far more than that, because of his strong will, strong urge to succeed in whatever he undertook.

KGS: Now, Sir, if I may ask you what would you regard as his most important contribution in the building up of new India?

JN: I don't know. The new India was essentially made by Gandhiji's movement. But my father brought into that movement a new type, which was that strong, dominant type, which might have succeeded in any department of life, and, at the same time, with full control. I think that type coming in did make a tremendous difference because that type was a rare type.

KGS: You mean the type that preserved its full individuality and was yet a part of this great movement?

JN: He preserved his individuality, was a part of the movement, affected the movement, in some directions considerably, and, I have no doubt, had some influence on Gandhiji himself. I might tell you that so far I am personally

concerned, the three men who have influenced me most in my life have been my father, Gandhiji and Rabindranath Tagore.

KGS: I see.

JN: The first two more than the last one because I came into contact with Tagore rather in the later years when I had been conditioned, more or less, by my father and Gandhiji. Nevertheless, Rabindranath had a very considerable influence on me. It is interesting to remember that my father and Rabindranath Tagore were born on the same day, month and year.

KGS: It is most interesting indeed and that it would appear as if your father had something of the great cultural qualities of Rabindranath Tagore.....

JN: Well.....

KGS: And the national urges that prompted Gandhiji in his work?

JN: National urges, of course, was then a common factor in all these three. But I doubt if you could find three persons who were more different from each other than Gandhiji, my father and Rabindranath and yet there were these enormous bonds and links in their thought and action, and to some extent their culture too. Again, there are so many facets of culture that it takes different shapes in different individuals.

KGS: I thought socially and culturally he would be nearer to Rabindranath Tagore.

JN: Of course, obviously, he would be.

KGS: Could you tell us something of what you would regard as a cherished moment in your association with your father? It is a very personal question, I know.

JN: I have so many memories of him, vivid memories. But I think, I remember most the last time I saw him when he visited me in Naini prison just a few days before his death. He was terribly ill and his face showed it. But throughout that brief interview his strong and dominant will not to give in to illness or death was apparent. He refused to recognize it and almost conveyed to me the impression that he would refuse to die, whatever happens.

KGS: He was essentially a great fighter I must say.

JN: He was a great fighter, specially when the odds were against him.

2. Interview with Michael Brecher-1¹

Michael Brecher:² I recall, Mr Prime Minister, that in your statement before the Allahabad Court in 1922,³ on the eve of your second imprisonment, you observed that when you returned to India ten years earlier you had thought and felt more like an Englishman than an Indian. One wonders, then what attracted a person with your prevailing outlook, educational background, and social and economic status to the political arena in India, so soon after you returned from your education abroad?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, surely, that is a question I have dealt with, or tried to deal with, in my *Autobiography*.⁴ So far as political matters were concerned, even in England, I was, if I may say so, an Indian nationalist desiring India's freedom and rather inclined, in the context of Indian politics, to the more extreme wing of it, as represented then by Mr Tilak.⁵ And so I came back here. There was no sudden change when I came back. It took about two or three years. The real thing that one was searching for was a way of expression, a way of action; the views were there, and that way of expression ultimately came with Mr Gandhi. Others came with Mr Tilak. I was not much in contact with Mr Tilak, Mrs Besant⁶ attracted me and I was on the Home Rule

1. New Delhi, 6 June 1956. *National Herald*, 13-14 July, 31 July and 5 August 1956. In the preface to his book *Nehru: A Political Biography*, Michael Brecher acknowledged Nehru's "many kindnesses", among others, "for allowing me to spend three days on tour with him in a relaxed and informal atmosphere; for consenting to unrehearsed interviews in June 1956 and for allowing me to use the verbatim record as I saw fit".
2. Michael Brecher (b. 1925); Canadian political scientist and author; appointments: faculty, McGill University, Montreal, 1952-63, Professor, 1963-93, RB Angus Professor, since 1993, wrote, among others, *The Struggle for Kashmir* (1953), *Nehru: A Political Biography* (1959), *The New States of Asia* (1963), *Succession in India* (1966), *Political Leadership in India* (1969), *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (1972), *Studies in Crisis Behaviour* (1979), *Crises in the Twentieth Century* (1988), *A Study of Crisis* (1997); Founder (1969) and later president of Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute.
3. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 1, pp. 252-257.
4. Published in 1936.
5. Bal Gangadhar Tilak.
6. Annie Besant, founder of the Home Rule League and President of the Indian National Congress in 1917.

League and all that. But it was only when Mr Gandhi put forward his message of action, etc., that I had a sense of, well, fulfilment, if I may say so.

MB: Might one say, then, that your political consciousness really began during your educational experience in England and that the period from your return in 1912 until your active participation in the Indian national movement, with the coming of Gandhi, represents in a sense a period of gestation or training?

JN: Well, yes. In England, I felt like any average Indian student would feel; there was nothing peculiar about it. I came back here, I joined the movement immediately after coming back, that is the Indian National Congress; there was not very much doing then. Then came the First World War which rather put an end to political action. There was some action, of course, going on all the time. And then, after the War, came Gandhi.

MB: Now, Mr Prime Minister, you have dealt with the question of your association with Gandhi very frankly and rather exhaustively during your interview with Mr Mende some months ago.⁷ But there are a few questions which continue to puzzle me about this association. On many occasions, as related in your *Autobiography* and elsewhere, you found yourself profoundly disconcerted by Gandhi's decisions. Yet, ultimately, you followed his course of action. I find it difficult to understand this apparent duality and would therefore appreciate your reflections on these events years after they occurred.

JN: It is rather difficult to discuss these matters. There was this apparent duality and, to some extent, it continues even today, in regard to certain aspects of Mr Gandhi's thinking or action. But the duality did not really come in very much on the political plane. It was other matters which impinged on politics.

MB: Would you say it was largely matters concerning social and economic objective and policies in the free India which was to follow?

JN: Primarily, it was my lack of understanding of, well, what he called his inner voice. He would go on a fast. I didn't understand that—and I don't understand it still. Again, he referred to the Bihar Earthquake⁸ and said that was because India had the sin of untouchability. I didn't understand that and

7. Nehru had a series of conversations with Tibor Mende in New Delhi in December 1955 and January 1956. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 438-518.

8. According to official estimates, 7,253 people lost their lives in the earthquake in Bihar on 15 January 1934.

I don't understand it still.⁹ But, on the political plane, and I would say also to a considerable extent on the moral plane, he attracted me a great deal. Also, it is always difficult to describe a man who is rather unusual and a tremendous personality, and who gave an impression of enormous strength and inner reserves of power. I don't think his books or his writings bring it out; to some extent they do but not very much, his personality and all that. And then, his career was one of success. Not success on normal standards which you may have to apply, success in moulding the Indian people, in affecting the Indian people, in making them better than they were, stronger, braver, more disciplined. One saw that happening and all that affected one.

MB: Could you tell me, Sir, what it was that attracted you initially to Gandhi, bearing in mind the fact that in that very early period, I am thinking of 1919-1920, one gathers that your own prevailing outlook and way of life were fundamentally different from his?

JN: Yes, I think I met him first at the end of 1915.¹⁰ But before that, of course, I had heard a great deal about his activities in South Africa. We had admired those activities and we had collected money in support of *satyagrahis* in South Africa, because he was known to us a great deal by reputation and he was already a hero, in our minds. Then he came nearer to us; I saw him. He started some rather small campaigns. There was the Champaran campaign against the attempt to suppress the indigo peasants in 1917, then, later, there was a peasant struggle in Gujarat; all that. We saw him functioning, grouping and functioning, and functioning with success. It was so different from our method, the normal political method of a nationalist movement, which shouted a great deal and did little. Here was a man who did not shout at all. He spoke softly, gently and put forward what he thought were his minimum demands and stuck to them. There was an element of great strength about it. I remember very well how repeatedly he pulled up.... stressed the fact that you must not talk so vaguely. More specially, I remember, I think, I have written about it, when a deputation was going to see the Viceroy about those Muslim demands.

9. For Nehru's comments on the views of Mahatma Gandhi on the Bihar earthquake, see his *Autobiography*, p. 490.

10. Nehru recounted in his *Autobiography* that his first meeting with Mahatma Gandhi was about the time of the Lucknow Congress during Christmas in 1916. However, according to B.R. Nanda, a biographer of Nehru, he had first seen Gandhi at the Bombay Congress in December 1915; the following year they met during the Lucknow Session. See B.R. Nanda: *The Nehrus: Motilal and Jawaharlal* (1962), p. 158.

And when he read the memorandum which was going to be presented to the Viceroy, he refused to go on the deputation. He said, "all this is vague talk—and tall talk. All you have to say is simple, these are your minimum demands. If you do not get them, well, you propose to take some action about them."¹¹

MB: One thing, Sir, that has struck many people is that towards the very end of his life, I am thinking here largely of the decision on the Partition of India. You along with others found it necessary to follow a path to which he appeared to be firmly opposed. What were the circumstances which compelled this particular decision on your part, particularly in view of your dedication to a united sub-continent all during the Freedom Movement?

JN: I suppose, the compulsion of events, and the feeling that we could not get out of that deadlock or morass by pursuing the way we had done; it became worse and worse. Further, a feeling that even if, somehow, we got freedom for India, with that background, it would be a very weak India, that is, a federal India with far too great power in the federating units.

MB: So that it was preferable to have a partitioned India which would be strong and united rather than a large India which would be weak?

JN: Yes, a larger India which would be weak and which would have constant troubles, constant pulls, disintegrating pulls, and also, the fact that we saw no way of getting the freedom too—in the near future, I mean. And so we accepted this, we said let us build up a strong India. And, if the others, the Muslim League leaders and those who do not want to be in it, well, how can we and why should we force them to be in it?

MB: Would you say, in the perspective of 1956, that the partition of India was inevitable?

JN: The partition of India became inevitable, I should say, in less than a year before it occurred. It was not inevitable till the last year.

MB: Could you recall for me, very briefly the crucial acts or sequence of events which, in your opinion, sealed the issue of a divided or united India? Would you be inclined to date it from the collapse of the Cabinet Mission negotiation?

JN: No, that was a relatively minor event. In those days, when we joined the Government and a little before that, this was in August 1946, a few months

11. See Nehru's *Autobiography*.

before that, conditions were deteriorating, I think that one of the major reasons for that deterioration, apart from other obvious reasons, was that the British Government, or, perhaps, it is not quite correct to say the British Government, but the then Government of India, under British control, wanted Partition. Or, if you like to put it another way, it wanted to prevent India becoming free and therefore encouraged the idea of Partition.

MB: Can that be dated to the period preceding the War or does it assume....?

JN: No, I don't think that preceding the War they had any clear ideas about Partition or, indeed, wanted it. But obviously, throughout that period, and long before, the British Government's policy, like the policy of any such governing authority in a colonial territory, was to weaken the national movement. And the major way of weakening it was to play up the Muslim League and other dissident elements. And the Muslim League itself only gradually came to the Partition of India. I think, now, looking back, that Partition could have been stopped, if the British Government's policy had been different about a year or, say, 18 months before the Partition. It wanted to encourage them because, you must remember, the Muslim League was a very peculiar organization. It was controlled and led by people who were very very far from revolutionary. They were conservatives in every respect, in politics, in economic matters and social matters. But unfortunately, on religious background, functioning from there, they got the backing of considerable numbers of the Muslim masses.

MB: This dates really from the War-time period. I wonder, in that connection, thinking of the August 1942 Quit India movement, which was led by the Congress, whether it would be a stretch of historical imagination to consider that decision a great error of judgement in that it removed the Congress from the political arena, for all practical purposes, and gave the Muslim League an opportunity to build up its strength by appealing to the Muslim masses. The result was that by the end of the War the Muslim League, for the first time in its history emerged as a powerful political force with which the Congress and the British had to contend?

JN: I don't think so, I don't think that the action we took in 1942 could have been avoided or ought to have been avoided. It might have been in slightly different terms, that is a different matter. Circumstances drove us into a particular direction. If we had been passive then, I think, we would have lost all our strength. I really don't think that the Muslim League grew in strength in those days very much; to some extent it did. But the Muslim League's strength was essentially, if I may say so, due to two factors. One was the

encouragement given to it by the British Government. The other was a vague mass following on the religious ground. It was never a disciplined body; it was never a really well organized body. It was a vague conglomeration of various elements, chiefly negative, that is cursing the Congress, cursing the Hindus, and always considering itself as a kind of balancing factor playing off one against the other.

MB: From what you say, Mr Prime Minister, it would appear that in your opinion the onus for the Partition of the subcontinent must rest ultimately, on the then existing Government of India.

JN: Yes, the key men here. Take, for instance, some rather crucial things that happened in the course of that year. Both in Sind and in the North-West Frontier Province there were, shall I say, not Congress Governments—one was really a Congress Government and in Sind, for a short while, there was a semi-Congress Government. Now, I have no doubt that the then Governor of Sind¹² functioned in a very improper way, in a deliberately very unfair way, to put down that Government and allowed all kinds of tactics of the Muslim League, permitted them to take place. And Sind, being a rather backward province then, politically and chiefly governed by big clans, tribal people, you might say they succeeded. I might tell you that the then Governor of Sind took pride soon after the partition and said that “I brought about the Partition—as an English Governor”. He said that privately, of course, because, that was a turning point, you see, in Sind, deciding by a majority in favour of separating. And of course, you must remember that what we agreed to ultimately was not a Partition on a religious basis.

MB: Yes, I appreciate that fully.

JN: Although, of course, there was that there. We could not agree to it. We agreed to certain areas of India voting themselves out, voting themselves, that is in the assembly. Even in the Punjab, remember, at that time it was probably 55/45, as it was in the old assembly, that is, there was no overwhelming majority one way. So also in Bengal. There was just.....

MB: It was a marginal difference?

JN: Marginal difference and you see, it is only when there are marginal differences that a third party can play on them, and did play on them, and brought about a major result. Now, Sir, they could not play on us because we were overwhelming. They could not. They could withdraw a few persons from us, it made no difference to us. It did make a difference if a certain

12. Francis Mudie.

leader, a clan leader—this was family politics. Even now, in the Punjab, it is family politics. You read the names, they are big zamindars with a large number of people being supported by them.

MB: Whose allegiance they can command?

JN: Completely. That is still true in Sind and the Punjab. They have not got over that yet.

MB: I should like to return briefly to your association with Gandhi, Mr Prime Minister. Some years ago I believe it was in 1942, Mr Gandhi expressed the view that after his death you would follow his message more closely.¹³ I think it is fair to say that his prediction has come to pass. I would appreciate it very much if you could explain this metamorphosis.

JN: I can't. Whose metamorphosis—in whom?

MB: In the sense that...

JN: In me, or in somebody else?

MB: No, in your own, shall we say change, with regard to certain issues about which there may have been disagreement before, whereas now you find yourself speaking his language more closely and following his message in a way that was not true in the thirties or forties?

JN: I don't think that is so. Gandhi was an extraordinarily generous man. He had a remarkable capacity for winning over people, even opponents. If he could not win an opponent over, he somehow dulled his antagonism and his hostility, because, fundamentally I think, he just praised a person. That is too simple a thing, he did not do that, but he spotted the good points in a person and laid stress on them, and rather slurred over the bad points.

MB: I am thinking here, Mr Prime Minister, of one very important question, namely, the place of violence and non-violence. As I understand the position, before 1947, whereas Mr Gandhi conceived of non-violence as an absolute value or as a creed, you were inclined, at least at some stages in the thirties, to justify the use of non-violence

13. Speaking at the AICC meeting in Wardha on 15 January 1942, Mahatma Gandhi said that it was "baseless" for anybody to suggest that Nehru and he were estranged. "I have always said that not Rajaji, nor Sardar Vallabhbhai, but Jawaharlal will be my successor. He says whatever is uppermost in his mind, but he always does what I want. When I am gone he will do what I am doing now. Then he will speak my language too". (*Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. LXXV, p. 224).

on pragmatic grounds. After 1947, I think your speeches reveal the fact that it has become an article of faith with you as well. Now, on occasion, of course, as in Kashmir, Hyderabad and elsewhere, resort to violence has become necessary. To what extent would you say that a statesman who is responsible for the welfare of his people can rely on non-violence as an approach to the settlement of disputes? What constitutes, in your opinion, the boundary line beyond which resort to violence is justifiable and perhaps necessary?

JN: Well, may I just finish what I was saying previously. Gandhi said something about me, that I would speak his language more. I don't think that has any very special meaning except that he always managed to induce a person to behave in a particular way by expecting him to do so. That was there in him. And he pulled out a person—he was by no means a soft person with his colleagues or others. He was a hard taskmaster, but at the same time one could see his friendship and affection. Now, I don't think that I have changed my mind at all about violence or non-violence during the last 35 years—basically, I don't think so. I should imagine, indeed, that in the early twenties, at the beginning of this movement, in the first two or three years, I was much more powerfully influenced by him, in fact, to the extent, if I may say so, that my mind was sort of under his—not under his control, that is not right, but still more so than I was a few years later when I started questioning about violence and non-violence.

MB: Is it not true, Sir, that during the thirties, in some of your public speeches, you expressed the view that while violence was bad, slavery was worse, and that in certain conditions violence would become necessary?

JN: Well, yes. But Gandhi said once that he believed completely in non-violence, but he said cowardice is worse. And he said, "I prefer you to fight with arms than to run away." He said that, "I do not want the non-violence of the coward. I believe in the non-violence of the brave man". He said that repeatedly. But there is no great difference in that, because slavery is not non-violence, according to him. It is submission, it is submission to an evil which is not non-violence, according to him. You should not submit to an evil.

MB: So that it comes within the bounds of violence itself?

JN: Yes, that is submitting to violence. But he used to say, really, that the way to get rid of that evil is the non-violent method, both on grounds of principle and in practice, at any rate, as applied to India.

MB: If one reverts to this general question about the boundary line beyond which violence is justifiable and, indeed, necessary—looking

at the Indian scene at present, where would you draw the line beyond which resort to violence is necessary?

JN: It is very, very difficult to draw a line. It is really one's motive and one's desire to avoid violence. You see, you come back to the old question and the old difference between a prophet, and a prophetlike person who sticks to the straight line of his idea of the truth regardless of any consequences. And normally of course, the consequences—the mob puts an end to him. It does not matter, even in his death he lives, his memory and his message live. Now, that applied to the normal political leader or statesman. It is very difficult. In fact, such a person, a prophet, is normally speaking, never a political leader.

MB: Gandhi was an exception.

JN: I say, Gandhi was an exception of course, and even Gandhi—I just cannot imagine him as a leader in any other country but India.

MB: In the sense that he gave expression to the traditional values of India?

JN: Yes, that is, he gave expression, he appealed to something in the mind of Indians. He would be out of place elsewhere, that is to say, he would be respected, may be admired, but he would never have political power, which he got through his affecting the mass mind here. Remember this, that when he started his big movements here, in 1919 and 1920, almost every political leader of the Congress, leave out the others, opposed him, that is to say, opposed the steps that he wanted us to take. The first prominent person who joined him, after a great deal of thinking and agonizing consideration of the situation, was my father, that is quite different. But he came to the conclusion, ultimately—I don't know if he analyzed every step he took, but anyhow he came to the conclusion—that this man was a big man and he was a strong man and it was worthwhile being with him, rather than with this large number of pygmies and others. But no other leading Congressman was with him, not that they were against him I mean, but they doubted, they argued, they would not agree to what he said. He went ahead, in spite of them, and it was the success he obtained in those three or four months that convinced all these people. You see, the success was obvious, because he had asked for a boycott of the elections.

MB: This was in 1920, was it not?

JN: This was in 1920, yes. And others had opposed it. But the Congress passed it anyhow, in spite of the opposition. And that boycott was so successful that others felt, well, here is a great power, not only Gandhi, but in the country, and so almost every one of them joined him—after this demonstration of his

strength with the Indian masses. Some, of course, left the Congress completely and formed the Liberals¹⁴—they would have nothing to do with it—but most of the big leaders remained there and joined him and played a very important part later.

MB: So that it was in a sense his success which broke down the opposition?

JN: It was his success and his demonstration of his strength with the Indian people, and how he could discipline them and make them act in a particular way.

MB: Sir, to return briefly to this question of violence, before we move on to quite another theme—many people have been impressed with the spate of violence and police firings in connection with the agitation over states reorganization and the recent railway strikes. Some have even expressed the view to me that the police in this country are too prone to use violence to meet violence. Some have gone even so far as to suggest that the Indian police are resorting to methods which bear a remarkable resemblance to the days of the British Raj. Would you care to comment on this with particular reference to the larger question of violence as a technique of social action and as an instrument for the maintenance of order in a state?

JN: It is rather difficult to say anything general about police firings in India. It is quite possible that some of them were wrong. But I think, that putting oneself in the place of the policeman, they are usually a small number and they are surrounded by a stone-throwing crowd, well, it is difficult to keep one's nerves. And the fear of being submerged completely—a man is hit on the head with a stone, well, he gets excited, takes out his gun or revolver and fires. After all, merely saying that the police have fired is a bad thing... If they had not fired, on many occasions the situation would have been infinitely worse. Last year, in Madhya Bharat, in Indore, I think, a large number of students and others were rioting and burning—for a few days. The police did not intervene, hardly. On the third day, they set fire, to the High Court building—nothing to do with the students—took out the records and set fire to them. Then the

14. In July 1918 when the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published, cracks reappeared in the Indian National Congress. The extremist leaders dismissed it while the moderates hailed it as a considerable concession. In August 1918, a special session of the Congress was convened to consider the Report. The moderates did not participate and formed a separate organization, the National Liberal Federation.

police came into action. In fact, when we telephoned them there, and asked, "what the hell are you doing with all that is happening—you must take some action" well, then they fired and three, four five, six persons died or something like that.¹⁵ Then there was a tremendous hullabaloo that the police had fired. They don't realize that for two days, they were being harassed, stoned, injured and buildings were being destroyed.

MB: Would you be inclined to say that the majority of cases of police firings in recent years were justifiable in terms of self-defence—or reducing the possible consequences of the course of events?

JN: I think that most of them have been justified—sometimes they have not been justified—and conditions are sometimes created when the thing is not justified, but it is very difficult to blame a person who is surrounded by...

MB: So that it becomes a decision of the moment?

JN: Yes, now, I was in Bombay two or three days ago. The police there functioned with amazing efficiency on this occasion. I saw it. They never fired this time. They never fired, and here I was, addressing a meeting, a very big meeting of about 100,000 or so and thousands and thousands of persons wanting to break it up from outside by throwing stones and all kinds of things. The meeting was never disturbed and the police dealt with them quietly without any fuss, and gradually pushed them—they were quite rough, the police—I admit—they pushed them back. As far as I can remember I don't think they even used a lathi.¹⁶ Of course, they were prepared for it. You see, the trouble occurs when one is not prepared and is surrounded by a mob and then.... There was one man who died in Bombay three days ago. It was not the police. A mob suddenly got hold of persons in a car, pulled them out, belaboured them hard and started "kill them, kill them". One of the persons in the car had a revolver and he took it out and fired. As a matter of fact he fired quite low. He didn't want to hit them but, unfortunately, as he fired low the fellow ducked and he got it in his head.

MB: In a similar vein, some have expressed misgivings in this country and elsewhere about the continuing need for a Preventive Detention Act in a flourishing democracy. Granted that such a method has a place during an emergency, what is the justification for its perpetuation in normal conditions?

15. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 261.

16. See *ante*, p. 309.

JN: Have you seen the figures.....?

MB: Yes, I was in Parliament when Pandit Pant announced them. There are 150 at present.

JN: One hundred and fifty in the whole of India. Now, every person who is arrested under the Preventive Detention Act—his case goes up to a tribunal. It is semi-judicial procedure, remember that, not full judicial procedure but it goes up before a High Court judge and others. They examine it. They examine him. He can give an answer and then they can decide whether or not he should continue in detention.

MB: But, doesn't it suggest that if the number is so small this particular group in a population of 370 millions can be dealt with under the ordinary laws which are available to the Government?

JN: That is a valid argument. On the other hand, there is another argument; the act being there and not being used much is itself a deterrent; both ways. And you see, of the 150 or so, I doubt if more than perhaps, 10 were political people. The rest were just gangsters and goondas in big cities. It is very difficult to convict them. Everybody knows he is...he pulls the strings from behind.

MB: Would you say that, in theory, such an Act has a place in a democratic state except in time of national emergency?

JN: Surely, that is a theoretical question. I don't like that Act and I hope it won't continue. But I do say that when there are all kinds of violent elements and people who create a great deal of mischief it is helpful, at least sometimes. Suppose we know, suppose that there is going to be a big communal riot, well, if we arrest a dozen persons, the riot doesn't take place. You may let them off a month later but it just suppresses the riot.

MB: And this cannot be done under ordinary law?

JN: It can't be done under the ordinary law. As it is even if we arrest them, they go to the High Court. They look into it. They don't look at it from the point of view of all the apparatus of a normal trial, but they do look into it. There are checks on executive action.

MB: The reason I raised this is that in other respects people abroad, and within India as well, admire the functioning of democracy in this country. Yes, they always point to the Preventive Detention Act as the one black mark, as they term it.

JN: May be, may be and perhaps they are right, but I don't think they know the figures and the analysis of the figures. Normally, they would think, probably, that these are political opponents that we put in prison. There are plenty of

political opponents cursing us all over. The only ones that have been put in prison have been persons indulging in violence and, say, strikes or the like—or communal violence or the goonda and the gangster type and mostly in that category. As a matter of fact, of the 150, there are some persons who are detained for political offences, in the sense of espionage.

MB: But you would hope that by 1957, unless there is a fundamental change in conditions in this country, there would not be a need to continue this act?

JN: I hope not. It really comes to this. I don't think that within a year some fundamental change will come about in India but we just take the risk of a few more scoundrels out, just like we put an end....

There is such a lot of fuss. Again criticism was made about our dealing with the press here. You may have seen the press here. I don't know if you have seen the worst part of the press, in Hindi and Urdu and these languages?

MB: No, I am afraid not.

JN: Terrible, something terrible and we found it did little good. We put an end to it.

MB: That gave rise to the Press Objectionable Matters Act?¹⁷

JN: Yes, some say we are suppressing the press. It is absurd. You see the press here, how it functions.

MB: You once expressed to me, Sir, your view that the pace of land reforms is not as rapid as you would like it to be and that *Bhoodan*¹⁸ is not really a solution to the land problem in India. One surmises from your speeches that you are not enamoured of it, even as an approach to this vital issue, yet, the Congress has often gone on record in support of *Bhoodan*. What function do you think *Bhoodan* can perform, if any? And if *Bhoodan* cannot solve the land problem,

17. The Press (Objectionable Matters) Act, passed by Parliament on 6 October 1952, empowered the Government to demand a cash security from newspapers as a guarantee against the publication of "objectionable matter"; the security was to be forfeited and the papers seized and destroyed if they published anything that officials considered to be "objectionable". The Act, initially applicable for two years, was renewed several times and had lapsed at the end of January 1956. Newspaper editors had frequently attacked the Act as a threat to the freedom of the Press, and on 12 April 1956 the Union Home Minister, G.B. Pant announced the Government's decision to abandon it.
18. *Bhoodan* movement was launched after Independence by Vinoba Bhave, a prominent disciple of Mahatma Gandhi to collect land through donation for distribution among the landless.

why is there no other positive approach? For example, is anything to be learned from the Kashmir experience in this regard?

JN: Well, surely there are many positive approaches. During the last six or seven years there has been any amount of legislation in regard to land problems.

MB: As far as the abolition of the zamindari system is concerned.

JN: The abolition of zamindari, the abolition of *jagirdari*, *taluqdari*—the big estates, and the limitation of estates in the future, the limitation in the present too. I think, the record is a fairly good one. It has not gone far enough. Much remains still to be done.

MB: In what sense far enough? What represents the next stage in the land reform programme?

JN: Well, although zamindari is gone, there are individual proprietors, not zamindars as such, who have fairly large estates, hundreds of acres. Maybe they are not too many but they are there. Then, in the peasant proprietorship provinces there are fairly large peasant holdings employing labour, of course. They cannot do it by themselves. Theoretically, we would like to make them smaller and then have cooperatives among them. The difficulty comes in, first of all, we don't want to do anything which might result in reducing production. This is most important. Secondly, when we do all these things we give compensation, and it is hardly possible for us to give compensation again on this vast scale. But the process goes on that way. So far as *Bhoodan* is concerned, I don't think—and I doubt, if even the chief supporters of *Bhoodan* think—that by itself it will solve the land problem in India. But it creates a tremendous atmosphere which helps in its solution and partly solves it, in a small way. But really, it is the atmosphere that helps in bringing in laws and other things.

MB: But ultimately, it is the legislative approach which you consider to be the most effective approach to its solution?

JN: Yes, it is.

MB: Thinking for a moment about the Avadi Resolution in January, 1955, which proclaimed a socialist pattern of society as the aim of the Congress Party,¹⁹ I have often wondered what the circumstances were which induced the Congress to adopt this resolution at that time. I know of your own socialist convictions dating back to the thirties,

19. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, p. 255.

but why was this move to socialism after independence taken last year; why not earlier or why not later?

JN: I don't know, really, that any special thing happened then. The Congress, or large sections of the Congress, have always spoken in terms of socialism for the last twenty years or more.²⁰ We have even passed resolutions in the Congress about social reorganization, the basis of that. But it was essentially a nationalist political movement and, to some extent, an agrarian movement, because many peasants came into the Congress and our attention was drawn to agrarian reforms in the old days, even before independence. But we talked about socialism throughout and as long ago as twenty-five years ago, the Congress said that the chief industries, heavy industries and basic industries, should be owned and controlled by the state.

MB: This was in the Karachi Resolution on Fundamental Rights in 1931?²¹

JN: Karachi Resolution, yes. Some of our provincial Congress committees even went further than that, of course. The Congress, being a vast organization, had all kinds of people in it, anti-socialists, socialists, but we could always get through a resolution on socialism when we wanted it. The majority would welcome it. But in consideration, really, of many of our senior colleagues, who didn't like to go that far, we didn't press it. Now, after the coming of Independence, gradually, there was a tendency to go a little further. It developed gradually and ultimately it came out. Nothing special happened last year.

MB: I was wondering in particular—a suggestion has been made that perhaps the impact of your own experience and the impressions during your China tour, which occurred just two months before the resolution was passed.

JN: Absolutely nothing to do with it.

MB: This was a mere coincidence?

JN: No, no, I had not even thought of it but, since you mention it, I think of it. It had nothing to do with it. But I might tell you, I had very little to do with that resolution. It was the new Congress President.

20. The Karachi Resolution in 1931 was the first official Congress pledge in favour of socialism. At the Lucknow session of the Congress in 1936, Nehru declared that socialism was the only solution of India's problems and that of the world.

21. The Indian National Congress passed a resolution on Fundamental Rights at its Karachi Session on 31 March 1931. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 4, pp. 511-513.

MB: Mr Dhebar.

JN: I approved, of course, heartily, but it was the new Congress President who took the initiative in the matter.

MB: On this question, Mr Prime Minister, I wonder if you could tell me briefly your basic impressions during this tour particularly in comparison with the impressions you gathered during your tour of China many years ago, in 1939, with reference to such things as the rate of progress, the methods which were utilized and so on.

JN: My tour in 1939—it was no tour at all, I went to Chungking and spent five or six or seven days, and I had to rush back because War was declared.²² I had only remained in Chungking. I didn't see....and that, War-time Chungking, bombed by Japanese aircraft every night. My first experience of bombing.

MB: What about this recent tour, Sir?

JN: Recent tour, certainly, though I spent only two weeks there, I saw a good bit of it.²³ My major impression was one of enormous basic strength of the Chinese people. Of course, even in the old days I had that sensation but it was spread out. They are amazing workers and they work together and that itself gives strength. And now, with a centralized government and all that, it gives them really a terrifying strength; I may say, these masses of people, all working together and each person capable of working hard. I do not think there is any person in the wide world who works as hard as a Chinese, individuals apart, I mean. The average Chinese is a harder worker, certainly, than the average Indian.

MB: Would you say that the rate of progress has been very considerable?

JN: Now, I can't judge of that. One's impressions are mixed impressions, derived from statistics, from what one sees, what one reads and all that. And I think that the progress has been very considerable. I may say, production, food production and even industrialization are going ahead pretty fast.

MB: One question that has often been raised is whether it would be correct to say that there is in reality a peaceful economic and cultural competition between India and China—in the spirit of *Panchsheel*?

JN: There is no competition as such, but it is, perhaps, inevitable for people to compare, from time to time, the progress made because the two countries

22. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 10, pp. 84-114.

23. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 3-53.

are alike in that they are big with large population, industrially undeveloped and also very ancient countries. We have many similar problems, the land problem, and of course, the land problem is not solved merely by decree.

MB: Would you be inclined to say that in a sense the future course of events in South East Asia depends very largely on the degree to which either India or China or both succeed with their development programmes?

JN: Yes, they are bound to influence other countries.

MB: It was in that sense that I was using the term competition.

JN: I know. As a matter of fact, we are constantly sending groups of experts and delegations to study conditions there.²⁴ In about a fortnight, we are sending a small team to study the cooperatives in land. Another little group of economists and statisticians are going there to study that aspect. The Chinese have sent two or three teams to study some aspects of what we are doing. It is a mutual thing, of course. Quite apart from communism, more than anything, there is a way of doing a thing, and we can learn from it. Take flood control. There are problems that face us and face them. We have sent a team to see how they had rapidly built up their dams and we have profited by it. We have tried it here, that is, tried it here not in the normal way but asking the people round about, fifty thousand, sixty thousand, to come and help during the off-season. The peasants came and helped. So we learn from each other.

MB: One final question which I have this evening is with regard to the population problem. You have frequently indicated your conviction that this is not a pressing issue, that its solution is possible only within the framework of general economic improvement and higher literacy. No one, I think, would question this in theory, however, even after the Second Plan there will be twenty million new mouths to feed in this country. This gives rise to various questions which I should like to put together. In the first place, would you say that a larger population is desirable for India at the present time? Equally important, is this not a pressing economic problem which develops into a vicious circle, the larger population hindering economic development which, in turn, makes it more difficult, as you suggest, to solve the population problem? If this be so, why is it not possible to attempt with the concerted backing of the state, to inculcate consciousness of limiting the size of

24. See *ante*, p. 111.

families, particularly as there is evidence to suggest that the Indian peasant is very interested in population control? Here I am thinking of a recent study by the Gokhale Institute in Poona which suggests that the peasants in surrounding villages respond very favourably to the idea of adopting simple methods to limit the size of their families.²⁵ Would you say that if experiments in simple methods of birth control prove to be effective, the Government of India would have any objections to giving its full support and publicity to these methods of family planning?

JN: Well, I should like to limit the population of India, or, if I may say so, to prevent it from growing too much. It is obvious that the larger it grows the more difficult the economic problems become—and, I am personally in favour of methods of family planning and birth control. As a matter of fact, broadly speaking, our Government has been helping, not in a major way, but in experimentation. And if the experiments succeed, we are likely to do much more. Having said that I should like to say also, that in the near future I think, the question of limiting the family is not the primary question, in the sense that in any event it will take time to give results. We have to make economic progress much more rapidly, and we cannot wait for family planning to bring about results. I am all in favour of family planning work being done, but I think it is all wrong for people to say that our economic problems depend on family planning.

MB: I would fully agree with that, Sir.

JN: Yes, but there is that tendency to say that all would be well if family planning were there and the population does not increase. It is a secondary thing and other things are really economic progress which should come more rapidly. Also, the rate of growth in India of the population is not a high rate. In the totality, of course, it is a big number but it is not a high rate compared to some European countries and other places.

MB: No, but Sir, in terms of economic and social problems, is not the absolute number more important than the rate of growth, given the economic situation in India today?

25. During 1951-55, the demography section of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics conducted studies in the attitudes towards family planning. The scope of the surveys undertaken in various districts of Bombay State included consideration of the acceptability of alternative contraceptives.

JN: Given the economic situation in India, we should have half the population that we have got or a quarter. That has no meaning—but the point is that India can support a larger population, given economic growth.

MB: Recently, Mr Prime Minister, Vinoba Bhave and others have stressed the need to use satyagraha as a means of attaining political objectives. In view of the recent outbreaks of violence flowing from the resort to satyagraha, and in the new context arising from Independence and the establishment of a democratic state with other means for the pursuit of objectives, what do you consider the place of satyagraha to be in the new India?

JN: Broadly speaking, I do not think that satyagraha ought to have any place where you can change anything you like by democratic means. It may take a little longer. satyagraha is either individual satyagraha or mass satyagraha. Mass satyagraha is in the nature of a peaceful rebellion and it really means, in effect, that you have not got a majority and the minority is trying to terrorize the majority through satyagraha to do something. Individual satyagraha stands on a different footing, although it may have far-reaching consequences. Something like Thoreau²⁶ did—he objects to a tax, he says, “I will not pay” and goes to prison. It does not upset the social structure but it creates public opinion in his favour.

MB: But surely this is not the kind of satyagraha that has been resorted to recently?

JN: What they call satyagraha now, is not satyagraha at all from any point of view. It is just a breaking of laws, sometimes in a violent way, too.

MB: Would you say that it is a distortion of an honoured practice in the national movement?


JN: Absolutely, it is, it is. It is what I would call *duragraha*. Satyagraha is holding on to the truth. This is holding on to the untruth.

MB: Moving to a somewhat different plane, Sir—since Partition, India has attained an honoured place, both in terms of world prestige and internal stability. Viewing this period as a whole, what do you consider to be the significant achievements of independent India since 1947?

JN: First, the Indian States, the absorption of the Indian States into the Union of India. Secondly, our meeting the tremendous problems following Partition, including, well, not only the killing, etcetera, but in a sense a kind of rebellion.


26. Henry David Thoreau, an eminent American poet and naturalist who preferred life in woods observing nature. His essay “Civil Disobedience” influenced Mahatma Gandhi.

Cash And Carry



The Prime Minister presented the Second Five-Year Plan to Parliament

'Save Me, If You Like'



Rumours are again current that the Finance Minister will press his resignation on the issue of Bombay city not going to Maharashtra.

MB: Would you say, broadly speaking, stabilizing the internal situation?

JN: Yes, if you like, but stabilizing might very well mean economically, and so on. I say, that after the Partition, we had to contend against two forces. One was the powerful reaction, communal reaction, which affected both sides, Pakistan and here. Now, you can argue and go into details as to which started it. It is immaterial. News comes here that Hindus are being killed in Pakistan. People get very angry, on the border especially, and it increases and increases. The other was advantage taken of the situation by all the reactionary elements in India who did not like.....

MB: The creation of a separate Pakistan State?

JN: No, no, that is the communal idea. I am talking about reactionary people here who did not like a progressive, independent government, and they wanted to break it, taking advantage of the communal situation. Well, we controlled it. And then the third biggest thing was, I think, of dealing with the refugees, a pretty big task, seven or eight million coming over in two or three months' time, a tremendous task, not only then but in subsequent years. I rather doubt if anywhere else such a major problem of refugees, in the conditions we had in India, a new state and all that, we tackled so successfully, practically without any foreign assistance, UN or other. Then, I would refer to our economic front because, at that time, we had suffered a great deal of inflation—it was going up and up and up. With all these difficulties to face, the refugees in millions, and then there was the Kashmir operation, we succeeded there. The food question. We had to import vast quantities of food and it was a constant difficulty in reaching a place; because it was really a ship-to-mouth kind of thing. There was our success on the food front and then, well, broadly our general economic rehabilitation, with big schemes. And finally, something that I think is bigger than all, the community schemes, the Community Development Projects, which are really, I think, revolutionary in their context. The fact is that they are changing the villagers, and they are the great majority of the Indian population.

MB: What would you consider the principal obstacles, institutional and other, to more rapid and far-reaching change in the social and economic spheres?

JN: Well, the principal obstacle is a tendency to disruption, not basic, nobody wanting to go out of India, I mean, not that way, but certain inherent tendencies to function in factions, whether it is on the communal plane, whether it is on the caste plane or on the provincial plane—they are all coming in the way of the basic unity of India. Of course, the forces in favour of unity are also very

strong, not that they are weak, but when there is no apparent danger to it, people forget this and go off into these factions, and that affects even our parties, whether it is the Congress or whether it is the Socialist Party and even, to some extent, the Communist Party—which is very, very disciplined! And, unfortunately, if there is an election, there is no doubt that when the area of the constituency is a small one, probably, the dominant caste will get its man in. Mind you, caste is rapidly ceasing to be....it is losing its social aspect, I may say, eating together and so on. That is getting less and less.

MB: But there is still caste consciousness?

JN: Very much so. Marriage still continues very largely, even though it is getting less. But a certain political aspect of caste comes in, that is, a man would vote for this caste—in that sense—and if the Communists put up a candidate in a particular constituency, they take jolly good care that he belongs to the dominant caste of that constituency.

MB: Are there any other fundamental obstacles to far-reaching change?

JN: Social customs come in the way.

MB: Would you say that, in a sense, poverty itself is a great barrier?

JN: Poverty is a barrier and a certain inertia which comes from poverty—these are tremendous barriers.

MB: While talking about economic affairs, Mr Prime Minister, some time ago you used the interesting expression “hope level” as the minimum objective of planning, and added if this could not be maintained in India, the process of peaceful transformation would be jeopardized. Does not the maintenance of the hope level depend, at least in part, on external considerations? For example, an increase of US military aid to Pakistan or the reduction of external assistance to India may compel the slowing down of development. Might this not make the maintenance of the hope level precarious? If the hope level cannot be maintained, then much of the structure of the new India is threatened. What I am interested in knowing is your priority of values here—is it social and economic change to achieve your conception of the good society or is it the preservation of the existing methods of achieving such change?

JN: What are the existing methods you are referring to?

MB: The democratic methods.

JN: Oh, that. I think, it is quite essential for any country to have a certain confidence in itself. This is basic. The moment that confidence goes down, it becomes weak, progressively. The big lesson that Gandhi taught us was to rely on ourselves and not others, to be friendly with others. Throughout our independence movement, we never really looked abroad except, of course, we wanted friendship, we wanted the goodwill of others. But throughout, we thought in terms of our own strength to meet the British Empire. Now, of course, that continues to some extent, but quite apart from its continuation, I am quite convinced, that the moment a country begins to think in terms of reliance on others, it loses that big incentive of working hard and a pride in its own achievements.

MB: But if one assumes for the moment, whether because of external considerations or others, that this hope level cannot be maintained by the use of democratic methods, what then becomes the primary objective, the preservation of existing methods or the use of other methods in order to carry through the programme for a new society in India?

JN: Well, these ifs and buts are difficult to deal with. There is no absolute choice between two extremes. There are many middle ways. You can keep the democratic method. What does it consist of? Many things, of course, but essentially, your giving a chance to every opposing idea and party to function and ultimately, the majority of the people supporting you. Well, if the majority of the people do not support you, I don't think any other method is going to tell—in India certainly, I can't speak for others. And Gandhi has increased the individuality of the Indian so much. All this satyagraha business—everybody wants to fast for something. You see, all this is increasing the individual consciousness of a person and it will be exceedingly difficult, and I doubt if it will be possible, for the normal type of authoritarian government to come in. I can conceive—in theory—a military dictatorship. I don't think it is likely. That does not matter but I can theoretically conceive, of it, that the army is strong and powerful and imposes itself, but it would have a lot of trouble, all over the place.

MB: But you suggest that it would not be very effective?

JN: No, but that will not be the type of authoritarian or other government which you are thinking of, which can deliver the goods in the economic sense. The army would never give them....the army would simply impose itself for some time as long as it is powerful to do so.

MB: And at best maintain the existing situation?

JN: And thus, maintain the existing situation. Maybe it would make a little progress here and there, but armies don't normally function on the economic plane, in a big way.

3. Interview with Michael Brecher-II¹

Michael Brecher: This evening, Mr Prime Minister, I should like to turn to some problems in the field of foreign affairs. For many years, students of world affairs have debated the question of the relative importance of ideological and power considerations in the motivation of the foreign policy of states. As one of the most prominent practitioners of the art of diplomacy in this century, what would you consider to be of primary importance in the decision-making process with regard to foreign affairs? Is it considerations of power or material factors, or is it, rather ideological urges?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Ideological urges obviously play some part, though not so much the ideological urges of the individual. But, if they become part of the common thinking of the people, then they play an important part—especially in a democracy, because, unless the common people have those urges, they are not reflected in their representatives in Parliament; and no policy can go very far if it is quite divorced from the people's thinking. However, in the final analysis, all foreign policy concerns itself chiefly with the national interest of the country concerned. National interest can be seen in two ways that is, rather narrow national interest, temporary national interest—and most people see it that way—or a long-term view of national interest, which may well lead one to the conclusion that a country's national interests are served, let us say, by peace in the world, or by friendship with other nations, or by the well-being of neighbouring countries. So, it becomes an intelligent long-term interest.

MB: Enlightened self-interest?

JN: Enlightened self-interest. But obviously, in a democracy no government can take any step which is patently, from the point of view of public opinion, against national interest.

1. New Delhi, 13 June 1956. *National Herald*, 1-4 August and 7 August 1956.

MB: If one applies this to the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the past decade, does it suggest that if the Soviet Union possessed institutions and an ideology comparable to those of the United States and the West generally, the mere fact that these were two Great Powers would itself constitute a significant source of conflict or friction?

JN: I think that the conflict in the past few years has been essentially due to political reasons, not communist or anti-communist, the main reason being two Great Powers whose national interests appear to come into conflict. And, therefore, they do not like each other, or are apprehensive of each other, have no faith, and so on and so forth. Of course, behind that are likes and dislikes of policies. But, let us take a country like Yugoslavia. It is a communist country but there is no difficulty in non-communist countries getting along with Yugoslavia, it is not communism that came in the way. Therefore, it is essentially a conflict on the political plane that separates countries, although other means may be used....

MB: To provide a rationalization?

JN: To rationalize it or, well, to justify it to your own people and get support, therefore, I may say, either communist or anti-communist.

MB: You used the word 'appear' in the context of American-Russian relations; they 'appear' to have strong disagreements with each other and to dislike and misunderstand each other. Does that suggest that reasons in this case and a proper appreciation of the existing conditions would have eliminated or at least reduced the degree of conflict and friction?

JN: I wouldn't have said that it would have eliminated it, but I think, it would have reduced it on both sides, because antagonisms on one side breed antagonisms on the other, action and reaction. If on one side it goes down, it inevitably goes down on the other. I am absolutely convinced, whether in individual behaviour or group behaviour, that in the long run, the type of behaviour we adopt against a person—we bring forth that same type from the other. If we hate him, we bring forward hatred. If we treat him gently, well, if we don't bring forward gentleness we tone down his crudity.

MB: As regards India's foreign policy, Mr Prime Minister, would you sum up briefly the primary considerations which give rise to the policy of non-alignment; that is to say what are the ideological and material foundations of India's foreign policy?

JN: Yes, during the last thirty years, I should say, that is, in the Indian national movement, we gradually developed a foreign policy of a kind, though we were not a government. If you study that, you will see that whatever we have done is essentially a continuation of it. Naturally, it has varied—and foreign policy, too, is seldom one foreign policy. It is really a collection of foreign policies that go to make one. One tries to make it integrated. One does not always succeed, because one lives in a world which is not integrated. So that first of all, the background and the conditioning factors are there. Secondly, apart from our desire for peace, which is there, is our feeling that peace is absolutely essential for our progress and our growth, and if there is war, big or small, it comes in the way of that growth which is for us the primary factor. Thirdly, with the coming of nuclear weapons, war seems to us—and seems to most people everywhere—as extreme folly, that is, it has ceased to promise what you want. People have had war in the past because they expected to get something out of it; it may have been a gamble but anyhow there was a chance of something. Now, you know the result of the gamble. There is not even the slightest chance of attaining what you want through a war. Therefore, war is sheer folly.

MB: Would you say that it is a relic of the past?

JN: Yes, it does not apply now; it does not solve any problem. One may say, of course, “what are we to do if some mad person or some mad bull comes in and we have to deal with him.” That is a different matter, that is, if some mad country attacks us, what are we to do? Are we to go down? Well, I have no answer to that except that you must defend yourself, and if you have to defend yourself you have to be prepared to defend yourself. That is true but apart from that, war should be ruled out. And, I believe, there is widespread recognition of this fact, both among leaders of nations and among the common people, it is only a measure of fear that comes in the way, that the other party might take advantage of us if we do this or that well; the only way to get over that fear is for some common steps to be taken so that this fear of the other party having an advantage does not come in the way. That means disarmament, etc.

MB: Sir, given the state of technology at the present time, to which you have just referred, would you say that a state which can remain non-aligned with either bloc in time of peace, can also remain non-aligned if the great powers are at war with each other?

JN: That depends so much on the geographical position of the state.

MB: Shall we say the Indian state?

JN: I should say that a state that is not aligned will be in the safest position.

MB: Would you elaborate that?

JN: I will, yes. India, of course, in a sense is more happily situated. A small country, surrounded by warring nations, will be in a more difficult position, undoubtedly. But India is big and India is happily situated. And, I do not conceive of any kind of, let us say, invasion or attack on India—not because of other countries' love of India but because it will bring them no profit and it will only give them trouble, whether it is a world war or any major conflict of that type, India does not come into the picture. It does not help. Any country attacking India merely adds to its troubles.

MB: But supposing such an attack on India should take place?

JN: Well, of course, if it takes place it is obvious that the people of India will fight that attack and defend themselves. But again, who was it who said: "a wise general is a person who wins battles without fighting".² That is, why create enemies who will be induced to attack you? Why not have friendly relations, for when there is no particular inducement to attack, there is less likelihood of attack.

MB: Would you say then, that India's geographical position makes it possible for it to be non-aligned, whereas this would be exceedingly difficult for other countries?

JN: I would say that non-alignment is a policy which is nationally profitable for any country. But in some cases there is danger—because of the smallness of the country or because of its geographical position—that, whether it is aligned or non-aligned, it may suffer from the war. It may even be somehow involved in it. Other countries which are geographically better situated do not face that big risk in a big war every country will suffer. In modern war no country can escape suffering. And, apart from the actual suffering, that is direct suffering, the mere fact that if nuclear weapons are used, it is said now by competent scientists, the radioactive substances would be dangerous for everybody in the world.

MB: In view of the considerable misunderstanding of the meaning of non-alignment, which continues to exist in certain circles today, I wonder how one should distinguish non-alignment from the concept

2. Perhaps, Nehru refers to Sun-tzu, a Chinese general and military theorist of the sixth century B.C. One of the maxims laid down in his treatise on strategy, tactics, logistics and espionage, known as *The Art of War* is: Winning one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not real excellence; winning a victory by subduing the enemy without fighting is the highest excellence.

of a third force or from the concept of a balancer. By a balancer, I mean, a state which withholds its influence from all of the contesting powers and thereby, is able to influence the course of events in world affairs.

JN: There are these words, non-alignment and neutrality. Non-alignment is, of course, a much better word. The use of the word 'neutrality' signifies an actual or potential state of war; one thinks in terms of war. I don't think that is right. Too much thinking of war leads to a climate of war or conflict which inevitably brings that conflict nearer. Non-alignment is a negative word and only partly explains the position. What is much better is a positive policy for peace. That positive policy will be successful, not because of pressures nor because of sanctions, military or other. I do not think that a real policy of peace can be furthered by military threats. It can only succeed if it responds to the reality of the situation and, therefore, finds an echo in people's minds. If it does, then, even a small voice is heard, a voice, I mean, that is not backed by power. It is heard. If it does not fit in, then it is a voice in the wilderness and just does not count. You talk about a third force. That simply means you are trying to create another force to counter the forces or as a balancing factor but you are thinking still in terms of force. I think that this thinking in terms of force really puts you in that vicious circle of force. I can understand an area which wants to keep out of war. That is a different matter or rather a state of men's minds which may exist anywhere.

MB: Well, for a long time, Mr Prime Minister, as revealed in your writings and in many Congress resolutions, you were, I believe, a very staunch advocate of a world federation as the ideal to which states should aspire. Do you consider the cleavages that exist today in social, economic and political systems to be too great and too rigid to conceive of this in practical terms in the foreseeable future?

JN: I think, that it is quite inevitable in the long run for some kind of world organization to come into being. You may call it world federation, I do not know what it will be. It will have to be a loose federation but I just do not see it in the foreseeable future. I can see, perhaps, steps towards it but I think, just talking about world federation now is totally artificial and unreal. I may say, take the two most powerful countries in the world today, the United States and the Soviet Union. I don't think that they are as terribly far apart as they themselves or other people imagine. I think, there are quite remarkable similarities between them despite their different systems. And I am inclined to think that the gap between them will lessen. And it might even lessen with fair rapidity if—once—the present climate of fear and war is removed.

MB: Thereby, permitting a greater degree of cooperation and appreciation of each other's viewpoints?

JN: Yes, yes and each influencing the other.

MB: May we look at the situation closer to home, Mr Prime Minister? In view of your recent pronouncements on the Kashmir problem³ and the Pakistani rejection of your proposal to negotiate a solution of this problem on the basis of partition along the ceasefire line, where do we go from here?

JN: There are only three ways of dealing with the Kashmir problem. One, if you like, is war. We rule it out. The others are a legal approach, legal and constitutional, or if I may use the word, a practical approach, not quibbling about legal points and taking things as they are. Now, we rule out war. If people want to talk to me about the law and the constitutional aspects, I am perfectly prepared to talk about them. If they want to discuss the practical aspect, I am perfectly prepared to do that. I have suggested both. The other day, a question was put to me in Parliament about Chitral. I was asked the legal position. I stated the legal position....⁴

MB: Without any further implications?

JN: If you want the law, there is the law. If you want a practical approach to the problem, my practical approach would be governed, first of all, by no war, of course. Secondly, by accepting things as they are, in the main, because any other approach leads to some kind of conflict.

MB: Well, aside from the fact that Kashmir has legally acceded to India, what makes Kashmir so important to India? Does it have any implications for India's efforts to establish a secular state and to maintain communal harmony in this country?

JN: Yes, that is probably the most important aspect of it. There is a sentimental aspect, not so important. Kashmir has been intimately connected with India, culturally and otherwise, for 2,000 or 3,000 years. It has been a great centre of Indian culture, it has been a great centre of Buddhist culture, it has been a great centre of Islamic culture. Probably, in Kashmir more than anywhere else in India, there has been less of what is called communal feeling, and the Hindus and the Muslims and others have very rarely quarrelled. And, even if they have quarrelled, it has been of short duration. Their lives are generally more or

3. See *ante*, p. 383. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 301 and 532.

4. See *ante*, pp. 382-383.

less alike. Their culture is alike, their language, eating habits, and whatever goes to make a culture. And, they have lived happily together even if there has been trouble in India. Now, we have never accepted, even when Partition came to India, the two-nation theory, that is, that the Hindus are one nation and the Muslims are another. If Muslims want to go out of India, that is a different matter, that is, a certain area of India votes itself out. But, we did not accept it and, even if every Muslim says so—every Muslim did not say so—I say we cannot accept that because once we accept that nationality goes by religion, we break up our whole conception of India. India is a country with many religions. Maybe one is larger than the others, but there are fairly big religions here, any number of them. And, as in any other country, nationality has to be based on other factors, not on religion, of course, giving freedom to various religions to function. Pakistan came into existence and a large number of Muslims decided that way, when we accepted it. Many went there, too. Many Hindus came here. Nevertheless, 35 million Muslims remained in India. Today, there are more Muslims in India than there are in West Pakistan.

MB: A fact that is generally unknown.

JN: Unknown, because Pakistan is in two bits. In Kashmir, even before the Partition, there was, as you must know, a struggle for the mind and heart of Kashmir between the Muslim League and the national movement of Kashmir. We did not come into the picture then. Later, we came in, and the national movement of Kashmir deliberately rejected the Muslim League idea of the two-nation theory. That was before Partition and, naturally, we welcomed it and we cooperated with them in the larger national movement. Then came the Partition and the struggles in India. There were no troubles in Kashmir. And, when Kashmir joined India, both in the constitutional sense, through the Maharaja who had the right to do so, and in a popular sense through the organization. Well, apart from political and other aspects, it was very important for us because it helped our thesis of nationalism not related to religion. If the contrary thesis were proved in Kashmir, it would affect somewhat—I don't say it would break up India—but it would have a powerful effect on the communal elements in India, both Hindu and Muslim. That is of extreme importance to us—that we don't by taking some wrong step in Kashmir, create these terribly disruptive tendencies within India.

MB: I would like to ask just one further question on Kashmir, if I may, in order to get the position clear regarding the notion of a plebiscite. If one assumes for the moment—it is largely hypothetical, very remote, indeed—but if one assumes that Pakistan withdraws all of its forces from Kashmir and fulfils all of its obligations under the

UN resolutions, as India interprets these resolutions, would India then be prepared to reconsider the question of a plebiscite under international supervision? Or is a plebiscite, in your opinion, no longer a valid approach to the settlement of the Kashmir problem under any conditions?

JN: You are asking me a hypothetical question. I cannot rule out a plebiscite under any conditions. In fact, a democratically—governed country periodically has a plebiscite, where there is an election there, provided it is a proper and fair election. The very system of democracy is a periodical plebiscite.

MB: I was referring to the idea of a plebiscite....

JN: I know that, but I mean to say that if an autonomous Kashmir State, which has its own election and a democratic apparatus of government, if it is dissatisfied with something, under the Constitution of India, it can express its dissatisfaction in a very powerful way and in a constitutional way, by action and otherwise. But if you put this question to me, that if every condition is fulfilled, then am I to refuse a plebiscite? I say no. But, in practice, we have been considering this matter for the last seven or eight years and even the first condition has not been fulfilled leave out many others.

MB: You mean the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces?

JN: Yes, the withdrawal. But I will tell you this, that we have always attached great importance to one factor in a plebiscite, that is, we have said that if there is a plebiscite, it should be a fair political plebiscite and not one in which wildly religious passions are roused; and, by bringing in religion, making it impossible for people to decide really on political and economic issues.

MB: That would be one of the conditions of such a plebiscite if it were ever to be held?

JN: We have said that right from the beginning, repeatedly. How to bring that about, I don't know.

MB: In view of the tragic aftermath of Partition, Mr Prime Minister, in the form of communal riots, the Kashmir problem and other unresolved issues between India and Pakistan, is it visionary, do you think, to expect a genuine rapprochement between the two countries in the foreseeable future?

JN: Before I answer that question I shall say something about a related matter. Many people think and say that the Kashmir problem is a major problem which comes in the way of good relations between India and Pakistan. That is true, in a sense, but not basically true. What I mean is this: the Kashmir problem is

a result of other conflicts between India and Pakistan, and even if the Kashmir problem were solved, well, not in a very friendly way, those basic conflicts would continue. If it were solved in a really friendly way, then, of course, it would help. But, it is a friendly approach to the problem that is important, not a forcible solution, which gives rise to other problems.

MB: Yes, I think, most people would agree but what are these basic conflicts?

JN: I shall say, basically, they are ideological. And we go back again to what I was just talking about, this business of the two-nation theory, what is nationalism and all that. Also, I am sorry to refer to it, there is an unfortunate tendency—not of Muslims as such—but of some people, saying: “We were the rulers of India before the British came, why should not we again be rulers over India? We shall capture Delhi, we shall do this”. Of course, it is rather fantastic and nonsensical but this kind of thing produces action and reaction. I would also say that so far as the people of Pakistan and the people of India are concerned, they are in a much better and more friendly frame of mind today than they were some years ago at Partition time. Conditions have improved very greatly. There really is hardly any prejudice against each other qua individuals or qua groups. As a nation the political issue may come up or some other issue, or they may be excited about some religious story. But when Indians go to Pakistan in groups, they are welcomed and embraced. When the Pakistanis come here they are welcomed and embraced too. You see, we have the same language, and so many things in common.

MB: What effect, if any, Sir, does the current political crisis in Pakistan have on the establishment of more friendly relations between the two countries?

JN: It is difficult to answer. When a country is afraid, it is afraid of taking any steps forward....

MB: Because it does not feel that its own foundations are secure?

JN: Yes, it is afraid and they have fed themselves on fear of India. This is totally unjustified, because under no circumstances whatever, even from the view of the narrowest national interests, do we wish to interfere in Pakistan. We want them to be an independent country and a flourishing country. It is not good for us to have a country that is not flourishing because that leads to political crisis, conflicts and all kinds of things. And when Pakistan, either politically or economically, grows weak, the fear element increases and is played upon deliberately, so as to divert people’s attention. And one is always afraid of adventurist action, that kind of thing. It stops a natural development—

it has taken place in the past—of more friendly relations between India and Pakistan.

MB: Just one final question on Indo-Pakistan relations. Is it possible that instead of tackling these vexed issues separately, more positive results might flow from a larger approach, to which you have often referred. In this context, this would be an attempt to deal with all of the major unresolved problems between India and Pakistan in order to secure an agreement in principle on the entire gamut of disputes between the two countries. Many people refer to this as a package deal. Whatever the terminology, do you consider this approach to have any merit? Or must one continue to deal with these issues separately and thereby hope to solve them?

JN: We have no objection at all to considering all the issues. The issues may be defined, a number of minor ones and some major ones. The major ones at the present moment, apart from Kashmir, are supposed to be Canal Waters, Evacuee Property and, well, this exodus from East Pakistan. We have been dealing with each one. So far as Canal Waters are concerned it is now two years since we have been arguing in Washington, chiefly before the World Bank, and it is more than a year since we accepted their proposals—and there we are. And now, Pakistan has more or less finally replied.⁵ I hope it will be favourable because nobody wants to injure Pakistan. It is a question of making the best use of the canal waters.

There is Evacuee Property. Well, I don't know, the number of times we have met and discussed it. You see, the basic difficulty is that the property legally belonging to Indians who came from Pakistan is far greater in value than the property in India belonging to the Pakistanis. And I think, it is their apprehension, when they came to discuss this matter, that they might be saddled with a large sum of money.

MB: Surely, it is possible that in such a situation mutual concessions could be made.

JN: But of course, of course! Obviously, nobody expects these vast sums of money to come out of nothing. We have told them that. We don't expect a kind of balancing of this or that. And, naturally, we have made various

5. In fact, Pakistan's reply to the World Bank's aide memoire of 21 May 1956 on the Canal Waters issue, addressed to both India and Pakistan, was delivered to W.A.B. Illiff, Vice-President of the Bank, on 27 June in London. See also *ante*, pp. 433, 441-442.

suggestions, even ad hoc suggestions; let us settle this by a very rough calculation; you may limit the fund, you may pay it in ten or twenty years, whatever it is. But anyhow, they have not been willing, and now things have taken their course.

After we found that all the properties were decaying, because nobody was responsible, we are selling them so that people may buy them, repair them and live there. But even so, the money we get from them is put in a separate pool which, in theory, belongs to the other party.

MB: On principle, then, you would have no objection to considering all of these disputes in conjunction with one another rather than separately?

JN: Not at all, not at all.

MB: Much has been written, Sir, about the significance of the Bandung Conference and you, yourself, have spoken frequently about the Conference of Asian and African States. It would be helpful, nevertheless, if you would sum up briefly for me your view of its significance in terms of the Renaissance of Asia and, connected with that, in terms of world politics at the time it occurred.

JN: I will tell you an old story. Perhaps, you have come across the fact that I attended a conference in Brussels in 1927, the Congress against Imperialism.⁶ Well, we met Chinese and Japanese, Indonesians and Algerians, Moroccans, Burmese—all kinds of people. When the Conference was over, we talked amongst ourselves. We said, why should not we people from these countries, especially Asia, meet by ourselves? And when we discussed this matter, we found that it was not possible for us to meet anywhere except in some country of Western Europe because the facilities were simply not there—they were all colonial countries. The other parties would not be allowed to come. The only common meeting place might be London or Paris or Berlin—in those days—and may be Vienna.

MB: The world has changed since then!

JN: The world has changed and, of course, we meet. The mere fact of all these countries meeting and, officially as governments, was itself a recognition of a fact we know, of course, but there it was—a significant illustration of it. Secondly, that with our very different problems, there was so much common

6. Nehru attended the International Congress against Imperialism held in Brussels in February 1927. See *Selected Works* (first series), Vol. 2, pp. 272-297.

ground between us that we would ultimately produce a document which was unanimously agreed to. And there was a psychological feeling of commonness, in spite of our differences, common objectives, common—if you like—adversaries. And that in itself gave one a feeling of strength and created a feeling of comradeship and friendship among those countries. Practically, as you know nothing much was decided, apart from these things. We said something about economic matters and the rest. Something has been done but not very much because there is no common economy from the Gold Coast to Indonesia. It is really countries in the same region developing by bilateral treaties.

MB: May one look upon it as the first step in what might develop into a more cohesive group of states in Asia and Africa?

JN: Well, it is too widespread for it to develop into a cohesive group—Western Africa and China and Japan and Indonesia and India—but you can say that it may develop into something which holds together.

MB: And can ultimately foster more friendly relations and greater cooperation among the participants at Bandung?

JN: Yes.

MB: There is one aspect regarding the Bandung Conference which perturbed many people, particularly in the West, and that was the exclusion from the conference of one sovereign Asian state, namely Israel. Many people raised the question, how can this be justified in terms of the criteria set up by the five sponsors at the Bogor Conference a few months earlier?⁷ Is it likely that this particular act of exclusion will be repeated at the next Afro-Asian Conference, if one is ever held?

JN: I don't know what will happen at the next conference but conditions were and still are that the Arab nations and Israel don't sit together. They do sit at the United Nations but, apart from that, they just don't sit. And one is offered this choice of having one or the other. It is not logical, my answer, but there it is.

When the proposal was made for Israel to be invited, regardless of the question of Israel, but merely as a country which is represented in the United

7. The Prime Ministers of the Colombo Powers, namely, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, Myanmar and Pakistan, met at Bogor, Indonesia, on 28 and 29 December 1954 to draw up an agenda for the proposed Asian-African Conference.

Nations, it transpired that if that were done, the Arab countries would not attend.⁸ There it was.

MB: The reason that I raise the question is that many people, while they could appreciate this particular situation, found it difficult to justify the exclusion of Israel.

JN: Well, it is. As I said, our outlook on this matter was based on some logical approach. Our sympathies are with the Arab nations in regard to this problem. We felt that logically Israel should be invited but when we saw that the consequences of that invitation would be that many others would not be able to come, then we agreed. Our approach, obviously, if I may add, is that it is good for people who are opponents to meet.

MB: Yes, but the Arabs for some reason or other have refused every particular invitation to sit and talk about the question of peace in West Asia.

JN: It is obvious that there is the way of war to settle the question and, if you rule out war, then the only way is to meet—or allow things to drift.

MB: Yes, but drift has the great risk surely that it may itself lead to war.

JN: Yes, I know, but actually there is no other way.

MB: Sir, the existing tension in the Middle East, perhaps the most explosive area in the world today, has given rise to an interest in India's attitude to the problems of the area, more particularly, because of its successful offer of good offices in Korea and Indo-China. Whether or not conditions are conducive to mediation in that particular area today I do not know. But, leaving that aside for the moment, what do you consider to be the minimal conditions for a relaxation of tension, shall we say, if not for a resolution of the conflict?

JN: I am totally unable to answer that question. I don't know except that I am for the present greatly interested in the situation not deteriorating into war. So long as that does not occur, there is always the chance of some opportunity occurring which helps to take a step in the right direction.

MB: In view of the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, it would be very helpful, Mr Prime Minister, if you would offer some observations on this institution. I have three questions in

8. For details, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 109-110, 119-120, 129 and 566.

mind which I should like to group together. In the first place, what were the considerations which induced India to remain in the Commonwealth, particularly when set against the background of your many statements before 1947 that India would sever its connection with the Commonwealth on attaining its freedom? Secondly, on the basis of eight years of experience, what positive contributions would you say the Commonwealth has made to the reduction of international tension? And, thirdly, what benefits has India derived from its continued association with the Commonwealth.

JN: I think, you will find that in all the statements I made previously, I said that India must be independent and an independent republic. We did not consider or rule out any kind of association with England or the Commonwealth. The main thing was that we should be an independent republic. The Commonwealth as it then was, was essentially what it was named, a British Commonwealth of Nations, with everybody being considered a British subject.

When we became independent, for the moment, till we framed our Constitution, we were a Dominion. That was a passing phase, accepted as such, although that, too, brought us practically Independence. And, then we sat down and drew up our Constitution and became a republic, that is to say, we satisfied completely, one hundred per cent, what we had wanted to do in past years. Then the question arose: as a republic, should we associate ourselves with the Commonwealth? It was a novel question, not only for us, but for the other countries. We decided that there was absolutely no reason why we should break an association which did not come in our way at all, legally, constitutionally, practically, in any sense, and which merely helped us to co-operate in a measure, consult each other and maybe influence others and may to be influenced ourselves. In fact, I would like that type of association with every country in the wide world. It is far better than a treaty or an alliance where you undertake to do something. We have undertaken to do nothing in the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth countries have undertaken to do nothing to us. We are freer than two countries tied by an alliance.

MB: What positive benefits would you say....?

JN: The positive benefits are, I say, that it is always a good thing for a number of countries to be on friendly terms of consultation. That itself is good. Now, our relations with Burma are fairly close, closer than with many countries in the Commonwealth. It does not require Commonwealth relationships to do that.

MB: But this may be a special case?

JN: Yes, I know that is a special case. Other countries, too, but there is no reason at all why we should break a subsisting relationship. You see, we had first come in as a Dominion and then we become a Republic. They accepted us as a Republic. Apart from being wrong, I think, it would have been quite churlish. There was absolutely no reason—except that we just don't like your face. There was no political or economic or any other reason why we should do it. And there were good reasons why we should be there because it does help us in conferring with a number of important countries, well, to influence them and to be influenced by them and, through them, to influence world affairs to some extent.

MB: Would you also say that it has some economic benefits in that, the traditional economic links between India and the United Kingdom.....?

JN: That is something quite apart. We may not be in the Commonwealth at all and yet our economic links may continue simply because they have been there and we don't break them. That has nothing to do with it. Of course, you may say, in a sense, that it slightly helps but really it does not make..... We are in the sterling area.

MB: But is this not a crucial consideration?

JN: No. We are in the sterling area but while remaining in the Commonwealth, we can be outside the sterling area, as Canada is. Or we may be outside the Commonwealth and yet, be in the sterling area like Norway and other countries.

MB: Would you sum it up, perhaps, by saying that there are no disadvantages whatsoever and there have been some particular advantages?

JN: Definitely advantages and, more especially, in the world today, with so many conflicts and pulls in different directions, any relationship that brings countries together to discuss matters in a friendly way is desirable, both from those countries' point of view and from the larger point of view of the world.

MB: I should like to revert briefly to the domestic arena, Mr Prime Minister. You have often stressed provincialism, communalism and casteism as the three grave dangers to Indian unity and stability. During our discussion last week you referred briefly to casteism. I should like to take the other two in turn, and secure your opinion on the role these play today. With regard to provincialism, there has been much searching of minds and speculation on the significance of the events accompanying the reorganization of states. Do you attach much importance to the revelation of regional and particular loyalties

apparently lying with loyalty to India as a whole? Does it appear to you to be transient? Do these events suggest the desirability of strengthening central control or is decentralization still the goal? In the broadest sense, what are the lessons to be derived from the experience of states reorganization?

JN: All that has happened recently in regard to the reorganization of states has come to us as a shock, that is, the intensity of it. I can't call it absolutely transient. Nevertheless, I think it will gradually lessen. Perhaps, one might even say that this sudden and rather aggressive and violent exhibition has one good aspect and that is it has shaken people up to its dangers. They are more wide awake about it and many people are thinking about where this would lead. But I have no doubt in my mind that in the long run, not a very long run I mean, this will gradually lessen.

Now, you talked about centralization and decentralization. There is a measure of decentralization, federal states and all that. Yet the Centre is fairly strong. There is absolutely no suggestion that the Centre should become weaker than it is. Some people say it should become stronger. Some people say there should be a unitary state. I don't believe in this unitary state. I don't believe that a large country like India can develop in the way I should like it to develop and can be really democratically governed by a strong, by a central apparatus. I want the Centre to be strong because there are disruptive tendencies in India and the Centre must be strong enough to control them and to put them down. But to carry out the governance of a huge country like this from the Centre—it would certainly have some advantages in the sense that we can get things done quickly—but I don't think it would develop the spirit of self-reliance, and self-dependence, which we would like the people to develop.

MB: Perhaps, the diversity amidst unity to which you have often referred?

JN: That, too. That is to say, the Centre must be strong and be able to intervene. Nevertheless, we should develop as much local initiative as possible.

MB: With respect to communalism—while I may be wrong, Mr Prime Minister, my studies and interviews in this country lead me to believe that although many pay lip-service to the ideal of a secular state, largely out of deference to you, there are many people within the Congress, as well as in other parties, who retain a strong communalist bias. This lurks in the background largely because of your efforts to keep it under control. Everyone with whom I have talked has stressed your indispensable role as a barrier to the resurgence of communalism.

One wonders, therefore, what institutional safeguards there are for the continued protection of minorities in this country?

JN: Institutional safeguards we can have. We are going to have some more—new changes in the Constitution. But really no institutional safeguards can take the place of goodwill. No institutional safeguards will protect isolated communities in the villages or towns. They help, of course, the Constitution helps, the judiciary helps, but in the final analysis people have to develop tolerance and respect for each other. Now, they have got that basic tolerance. I would despair of India if I did not believe that people have got that basic tolerance and that they tolerate each other and are friendly with each other in their normal lives. It is not that any group amongst them, has got the spirit of a crusader to drive out the other odd individuals, might be foolish enough. The difficulty only comes in when they can be excited on occasions. But they recover their balance a little after.

MB: So that ultimately one has to depend upon this deep-rooted tolerance of Hindu society?

JN: Why call it Hindu society. I call it Indian society, including non-Hindus too. Of course, we bring in safeguards and legislation as well.

MB: In the larger perspective of Asia, Mr Prime Minister, do you think that there is a rising tide of power of religion or religious ways of thinking? If so, do you think this may be a serious threat to democratic institutions and a secular state?

JN: I do not think there is any danger of religious revivalism coming in the way of social and economic progress or coming into conflict with each other. Basically, that is so. It is true, however, that there are tendencies of religious revivalism.

In India, it is there but I don't think it is important from a national point of view, in a big way. And it is really a kind of very narrow-minded nationalism. There is certainly an interest in India in what might be called old Indian concepts of philosophy. In the Buddhist countries, like Burma and Ceylon, there has been a very definite revival of Buddhism but I don't think it comes into conflict with anything. In some of the Islamic countries there is a certain revivalist tendency for Islam which, again I suppose, would be divided into two parts; one is the orthodox variety which is rather limited in outlook; the other is a more advanced approach and explanation of religion. All these are there. I think, they are the natural reactions of a country's freedom. But, after all, the basic problems are economic in every country.

MB: So that ultimately, you do not see a conflict arising from this resurgence?

JN: No conflict, I don't think there will be any conflict on that basis.

MB: Everyone with whom I have talked, Mr Prime Minister, has cited your presence as the greatest force for unity in India. They have also stressed your role as the initiator of policies which will transform Indian society. Some, of course, have criticized you for going too quickly, others for not moving fast enough. In view of these roles, as well as your indispensable link among the many groups within the Congress—as Mr Dhebar said at Amritsar a few months ago, what distinguishes the Congress from other parties is the presence of Mr Nehru⁹—certain crucial questions about the future arise. I do not want to trouble you with a re-echo of “after Nehru’s Who” but I am interested in knowing where to look for the institutional assurances for a continuation of your policies. The question of succession is important to many people in this sense. I have been particularly disturbed, if I may be so bold, by the evidence that many prominent persons in the Congress do not seem to share your fundamental ideology and policies though they accept them for various reasons. Partly, because of this and partly, because one looks in vain for the semblance of a group who will faithfully continue your policies, there are many who wonder where to look for the safeguards, if I may use that term, that the policies and programmes associated with your leadership will be continued—in particular, socialism, democratic institutions, the secular state and non-alignment in foreign affairs?

JN: Well, that is a very long question!

MB: It is indeed!

JN: At the same time, it is difficult for me to answer except to say that the policies I have encouraged, advocated, sponsored, have not been just individual policies. There are many people, and important people, in the Congress and in the country, who believe in them. What is much more so is that they have, vaguely and broadly speaking, the backing of the masses in this country. And,

9. U.N. Dhebar, in his presidential address at the sixty-first session of the Indian National Congress in Amritsar on 11 February 1956, pointed out that India’s “post-freedom journey on (the) road to progress” had started with the initial advantage of the presence of Nehru, and added, “We have the good fortune to possess in Panditji a leader who has carried with him and is still carrying with him the trust of our people, perhaps unequalled anywhere”.

as step by step we give effect to those policies, well, that is a step confirming a certain direction of growth. It is very difficult to go back from these things, more especially because, by and large, they are appreciated by the people.

MB: Would one say then that the greatest institutional safeguard is the fact that the masses of India support you in the policies that have been followed during the past nine years?

JN: Yes, though that is not institutional, I suppose, my chief business, in so far as the people are concerned, has been, if I may use the word, to speak to them as a schoolmaster, to try to explain things to them in as simple a language as possible and not to deliver, well, I can't deliver them, fiery orations, but just trying to get them to think and to understand. For after all, in India, the first approach—by public meeting—is still the biggest approach. For the rest, well, really, one does one's best and one doesn't worry too much about the future.

MB: Yes, but is it not very important that the policies which have been followed during the years since Independence should be continued in the future?

JN: Yes, yes, certainly, and more. But, all this business. Take the Planning Commission's Report, the new one. Now, it is, if I may say so, a very good document—apart from the details of it, the broad approaches of it. All of these sink into public consciousness. People discuss it. Almost everybody in India talks about planning. Their conception of planning may be very limited but they talk about it. And all this trains, and educates people, makes them think in a particular way and drives all of them forward in a particular direction. Now, some of them may stop the pace, not going in that direction, or they may make it faster but I don't think, it is possible in the future for the mass of the people to be taken away, far away, from their moorings. What is always conceivable is that small groups, not functioning on the basis of these policies... but they will not be able to affect these policies in a direct way. Remember that. Nobody is going to the people and say, "Give up your socialism." They dare not say so.

MB: But is there any more positive assurance that the policies would be continued?

JN: They dare not say so but, I should say, what they might do is to talk about religion, to talk about something else.

MB: And thereby divert attention?

JN: Divert attention, confuse them and even push them in the wrong direction. That is, they cannot challenge these things directly, because there is too much

public support. Indirectly, it is conceivable that they can confuse the public mind.....

MB: And accomplish their objectives thereby?

JN: Yes, but they would be temporary objectives and ultimately they would get into trouble with them.

MB: Sir, many people both in India and abroad were somewhat shocked in the autumn of 1954, just before you went to China by your letter indicating your desire to resign both as Prime Minister and as President of the Congress.¹⁰ Most of these people have no understanding of the circumstances which played on your mind at the time and gave rise to this particular thought.

JN: Do you understand U Nu's retirement from the Prime Ministership of Burma?¹¹

MB: Well, perhaps in terms of the Buddhist conception of renunciation.

JN: Well, I don't know. It is not for me to say what it is but he has, of course, been wanting to retire for a long time. And now that he has done one thing he was very keen on doing, that is, completed his Buddhist synod, he thought his work was over. But he is by no means retiring from public life. He is still the head of his party and I should say, it is my own personal opinion, that he has retired from the Prime Ministership to strengthen the party and to get into closer contact, with his people, to come back if necessary with that new strength. Now, I made it perfectly clear, two years ago, that I had absolutely no intention of retiring from public activity, that if I resigned from Prime Ministership, I would do so to work harder. As a matter of fact, I did resign afterwards from the Congress Presidentship, and other jobs I was doing too. I got away from them. I was Minister of Defence, and other things of that type. But I remained as Prime Minister, well, for a variety of reasons—pressure from many sides and doubt in my own mind and all that. Yet, I didn't think for an instant that by not being Prime Minister I cease to be a very important personality in India, influencing policies wherever I might be and whether or not I occupied any position.

MB: Shall we say, as the Mr Nehru of the national movement?

10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 27, pp. 312-317.

11. See *ante*, pp. 449-451.

JN: Yes, whatever it is, yes. I knew that. I was not terribly afraid that the country would go to dogs because I was not there. It is a silly idea. Oh, many things might be done which I did not approve of, possibly. We could pull them up later. But the main idea behind it was a certain spirit of frustration at what was happening in the country, something that U Nu probably feels. That is why he has resigned...working in more direct touch with the people rather than sitting in the secretariat, encumbered with the daily routine. That was the main idea. And I said then I would come back. It is not that I was retiring for life. A year later or two years later I would be prepared to come back if people want me and.....

MB: Yes, Mr Ben-Gurion¹² did this for two years in Israel, resigning from the Prime Ministership.

JN: Yes, yes.

MB: I wonder whether this thought continues to occur to you, that perhaps it would be of some value if you had more time to think about the urgent problems confronting India?

JN: That is always present in a corner of the mind! May be, may be, I don't think it is so but may be. After all, some relic of the old Hindu thought of retiring at a certain age, although I am not at all in the retiring frame of mind.

MB: I have just one final question, Mr Prime Minister. Some years ago there appeared a book entitled *I Believe*¹³ which contained very brief statements of their basic philosophy of life by prominent men of letters, the arts, science and public affairs. I don't propose to ask you to restate at great length your basic philosophy of life. But, in concluding these interviews, it would be appreciated if you were to sum up once again very briefly what, in your view, constitutes the good society?

JN: I was asked to contribute to that *I Believe* book and I did not agree. I did not agree because I would have found it difficult anyhow. And, honestly, I don't like shouting out to the wide world my inner thoughts. I have no desire to advertise them.

12. David Ben-Gurion (1886-1973); Zionist leader and Israeli statesman; proclaimed the independent State of Israel in Tel Aviv in 1948; Prime Minister, 1948-53 and 1955-63; retired in 1953; called back as Minister of Defence in February 1955 and in the same year, became again Prime Minister.

13. *I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Certain Eminent Men and Women of Our Time*, ed: Clifton Fadiman (1939).

MB: But surely, in your position as Prime Minister.....

JN: As a matter of fact, I am normally very frank with my public, more frank than when I am talking to individuals. At a public meeting. I somehow come out more, I feel intimate with them, friendly with them. I have written something about my philosophy in the early chapters of *The Discovery of India*.¹⁴ Now, what constitutes the Good Society and the Good Life? Broadly speaking, apart from the material things that are necessary, obviously, a certain individual growth in the society, not only the corporate social growth but the individual growth. For I do believe that ultimately it is the individual that counts. I can't say that I believe in it because I have no proof but the idea appeals to me without belief, the old Hindu idea that if there is any Divine essence in the world, every individual possesses a bit of it, everything, but every individual certainly, and he can develop it. Therefore, no individual is trivial. Every individual has an importance and he should be given full opportunities to develop—material opportunities naturally, food, clothing, education, housing, health, etc. They should be common to everybody. The difficulty comes in about the moral aspect, the moral aspect of religion. I am not at all concerned about the hereafter. It does not worry me; I don't see why it should worry people whether the next world is or is not there. And I am not prepared to deny many things. I just don't know! The most correct attitude, if I may say so, is that of the Buddha who did not deny it and did not assert it. He said, "This life is enough for me and when you do not know about something why talk about it!" I do believe in certain standards. Call them moral standards, call them what you like, spiritual standards. They are important in any individual and in any social group. And if they fade away, I think that all the material advancement you may have will lead to nothing worthwhile. How to maintain them I don't know; I mean to say, there is the religious approach. It seems to me a rather narrow approach with its forms and all kinds of ceremonials. And yet, I am not prepared to deny that approach. If a person feels comforted by that, it is not for me to remove that sense of comfort. I don't mind—I think it is silly for a man to worship a stone but if a man is comforted by worshipping a stone why should I come in his way. If it raises him above his normal level it is good for him. Whatever raises a person above his normal level is good, however, he approaches that—provided he does not sit on somebody and force him to do it. That is a different matter. So, while I attach very considerable value to moral and spiritual standards, apart from religion as such, I don't quite know how one maintains them in modern life. It is a problem.

14. Published in 1946.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

I¹

New Delhi
10 May 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

It is a long time since I wrote to you.² To plead an excess of work would be a poor excuse. It is true that there has been heavy work, but that is not an unusual occurrence. The real reason perhaps has been that I could not develop the mood to write this fortnightly letter to you. The day's work was attended to with more or less efficiency, but to sit down quietly and talk to you, as it were, of the important happenings in the world and in our own country seemed difficult. Normally, I have liked writing these fortnightly letters and to share with you some of my own thoughts. But during these days, I could not think, how I could say anything worthwhile. I do not wish these letters to become a collection of platitudes or just a statement of odd events, many of which are recorded in the newspapers. If these letters have any value, they must contain something more.

2. It was that something more which I could not get hold of and so I could not develop the mood for writing this. It is true that there has been an abundance of things and events to write about both in our country and abroad. There is no lack of drama in this changing world of ours and, even in India, we live in an exciting age. I have always considered it a great privilege for people of this generation to live during this period of India's long history and to take some little part in the shaping of that story. I have believed that there is nothing more exciting in the wide world today than to work in India. That very thought fills me with vitality and a desire to get the most out of this passing show in our fleeting lives.

3. But perhaps, there can be too much excitement, or the excitement can be of the wrong kind. As you know, our minds have been unhappily occupied during these past six or seven months with the question of the reorganization of states. It was not a question of high political or economic or social policy which usually stir people's minds. And yet, it was a question which moved people powerfully and excited their passions. Those passions were not against an external enemy or some internal evil. They were against each other and the whole fabric that millions had built up by their labour through generations of effort seemed to crack up. Was this some temporary phase, an aberration of

1. File No. 25 (30)/56-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964*, Vol. 4 (New Delhi, 1988), pp. 366-374 and 376-388.

2. Nehru wrote on 3 April 1956 last.

the moment, or was there something deeper to it, I do not know. I have tried to believe that this was a relic of the narrow regionalism and parochialism which had been our failing in the past and which were having a final spurt before this ghost was laid.

4. For the moment, the ghost is there and we live a somewhat haunted existence. We may well blame each other, but that brings little solace or solution, for, in the context of India, we are all to blame and we have all to suffer the consequences. I have tried to search my mind and heart to find out where I have erred. What should I have done that I have not done, and what should I have avoided doing that I have done? It is easy to be wise after the event. But the basic fact remains that we have yet to develop a unified nation. We distrust each other and sometimes even dislike each other. Under stress of some calamity or external danger, we may well unite. When that immediate urge is removed, we fall back into our respective shells and lose the sense of the whole. Painfully, we try to get out of these shells and build the unity of India. Step by step we advance, and then something happens which lays bare our inner urges and failings. Whether it is caste or provincialism, we still live in a tribal age. Religion was exploited to break up our unity and now language, which should be a binding and ennobling factor, works in the same way. Meanwhile, caste remains to separate us and to encourage narrow groupings.

5. I suppose we shall get over this distemper. But, for the moment, it results in a high temperature. The fever will go and we shall settle down to something more worthwhile. What tremendous tasks we have undertaken demanding all the strength and energies, and yet we fritter them and waste our substance.

6. Even this would not matter so much if we could face our problems peacefully and democratically, but we seem to live on the verge of violence, often crossing that border line, and threats and coercive methods become the fashion. The very basis of democracy is threatened and our dreams of rapid progress become increasingly unsubstantial. Whatever our differences, there should be common ground about our broad methods, if we are to function democratically. These methods must be peaceful and we must recognize the worth of even those who oppose us, for we have to win them over. We have to learn how to accept decisions which are against us and which we do not like.

7. We had hoped to get the States Reorganization Bill through Parliament during this session and then to set about fashioning the new states.³ We had

3. The Bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 10 August and by the Rajya Sabha on 25 August. It received the President's assent on 31 August 1956.

drawn up a programme for this, according to which the new states would come into existence at the beginning of October. We were anxious that our General Elections should be held at the normal time and should not be postponed.⁴ We now find that it is almost physically impossible to get this Bill through Parliament during this session. It would not be proper to rush through this Bill, in Select Committee or in Parliament, without adequate opportunity being given for discussion.

8. The result has been a change in programme. This has not been finalized yet, but it is probable that the next session of Parliament will be held early in the second week of July.⁵ Before that date it is expected that the Select Committee will have finished its work. It is hoped that Parliament will finally pass this legislation before the end of July. This will have to include a separate Bill which will come soon relating to Bihar and Bengal.⁶ If the final Act is passed by the end of July, it may be possible to have the new states begin their fresh career on the 1st November or perhaps even earlier. This is about a month later than our own programme and we still hope that the General Elections will be held by March next year. But the programme is a very tight one and we shall have to work our hardest to give effect to it within the stated time.

9. One piece of good news, which has heartened me, is the passage in the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha of the Hindu Succession Act.⁷ This will have to go back to the Rajya Sabha, as the Lok Sabha has made some amendments.⁸ But I think, we can be fairly certain now that within a few days this Bill will become the law of India. It has had a long and difficult journey

4. General Elections for the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies were held from 24 February 1957.

5. Starting on 16 July 1956, Parliament's monsoon session concluded on 13 September 1956.

6. See *ante*, p. 338.

7. The Bill, passed by the Rajya Sabha on 30 November 1955, was also passed by the Lok Sabha on 8 May 1956 with some amendments. Rajya Sabha agreed to the amendments and passed the Bill on 15 May 1956 which received the President's assent on 17 June 1956. For Nehru's speech during a debate on the Bill on 8 May 1956, see *ante*, pp. 214-221.

8. One amendment gave the daughter a right of residence in her paternal home, irrespective of whether she had been left a house or not by the husband from whom she had been separated. Till then such a right was vested only in an unmarried daughter, the daughter deserted by her husband, or a widowed daughter. By another amendment the right to dispose of the property by will was not to affect the existing right of maintenance of certain categories of dependants.

and it has changed shape several times. At last we appear to be reaching the end of the journey. This Bill and the Hindu Marriage Act⁹ have a peculiar significance, not only because of the changes they bring about but chiefly because they have pulled out Hindu law from the ruts in which it had got stuck and given it a new dynamism. In that sense, the passage of this legislation marks an epoch in India. It indicates that we have not only striven for and achieved a political revolution, not only are we striving hard for an economic revolution but that we are equally intent on social revolution; only by way of advance on these three separate lines and their integration into one great whole, will the people of India progress.

10. Some days ago I placed before Parliament a new resolution of the Government of India on Industrial Policy.¹⁰ We had spent a good deal of time over this. I am very glad that it has met with a favourable response from many quarters including some from which this was not expected. This resolution faithfully brings out our policy which, I think, is a realistic policy and yet essentially dynamic and revolutionary. Our way has been to bring about changes as rapidly as possible and at the same time to keep up the continuity of national life and tradition. This resolution is going to be followed soon by the Second Five Year Plan which is meant to give form and shape to it, in as large a measure as our strength and resources and our will to success permit. The National Development Council has already approved of it and after a final revision it is likely to be signed by the members of the Planning Commission within a few days. After that it will be placed before Parliament for its approval.¹¹

11. In the course of our discussions in the National Development Council, stress was laid on many aspects and it was pointed out that there was a new

9. The Hindu Marriage Act, passed by the Rajya Sabha on 15 December 1954 and by the Lok Sabha on 5 May 1955, received the President's assent on 18 May 1955. It provided for (i) the minimum essential conditions for a Hindu marriage; (ii) rules regarding restitution of conjugal rights; (iii) judicial separation; (iv) the grounds for divorce; and (v) punishment for bigamy. For Nehru's speech in the course of debate on the Bill on 5 May 1955, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 30, pp. 468-478.

10. Enunciating the Government's new industrial policy in the Lok Sabha on 30 April 1956, Nehru stated that the State would progressively assume a predominant role and direct responsibility for setting up new industrial undertakings and for developing transport facilities. He added: "The state will also undertake trading on an increasing scale. At the same time, as an agency for planned national development in the context of the country's expanding economy, the private sector will have opportunity to develop and expand." See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 72-79.

11. See *ante*, pp. 71-110.

emphasis on industrial development,¹² which is so essential if we are to raise our national income and capacity to invest for future development. In particular, heavy industry and the machine-making industry have been emphasized. But in spite of all that we have to do for industry, the fact remains that agriculture is the solid foundation on which we have to build. It is from agriculture and from the increasing production on the land that we can build up our surpluses for future growth. Therefore, agricultural production assumes a vital importance. This increase in agricultural yields will necessarily come far more from intensive cultivation than from extending our cultivated area.

12. Our yield per acre today is, I believe, the lowest in the world. The capacity for increased yield is therefore tremendous. Why should China which is in many ways even less developed than we are, produce double the quantity per acre? Why should Egypt produce fourfold of our production? These are not countries where there is mechanised production and therefore, the comparisons are justified.

13. Our original estimate was for a fifteen per cent increase in agricultural production during the Second Five Year Plan. This manifestly is too little. The Chinese estimate is between 35 and 40 per cent in five years and they start with a higher yield per acre. There is absolutely no reason why, if we are serious enough and work hard, we cannot equal the Chinese rate of progress in this matter. Our Food & Agriculture Ministry is giving fresh thought to this question and I have no doubt that they will put forward fresh targets much in advance of the old ones. I think that our Community Projects and National Extension Service have a very special part to play in increasing agricultural production. They have done wonderful work and begun a new revolution in the countryside. A new spirit is there and a new vitality. We have to turn this more particularly, in the direction of intensive cultivation as well as small and cottage industries. The farmer all over the world is not influenced by theories. He only understands something that he sees. If a particular method yields better results and he sees it, then he will copy it. We should therefore, have a very large number of demonstration farms. They need not be very big. In fact, each Community Centre should have at least one such farm, if not more. These selected farms should be carefully worked so as to calculate the cost and the yield and the final economic results.

14. I have not referred to any international problems although there is no lack of them. Kashmir has again occupied the headlines and it is said that

12. For Nehru's speech on 1 and 2 May 1956, see *ante*, pp. 39-52.

Pakistan is going to bring this question up in the Security Council soon.¹³ So far as we are concerned, our minds and our policy are clear now. Unfortunately, during the past eight years, this problem has become covered up with so much argument that the real issues have become hidden. Anyhow, we have to take things as they are today and not to be dragged again into interminable debate and protracted negotiations.

15. The recent visit of Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev to the United Kingdom¹⁴ attracted much attention. In spite of hard language and angry exchanges occasionally,¹⁵ and the vague nature of the joint communique issued at the end,¹⁶ I have no doubt that the visit has done good and helped a little in easing world tension. I would draw your particular attention to the fact that in this joint statement the Five Principles, which have become the basic policy of so many countries, have been mentioned with approval.

16. The dissolution of the Cominform,¹⁷ though expected, is yet another significant step towards a more normal relationship between countries. Unfortunately, disarmament has made no progress at all. And yet, I have an impression that even there we are moving forward though very slowly. It is possible that the Soviet Union might do something in this respect unilaterally.

17. As a result of the London meetings, the situation in the Middle East has toned down somewhat, though it continues to be explosive. In Ceylon, there

13. See *ante*, p. 389.

14. From 18 to 27 April 1956.

15. On 24 April there were sharp exchanges between the Soviet leaders and Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, on the Baghdad Pact when Khrushchev had remarked that the Pact "would die." On most other questions also, and specially on European issues, there was little narrowing of differences. The Soviet leaders also had angry exchanges with the leaders of the Labour Party.

16. The communique of 27 April 1956 mainly dealt with disarmament, Anglo-Russian trade, situation in West Asia, preservation of international peace, maintenance of European security and good relations between the nations by following the principles of the UN Charter.

17. On 17 April 1956, Mikoyan, the First Vice-Chairman, Council of Ministers, USSR, officially confirmed a press report about the dissolution of the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), which had been set up on 5 October 1947 at a secret meeting in Poland of Communist delegates from nine European countries.

has been a marked change in the Government as a result of the elections¹⁸ and in Burma Prime Minister U Nu's party has won a resounding success.¹⁹

18. Our President and Vice-President are very much concerned at the fact that many of our valuable old manuscripts, some on palm leaves, are deteriorating and may well be lost for ever.²⁰ If I may say so with all respect, I entirely agree with them that we should do everything in our power to rescue these wherever they might be at present and to give them proper shelter. The right thing, of course, would be to build up a proper Indological Institute where all such manuscripts could be preserved and studied. I suggest to you that you might take immediate steps in your state to find out and make a list of such manuscripts. They may be in libraries, temples and in private houses. If each state helped in this way, it would become easy for the Government of India to collect.

19. In less than two weeks, we are going to celebrate in India and in many places in the world the Buddha Jayanti—the 2500th anniversary of the *Parinirvana*. This is a great occasion for the world. But for us in India, it has a special significance, for it is our pride and high privilege to consider the Buddha as our countryman. He belongs to the world, but certainly we are justified in thinking of him as one of ourselves, though infinitely greater and nobler than anyone of us. In this age of the atomic and hydrogen bomb, his message of peace and tolerance shines and brightens up the dark corners of the world where lurks hatred and violence and the spirit of the hydrogen bomb.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. General elections in Sri Lanka, held between 5 and 10 April 1956, resulted in a severe defeat of the ruling United National Party. The People's United Party secured an absolute majority by winning 51 seats. John Kotelawala resigned on 11 April and Solomon Bandaranaike assumed office on the next day.

19. General elections held on 27 April 1956 in Myanmar resulted in a clear victory for the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), the ruling party.

20. See *ante*, pp. 158-159.

II

New Delhi
15 June 1956

My dear Chief Minister,

A month and more has passed since I wrote to you my last letter.¹ Within a few days I shall be leaving India for another tour abroad.² It is going to be a difficult tour, both physically and because of the problems I shall have to face in various capitals. My main object in going is to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference,³ but perhaps an even more important visit is to Washington to have talks with President Eisenhower.⁴ Unfortunately, the President has fallen ill again and it is doubtful if he will be well enough for him to have long talks with me. I have not changed my programme because of his illness and I hope to go to Washington. But I rather doubt if the main purpose of the visit will be fulfilled.

2. After Washington I go to Bonn etc.,⁵ in West Germany via London. Then a brief visit to Paris⁶ and on to Yugoslavia,⁷ Cairo⁸ and Beirut.⁹ Everywhere there are important talks with Heads of Governments on difficult subjects. Apart from my stay in London to begin with, I shall hardly spend two consecutive nights in one place.

3. All this will be rather strenuous work, and yet it may well be a change from my normal routines and worries here. India's problems will not leave me wherever I might be. And so, I cannot entirely change the subject of my thoughts, but other occupations and discussions will no doubt be a refreshing change, however arduous they might be.

4. In India the biggest thing we have to tackle and give thought to is the Second Five Year Plan and the administrative apparatus that should be adapted to meet the needs of that Plan. It is true that this Plan has attracted widespread attention and everyone says that India is very plan-conscious. And yet, it is

1. See the preceding item.

2. From 21 June to 22 July 1956.

3. Held from 28 June to 6 July 1956.

4. The proposed visit from 7 to 11 July 1956 was later postponed to December 1956.

5. From 13 to 16 July 1956.

6. On 17 and 18 July 1956.

7. On 18 and 20 July 1956.

8. On 19 and 20 July 1956.

9. On 21 July 1956.

also true that recently the dominant news in the newspapers and in the minds of many of our people has been the problem of states reorganization and, more especially, the troubles we have had on the Bombay side and in some parts of the Punjab. I hope they will subside. Controversies about such matters are natural and might almost be welcomed. But what has troubled many of us is the way some of our people take to violence when they disagree with a decision. Stone-throwing, often with grievous results, appears to be becoming a fairly usual practice as an expression of disapproval. Arson and more violent attacks also take place. Two days ago in Hoshiarpur in the Punjab a public meeting was being held when, it is reported, a batch of Jana Sangh people came and started throwing stones.¹⁰ Many were injured and one police constable died of his injuries. In Bombay, when the AICC met, there was a good deal of stone-throwing and worse. I was much impressed in Bombay by the quiet efficiency of the Police. They had to deal with very difficult situations, but they kept their temper and controlled crowds remarkably well. Nevertheless, many prominent visitors to Bombay from other parts of India, apart from residents of Bombay, were injured by these stones and brickbats. If this was meant to convert anyone, it failed signally. If it was intended to be a threat, even so it could not succeed.

5. The All India Congress Committee passed a resolution condemning violence.¹¹ In this resolution, which you must have seen, the Committee noted with grave concern the increasing tendency in the country towards violence, indiscipline and the lowering of standards of public life and behaviour. There was no reference in it to any particular party or group. Indeed, there was an appeal to the nation and every party and organization in the country to work to overcome these tendencies towards violence and indiscipline and adventurism, because these imperilled democracy and progress. One would have thought that this was a resolution to which no one could take exception. And, yet, the Communist Party attacked this resolution in a statement and called upon people to protest against it.¹² This was an extraordinary and yet significant reaction,

10. Following rejection by the Union Home Minister of the demand of the Maha Punjab Samiti for a round table conference on the merger of Pepsu, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, the Samiti workers staged a demonstration at a public meeting organized by the Congress on 13 June 1956. This led to clashes between the police and the demonstrators.

11. See *ante*, pp. 323-325.

12. See *ante*, p. 365.

and it threw a somewhat lurid light on the thinking of the Politbureau of the Communist Party of India. It is well known, of course, that Communists not only do not believe in peaceful methods but consider violent methods as perfectly justifiable. But, to defend violence publicly in this manner is a feat which, even for the Communist Party of India, was rather remarkable.

6. I have drawn your attention previously to the major changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union.¹³ I have no doubt that these changes are very significant and indicate a big step away from the old communist methods of the Soviet Union and towards a more normal administrative set-up. In some of the East European countries, and notably in Poland, these changes have been even more remarkable.¹⁴ Probably, Marshal Tito's visit to the Soviet Union will result in a further step in this direction.¹⁵

7. While this is perfectly true about these communist countries, the behaviour of communist parties in countries where they are in a small minority, indicates no real improvement. There is confusion in their ranks and doubt as to what they should do because of the changes in Russia. Having passionately adhered to the old policies and methods of the Soviet Union, and accepted them as a creed which could not be doubted or challenged, suddenly they find the foundation slipping from under them. Recently, the Communist Party of India had a conference at Palghat in South India. Not knowing what to say clearly and definitely, they produced a resolution which covers forty-six pages of print.¹⁶ I have neither the time nor the desire to read through all these forty-six pages, but I have seen enough to indicate how utterly confused the

13. In the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union, held in Moscow from 14 to 25 February 1956, new policies amounting to de-Stalinization were announced. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 334 and 343.

14. Following Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz call for a "new democratization of our political and economic life", the Government began releasing on 30 April prisoners under the new amnesty law, announced changes in fiscal policy in favour of peasantry, and introduced changes in trade union leadership.

15. From 2 to 23 June 1956.

16. The fourth congress of the CPI held at Palghat from 19 to 29 April 1956 passed a resolution welcoming India's new status as the leader of new forces fighting against imperialism and for promoting peace in the world. While appreciating Nehru's stand on Kashmir, Baghdad Pact, and the US arms aid to Pakistan, it criticized support of the Commonwealth to Pakistan on Kashmir question and British support to Portugal on Goa. It welcomed the Government's fight against feudal forces and foreign capital, but criticized their failure to fight corruption and inefficiency; and while recognizing Congress as a mass-based party, it cautioned against the "feudal elements" in it and its so-called goal of socialism. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, p. 266.

Communist Party of India is. That is no concern of mine. But, what does concern me and others is the fact that their standards of action and behaviour do not seem to improve. Indeed, because they have been knocked on the head by certain developments abroad, they have to shout all the more loudly and violently to justify their existence.

8. At the other end of the scale, there are the communal organizations which believe firmly in violence. While India is thinking about great social and economic problems and discussing the Second Five Year Plan, these communal parties have nothing to say about social and economic issues. They neither understand them nor care for them. They concentrate on local grievances and indulge in violent activities. Both in Bombay and Maharashtra, and in the Punjab, the RSS has come into prominence in these violent agitations. In the Punjab, the RSS has become indistinguishable from the Jana Sangh, and both flourish under the banner of the Maha Punjab Samiti and rejoice in attacking individuals they do not like and in trying to break up meetings. This is the tactic we have long recognized in fascist parties in other parts of the world. Indeed, the whole outlook of these communal organizations may be described as fascist.

9. It is interesting to know that the Communist Party and the communal parties, far apart as they are supposed to be, have no hesitation in joining hands to oppose the Congress in elections and elsewhere. Neither has any positive policy left and can only function in a negative and usually in a violent way. This tendency towards violence and disruptive tactics raises important issues for us to consider, regardless of party or opinion. It is to this that the Congress resolution drew attention and it is necessary that we should realize how innocent people are misled and exploited for the ends of a few. This has always been the fascist way.

10. There is another aspect of this which deserves attention. Certain foreign individuals and organizations (not Governments) who do not approve of things as they are, encourage anything that leads to disruption. Such charges were made in the recent Burmese elections¹⁷ and similar charges have been made in Ceylon during the language troubles there.¹⁸ I have no doubt that foreign money has come in some way or other to help the Communist Party of India and the communal parties. I need not say that the same source does not feed

17. See *ante*, p. 451.

18. Rioting broke out between two main ethnic groups in Colombo on 5 June 1956, the day the House of Representatives debated the Official Language Bill declaring Sinhalese to be the sole official language of Sri Lanka.

both of these. Some of our newspapers are not above receiving this type of help in various ways.

11. I suppose that many of our present-day troubles are due to the fact that the General Elections are not far off. These troubles might well be considered a prelude and a preparation for them. Many people in the wide world are interested in our coming elections. We have therefore, to be wide awake and not be misled by relatively small difference of opinion into taking a path, which leads away completely from ordered progress. I remember the awful happenings after Partition in 1947-48. I do not mean to say that anything like that is in the air or can happen in India. But the poison is of the same variety and many of the people who created trouble then are again on the war path, if I may say so. We are apt to take many things too much for granted and to forget that unless certain basic assumptions are agreed to generally, the superstructure that we try to build will have weak foundations. Our views may differ but I am surprised that intelligent persons should encourage activities which only lead, if they succeed, to disaster. Fortunately, our people have a good deal of solid common sense and they have matured. I do not think they can be led away easily, but we have to explain things to them and make them understand. Above all, we have to adhere to certain basic principles of group and personal behaviour and to maintain certain standards. That is more important than some minor advantage or even some victory in an odd election.

12. There is no lack of criticism and condemnation of Government in the country. Even our friends rejoice in doing this. We should welcome criticism for it helps in keeping us up to the mark. But because of the constant running down of what has been done or is being done, a distorted picture is presented to our own people. Oddly enough, foreigners often see this picture in a better perspective. In other democratic countries, there is plenty of criticism, but there is also pride in achievement and a desire to stand together before the outside world.

13. You may remember that four or five years ago, an eminent authority from America, Mr Paul H. Appleby, spent some months in India, examining our administrative system and produced a report which attracted a good deal of attention.¹⁹ Mr Appleby came here again two years ago, and he has been

19. Appleby, who had long years of service in various capacities in the United States Government, was appointed consultant to the Government of India on public administration in September 1952. In his report, submitted in January 1953, he pointed out a number of defects in the administrative system. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 22, pp. 133, 302 and 547.

here for the third time recently. On each occasion, he did not come here just as a tourist, but as a keen observer and spent some time in finding out how we were functioning. He has just produced another report after his third visit. I hope you will get this soon, and I would particularly invite your attention to it. He has criticized our administrative system sometimes in strong language and has pointed out how, as it is today, it is not adequate for the great tasks we have to face. We welcome his criticisms and I hope we shall profit by them. But, his overall view of India today is at least as important as his detailed criticisms. This overall view is given in the first few paragraphs of his report. I quote them below:

“Intervals of about two years between three successive visits to India provide a perspective in which achievements of the new nation appear with a clarity perhaps otherwise not possible. The achievements thus visible are enormous, of a size and quality probably never before or elsewhere approached together. The democratic character of India does not permit the ruthless disregard of immediate mass interest that has characterized efforts elsewhere which otherwise might be regarded as similar. India has been both building and serving democratic values while at the same time engaging in a monumental programme of economic development. Facing tremendous need and many great difficulties, both primary objectives have been served convincingly with vision, wisdom and hard practical performance. The two five year plans have been brilliantly conceived in their analysis of needs and their balancing of values. Understanding leadership in the field of financial policy has been as outstanding in this latter, much more complex period, as that of Alexander Hamilton²⁰ in the early days of the United States. Most of the programmatic fields have been well directed, and the community development programme as a whole has been successful far beyond any reasonable expectations.

Yet, in the face of these achievements, one finds in Parliament, in the press, in the universities, and in many conversations that citizens of pretension, cultivation and influence voice criticisms which tend to suggest a sense of failure and a lack of confidence. Criticisms that would be appropriate enough as counsels of improvement (which is ever to be had and always desirable) are made in such sweeping and extravagant terms,

20. (1755-1804); American lawyer and statesman who, as First Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to 1795, initiated policies to establish a fiscal system that covered the entire country, strengthen the Federal Government, and help mobilize and develop national resources.

and in terms so little recognizing the nature and means to administrative improvement, as to be damaging and threatening of increasing damage to India's great march forward. One is moved to observe that India's greatest need is for a sense of certainty concerning her own success."

14. Since I wrote to you last, the session of Parliament ended after some months of heavy and continuous work.²¹ Many important pieces of legislation were passed. Perhaps, at a later time, the outstanding achievement of this session²² and the previous one will be the passage of the Hindu Law Reform Bills. They are not in any way revolutionary in the changes they bring about and yet there is something revolutionary about them. They have broken the barrier of ages and cleared the way somewhat for our womenfolk to progress. I have long been convinced that a nation's progress is intimately connected with the status of its women. I have admired the womanhood of India. They played a great part in our struggle for freedom and today they are playing an increasing part in the innumerable activities of the nation. I do not admire many rather frivolous and vulgar aspects that are evident today. But, we must not be led away by this and ignore the great changes that are coming over our women. They are doing good work in the professions, in the sciences, in the services and elsewhere. They are adapting themselves to the new conditions of life, without uprooting themselves from the soil that has nurtured them. No revolution can be complete if it is only political. The essence of a revolutionary change is economic and social. We have paid a good deal of attention to the economic aspect and, I believe, we are moving at a fair pace. The social aspect is indicated by these reforms in the Hindu Law, more especially, relating to women.

15. I have referred above to the agitation in some parts of the Punjab over the Regional Formula.²³ I have criticized it on several occasions and said that

21. Lok Sabha on 30 May and Rajya Sabha on 31 May.

22. See *ante*, pp. 214-221.

23. The Akalis, who were demanding a Punjabi-speaking state, agreed in March 1956 to the merger of the states of Pepsu and Punjab with two regional standing committees one each for Hindi and Punjabi-speaking areas to deal with specified matters. To oppose this, the Maha Punjab Samiti gave a call on 28 May 1956 for direct action and demanded the merger of Pepsu, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh as recommended by the States Reorganization Commission. The Communists demanded the Hindi-speaking State of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and a Punjabi-speaking State and the Praja Socialist Party and other Socialists demanded merger of Pepsu and Punjab, and Greater Delhi, or as an alternative, the formation of Haryana, with a Governor, High Court, and a Public Service Commission, common for all the three States.

I cannot remember having seen a more misguided or misconceived agitation. I do not expect everyone to agree with me or with our Government, but one does expect a modicum of intelligence in understanding and appraising any step taken. I regret that this is completely absent today in the Punjab among those who are getting so vastly excited about the Regional Formula. That formula flows almost inevitably from the basic approach in regard to language that has been laid down in the final chapters of the States Commission's Report regarding safeguards for linguistic minorities.²⁴ It is in line with the policy laid down during the last few years by the Congress and by the Punjab and Central Governments. The details of this Regional Formula have not been worked out even yet, though the broad principles are there. What then is all this shouting and thumping about, not to mention the stone-throwing? I really cannot understand. Then there is the loud demand for a Maha Punjab including Himachal Pradesh. If there is one thing that is quite clear, it is this that the people of Himachal Pradesh do not want to be merged into the Punjab. In fact, they resent the idea. Are we to compel them simply because the Maha Punjab group so desires? The entire Regional Formula of the Punjab is on a line with the regional formulas we have suggested to some other parts of India.

16. Last month we celebrated the Buddha Jayanti or the 2500th anniversary of the *Parinirvana*. I was very happy to notice how this was celebrated in many parts of India. And yet, all the time I feel the contrast between what we said and what many of us did.

17. Pakistan goes from bad to worse, both politically and economically. In East Pakistan there is famine. We have gladly made a generous gift of 5000 tons of rice to relieve somewhat the famishing people of East Pakistan. Politically, there is trouble all over Pakistan and instability. And yet all this has not lessened the animus of some of the leaders of Pakistan and the press against India. They still talk of war and American military supplies pour into Pakistan. This should at least induce us in India to hold together and not to encourage disruption and discord.

18. In the outside world, perhaps Algeria presents the most dismal and difficult problem. We made some suggestions, keeping in view the difficulties of both sides.²⁵ Thus far neither side has accepted them, though they have not rejected them either. A time will come, I have no doubt, when the broad line we have suggested will have to be adopted. Meanwhile, mutual killing goes on and tragedy overshadows the land.

24. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 31, pp. 155, 176, 190 and 535.

25. See *ante*, pp. 481-483.

19. Recently, we decided to establish diplomatic relations with Spain.²⁶ Some people have thought that a clever move to influence the Catholic world in regard to Goa. Some people have also thought that my reply to a question in Parliament about Chitral²⁷ was also a Machiavellian move in relation to the Kashmir problem. I am afraid, I am not clever enough, nor have I the makings of a Machiavellian move in relation to the Kashmir problem.²⁸ I am afraid, I am not clever enough, nor have I the makings of a Machiavelli. The question of having diplomatic relations with Spain had been with us for a year or two. For many years we refused to have them because of our dislike of the regime there. You will remember how we sympathized in 1937 and after with the Spanish Republic.²⁹ Even the UN at one time asked its members not to have relations with the present Spanish Government.³⁰ But later when in recognizing the People's Government of China, we laid down the principle that a stable Government should be recognized whether we agreed with it or not, it became difficult for us to deny recognition to Spain.

20. So far as the Chitral question is concerned, it was put to us in the ordinary course in Parliament and I had to give a correct reply from the legal and constitutional point of view. There was nothing very clever about it. I have been as frank as any one can be in regard to Kashmir. I have indicated the utmost limits to which we can go. Having done so, we adhere to our full position and I see no reason why we should qualify it. There is some talk of Pakistan raising this matter again in the Security Council. It appears that the UK and the USA are trying to dissuade Pakistan from doing so or at least wanted it postponed. I suppose, some time or other it will come up before the Security Council. I am not greatly concerned about it, as our case is strong enough.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

26. This was announced simultaneously from Madrid and New Delhi on 25 May 1956.

27. On 26 May 1956. See also *ante*, pp. 382-383.

28. This was suggested by Taya Zinkin in *Manchester Guardian* on 29 May, 1955.

29. Nehru and the Congress had extended their support to the Republican Government in their fight against the Nationalists under General Franco who eventually succeeded in defeating the popular Government in 1939.

30. The UN General Assembly resolution of December 1946 had recommended the recall of Ambassadors from Madrid. This was revoked in November 1950.

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Help to Chandra Singh Garhwali¹

This is a letter from Chandra Singh Garhwali² who, as an NCO, together with his group, refused to fire on a peaceful crowd in Peshawar in the early thirties.³ They were court-martialled and suffered long imprisonment. When he came out, he came to me. We helped him a little. He was in prison in Dehra Dun too later, in connection with an NCO movement. Later, he got tied up with some Communists and behaved rather foolishly. He has been quiet for a number of years.

2. I do not know if he is getting any pension from Government or any help from the UP Government. Even if he gets something, it cannot be much.

3. He has written to me asking me to help him in the education of four of his children. One of them is only aged four years. There is a girl aged fourteen, who is in some school in Pauri (Garhwal). The second girl is ten years old. She is also at some school. Then, there is the boy of eight years who has been taken in the Gurukul Kangri.

4. Shri Bhakt Darshan,⁴ MP (Lok Sabha) from Garhwal, brought him to see me. He has also written to me. He has written only about the boy who is

1. Note to M.O. Mathai, Private Secretary, 6 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. (1891-1979); recruited to the Garhwal Regimental Centre at Lansdowne; served in the NWFP; court-martialled and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1930; after release in 1941 became associated with the freedom struggle; served another term in jail for participating in the 1942 movement and embraced Marxism during his period of internment; released in 1945, but imprisoned again the same year for his association with the CPI.
3. When thousands of unarmed Pathans and a sizeable number of the followers of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan were picketing before foreign goods shops in Peshawar on 30 April 1930, during the Civil Disobedience movement, a British Captain ordered his troops belonging to the Garhwal Rifles to fire. Chandra Singh Garhwali intervened and shouted, "Garhwalis, don't fire". The troops obeyed his command, and the soldiers were arrested and court-martialled. Nehru refers to this incident in his *Autobiography*.
4. (1912-1919); participated in the freedom struggle and imprisoned in 1930, 1941 and 1942; founder-editor, *Karma Bhumi* (Lansdowne), 1939-49; member, Kumaun Forest Committee, 1946-50; president, Garhwal District Board, 1948-49; District Development Officer, Garhwal-cum-Dehradun, 1949-51; elected to the Lok Sabha, 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967; Deputy Minister in the Union Ministry of Education, 1963-67, and Transport and Shipping, 1967-69; Minister of State in the Union Ministry of Education and Youth Services, 1969-71; organized the Kasturba Gandhi Memorial Fund and the Azad Hind Fauj Relief Fund; publications: *Suman-Smriti-Granth* and *Garhwal ki Diwangat Vibhutipan*.

at the Gurukul and who, he says, has to pay to the Gurukul rupees seventy-five to begin with and rupees twenty-five a month for school dues, food, etc. He has asked, therefore, for rupees hundred as a lump sum and rupees twenty-five a month for the boy. He has not mentioned anything about the girls.

5. I should like to help Chandra Singh in the education of his children. Will you have a talk with Shri Bhakt Darshan and find out if Chandra Singh is getting any kind of a pension or help from anywhere. What is his income anyhow? Also, any other particulars that might be helpful.

2. Collections of an Australian Sculptor¹

I am sorry for the delay in returning these papers. Some time ago, I remember seeing photographs of these sculptures. I forget where I saw them. I was impressed by them as I am impressed by them now. Mr Ricketts² or Brother Billy is undoubtedly a crank from Australian or what might be called modern standards. But cranks of this type may well be the salt of the earth and I would certainly encourage them. I think, he has great artistic ability, whatever the Director of the National Gallery of Australia might say. It is true that the orthodox sculptors will probably not approve of Brother Billy.

There is a certain wildness in his sculpture, which may look odd in a distant place, but which is probably very realistic in its natural habitat.

If Mr Ricketts had been in India I would have made every effort to help him. But I just do not see how I can interfere in this matter in Australia. This is not so much a question of expenditure from public funds, but it has a political significance. We cannot go about buying property in Australia (the offer includes land and house) over the head of the Australian Government. We cannot do something which obviously will be looked upon with some disfavour by the Australian Government. We cannot undertake a new responsibility by

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 13 May 1956. JN Collection.

2. William Ricketts (1899-1993); a self-taught White Australian sculptor, environmentalist and spiritualist; lived for many years with the aborigines in central Australia and embraced their ideas; his kiln-fired clay sculptures portraying the mythology and symbolism of the aboriginal culture are housed in an open-air gallery in the William Ricketts Sanctuary on a hillside in the Dandenongs.

purchasing anything there. Therefore, regretfully, I have to come to the decision that we cannot give any financial help.

I really am surprised that in a rich country like Australia this man with great talent, if not genius, should be stumped for lack of 2,000/- pounds for a truck. Even if the Government is not interested, surely there should have been a number of private individuals who are prepared to help cranks.

I suggest that you might informally speak to the Australian High Commissioner here and tell him that while of course, we cannot help, we do feel that this man is worth encouraging and it would be worthwhile for some private individual to give him this little help. It is quite conceivable that some years later this collection of mountain sculptures may come into fashion and be very valuable indeed.

I think, some answer should be sent, perhaps through Mr Verrier Elwin. In this answer we should express our great appreciation of his work but point out that there are all kinds of difficulties in our way in accepting that offer. We should send him our good wishes.

3. To Carl Sandburg¹

New Delhi
13 May 1956

Dear Mr Sandburg,²

Some time ago, a common friend brought to me your great book on Abraham Lincoln. I thanked him for it, of course, but I must apologize to you for not having thanked you personally for this very precious and valuable gift that you have sent and which you have inscribed so beautifully. Abraham Lincoln has been a great hero of mine from my youth, and your record of this great life is

1. JN Collection.

2. (1878-1967); American author-poet and journalist; worked as an organizer for the Wisconsin Social Democratic Party, 1907; reported for the *Chicago Daily News*, covering mostly labour issues; famous for his searching analysis of the 1919 Chicago race riots; weekly columnist syndicated by the *Chicago Times* in 22 newspapers, 1941-45; authored several books, including *Chicago Poems* (1916), *Cornhuskers* (1918), *Rootabaga Stories* (1922), *Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years*, two volumes (1926), *Remembrance Rock* and *Always the Young Strangers* and *Abraham Lincoln: The War Years*, four volumes (1939); won Pulitzer Prizes in 1940 and 1951.

welcome indeed. I often wonder how we can recover the Lincoln spirit in these times of trouble and bitterness and hatred.

With all good wishes and thanks,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Pyarelal¹

New Delhi
15 May 1956

My dear Pyarelal,²

I have received your manuscript.³ I have only read the first five pages.

As for the last paragraph on page 5, which you have marked, obviously, I cannot remember precisely what I might have said on that occasion.⁴ But I suggest that you word it somewhat differently as follows:

Pandit Nehru's wrath melted away. His face was sad, his voice full of emotion. "This is not the time for me to tell you how much I feel for you all and how my heart aches at your suffering. But what I say to you is: 'Have these Muslims done you any harm? If not, then you must not injure

1. JN Collection.

2. Private Secretary to Mahatma Gandhi since 1942 and author of several books on him.

3. It was the manuscript of *Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*, Vol. II (1958).

4. The occasion, as described by Pyarelal, was Nehru's encounter, during the communal riots in Delhi on 9 September 1947, with some refugees from West Punjab who had reportedly gone to attack the Muslim patients in a hospital near a refugee camp in the city. While driving towards the camp, Nehru found the refugees fleeing with looted goods, the patients having escaped becoming their target due to timely evacuation. Nehru told the people who had gathered around him: 'I thought we were helping our suffering brethren. I did not know we were sheltering thieves and dacoits.' A fiery young man emerged from the scowling crowd and retorted: 'You lecture to us. Do you know what we have suffered?' Nehru could contain himself no longer and "shook the young man by the scruff of his neck". Sushila Nayar, who was also there, felt anxious for Nehru's safety and tried to pull him away. "But with his elbow he pushed her back. As he released his hold on the young man, the latter muttered, 'Yes, Panditji, go on. What better luck can I expect than to die at your hands'." The culmination of this incident is described in a paragraph suggested by Nehru in this letter. Pyarelal reproduces it in his book, *ibid*, p. 435.

them. We must be just. If justice requires it and it is necessary, we can go to war with Pakistan and you can enlist. But this kind of thing was degrading and cowardly.' The crowd cheered wildly: "Jawaharlal Zindabad".

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To K.M. Munshi¹

New Delhi
20 May 1956

My dear Munshi,²

Some time ago you sent me the manuscript of your book on Hyderabad.³ I wrote to you that I would pass it on to some senior officers here who were acquainted with the facts. I have not read this manuscript at all. But I have received a report from some of our officers who read it. They have drawn my attention to some passages in the book. I have read these passages only.

Out of these passages, there were some about which I have written the attached note.⁴

As you know, both Sardar Patel and Lord Mountbatten were forceful personalities.⁵ Both, from their respective points of view, were anxious to solve this question of Hyderabad as rapidly as possible. Both were convinced that it must come to India. Lord Mountbatten, naturally, wanted to avoid a conflict. So indeed did all of us, unless it was thrust upon us. We were then carrying on military operations in Kashmir and there was always the possibility of these operations spreading and developing into a regular war with Pakistan. This aspect naturally weighed with all of us, not only because of its domestic

1. JN Collection.
2. Governor of Uttar Pradesh at this time.
3. The book was published in 1957 under the title, *The End of an Era: Hyderabad Memories*. It dealt with K.M. Munshi's experiences between 5 January and 21 September 1948 as the Agent-General of the Government of India in Hyderabad.
4. See the next item.
5. During 1947-48, when the question of Hyderabad's accession was under discussion, Vallabhbhai Patel was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for States; Mountbatten was the Governor-General of India till June 1948.

repercussions but its wider consequences also. On the other, there was the increasing intransigence of the Nizam⁶ and his advisers and the way he was intriguing with Pakistan and even to some extent with Goa.⁷ There was the arms running from Pakistan to Hyderabad.⁸ All these facts had to be considered and ultimately we took the decision we did.⁹

In all the matters connected with the accession of States in India, Sardar Patel naturally took the leading part. So also, in his own way, did Lord Mountbatten. In fact, it is doubtful if we could have achieved all that we did without the active support of Lord Mountbatten.¹⁰ His attitude towards the Princes finally convinced them that they could get no help at all from the British Government. That became the deciding factor.

It was in this connection that Mountbatten dealt with the Hyderabad issue and it was he and Sardar Patel who were intimately connected with it. I hardly came into the picture in this or in the other States' matters, except sometimes I was called in for a consultation. Mountbatten's association with all these States' matters was in effect of importance and great help to us because it gave a wider justification to all that was done here than might have been possible if it had been dealt with purely on the domestic level. This applied to the Kashmir issue also.

Perhaps you know that ever since then, Mountbatten has been bitterly attacked in some important sections of the British press as well as among the diehards of the Conservative Party because of his attitude in regard to these matters in India. I think therefore, that it is not quite fair to depict Mountbatten as an obstructionist in our carrying out our policies.

6. Mir Osman Ali Khan, the Nizam of Hyderabad.
7. A secret treaty was signed by the Nizam of Hyderabad with Portugal which granted Hyderabad the use of Goa in return for her developing port and harbour facilities.
8. War material was being regularly flown from Karachi by British crews in four-engined bombers that were registered in Britain. The Nizam's government, on the advice of British armament firms, also maintained air squadrons for use against India in East Bengal, West Pakistan, Iraq and Iran.
9. A swift police action, taken in Hyderabad from 13 to 17 September 1948, led to the Nizam's unconditional surrender and the subsequent integration of the State with the Indian Union.
10. K.M. Munshi wrote in his book: "When the Princes came to Delhi for a meeting convened by the States Ministry...Sardar...allowed Lord Mountbatten to become the spokesman of his policy.... In fact, it is doubtful if Sardar could have achieved all that he did so swiftly and peacefully without the active support of Lord Mountbatten..." Ibid, p. '50.

If you like me to return to you your manuscript, I shall do so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. K.M. Munshi's Book on Hyderabad¹

1. Part II, Page 239. It is stated here that I had left the Hyderabad problem to Lord Mountbatten and the Sardar. Subsequently, it is stated that the impression you got was that I was only concerned with the international repercussions, particularly on the Kashmir question, and that I took Lord Mountbatten's reactions to the problem as a touchstone to international propriety.

You are perfectly entitled to give your impressions. But it is not correct to bring in Lord Mountbatten's name in this connection. Nor, of course, is it correct to say that I was only concerned with the international repercussions of the problem. It is perfectly true that I had left this problem to the Sardar who was in constant touch with Lord Mountbatten. I was occasionally present at some consultations.²

In Part III, Page 352, you mention a message that was sent to you by me.³ This message was sent at the instance, so far as I remember, of Sardar and Lord Mountbatten, because we did not wish our representative to get mixed up with the military activities.

1. Note to K.M. Munshi, 20 May 1956. JN Collection. The note contains Nehru's comments on some of the passages in the manuscript of K.M. Munshi's book, *The End of an Era: Hyderabad Memories*. The page numbers in the note refer to the page numbers of the manuscript. See also the preceding item.
2. K.M. Munshi observed that Nehru had left the Hyderabad problem "to Lord Mountbatten and Sardar, participating only in important consultations". Ibid, p. 151.
3. There is no mention of such a message in the book. However, see *ibid*, p. 158. General Bucher, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, had suggested in his letter of 22 May 1948 to Nehru that a senior army officer should be India's Agent-General in Hyderabad as this would enable "us to have a balanced military opinion on events within the State, and on the dispositions of the States troops". Nehru was in agreement with Bucher's suggestion. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 6, p. 221.

2. In Part I, Page 78, you refer to a report being made to Gandhiji on the issue of payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan and suggest that this was done by persons who did not like the Sardar and who had the ear of Gandhiji. It is evident that the reference is to me. The non-payment of Rs. 55 crores had been decided by the Cabinet and I was a party to that decision and agreed with it. I do not at present remember how it came to the ears of Gandhiji. Both the Sardar and I used to refer important matters to Gandhiji.⁴ When Gandhiji heard, he disliked this decision greatly and discussed it with some members of the Cabinet, including the then Finance Minister.⁵ His fast⁶ had little to do with this particular question, although no one can say what influence it had on him.⁷ The fast was primarily due to the communal situation in Delhi.

3. Part I, Page 104. I have no recollection of the Nizam threatening to publish the correspondence or that this had any effect on the Government of India.⁸

4. In Part II, Page 232, reference is made to Sir Walter Monckton⁹ and Laik Ali¹⁰ protesting against a "showdown" and that Lord Mountbatten and I

4. K.M. Munshi removed the allusion to Nehru being responsible for reporting to Mahatma Gandhi about the Cabinet decision not to pay the cash balances amounting to Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan. But he wrote in his book that it was at Patel's "instance that the Government of India withheld (the payment) to Pakistan.... Gandhiji, however, went on a fast on the issue... and had the decision... reversed". Munshi added: "There were open differences between Panditji and Sardar, and so there were between him and Gandhiji". Ibid, p. 43.
5. Shanmukham Chetty.
6. Mahatma Gandhi commenced on 13 January, a fast to improve relations between all communities. The fast lasted five days.
7. Announcing the reversal of the Cabinet decision regarding the non-payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan, a statement to the press issued on 15 January expressed the hope that "this generous gesture", inter alia, "will go a long way towards producing a situation which will induce Gandhiji to break his fast. That fast, of course, had nothing to do with this particular matter, and we have thought of it because of our desire to help in every way in easing the present tension".
8. K.M. Munshi recounted in his book that when Mountbatten, following Patel's advice, pressed for the standard Instrument of Accession with slight modifications, the Nizam's response, in his letter of 18 September 1947, was: "No accession, but only a treaty between the two independent, Sovereign States". Munshi also wrote, "At the end of the letter came the threat: If the Union demanded accession from him, further negotiations would serve no useful purpose. If there was a breakdown, he would publish the communications between Lord Mountbatten and himself!" Ibid, pp. 59-60.
9. Constitutional Adviser of the Nizam.
10. Prime Minister of Hyderabad.

assured them that they would not be parties to any show down. I do not know on what authority this statement of an assurance is based. No such assurance, to my knowledge, was given. It is, of course, possible that Lord Mountbatten said that the Government of India was anxious to settle this matter.

5. Part II, Page 260. It is stated that Lord Mountbatten was all for a settlement.¹¹ If he could not make the Nizam to make any concession, he could always get Panditji and Sardar to do so. It is perfectly true that Lord Mountbatten was eager to have a settlement. The question was what kind of a settlement. I do not think it is at all correct to say that if the Nizam would not make a concession, the Sardar and I would be made to do so.

6. Part II, Page 267 and 289. It is made to appear here that the Sardar allowed himself to be overruled by Lord Mountbatten to come to some settlement with Hyderabad. I do not know how far it is correct to put it in this way. We were all of us greatly annoyed at the activities of the Nizam and the Hyderabad Government. All of us wanted some settlement or some interim settlement which would lead to a final settlement few months later. The matter was discussed fully at Dehra Dun and the Sardar agreed to certain steps that were proposed, which would inevitably have led to other results.¹²

In all the matters connected with Hyderabad, I hardly came into the picture except rather formally. The burden of responsibility lay on the Sardar and I was unwilling to interfere. Naturally, at some joint meetings we discussed matters and expressed our opinions. Lord Mountbatten was anxious that there should be a settlement, if this was possible, and he tried his utmost. But he acted throughout as a constitutional head.

It is stated somewhere in the manuscript that the offer to you of the post at Hyderabad was made at Birla House in the presence of Shri G.D. Birla.¹³ I am not aware of this, but even if it is true, it is not desirable to bring in G.D. Birla in this way.

11. Ibid, p.165.

12. Ibid, pp. 170-171.

13. K.M. Munshi removed the reference to G.D. Birla and wrote that Patel had asked him around 20 December 1947 whether he would go to Hyderabad as Agent-General. Ibid, p. 1. An Agent had to be sent to Hyderabad under the Standstill Agreement between India and Hyderabad reached on 29 November.

7. Cable to B.R. Sen¹

Your telegram² No. 44 May 19. Matter has been placed before Prime Minister. We had made it clear to Committee³ in Delhi that it would not be practicable or advisable for them to visit Formosa. The only possible advantage of going there might have been to see entries in hospital registers. At that time the hospital was run by the Japanese and all the Japanese must have come away. There can be no first hand evidence available there. It is conceivable however that some entries in the hospital register might give some further information. We would like you to suggest to the Committee that you may on their behalf request the Japanese Government to ask their Ambassador in Formosa to be good enough to see the hospital entries and secure certified copies. At the Committee's request we had approached UK High Commissioner here to get this information for us but have not had a reply yet. The Japanese Ambassador in Formosa would be in a better position to handle this matter than the British who have only a Consul.

2. We have considered the matter again and are not in favour of the Committee visiting Formosa. Japanese good offices may enable Committee to land there but it is unlikely that the Formosan Government will give any facilities. In fact, they may put obstacles and suggest degrading conditions.⁴ Apart from this politically this will be very embarrassing for us and might lead to complicating situations. If the Committee feel that there may be some public

1. Drafted by Nehru on 21 May and sent by T.N. Kaul, Joint Secretary, MEA, on 22 May 1956. JN Collection.
2. Sen, Indian Ambassador in Tokyo, informed the Foreign Secretary that the Netaji Enquiry Committee, which was at this time examining witnesses in Japan, had requested for reexamination of possibility of its visit to Taiwan. The Japanese Government would not give any clear undertaking to move in the matter without a definite proposal either from the Committee or from the Indian Embassy.
3. Netaji Enquiry Committee. For details see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 32, pp. 584-585.
4. The relations between India and Taiwan had deteriorated around this time over Taiwan's disruption of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

criticism here later⁵ they are at liberty to state, if necessary, that External Affairs Ministry advised them against a visit to Formosa.

5. Sen stated that if the Enquiry Committee's proposal was peremptorily dismissed, the Committee would have a grievance which might make their whole report infructuous in the eyes of some sections of the people. He suggested that the Committee should be allowed to approach the Japanese Government for their good offices in the matter even if the Embassy kept out of it.

8. To U.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
27 May 1956

Dear Shri Trivedi,²

I am in receipt of your letter of the 25th May in which you refer to a number of persons, members of the RSS, who were sentenced under the Indian Penal Code and were thereupon dismissed from Government service.

Government have no desire to victimise any person, least of all young men and women. I know nothing about these cases and can only send your letter to the Home Ministry for enquiry.

But, you will appreciate that, if Government servants take part in agitations against the Government, the least that can be said is that they are not suitable for Government service. This is the normal rule which any government would apply. Government servants may be removed from service for indiscipline. Taking part in an aggressive and often violent agitation, is something much worse than normal indiscipline.

During the past several years, I have noticed with great regret that the RSS has encouraged agitations which have violence of various kinds as a

1. JN Collection.
2. Umashanker Muljibhai Trivedi (1904-1984); lawyer and politician; translator and interpreter, High Court, Yangon; Evacuation Officer and Camp Commandant, Dimapur, Manipur, 1942; member, Madhya Bharat Lawyers' Conference Working Committee, since 1949; Member, Indian National Congress, upto 1951; member, Jana Sangh, since its inception; elected to the Lok Sabha, 1952 and 1957.

definite part of the technique employed.³ That is hardly a case of an individual getting excited or misbehaving but of a regular practice being indulged in by considerable numbers of members of the RSS. It is well known that the RSS inculcates very strict discipline among its members. This leads to the only conclusion that the violence indulged in is deliberate and is a part of the policy of the RSS.

Even at present, in some parts of the country, notably in the Punjab and in some parts of Bombay State, members of the RSS have taken an active part in violent demonstrations. Stone-throwing is quite a common practice. Meetings are deliberately broken up and it is indeed announced that meetings will not be allowed to be held. The breaking up of these meetings usually takes place by stone-throwing, apart from other forms of violence.

This is extraordinary behaviour anywhere, and, more especially, in a democratic country. There is no obstruction to expression of views, whatever they might be. But no government can tolerate this kind of violence. The continuance of this type of violence in an organized way indicates that the policy of the RSS is based on violence and doing physical injury to those persons whom they dislike. It is for the RSS to consider if this can be called service to the country.

You have referred in your letter to the concessions made to political sufferers who had been punished by the British Government in India. Surely, there is a great deal of difference between such cases and the cases of those who indulge in violence in India at present. Apart from the fact that an alien government against whom there is a struggle for freedom stands on a different footing from a democratic government elected by the people, it has to be remembered that the struggle for freedom against the British was essentially a peaceful one.

As I have stated above, I am sending your letter, with a copy of my reply to you, to the Home Ministry for their consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 4 February 1948, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was declared unlawful throughout India. A press communique stated that the cult of violence sponsored and inspired by the RSS had claimed many lives, the latest and the most precious of all being that of Mahatma Gandhi.

9. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
30 May 1956

My dear Mahavir,²

I enclose a letter from Bhakt Darshan, MP, about the Garhwalis who refused to fire at Peshawar.

I do not quite remember what we decided in this matter. It must have been long ago. I should like you to look into this. I think, these people do deserve every consideration. There is hardly a case of establishing a precedent. There can be no such precedent. It was a unique case.

I suppose that the sums involved are small but they may mean much for these men who are old now.³ A few of them are alive. Their leader, Chandra Singh Garhwali, saw me some weeks ago. He has grown naturally much older. I have tried to help him a little.⁴

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Minister for Defence Organization.
3. Mahavir Tyagi informed in Lansdowne on 26 June 1956 that the Government of India had decided to restore to the dismissed personnel of the 2/18th Garhwal Rifles involved in the so-called "Peshawar Mutiny" of 1930, their forfeited pay and allowances, including deferred pay.
4. See *ante*, pp. 577-578.

10. To U.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi

5 June 1956

Dear Shri Trivedi,

Thank you for your letter of the 31st May.

I am afraid that the information that has often come to me about the RSS movement does not bear out your own appraisal of it. I am not referring to individual acts of misbehaviour but rather the philosophy underlying them, which is both authoritarian and tends to violence. We have had many instances of it.

You can certainly send my letter² to Shri M.S. Golwalkar,³ if you wish to do so.

I am forwarding your letter to the Home Ministry, as desired by you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. See *ante*, pp. 587-588.
3. Chief of the RSS.

11. Chinese Edition of *An Autobiography*¹

I am happy to know that my *Autobiography* is going to appear in the Chinese language. This book was written by me in prison more than twenty years ago and there is much in it that is perhaps of no great interest today. During these twenty years great changes have taken place in the world and in the countries of Asia.

1. Foreword to the Chinese edition of *An Autobiography*, New Delhi, 9 June 1956. JN Collection.

Nevertheless, a record of our struggle for freedom and how it affected not only me but millions of our own countrymen and country-women might have some value to others also. It will give them some insight into India as it was during the days of our struggle and the emotions that filled us then.

Each country has to work out its own destiny and find its way to freedom and self-fulfilment in its own way. India found her own way under the great leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

Though this is a personal record, it is to some extent also a record of a nation's struggle. As such, it may bring some understanding to our many friends abroad. During the past few years events have brought the people of China and the people of India much closer to each other and a greater understanding has grown between them. I hope that this book of mine will help in furthering this understanding and the bonds that unite our two great countries and their peoples.

12. Chinese Edition of *The Discovery of India*¹

Ancient civilizations grew up in a number of countries at the dawn of history. They experienced many breaks and some of them almost disappeared from the face of the earth, though they left some great memorials which remind us of them.

In two countries, however, China and India, there were not only these early civilizations when history began but, in spite of all vicissitudes and changes, there was no break in their continuity. Thus, China and India have this long unbroken tradition and cultural inheritance. They have influenced each other in the past and they are likely to do so in the future. Their relationship with each other is not only of vital importance to both these countries but is significant for the world.

Both these countries have the proud record of having lived at peace with each other for thousands of years. They had many contacts but they were peaceful and cultural. This is a unique record.

1. Foreword to the Chinese edition of *The Discovery of India*, New Delhi, 9 June 1956. JN Collection.

Now, we meet again as free nations, each trying to work out her destiny. Each may have some lesson for the other.

We have jointly laid down certain principles of international relationship which we call the *Panchsheel*. These Five Principles have spread to many other countries and are progressively capturing the imagination of the peoples of the world. If these principles are accepted all over the world and acted upon with integrity and in a spirit of cooperation, then indeed there is no danger of war or conflict.

The world at present is full of fears and apprehensions, hatred and violence. A few days ago, we celebrated the 2,500th anniversary of the death of the Buddha. His message of peace has influenced both India and China so much in the past. We labour for peace today in this unhappy and distracted world. In order to create the climate of peace, we have to get rid of the climate of fear and hatred and to encourage true understanding between nations.

More particularly, this is necessary for the countries in Asia, which have come out of their colonial shell in the recent past and are trying to build themselves up. We had a glimpse of this understanding at the Bandung Conference a year ago.

This book of mine was written in prison twelve years ago. Because I could not act in the present, I had to think of the past and try to peep into the future. I wanted to understand my own country for whose freedom I worked.

This book is not a history of India or even a continuous record of what has happened in this country. It is only an attempt to understand some facets of her life in her long history and of the thoughts and emotions that have moved her. I thought that such an understanding of the past of an ancient country was essential for a true understanding of the present.

I hope that a reading of this book may bring some understanding of our country to the great people of China, whose friendship we cherish and with whom we want to have ever-closer bonds.

13. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi,
12 June 1956

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of June 12th with its annexures, relating to the proper use of funds with religious and charitable trusts. I am in entire agreement with you that we should not only have proper administration of these trusts, but should arrange so that their surplus resources are used for public benefit. Certainly, we should take some action. But, I fear that this is not a very simple matter, and all kinds of religious prejudices as well as, of course, personal reasons of those concerned will come in our way. However, that is no reason why we should not proceed with it.

I rather doubt, if we can take any effective steps in regard to this matter in the course of the next week before I go. If it is possible, however, it would be a good thing to have a preliminary discussion in the Cabinet. I am asking the Cabinet Secretary to put up the draft summary to the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

GLOSSARY

akhand Bharat	undivided India
Baisakhi	a Hindu festival celebrated on the full moon day of the month of Baisakh (March-April)
bhoodan	voluntary donation of land; refers to a movement initiated by Vinoba Bhave
dai	midwife
duragraha	opposite of satyagraha, literally obduracy
gaz	yard
gram sevak	voluntary village worker
hazraat	gentlemen
Hindu rashtra	Hindu nation
izzat	prestige
jagir	a tract of land and its revenue (given for services rendered)
jagirdar	holder of jagir
jagirdari	a system of assignment of a tract of land and its revenue
Jai Hind	victory to India
jayanti	birth anniversary
kharif	monsoon crop, mainly paddy
kisan	peasant
maund	a measure of weight around one hundred pounds
panchsheel	five basic principles of international conduct
parinirvana	a state of Nirvana achieved by one who has completed the incarnation in which he achieved Nirvana and will not be reborn on earth

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

pir	a sufi teacher, a spiritual guide or a religious preceptor
rabi	winter crop, mainly wheat & gram
Ram Rajya	equitable and ideal rule; literally kingdom of Rama, worshipped as God by the Hindus
satyagrahi	one who offers satyagraha
shawwal	tenth month of the Islamic calendar
taluqdari	a system of land holdings
urs	literally wedding, term frequently used in India for the festival commemorating the death of a sufi saint
vasant panchami	fifth day of the eleventh month of Hindu lunar calendar when moon is waxing
waqf	a term which signifies the appropriation or dedication of property to charitable uses and the service of God
zindabad	long live
zulum	oppression

INDEX

(Biographical footnotes in this volume and in volumes in the first series are italicized and those in the second series are given in block letters.)

- Ab Jinke dekhne ko* (Anis Kidwai), 229 fn
- Abbasi, Anis Ahmad, 237
- Abdullah, Begum (Akbar Jahan), 381 fn
- , Farooq, (VOL. 26, P. 298), 379-380 & fn
- , Kemal Mustafa, 380 fn
- , S.M., (Vol. 7, p. 308), 379-380 & fn, 385 & fn, 388
- Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years* (Carl Sandburg), 579 fn
- Abraham Lincoln: The War Years* (Carl Sandburg), 579 fn
- Abu (Rajasthan), 302 & fn
- Afghanistan, 485 fn
- Africa, 43, 82, 142, 319, 481, 545
- , North, 16
- , West, 544
- Agra, 499 fn
- Agricultural Research Station (Karjat, Mumbai), 43 fn
- Ahmad, Nooruddin, 233 & fn, 238
- Ahmed Saeed, 233
- Ahmedabad, 95, 132 & fn-133, 401
- Ahmedabad Textile Labour Association, 132 fn
- Ajmer, 277 & fn-278 & fn; Legislative Assembly of, 277 fn
- Ajmer State Reform Board, 278
- Akali Dal, 361 fn
- Akbar, 166
- Alfred Stieglitz: An American Seer* (Dorothy Norman), 456 fn
- Algeria, 16 & fn, 43 fn, 320, 322, 349-351, 450 fn, 460, 480 fn-481 fn, 482 & fn-483, 484 & fn-485, 486 & fn-487, 488 fn-489 & fn, 490, 573
- Ali, Bakshi Shafqat, 229 & fn-230, 232, 238-239
- , Mir Laik, (VOL. 5, P. 284), 584 & fn
- , Mir Usman, (VOL. 1, P. 291), 274, 582 & fn, 584 & fn-585
- , Mohammad, (VOL. 3, P. 316), 17 & fn, 352, 383 & fn, 387, 432 & fn, 434 & fn- 435 fn, 436 & fn, 438, 443 & fn
- , S. Fazl, (VOL. 3, P. 31), 174 & fn, 176-177, 181-182, 183 fn, 190, 194, 198, 200-201, 301 & fn
- Aligarh, 168, 499 fn
- Aligarh Muslim University, 168 & fn, 498
- Allahabad, 210, 222, 417, 571
- All India Congress Committee, 26 & fn, 31 & fn, 238 fn, 306 & fn, 307, 309 fn, 319, 321-323, 324 fn, 325 & fn, 326-330, 337 & fn, 338, 359, 364, 371-372, 567; Mumbai session (2-3 June 1956) of, 26 & fn, 31 & fn, resolution on Condemnation of Violence (2 June 1956) of, 31 & fn, 364, 567, resolution on Goa (2 June 1956) of, 419; Wardha session (15 January 1942) of, 518 fn;
- All India Newspaper Editors' Conference (Kolkata, 16 June 1956),

- 33 & fn; Standing Committee of, 33 fn
- All India Urdu Conference (Hyderabad, 18 May 1956), 169
- Alphand, Herve, 480 fn
- Aluwihare, Bernard, 452 & fn
- Alvernaz, Jose, 417 & fn
- Amb (Pakistan), 382 & fn
- Ambala District, 265 fn
- Ambar Charkha, 365
- Ambedkar, B.R., (*Vol. 5, p. 299*), 274
- Amguri-Mokokchung road (Nagaland), 198
- Amir Khusrau, 164 & fn-165, 166
- Amritsar, 265 fn, 299 fn, 326
- Andhra, 28-29, 404
- Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (Myanmar), 447 fn, 449 & fn, 565 fn
- Appleby, Paul H., (*VOL. 22, P. 133*), 247 & fn, 249, 367 & fn, 570 & fn; first report (1953) of, 247 & fn; second report (1956) of, 247 fn
- Arelano, Father, 401
- Argentina, 148 fn
- Aryanayakam, E.W., (*Vol. 13, p. 440*), 205 & fn
- Arya Pradeshik Pratinidhi Sabha (Punjab), 265 fn
- Arya Pratinidhi Sabha (Punjab), 265 fn, 270 & fn-271 fn
- Arya Samaj, 49 fn, 265 & fn, 273
- Arunanand, Swami, 270 fn
- Ashwani Kumar, 262 & fn-263
- Asia, 6, 9, 13, 43, 82, 142, 146, 319-320, 366, 450, 459, 481, 544-545, 592
- , South, 82
- , South-East, 459, 503, 528
- , West, 24 fn, 348, 389 fn, 437 fn, 501 fn, 546, 564 fn
- Asia Foundation (USA), 252 & fn
- Asian-African Conference (Bandung, 18-24 April 1955), 147 & fn, 482 fn, 494, 544, 545 & fn, 592
- Assam, 99 fn, 104, 174 & fn, 176, 182-183 fn, 186 fn, 193 fn, 195, 203-204 & fn, 475; Government of, 104, 171 fn, 174, 180-181 & fn, 182-183 & fn, 186 fn, 191-192, 193 fn-194, 195, 198, 201 & fn, 204 fn; Legislative Assembly of, 183 fn
- Assam Oil Company, 118
- Assam Police, 171 fn
- Assam Rifles, 171 fn, 181 fn
- Atomic Energy Authority (UK), 503 fn
- Atomic Energy Commission (India), 153-154 fn
- Atomic Energy Research Establishment (UK), 503 fn
- Australia, 150-151, 578-579; Government of, 578
- Austria, 3, 6, 102
- Autobiography, An* (Jawaharlal Nehru), 512 & fn-513, 514 fn-515 fn, 577 fn, 590
- Awo (Obafemi Awolowo), 496 fn
- Awolowo, Obafemi, 496 & fn-497 fn
- Ayyangar, M. Ananthasayanam, (*VOL. 5, P. 81*), 188, 214 & fn, 313 & fn-314 & fn, 315fn
- Azad, A.K., (*Vol. 1, p. 353*), 120 & fn, 156, 158 fn, 168, 205-206 fn, 208, 226 fn, 361, 504-505
- 'Azad' Kashmir, 378 & fn
- Azadi Ki Chhaon Mein* (Anis Kidwai), 229 fn
- Badri Dass, 270 fn
- Baghdad, 211 fn
- Baghdad Pact (November 1955), 17, 320, 322 & fn, 352, 383 fn, 564 fn, 568 fn; meeting at Tehran (16-19 April 1956) of, 322 & fn

- Bahawalpur (Pakistan), 438
 Bal Bhawan (Delhi), 227 & fn-228
 Bali, A.C., 268 fn
 Baluchistan, 382 & fn
 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., (VOL. 25, P. 506), 251 fn-252 fn, 452 fn, 565 fn
 Bandung, 481-482 fn, 500, 545
 Bandung Conference *see* Asian-African Conference
 Bandyopadhyay, Bibhutibhushan, 163 fn
 Bangalore, 499 fn
 Bankura (West Bengal), 117
 Bankura district, 117 & fn
 Banswada (Rajasthan), 302 fn
 Baran, Paul A., 40 & fn
 Barkataki, S.N., 176 & fn
 Bartlett, Frederic P., 458 fn-459 fn, 461 fn-462 fn
 Basic Education Conference (Kanchipuram, 30 May-1 June 1956), 161 & fn
 Basirhat (West Bengal), 85
 Bastar (Madhya Pradesh), 202 fn-203
 Bastar district, 202-203
 Bazigar, Manka, 211 fn
 Beale, Jack Jordan, 150 & fn-151
 Beg, M.M.A., (Vol. 14, p. 396), 377 fn
 Beijing, 112 fn, 468 & fn-469, 472, 475 fn-476, 477
 Beirut, 566
 Belgaum district, 297
 Belgrade, 454 fn
 Benares, 499 fn
 Ben-Gurion, David, 554 & fn
 Berlin, 544
 Besant, Annie, (Vol. 1, p. 104), 512 & fn
 Bettelheim, Charles, (VOL. 25, P. 65), 40 & fn
 Bhabha, Homi J., (Vol. 13, p. 536), 34 fn, 141-145, 148, 152-155, 503 & fn
 Bhakra dam, 337
 Bhakra Nangal Project, 69, 103
 Bhakt Darshan, 577 & fn-578, 589
 Bharat Sewak Samaj, 281
 Bhargava, K.P., 243 & fn
 —, Thakur Das, (VOL. 7, P. 436), 214 & fn-215
 Bhatt, Ghulam Qadir, 381 & fn
 Bhattacharya, P.C., 257 fn
 Bhawe, Vinoba, (VOL. 5, P. 74), 524 fn, 530
 Bhilai Steel Works, 7 fn
 Bhingardevi, L.B., 306 & fn
 Bhooswami Sangh (Rajasthan), 283 fn-284 & fn, 285 & fn-286 & fn, 287 & fn, 288-289 & fn, 290
 Bhopal, 243 & fn
 Bihar, 28-29, 99 fn, 102, 104, 291 & fn, 301 fn, 304 fn-305 & fn, 338, 513 & fn, 561
 Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Bill (July 1956), 304 fn
 Bikini atoll (Pacific Ocean), 35 fn
 Birla, G.D., (Vol. 5, p. 135), 585 & fn
 Birla House (Delhi), 585
 Bled (Yugoslavia), 497 & fn
 Blitz, 399-401
 Bluecher, Franz, (VOL. 31, P. 411), 244 & fn-245
 Bogor (Indonesia), 545 fn
 Bogor Conference (December 1954), 545 & fn
 Bombay, 28, 292 fn, 297 fn, 300 & fn, 301 fn, 302 & fn, 304 fn, 400, 405, 415 fn, 529 fn, 569, 588; Government of, 405; Legislative Assembly of, 306; Legislative Council of, 298 & fn, 306
 Bombay city *see* Mumbai
 Bonn, 244 & fn, 456, 566
 Bourguiba, Habib, (VOL. 17, P. 560), 495 & fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Brahm Perakash, (VOL. 19, P. 487), 280 & fn, 371
- Brazil, 415 fn
- Brecher, Michael, 512 & fn-513, 514-555
- Brioni (Yugoslavia), 450 fn, 498 & fn
- British Film Institute (London), 163 fn
- Bucher, F.R. Roy, (VOL. 1, P. 76)
- Buddha, Gautama, 20-22, 23 & fn, 74 fn, 331 fn, 332, 451 fn, 555, 592
- Bulganan, N.A., (VOL. 29, P. 206), 365 fn, 450 & fn, 455 & fn, 564
- Bulgaria, 252 fn
- Burma *see* Myanmar
- Burmah Shell Company, 119 fn, 121 fn
- Butler, R.A., (VOL. 17, P. 448), 455 & fn
- Cabinet (India), 102, 119, 123, 234, 236, 238, 245-246, 275, 314, 442, 584 & fn, 593; Committee on rehabilitation of, 239
- Cabinet Secretariat, 246
- Cachar hills (Assam), 204 fn
- Cairo, 450 & fn, 501-502, 566
- Calcutta *see* Kolkata
- Caltex Company, 119 fn
- Cambodia, 16 fn, 464 fn, 483 fn
- Canada, 13, 42, 112, 146 & fn, 548
- Connaught Place (New Delhi), 217 fn, 227 fn
- Cannes Film Festival (1956), 163 fn
- Cape Comorin *see* Kanniyakumari
- Carvalho, S.J.D., (VOL. 32, P. 121), 175 & fn, 195
- Casual Symphony* (Ashwani Kumar), 262
- Central Food Technological Research Institute (Mysore), 116 & fn
- Central Intelligence Agency (USA), 252 fn
- Central Recovery Organization (1947), 254 & fn-255
- Central Social Welfare Board, 49 & fn-50, 206 & fn-207 & fn, 208; Advisory Committee on Social and Moral Hygiene (December 1954) of, 49 fn, report (October 1955) of, 49 fn
- Central Tractor Organization of India, 434 fn
- Ceylon *see* Sri Lanka
- Chacha Kahini* (Syed Mujtaba Ali), 253 fn
- Chakravarti, Renu, (VOL. 18, P. 335), 85
- Chakravarty, P.C., 428 & fn
- Chaman Lall, (Vol. 3, p. 128), 266 & fn
- Chambal river, 281 fn
- Chanda, Anil K., (Vol. 6, p. 230), 428 fn
—, Ashok K., (VOL. 10, P. 365), 315 & fn
- Chandernagore (West Bengal), 408-409 & fn
- Chandigarh, 269
- Chandiwala, Brij Krishna, (VOL. 28, P. 519), 281 & fn
- Chandola, Harish, 173 fn
- Chandra, Jagdish, 268 fn
—, Probodh, 268 fn
- Chang Wen-tien, 451 fn
- Chatterjee, Krishna Kumar, 336 fn
—, N.C., (VOL. 6, P. 51), 64 fn, 215 & fn,
- Chaudhuri, Nabakrushna, (Vol. 6, p. 44), 253 & fn
- Chetty, R.K. Shanmukham, (Vol. 6, p. 303), 584 & fn
- Chhad Bet (Gujarat), 45 fn, 439 & fn
- Chiang Kai-shek, (Vol. 10, p. 74), 475 & fn
- Chicago Poems* (Carl Sandburg), 579 fn
- China, People's Republic of, 7-9, 13-14, 42-43 & fn, 44, 46-49, 59 fn, 77, 111 & fn-112 fn, 113, 146, 369, 390 & fn, 446 fn, 451, 467 & fn-468, 469-473, 474 fn-475 & fn, 476, 479, 493 & fn, 503, 526-

- 528, 545, 553, 563, 574, 591-592;
Government of, 467 fn, 468-475, 479
& fn
- Chitral (Pakistan), 382 & fn, 386 fn, 539,
574
- Chou En-lai, (VOL. 15 Pt.I, P. 118), 43,
451, 469 fn, 471 & fn-472 & fn, 473
& fn-474 & fn, 475 fn, 493 fn
- Chowpatty (Mumbai), 309 & fn
- Chungking (China), 527
- Churachandpur (Manipur), 204 fn
- Churchill, Winston, (*Vol. 4, p. 52*), 454
& fn
- Civil Liberties Union (Punjab), 299 fn
- College of Physicians and Surgeons
(Mumbai), 210 & fn-211, 213
- Colombo, 121-122, 455 fn, 569 fn
- Colombo Plan, 145-146; Consultative
Committee Meeting (Singapore, 17-
22 October 1955) of, 145 fn
- Cominform (Communist Information
Bureau), 564 & fn
- Commonwealth Prime Ministers'
Conference (London, 28 June-6 July
1956), 24 fn, 257 fn, 387 & fn, 443,
546, 566 & fn
- Communist Party of India, 32 & fn, 252
& fn, 364 & fn, 505, 532, 567-568 &
fn, 569; Fourth Congress at Palghat
(19-29 April 1956) of, 252 & fn, 568 &
fn, resolution passed at the Fourth
Congress (29 April 1956) of, 32 & fn,
364 & fn-365
- Communist Party of Malaya, 172 fn,
493 fn
- Communist Party of Soviet Union, 31 &
fn, 371, 377 fn; Twentieth Congress
(Moscow, 14-25 February 1956) of,
364 fn, 568 fn
- Community Development Projects, 39 fn,
42, 44, 47, 50, 53 & fn-54, 70, 83-84,
98, 109-110, 113, 115, 151, 207 & fn-
208, 224, 329, 372, 531, 563;
Conference of Development
Commissioners (Naini Tal, 5-6 May
1956) for, 53 & fn-54
- Conference of Heads of Indian Missions
(New Delhi, 24 March-3 April 1956),
8 fn
- Conference on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy (New Delhi, 26-27
November 1954), 152-153 & fn
- Congress, Indian National, 11, 26-28, 265
& fn, 269 fn, 272-273, 292 fn-293 fn,
307, 314 fn, 319-321, 324, 329, 331-
333, 341-342 & fn, 343, 353, 356, 360
& fn-361 & fn, 362 fn, 363, 368-369,
371 & fn, 372-373, 384-385, 406, 449,
513 & fn, 516-517, 520-521 & fn, 525-
526 & fn, 532, 549, 551-552, 567 fn-
568 fn, 569, 573, 574 fn; Amritsar
session (11-12 February 1956) of,
326, 551 fn; Avadi session (21-23
January 1955) of, 368, 525; Bombay
session (December 1915) of, 514 fn;
Jaipur session (19 December 1948)
of, 409 fn; Karachi session (March
1931) of, 526 & fn, resolution on
Fundamental Rights (31 March 1931)
of, 363, 368, 526 & fn; Lucknow
session (December 1916) of, 514 fn;
Lucknow session (1936) of, 526 fn
- Congress Seva Dal, 222
- Congress Working Committee, 291, 297
fn; resolution (5 December 1953) of,
291 fn
- Conservative Party (UK), 582
- Constantine (Algeria), 481 fn
- Constitution (France), 403
- Constitution (India), 30, 169, 173 fn-174,
178, 182-183 fn, 193 fn, 264, 284 fn-
285, 300, 338, 403, 413-414, 541, 547,
550
- Cooper, John Sherman, (VOL. 28, P. 283),
147 & fn, 462 fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (New Delhi), 151
- Cunha, Paulo A.V., (VOL. 31, P. 241), 412
- Cyclical Environmental Management System* (Jack Jordan Beale), 150 fn
- Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, (VOL. 29, P. 233), 568 fn
- Czechoslovakia, 437 fn
- Dacca *see* Dhaka
- Dakshina Pradesh, 292 fn-293 & fn
- Dalai Lama, (VOL. 16 Pt. II, P. 647), 477 fn
- Dang area, 302 & fn
- Danta, Madan Singh, 285 fn, 286 fn, 289 fn
- Das, Arjan, 278
- , Shiv Charan, 286 fn
- Dayal, Bhagwat, (Vol. 4, p. 5), 382 fn
- , Rajeshwar, (VOL. 5, P. 573), 454 fn
- Deen-i-Ilahi, 166
- Defence Science Organization (India), 154 fn, 155
- Dehra Dun, 577, 585
- Delhi, 27, 29, 33, 228, 235, 280 fn, 572 fn; Government of, 227, 281 *see also* New Delhi
- Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, 34, 440 fn
- Democratic Research Centre (Mumbai), 253 fn
- Deogirikar, T.R., (VOL. 32, P. 180), 341 fn, 401 & fn-402 fn
- Department of Atomic Energy (India), 141-142, 144-145, 153-155
- Desai, C.C., (VOL. 7, P. 628), 290, 383 & fn, 432, 438-439
- , M.J., (VOL. 4, P. 155), 383, 432, 493 fn-494, 495, 496 fn
- , Morarji, (Vol. 13, p. 5), 210 fn, 298 & fn, 301 fn, 306 & fn, 399 & fn-400 & fn
- Deshe-Bideshe* (Syed Mujtaba Ali), 253 fn
- Deshmukh, C.D., (Vol. 15, p. 635), 119 & fn, 143, 159, 207 fn, 244 & fn, 249 & fn, 256 & fn, 430, 442, 593
- , Durgabai, (VOL. 5, P. 525), 206 fn-207 & fn, 208
- Deshpande, Sindhu, 414 fn
- , V.G., (VOL. 28, P. 404), 220 & fn
- Devi Lal, 263 fn
- Dhaka, 428 & fn
- Dhaka University, 428 fn
- Dhebar, U.N., (VOL. 17, P. 406), 173 fn, 245-246, 287, 299 fn, 314 & fn, 341-343, 346, 360, 362 & fn, 526-527, 551 & fn
- Dikshit, Narasingh Rao, 282 & fn
- Dimapur (Nagaland), 198, 199 fn
- Dir (Pakistan), 382 & fn
- Discovery of India, The* (Jawaharlal Nehru), 555 & fn
- Dixon, Owen, (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 205), 379 & fn
- Doaba College (Jalandhar district), 313
- Doulratram, Jairamdas, (Vol. 4, p. 136), 176 fn
- Dravida Munnetra Kazaghram, 293 fn
- D'souza, Andrew, 400 & fn
- Dulles, John Foster, (VOL. 1, P. 572), 412, 458 fn, 471 & fn, 474
- Duncan, Simon Jenkins, (VOL. 16 Pt. I, P. 279), 178 & fn-179
- Dungarpur (Rajasthan), 302 fn
- Duni Chand, 299 & fn
- Durga Das, (VOL. 8, P. 311), 246 fn
- Dutt, Subimal, (VOL. 7, P. 644), 202 fn-203 fn, 386 fn, 399 fn-400, 401 fn, 446, 458 fn-459 fn, 461 fn-462 fn, 463 fn, 480 fn, 494, 503-504, 586 fn
- Dyal, Vaid Ram, 268 fn

- East Bengal *see* Pakistan, East
- Eden, Anthony, (*Vol. 7, p. 105*), 387, 395 & fn-396 fn, 450 fn, 564 fn
- Egypt, 43 fn, 148, 415 fn, 437 fn, 450 fn, 494, 498, 563, 586 fn
- Eisenhower, Dwight D., (*Vol. 14, p. 28*), 450 fn, 456 fn-457, 458 & fn-459, 460, 468-469, 471 & fn, 474, 566
- Elizabeth II, (*VOL. 4, P. 608*), 454 fn
- Elwin, Verrier, (*Vol. 13, p. 137*), 190 & fn, 579
- Encounters: A Memoir* (Dorothy Norman), 456 fn
- End of an Era: Hyderabad Memories, The* (K.M. Munshi), 581 fn
- England *see* UK
- Eniwetok atoll (Pacific Ocean), 35 fn
- Etah district (Uttar Pradesh), 164
- Ethiopia, 494-495
- Europe, 6, 9-10, 13, 16, 24 fn, 79, 95, 102, 294, 320, 366, 389 fn, 412-414, 501
- , East, 503, 568
- , West, 474, 504, 544
- Evacuee Property Act (1950), 229 fn, 233-234 fn, 235, 239
- Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act (April 1953), 233 & fn
- Far East, 16, 320, 348, 468
- Fazal Elahi, 429 fn
- Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, 149 fn
- Federation of Malaya Agreement (1948), 172 fn
- Fiji Islands (Pacific Ocean), 505
- Film As An Educational Force in India, The* (Marie Seton), 163 fn
- Firozpur district, 438
- Fischer, Ronald, 40 & fn
- Five Year Plan (First), 50, 55-57, 62-63, 76-77, 81, 83, 95-96, 98, 99 & fn, 115, 139 fn-140, 327, 335, 391 fn
- Five Year Plan (Second), 13, 22 & fn, 39 & fn, 40 fn, 41-43, 44 & fn, 47, 49, 51-55, 57-58, 60-63, 65 fn, 66, 68, 71-73, 77-78, 84, 86 fn, 87, 89, 95-96, 98, 101, 104, 106, 112, 115 fn, 119, 128, 141, 143, 207 fn, 309, 320, 324, 327-330, 332, 335, 336 fn, 337 & fn, 359, 362 & fn, 366, 369-370, 373, 447, 478, 497, 528, 562-563, 566, 569; Draft outline of, 39 & fn, 40-42, 60-61, 64
- Five Year Plan (Third), 77
- Flames of the Chinar* (S.M. Abdullah), 380 fn
- Ford Foundation, 247
- Foreign Affairs* (New York), 15 fn
- Formosa *see* Taiwan
- Forward*, 275 fn
- France, 3-6, 8, 13, 16 & fn, 395 fn, 407, 409, 412-415, 482 & fn-483, 484 fn-485, 486 & fn, 489 & fn, 495 fn, 504; Government of, 16 fn, 323, 351, 395-396 & fn, 402-403 & fn, 408-409, 411, 460, 464 fn, 481-483, 485-488; National Assembly of, 482 fn, 486 & fn, 489 fn
- Franco, Francisco, (*Vol. 8, p. 457*), 574 fn
- Franco-Indian Treaty of Cession of Chandernagore (9 June 1952), 409 & fn
- Freedom First*, 253 fn
- Freedom League (Mumbai), 252
- French Revolution, 408
- Frisch, Ragnar, (*VOL. 27, P. 379*), 40 & fn
- Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) (Algeria), 481 fn
- Gadgil, N.V., (*Vol. 3, p. 68*), 301 & fn
- Galbraith, John Kenneth, 15 & fn, 40 & fn, 88
- Gandhi, Indira, (*Vol. 1, p. 232*), 227, 231, 460, 498

- , Mahatma, 18, 30, 132 & fn, 136, 162
fn, 167, 324, 331, 371, 406, 416-417,
510-511, 512, 514 & fn, 518 & fn, 519-
521, 524 fn, 533, 584 & fn, 588 fn, 591
- Ganga river, 476 fn
- Gangotri, 476 fn
- Garhwal, 577
- Garhwali, Chandra Singh, 577 & fn-578,
589
- Garhwal ki Diwangat Vibhutan* (Bhakt
Darshan), 577 fn
- Garhwal Rifles, 577 fn, 589
- Gascoyne-Cecil, Robert Arthur James,
455 & fn
- Gauhati *see* Guwahati
- Gazette of India* (April 1947), 217 fn
- Gazette of India* (May 1956), 314-315
- General Elections (India, 1957), 251 & fn,
263 fn, 561 & fn, 570
- Geneva, 348, 381, 467 & fn, 469-470, 472
fn-473 & fn, 474
- Geneva Agreements (1954), 16 fn, 464 &
fn-465, 466
- Geneva Conference (April-July 1954),
464 & fn, 466, 483 fn
- Germany, 3, 5-6, 8, 12-13, 16, 102, 137,
210, 244 & fn, 412, 437
- , East, 1 17
- , West, 6, 16-17, 244, 450, 456, 504,
506
- Ghana, 545
- Ghatge, S.A., 45 fn
- Ghukiam (Nagaland), 200 fn
- Gill, Niranjan Singh, (*Vol. 15, p. 98*), 495
- Giri, V.V., (*Vol. 4, p. 63*), 136 & fn
- Goa, 9, 319, 351-352, 399 & fn-400, 405 &
fn-406 & fn, 409-415 & fn, 416-420,
568 fn, 574, 582 & fn
- Gokhale, B.K., (VOL. 19, P. 574), 444 &
fn-445, 446
- Gokhale Institute of Politics and
Economics (Pune), 529 & fn
- Gold Coast *see* Ghana
- Golok villages (Tibet), 477 fn
- Golwalkar, M.S., (VOL. 8, P. 288), 590 &
fn
- Gopalan, A.K., (VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 156), 64
& fn-65 & fn
- Gosplan (Planning Commission of
USSR), 4 fn
- Gracias, Cardinal Valerian, (VOL. 21, P.
380), 399 & fn, 401 & fn
- Greece, 554 & fn
- Gujarat, 297 fn, 301 fn-302 & fn, 303 &
fn-304 & fn, 307-308, 341, 400, 514
- Gujarat Pradesh Congress Committee,
342
- Gulhati, N.D., (VOL. 21, P. 506), 441 fn-
442 fn
- Gunewardene, R.S.S., 486 fn
- Gupta, Bhupesh, (VOL. 18, P. 335), 96
- , C.B., (VOL. 16 Pt. II, P. 124), 290 &
fn
- , Gopi Chandra, 268 fn
- , Sadhan, 403
- Gurdaspur district, 427
- Gurukul Kangri, 577-578
- Guwahati, 201
- Gwalior, 423 fn
- Haffkeine Institute (Mumbai), 213 & fn
- Haldane, J.B.S., (VOL. 25, P. 265), 40 & fn
- Hamilton, Alexander, 571 & fn
- Handoo, S.K., 256 fn
- Hanoi, 465
- Hanumanthaiya, K., (VOL. 14 Pt. I, P. 496),
46 & fn, 50, 51 & fn, 86 fn, 206
- Haralu, Nicchulieu Nikki, 199 & fn
- , Silie, (VOL. 25, P. 210), 199 & fn
- Harun-al-Rashid, 211 & fn
- Harwell (UK), 503 & fn

- Haryana, 572 fn
Hedge, Ram, 420 & fn
Hero: Myth, Image and Symbol, The (Dorothy Norman), 456 fn
Heydon, P.R., 151 & fn, 579
Himachal Pradesh, 262, 265 fn, 269, 343 fn, 567 fn, 572 fn-573
Hindu Code, 217 & fn
Hindu Mahasabha, All India, 17, 243 & fn, 265-266, 273, 333, 353-354
Hindu Marriage Act (May 1955), 562 & fn, 572
Hindu Succession Bill (May 1956), 214 & fn, 219, 221, 461 & fn, 562, 572
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (Bangalore), 248
Hindustan Antibiotics Limited (Pimpri), 212 & fn-213 & fn
Hindustan Machine Tools Factory (Bangalore), 248
Hindustani Talimi Sangh (Wardha), 162 & fn
Hindustan Times, The, 246 fn
Hitler (Syed Mujtaba Ali), 253
Hmar tribe, 204 & fn
Holland, 97
Hollister, J.B., 145 fn
Home Rule League (1914), 512 & fn
Hong Kong, 472 fn
Hoshiarpur, 567
Hsuan Tsang, 166
Hungary, 505
Hunza (Pakistan), 382-383
Husain, Azim, (VOL. 1, P. 471), 391 & fn
_____, Zakir, (Vol. 3, p. 67), 168 & fn, 390 fn
Hyder, Husein, 378 & fn
Hyderabad city, 158 fn, 499 fn
Hyderabad State, 19 & fn, 27-28, 274, 407, 423 fn, 431, 519, 581 & fn-582 & fn, 583 & fn, 585 & fn; Nizam of, *see* Ali, Mir Osman
I Believe: The Personal Philosophies of Certain Eminent Men and Women of Our Time (Clifton Fadiman), 554 & fn
Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz Bin, (VOL. 18, P. 207), 168 & fn, 498 & fn-499 & fn
Iengar, H.V.R., (VOL. 2, P. 192), 257 fn
Iliff, William A.B., 441 & fn, 442 fn, 543 fn
Imphal (Manipur), 198, 199 fn
Imru, Ras Haile Selassie, 494 & fn-495
Income Tax Office (Delhi), 227 fn
India, Government of, 19 & fn, 26-27, 34, 40, 44, 46, 58, 62-64, 100, 108, 118-119 fn, 121 & fn, 123-124 & fn, 127, 141, 154 & fn, 162, 173 fn, 177 fn-178, 184 fn, 186 fn, 187-190, 206 fn, 212 & fn, 213, 224, 233, 245 fn, 247, 257, 266, 273 fn, 274-277, 281, 289 fn, 292 fn, 300 & fn, 303 & fn, 304, 307, 314 fn, 319, 323, 326-327, 333-334, 365 fn, 371, 373, 382, 400 fn, 402 & fn, 405, 407, 411, 416, 427, 429 fn, 435-436, 439, 442 & fn, 448 fn, 458 fn, 459 fn, 461 fn, 462 fn, 464, 465 fn, 466, 476 fn, 481-482, 492 fn, 495, 498-499 & fn, 500, 529, 565, 570 & fn, 573, 577, 581 fn, 584 & fn, 585, 589; resolution on Industrial Policy (15 April 1956) of, 40 & fn, 85 & fn, 562 & fn
Indian Administrative Service, 245 & fn, 389
Indian Air Force, 395 fn
Indian Cancer Research Centre (Mumbai), 146 fn, 155
Indian Civil Service, 247-248
Indian Council for Child Welfare (Delhi), 222 & fn
Indian Foreign Service, 204, 258 fn
Indian Institute of Technology (Kharagpur), 135 & fn

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Indian Institute of Technology (Mumbai), 8 & fn
- Indian Iron and Steel Company, 249 fn
- Indian National Trade Union Congress, 126-127
- Indian Penal Code, 587
- Indian Standard Institution (Delhi), 149 fn
- Indian Statistical Institute (Kolkata), 39 fn, 59
- Indira Gandhi: Letters to a Friend 1950-1984* (Dorothy Norman), 456 fn
- Indo-China, 16, 146, 248, 319, 349, 395, 464 & fn, 472 fn, 483 & fn, 546
- Indo-Pakistan Ministerial Conference (Dhaka, 5-6 May 1956), 428 fn
- Indonesia, 146-148, 545 & fn
- Indore, 521
- Industries (Development and Regulation) Act (1951), 119 fn
- Industrial Revolution, 13
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Washington), 431, 433 & fn, 442 & fn, 543 fn
- International Commissions for Supervision and Control (Indo-China), 16 & fn, 319, 349, 459, 464 & fn-465 & fn
- International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (Geneva, 8-21 August 1955), 155 & fn
- International Congress against Capitalism (Brussels, February 1927), 544 & fn
- International Court of Justice (The Hague), 148 & fn
- International Dolls Museum (Delhi), 227 fn
- Iran, 485 fn, 582 fn
- Iraq, 148 fn, 582 fn
- Iron and Steel Plant (Rourkela), 143
- Israel, 16, 320, 348 & fn, 545, 554
- Iyengar, M.A.T., 117 & fn
- Jain, Ajit Prasad, (*Vol. 8, p. 205*), 111 & fn, 112, 114 fn, 116-117, 151, 429 & fn, 448 & fn, 458, 479 & fn
- _____, Takhtmal, (*VOL. 17, P. 108*), 282 & fn
- Jaipur, 288, 365 fn
- Jalandhar, 230-231, 265, 269, 299 fn, 343 fn
- Jammu, 354, 434 fn
- Jammu and Kashmir, 352, 379, 382-383, 386 & fn, 388, 431 fn, 435 & fn; Constituent Assembly of, 383 fn; Government of, 377, 390 & fn; Maharaja of, *see* Singh, Hari
- Jamnagar (Gujarat), 212
- Jana Sangh, Bharatiya, 17, 32-33, 262 fn, 265 & fn, 266, 269, 272-273, 278, 331 fn, 333, 353, 384, 567, 569
- Japan, 3, 5-6, 8, 13, 43 fn, 48, 113, 146, 500 & fn, 545; Government of, 586 & fn-587 fn
- Jayaraman, A., 132 fn
- Jha, C.S., (*VOL. 28, P. 129*), 448 & fn
- Jhelum river, 433
- Jind (Haryana), 232, 238
- Jinnah, Fatima, (*VOL. 9, P. 241*), 378 & fn
- _____, M.A., (*Vol. 1, p. 168*), 294
- Jiribam (Manipur), 204 fn
- Johnson, Alexis, 467 & fn, 469, 473
- Joshi, Subhadra, (*VOL. 29, P. 410*), 384 & fn
- _____, Sudha, (*VOL. 32, P. 528*), 401 & fn-402, 414 & fn-415 fn
- Junagadh (Gujarat), 431
- Jung, Ali Yavar, (*VOL. 1, P. 588*), 498 fn
- Kabul, 382 fn

- Kairon, Partap Singh, (*Vol. 14, p. 75*), 262 & fn-263 & fn, 264 fn-265 & fn, 270 & fn, 272 & fn
- Kakodkar, Purushottam, 420 & fn
- Kaldor, Nicholas, (*VOL. 32, P. 472*), 40 & fn
- Kalelkar, D.B., (Kaka), (*Vol. 4, p. 384*), 161 fn
- Kalka, 331 & fn, 336-337 & fn
- Kamath, H.V., (*Vol. 9, p. 397*), 464 & fn-465
- Kanchrapara (West Bengal), 31 fn
- Kangra (Himachal Pradesh), 269
- Kanniyakumari, 86 fn
- Kanpur, 95
- Kaparthala, 269
- Karachi, 121, 123, 322 & fn, 429, 436, 439, 582 fn
- Karaikal (Pondicherry), 402 fn, 404 fn, 409, 411
- Karnataka, 28, 411-412
- Kashmir, 17 & fn-18, 19 & fn, 50, 248, 280, 313 fn, 322 & fn, 351, 353, 377 & fn-378, 379 & fn, 382-383 & fn, 384, 387, 389 fn, 391, 430 & fn, 431 fn-432 & fn, 433, 437 & fn, 441 & fn, 459, 519, 525, 531, 539-543, 563, 568 fn, 574, 581-583; UN Military Observers Group in, 434 & fn, 436, report of, 436 & fn
- Kashyap Bandhu, 385 & fn
- Kathmandu, 445 fn-446 & fn
- Katju, K.N., (*Vol. 1, p. 154*), 171 & fn, 199
- Kaul, Balkrishna, (*Vol. 1, p. 265*), 278 & fn-279 & fn
- , B.N., (*VOL. 4, P. 282*), 280, 286 & fn-287, 289 fn
- , T.N., (*VOL. 18, P. 550*), 181 fn, 182 & fn, 184 fn, 382 fn
- Kaur, Amrit, (*Vol. 11, p. 274*), 156 & fn, 209 fn, 222 & fn
- Kenya, 125
- Kerala, 28, 404
- Keskar, B.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 15*), 163 & fn, 253 & fn
- Khalil Ahmad, 229 & fn, 230-231
- Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, (*Vol. 4, p. 293*), 577 fn
- , Ajmal, (*Vol. 9, p. 655*), 156 fn
- , Ghazanfar Ali, (*VOL. 1, P. 191*), 238, 438 & fn
- , Mobassir Muhammad, 168 & fn
- , Mohammad Zafrulla, (*Vol. 9, p. 394*), 431 & fn
- , Sadath Ali, 464 fn
- , Sardar Ali, 229 & fn-230
- , Sultan Yar, 233 & fn
- Khanna, Mehr Chand, (*Vol. 14, p. 577*), 161, 233 & fn, 238-239, 428 & fn, 438
- Khanolkar, V.R., (*VOL. 27, P. 422*), 34 fn, 154
- Kharagpur, 128 fn, 135 & fn-136, 137, 331 & fn
- Khongmen, Bonily, (*VOL. 27, P. 428*), 188 & fn
- Khrushchev, N.S., (*VOL. 29, P. 220*), 252 fn, 450 & fn, 564 fn
- Khuivi (Nagaland), 186
- Kidwai, Anis, 229 & fn, 231
- Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, 365 fn
- Kivikhy (Nagaland), 186
- Kochhar, R.K., (*VOL. 32, P. 122*), 175 fn, 185 fn, 187, 189, 191-192, 194-196, 197 fn, 199, 201 & fn
- Kohima, 176 & fn, 182, 185 fn-186, 187, 198-199 & fn, 200-201 & fn
- Kolaba, 308, 340
- Kolkata, 31, 76, 95, 130, 234, 275 fn, 305 fn, 429
- Kolmogorov, A.N., 40 & fn

- Korea, 248, 459, 466 & fn, 472 & fn, 474, 546
 —, South, 466 fn
 Kosbad Agricultural School (Bombay), 43 fn
 Kotelawala, John, (*Vol. 10, p. 4*), 251 & fn, 452 & fn, 565 fn
 Kothari, D.S., (*VOL. 27, P. 384*), 34 fn, 154-155
 Kripalani, Sucheta, (*Vol. 9, p. 469*), 157 & fn-158, 160 fn
 Krishnachuda (Surendra Mohanty), 430 fn
 Krishnamachari, T.T., (*VOL. 7, P. 447*), 83, 116, 119, 124, 125 & fn, 138, 249 & fn-250 fn, 292 & fn-293 fn, 448 & fn, 462, 501
 —, V.T., (*Vol. 10, p. 412*), 42 & fn, 43-44, 50, 111, 120, 244
 Krishnanagar (West Bengal), 276
 Kshatriya Mahasabha (Rajasthan), 283 fn-284 & fn
 Kuari river, 281 fn
 Kud (Jammu and Kashmir), 380 & fn, 385, 388, 391
 Kunte, D.K., (*VOL. 25, P. 238*), 297 & fn
 Kurchatov, Igor, 503 fn
 Kuznets, Simon, 40 & fn

 Labour Front (Singapore), 491 fn
 Labour Party (UK), 564 fn
 Lacoste, Robert, 487 & fn-488 fn
 Lad, P.M., (*VOL. 24, P. 648*), 202 fn-203 fn
 Lalbhai, Kasturbhai, (*Vol. 6, p. 334*), 302 & fn
 Lall, Arthur S., (*VOL. 10, P. 209*), 436 & fn, 480 fn
 Lange, Oscar, 40 & fn
 Lansdowne (Uttaranchal), 589 fn
 Laos, 16 fn, 464 fn, 483 fn

 Lejeune, M., 482 fn
 Lennox-Boyd, Alan Tindal, 455 & fn
 Life Insurance Corporation Act (July 1956), 85 fn
 Life Insurance Corporation of India, 256 & fn-257
 Lincoln, Abraham, 579-580
 Lisbon, 405 fn-406 & fn, 420
 Lisle, Orchard B., 123 & fn
 Liverpool, 102
 Lloyd, Selwyn, (*VOL. 23, P. 532*), 396 fn, 467 fn
 Lodhi Gardens (Delhi), 157
 Lohia, Rammanohar, (*Vol. 7, p. 430*), 365
 Lok Sabha, 22 & fn, 55, 64, 66, 71-72, 74, 78-80, 82-83, 85 & fn-86, 87, 89, 105, 117, 128, 133, 136, 214 & fn-215, 221, 283, 300 fn, 315, 338 fn, 349-351, 355, 381, 383-384, 402-404, 414 fn-415 fn, 432, 465 fn, 483, 489 fn, 560 fn-561 & fn, 562 fn, 572 fn; Business Advisory Committee of, 55 fn
 London, 4, 24 fn, 121-122, 125 fn, 247, 257 fn, 387 fn, 395 fn-396 & fn, 437, 443, 453, 456, 459 fn, 460, 464 & fn, 466, 491 fn-492 fn, 503, 543 fn-544, 564, 566; India House in, 456
 Lucas, Martin H., 401 & fn
 Lucknow, 237
 Lucknow University, 290-291 & fn
 Ludhiana, 265-266 fn, 299 fn
 Lushai Hills (Assam), 203
 Lyttleton, Oliver (Lord Chandos), 125 & fn

 MacDonald, Malcolm John, (*VOL. 28, P.334*), 387 & fn, 491 & fn, 586
 Macmillan, Harold, (*VOL. 29, P. 229*), 455 & fn
 Madhya Bharat, 189, 202 fn, 281, 283, 342, 521; Government of, 282 & fn

- Madhya Pradesh, 7 fn, 186 fn, 342;
Government of, 202 fn-203 fn
- Madhya Pradesh Special Armed Police,
186
- Madras, 28, 292, 411
- Madrid, 574 fn
- Madurai, 294
- Maha Punjab Samiti, 265 fn, 269, 272 fn-
273 fn, 299 fn, 343 fn-344 fn, 354, 567
fn, 569, 572 fn
- Mahajan, M.C., (VOL. 4, P. 263), 272
& fn
- Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (Sri Lanka),
251 fn
- Mahalanobis, P.C., (Vol. 11, p. 293),
39 fn
- Mahanagarir Ratri* (Surendra
Mohanty), 430 fn
- Maharashtra, 26-28, 298 & fn, 301 fn-302
fn, 303 fn, 306-308, 340 & fn, 341-342,
400, 411-412, 569; Government of,
307
- Maharashtra Pradesh Congress
Committee, 297 fn
- Mahatma Gandhi—The Last Phase*
(Pyarelal), 580 fn
- Mahe (Kerala), 402 fn, 404 & fn, 409
- Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, (VOL. 28, P.
268), 445 & fn-446 fn
- Mahmud, Syed, (Vol. 1, p. 170), 501 &
fn
- Mahtab, Harekrushna, (Vol. 9, p. 435),
300 & fn
- Maki, Y., 499 & fn
- Malakand (Pakistan), 382 fn
- Malaviya, K.D., (Vol. 1, p. 260), 123 fn,
246 fn
- Malaya *see* Malaysia
- Malaysia, 172 & fn-173
- Malek, Selim, 489-490
- Malik, H.S., (VOL. 16 Pt. II, P. 328), 487
fn-488 fn
- Malkani, N.R., (Vol. 7, p. 649), 68-69
& fn
- Manaslu peak (Himalayas), 499 & fn
- Manchester, 102
- Manchester Guardian*, 574 fn
- Mandal, Pashupati, 117 & fn
- Mandhata, Krishna Chandra Singh
(Maharaja of Nayagarh), 423 & fn
- Manipur, 173 fn, 199 fn, 204 & fn;
Government of, 204 fn
- Manitoba Province (Canada), 112
- Mao (NEFA), 176 fn
- Mao Tse-tung, (Vol. 10, p. 75), 46
- Marshall, David Saul, 459 & fn, 490 &
fn-491 & fn, 492 & fn-493 & fn
- Masani, M.R., (Vol. 6, p. 135), 252-253
& fn
- Mathai, M.O., (Vol. 15, p. 385), 132 fn,
202 fn, 288
- Mathrubhumi*, 160 fn
- Matthai, John, (Vol. 15, p. 101), 247 &
fn, 256 fn-257 fn
- Max Muller, Friedrich, 10 & fn
- McMahon Line, 475
- Mears, Grimwood, 509 & fn
- Medhi, Bisnuram, (Vol. 8, p. 483), 171 &
fn, 176-177, 183, 191-192, 193 fn, 195-
196, 199-200, 201 fn
- Meghalaya, 204 fn
- Megorto (a Naga), 184 & fn-185 fn,
187 fn
- Mehta, Asoka, (VOL. 11, P. 355), 265-
266, 301 fn, 381
- , G.L., (Vol. 13, p. 548), 147 & fn, 457
& fn, 460 & fn, 467 & fn-468, 469, 471
& fn
- , J., 496
- , Nalin, 361 & fn
- , V.L., (VOL. 26, P. 267), 257 fn
- Mende, Tibor, (VOL. 31, P. 437), 513 & fn
- Menon, Lakshmi, (VOL. 8, P. 299), 70 fn
- , P.N., 478 & fn

- ____, V.K. Krishna, (*Vol. 7, p. 15*), 119, 148 fn, 391, 395 & fn-396 fn, 432, 460 fn, 467 & fn-468, 469, 487 & fn-488 & fn, 489 & fn
- ____, V.P., (*VOL. 2, P. 114*), 423
- Menzies, R.G., (*VOL. 16 Pt. I, P. 366*), 419 & fn
- Mexico, 148 fn
- Middle East, 349 & fn, 488 fn, 546, 564
- Midnapur, 128 fn, 305 fn
- Mikoyan, A.I., (*VOL. 29, P. 214*), 88, 89 fn, 463 & fn, 564 fn
- Military Messenger*, 463 & fn
- Minimum Wages Act (1948), 50
- Ministry of, Commerce and Industry, 120 fn, 248
- ____, Communications, 275, 315
- ____, Defence, 127, 197 fn, 248, 343, 427, 449
- ____, Education and Scientific Research, 159, 206 fn-207 fn, 314
- ____, External Affairs, 142, 145, 147, 164, 229 fn, 231, 244-245, 248, 254 & fn-255 fn, 281, 454, 502, 505, 587
- ____, Finance, 39 fn, 60, 108, 120 fn, 122-123, 142-143, 206 fn, 246 fn, 248, 249 fn-250 & fn, 256 fn
- ____, Food and Agriculture, 44, 45 fn, 111 fn, 115 & fn-116, 117, 197 fn, 248, 429, 563
- ____, Health, 50
- ____, Home Affairs, 160 fn, 247-248, 274, 277 fn, 390, 438, 587-588, 590
- ____, Information & Broadcasting, 34 fn, 163-164, 201 fn, 203, 276; Publications Division of, 34 fn, 162
- ____, Law, 274
- ____, Natural Resources and Scientific Research, 118, 123
- ____, Planning and Irrigation and Power, 248, 282 fn
- ____, Production, 118, 120 fn, 248
- ____, Railways and Transport, 248
- ____, Relief and Rehabilitation, 229-232, 234, 237-238, 248, 254 fn
- ____, Works, Housing and Supply, 120 fn, 122
- Mirza, Iskandar, (*VOL. 23, P. 453*), 17 fn, 383 fn, 432 fn
- Mizoram, 204 fn
- Mohammad, Bakhshi Ghulam, (*Vol. 9, p. 440*), 50, 380 & fn, 385, 387-388 fn, 391
- Mohanty, Surendra, 109-110, 430 & fn
- Mokokchung (Nagaland), 188, 198, 200 & fn-201
- Mollet, Guy, (*VOL. 32, P. 347*), 486 fn, 487 fn, 489 fn
- Monckton, Walter, (*VOL. 4, P. 28*), 396 & fn, 455 & fn, 584 & fn
- Montagu-Chelmsford Report (1918), 521 fn
- Morocco, 16 & fn, 43 fn, 320, 350, 481-482 & fn
- Moscow, 364 fn, 463 fn, 476, 568 fn
- Mountbatten, Lord Louis, (*Vol. 13, p. 276*), 274, 379 fn, 395 & fn, 407, 430 fn, 455 & fn, 581 & fn-582 & fn, 583 & fn-584 fn, 585
- Mudie, Francis, 517 & fn
- Mukerian (Punjab), 261 fn-262 fn, 264 & fn, 266
- Mukerjee, B.K., (*Vol. 5, P. 547*), 67 fn
- ____, H.N., (*VOL. 18, P. 335*), 128 fn, 189 & fn
- Mukherjee, Kali, 335 fn
- ____, Subroto, (*VOL. 12, P. 471*), 198 & fn
- Mumbai, 26 & fn-27, 28, 76, 86 fn, 95, 121-122, 140, 192-194 & fn, 216, 252, 267, 277, 297 & fn-298 & fn, 301 fn, 303 & fn-304, 306-308, 309 & fn, 319, 335, 338, 339 & fn-340 & fn, 341, 359, 381, 385, 399-400, 417, 419, 494 fn, 499 fn, 522, 567

- Mundasseri, Joseph, 160 fn
- Munshi, K.M., (*Vol. 5, p. 292*), 581 & fn-582 fn, 583 fn-584 fn, 585 fn
- Murrow, Louis I.R., 276-277 fn
- Musafir, G.S., (*VOL. 21, P. 350*), 273 & fn, 343 & fn, 344 fn
- Muslim League, All India, 11, 33, 294, 353, 441 fn, 515, 517, 540
- Myanmar, 99-100, 114 fn-115, 146, 148, 176 fn, 180, 251 & fn-252, 447 fn-448 & fn, 449, 451 & fn, 457, 461, 484 fn, 486 fn, 545 fn, 547, 550, 553, 565 fn; General Elections (27 April 1956) in, 565 fn
- Mysore, 28, 50, 102, 116 & fn, 400
- Nadar, K. Kamaraj, (*VOL. 17, P. 327*), 292 & fn-293 & fn, 294
- Nadia (West Bengal), 276
- Naga Hills District (Assam), 171 fn, 178-180, 181 fn, 184 fn, 187, 191-192, 193 fn-194, 195-196, 200
- Naga National Council, 171 fn, 176 fn, 185 fn-186 & fn, 187 & fn, 193 fn, 199 fn
- Nagar (Pakistan), 382-383
- Nagarparkar taluqa (Pakistan), 439 fn
- Nagpur, 499 fn
- Naicker, E.V. Ramaswami, (*VOL. 26, P. 193*), 293 & fn-294
- Naini (Uttar Pradesh), 102, 511
- Naini Tal, 54
- Nambiar, A.C.N., (*Vol. 3, p. 300*), 244 & fn-245
- _____, K. Ananda, 130 & fn, 134 & fn
- Namu island (Pacific Ocean), 35 fn
- Nanda, B.R., 514 fn
- _____, Gulzarilal, (*Vol. 9, p. 39*), 50, 55, 61, 65, 96, 209 & fn, 281, 442 & fn
- Nangal, 143
- Narayan, Jayaprakash, (*Vol. 4, p. 305*), 377 & fn
- Narora (Uttar Pradesh), 238 fn, 343 fn
- Nasser, Gamal Abdel, (*VOL. 23, P. 50*), 450 & fn, 490, 498 fn
- Nath, Davinder, 203 & fn
- National Book Trust, 162-163
- National Conference (Jammu and Kashmir), 385
- National Development Council, 39 & fn-40, 43-44, 50, 52 & fn, 60-63, 78, 86 & fn, 98, 109, 112 & fn, 113, 115, 206-207, 562; Plan Economy and Efficiency Promotion Committee (PEEP) (1956) of, 52 fn
- National Education Conference (Wardha, 1937), 162 fn
- National Extension Service, 39 fn, 42, 44, 50, 53 & fn, 70, 83, 207-208, 224, 329, 372, 563
- National Film Theatre (London), 163 fn
- National Gallery (Australia), 578
- National Liberal Federation (1918), 521 & fn
- National Physical Laboratory (New Delhi), 146 fn
- Nawal Kishore, 369 & fn
- Nayar, Sushila, (*Vol. 6, p. 381*), 580
- Nazre khush guzre* (Anis Kidwai), 229 fn
- Nehru, Jawaharlal, 8 fn, 17 fn, 22 fn, 24 fn, 26 fn, 31 fn, 33 fn, 34 fn, 39-44, 45 fn-46, 49 & fn-50, 51, 55 & fn, 64-67, 69, 85, 88, 96, 102, 109-110, 114 fn, 117 fn, 123 & fn, 127-128, 132 fn, 135 fn, 148 & fn-149 fn, 153 fn, 158 fn-159 fn, 160 fn, 163 fn, 173 fn, 176 fn, 181 fn, 184-185, 188-190, 193 fn-194 fn, 197 fn, 202 fn, 204 & fn, 206 fn, 210 fn, 214, 216, 220-221, 226 fn-227 fn, 234, 238 fn, 243 fn, 245, 246 fn, 249 fn-250 fn, 252 fn, 256 fn-257 fn, 267 fn-268 fn, 276-277 fn, 278 fn-279 fn, 280 fn-281 fn, 282 fn-283 fn, 284 fn-

285 fn, 286 fn, 288-289 & fn, 291 fn, 293 fn, 298 fn, 306 fn-307 fn, 309 fn, 313 fn-314 fn, 315 fn, 331 fn, 341 fn, 343 fn, 345 fn, 361 fn, 367, 371 fn-372, 380 fn-381 fn, 382-383 fn, 386 fn, 388 fn-389 fn, 395 fn-396 fn, 399 fn-400 fn, 401 fn, 402-404, 409 fn, 414 fn-415 fn, 428 fn, 430 fn, 432 fn, 434 fn, 436-437 fn, 441 fn, 449 fn-450 fn, 451 fn, 454 fn-455 fn, 458 fn-459 fn, 461 fn-462 fn, 463 fn-464, 465 & fn, 467 fn-468 fn, 470-471 fn, 475 fn-476 fn, 482 fn-483 fn, 487 & fn-488, 489 & fn-490, 492 & fn-493 fn, 496 fn-497 fn, 498 fn, 504 fn, 509-511, 513 & fn, 514 & fn-515, 516-518 & fn, 519-524, 526 & fn, 527-535, 537 & fn, 538-542, 544 & fn, 545-549, 551 & fn, 552-555, 559 fn, 561 fn-562 fn, 563 fn, 568 fn, 574 fn, 577 fn, 580 & fn-581, 583 fn-584 fn, 585-586

—, addresses public meetings, at New Delhi, 20-36; drafts resolutions for the AICC, Mumbai, on international affairs, 322-323, on Portuguese possessions in India, 325-326, on the Second Plan, 327-330, on Treaty of Cession of the French Settlements in India, 323, on violence, 330-333, on violence and indiscipline in public life, 323-325; gives interview, to K.G. Saiyidain, 509-512, to Michael Brecher, 512-555, to Selim Malek, 489-490; replies to questions in Parliament, on accession of Chitral, 382-383, on Indo-China, 464-465, on Naga resistance and government actions, 185-190; sends messages to, All India Basic Education Conference, Wardha, 161-162, All India Urdu Conference, Hyderabad, 169, Bombay PCC for a souvenir for the AICC, 319-321, eighth annual

convention of the INTUC, Surat, 126-127, fifth All India Development Commissioners' Conference, Nainital, 53-54, women's training camp, Allahabad, 222; speaks in the Parliament, on Algeria, 481-483, on ceiling on individual income, 67-71, on Hindu Succession Bill, 214-221, on Railway employees' strike, 128-136, on Second Plan, 55-68, 71-110, on Treaty of Cession of French Establishments, 402-404; speaks, at a conference of the Presidents and Secretaries of the PCCs, New Delhi, 3-19, at a convention of Congress Workers, Narora, 363-373, at a rally of Goans, Mumbai, 405-420, at the AICC, Mumbai, 334-341, at the inauguration of the first National Conference of Child Welfare, New Delhi, 222-226, at the inauguration of National Savings Organization Stall, AICC, Mumbai, 139-141, at the NDC meeting, New Delhi, 39-52, at the six hundred and fiftieth *Urs* of Amir Khusrau, New Delhi, 164-166, at the special convocation of the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Mumbai, 209-213, to the members of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 346-359, on 2,500th birth anniversary of Gautama Buddha, New Delhi, 20-24; visits, Bombay, 116, 136, 139-141, 190-192, 247-249, 274-275, 323-341, 405-420, 466-467, 472, 487-488, Narora, 363-373; writes foreword to the Chinese edition of *An Autobiography*, 590-591 & *The Discovery of India*, 591-592, *Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects*, 154-155

—, on administrative system of India, dealing with various aspects of

development of, 248, expansion of, 247-249, growing responsibilities of, 248, Paul Appleby's reports on, 247, 249; agricultural production, efforts for increase in, 563, need for demonstration farms for, 113; Ajmer, suitability of making capital of Rajasthan of, 277-278; Algeria, India's five-point suggestions on, 483, 489, issues in freedom of, 349-351, policy towards, 481-483, role of Asian-African group in the UN on, 480, 486, self determination for, 481-489, for problem of, 573; Aligarh Muslim University, Saudi Arabia's help for, 168, 498-499; Ambar Charkha, 366; *An Autobiography*, Chinese edition of, 590-591; 'Azad Kashmir', conditions in, 378; Amir Khusrau, greatest symbol of India's unity, 164-166; antibiotics and other drugs, production of, 212-213; Arab countries, lack of availability of Indian goods in, 501-502; atomic energy, Bertrand Russell's views on, 503, India's advance in, 13, policies for developing Indian programme for, 141-144, usefulness for India of, 97; Atomic Energy Commission, proposal to give statutory authority to, 153-154; atomic warfare, effects of, 21, 34-36, 152-155, raising the issue at the UN of, 148-149; Bal Bhavan, allotment of land for, 227, committee for, 228; Bandung Conference, emergence of common objectives in, 545, exclusion of Israel from, 545-546; B K Kaul, allegations against, 278-280; basic education, 161-162; Bhooswamis of Rajasthan, agitation for adequate land compensation by, 283-290 and offer of his mediation, 285-286, and Pant Award, 284 and release of their

leaders, 286, go across to Pakistan, 290; canal waters, 543; Bihar, discontent over transfer of territories to West Bengal, 304-305, and over B.C. Roy's withdrawal of the merger proposal, 305; Bihar earthquake, Gandhiji's comment on, 514; Bombay area, reorganization of, 297-298, 301, 307-308, and Gujarati viewpoint, 302-304, and Maharashtra viewpoint, 308-309; Bombay city, future of, 297-298, 338-341, Morarji Desai's statement on, 298, 306, violence over the future of, 309-310; Brussels Congress, 544; Buddha, message of peace and tolerance of, 20-24, 565; Bulganin & Khrushchev, UK visit of, 564; Burma, elections in, 447, 451, foreign funding of parties in, 251-252, trade relations with, 448-449, 457; casteism, 10, 23, 532; ceiling on individual income, 67-71; CFTRI, large-scale food for distribution in schools, 116; Centre- states relations, 549-550; C.B. Gupta, treasurership of Lucknow University of, 290-291; Chandra Singh Garhwali, financial help to, 577-578, 589; Chhad Bet, restoration of status quo in, 439; children, attention of Community Projects in rural areas for, 224-225, joint efforts of Government and people for welfare of, 223-224, literacy among, 223-224, need for welfare specialists for, 225-226; China, 8, comparison with India of, 527-528, developments on the Indo-Tibet border, and India's concerns, 477-478, foodgrain production in, 42-44, 46-49, his visits (1939 & 1954) to, 527, Indian delegation to study agrarian cooperatives of, 111, 113, 479, 528, Twelve year agricultural plan of, 46-49, 111-112; Chinese

maps, issue of frontier with India in, 475-476, 478; Chitral, accession of, 382-383, legal position of, 574; Commonwealth, India's association with, 547-548; communal organizations, 33, 516-517, fascist outlook of, 569; CPI, criticism of AICC resolution on violence by, 567-568, foreign financial assistance for, 252, influence of USSR on, 32, Palghat resolution of, 364, 568-569, questions about finances and accounts at Palghat conference of, 252, views on national issues of, 32; community programmes, producers' cooperatives for agriculture and village industries, 53-54; community projects, in rural India, 115 & NES, 83-84, 98, 109-110, 563; Congress, and establishment of socialism or a welfare state, 327-328, 335-336, and de jure transfer of French territories, 323, and fundamental rights, 364, 526, and maintenance of moral standards in public life, 325, and resolution on social reorganization, 526-527, and trade union movement, 324, condemnation of violence by, 323-324, 330-333, constructive work programme of, 362-363, national policies of, 320-321, on the Second Plan, 327-330, opposition by CPI and communal parties of, 569, policies towards world situation of, 319-320, 322-323, position in coming elections of, 447, support to policies towards Portuguese possessions of, 325-326, tasks before, 365-373; cotton textiles, need to increase production of, 115-116; cultural delegations, prospects of sending to foreign countries of, 503-505; Dakshina Pradesh, issue of, 292-293; death sentences, commutation through discretionary

powers, 274-275; delegates going abroad, procedure for selection of, 244-245; Delhi slums, progress in clearance of, 280-281, role of Bharat Sewak Samaj in, 281; democratic methods, and decision-making process for foreign policies, 534-535, and enlightened self-interest, 534-535, for transformation of society, 533; disarmament, 347-348; *Discovery of India*, The, Chinese edition of, 591-592; Dolls Museum, 227-228, committee for setting up of, 227; East Pakistan, gift of foodgrains to, 429-430, 573, procedures for migrants from, 428-429; Ethiopia, difficulties with neighbours of, 494-495, proposed visit to India of the Emperor of, 494; evacuee property, 543-544, displacement of muslim tenants by auction of, 234, terms for moveable assets of, 236-237; Evacuee Property Act, and conduct of the Custodians, 233-234, 237, and pending cases, 233-235, 237-238, implementation of, 233; Farooq Abdullah, harassment at Kud by security officers, 379-381; First Plan, success of, 56-57, growth of per capita income during, 76, foodgrains production and stocks, 114-115; foreign policy, and democratic decision-making process for, 534-535, formulation of, 3, primary considerations for, 536-539; freedom of expression, 32; French settlements in India, de jure transfer of, 351, 402-404, 408-409, maintaining French culture in, 409, 411; Gandhiji, truly Indian leader, 520, and Champaran satyagraha, 514, on Bihar earthquake, 514, dealing with opponents by, 518, influence on minds of Indian masses of, 520-521, 533, methods of, 515, 533, on non-violence, 519, in South Africa,

514; General Elections, foreign funding of various parties in, 251, 253, scheduling of, 561, 570; Geneva Agreements, implementation of, 464-467; Ghulam Qadir, ill treatment by police of the family of, 381; Goa, AICC resolution at Mumbai on, 419-420, arrangements for borders of, 399-400, *Blitz* article on Vatican directive on, 399-401, conditions in, 414, conditions of women prisoners in, 401-402, 414-415 and their hunger strike, 351, India's discussions with Portugal on, 9-10, 406, 408-410, no compulsion for joining India by, 410-411, Salazar's statement on, 405-406, 412-413 and use of Catholic Church for, 399-401, 418-419, struggle for freedom of, 414-415, 417-418, Sudha Joshi's detention in, 401-402, 414-415; good society, characteristics of, 555; government servants, conduct rules for, 587-588, 590; heavy industries, foreign investment in, 125, growth of, 41, 96-97; himself, his days in England, 513, influence of Gandhiji on, 513-515, 519, influence of Tilak and Annie Besant on, 512-513, his tour abroad, 566, his resignation from premiership, 449, 553-554; Hindi language, as an alternative medium for examination, 170; Hindu Law Reforms Bills, progressive nature of, 572; Hindu society, dynamism and vitality of, 218-221, stagnation under the British rule of, 215-216, women's status in, 217-218; Hindu Succession Bill, and economic freedom of women, 219-220, background for, 215-216, effect on the society of, 561-562, significance of, 214-215, 221, 334; Hmar tribals, state employment for, 204; India, comparison with China of, 14 and,

with Pakistan, 10-12, Congress movement for independence of, 10-11, disruptionist tendencies in, 531-532, formation of agricultural cooperatives in, 46, growth of national income in, 76, need of cohesion in, 9, obstacles in socio-economic progress of, 531-532, place in the world of, 3-7, 16-17, 22, 346-359, 531, potential for growth of, 9; IAS, provision for special recruitment to, 245-246; Indian administrative system, Appleby's reports on, 247, 249, 367, 570-572; IFS (B), transfer of personnel from CRO to, 254-256; Indian nationals, foreign invitations only through the Government to, 500-501, 505; Indian people, his role for, 552; indigenous systems of medicines, 209-211; Indo-China, continuation of ICSC in, 349, 464-467, 474; industrial policy, 85-86, 562, and development of basic & heavy industries, 86, emphasis on heavy and machine-making industry and agricultural surplus in, 563; Intelligence agents, usefulness of, 243; international disputes, devising means for settlement of, 443-444; Japan, admission to the UN of, 500; Kashmir, army action in, 18-19, attitude of Muslims in, 377-378, conditions of craftsmen in, 50, economic progress in, 391, inclusion in services of people of, 389-390, national movement in, 353-354, no communal feelings in, 539-540, plebiscite in, 17, 541, Kashmir issue, 539-542, 563-564, at the Commonwealth conference, 387, history of, 379, India's approach to, 352-354, legal aspects of, 388-389, and opposition of Hindu communal forces, 353, settlement along the

ceasefire line of, 17-18, 352-353, 383-384, 432; K.M. Munshi's book on Hyderabad, his comments on, 581-586; labour, relations with management of, 126-128; land reforms, and Bhoodan movement, 525, inadequacy of, 525; language questions, 29-30; lunar eclipse, 20-21, 24; Madhya Bharat, the case of sati and state government's unawareness in, 282-283, proposed reclamation of ravines in, 281-282; MPs, new concessions to, 313-315; medical services, need for spread of, 212, for rural areas, 210-211; metric system, international nomenclature for, 149-150; Middle East, situation in, 348-349; migration procedures, for East Bengal migrants, 428-429; minorities, institutional safeguards for, 550; monorail, usefulness of, 137-138; mosques, dargahs, graveyards, recovery from refugees of, 236-237; Motilal Nehru, 509-512; Mukerian dacoity case, circumstances of, 261-264; Murrow, Bishop of Krishnanagar, anti-India propaganda by, 276-277; Muslim League, 516-517 muslims of India, 377-378, 539-540, 542; Mystere aircraft, purchase of, 395-396; Nadia, Anti-India propaganda by Bishop Murrow in, 276-277; Naga issue, appointment of an Adviser to Military Commander to deal with, 181-182, 194-197, approach to, 174-175, 177-180, 182-183, 189-190, 193, Assam Government's proposal on, 183-184, combination of political and military approach to, 174-175, 182-183, 189-190, 193, 198, discussions with S.J. Duncan on, 178-179, his reactions to *Times of India* article on, 173-178, international implications of, 172,

and his meetings with Naga leaders, 175-177, and surrender of arms by Vilhume, 185, 187-188, military appraisal of, 171-173, Naga leaders' initiative on, 183-185, political approach to, 173-174, 182, talk with N. Haralu on, 199-200; Naga Hills, army protections to families in, 188-189, burning of foodgrains by Army in, 197, difficulties faced by Army in, 188-189, military operations in, 191, steps to check violence during monsoon in, 187, violence in, 199-201; Naga Hills District & Tuensang Division, proposed transfer under the Central rule of, 180, 192; Nagas, grievances of, 174, various tribes of, 178-179; National Book Trust, publication of low priced books by, 162-163; National Conference, measures of strengthening of, 385; NDC, resolution of, 51; Nekowal incident, compensation and ex-gratia contribution for lost lives in, 435-436, Pakistan's blame on Indian Border Police for, 434, publication of Indo-Pakistan correspondence on, 436, UN observers' report on, 434; Nepal, political situation in, 445-446; Netaji Enquiry Committee, visit to Formosa of, 586-587; newspapers, finances from foreign sources for, 461-462, foreign monetary aid to, 33-34; Nigeria, Indian advisers for industrial development and community development in, 496-497; non-alignment, meaning of, 538; non-violence, 519-520; 'no war' declaration by India and Pakistan, 443-444; Nuclear Centre in Philippines, suitability of setting up of, 144-148; old manuscripts, rescue and preservation of, 158-159,

565; Pakistan, and talks on Indus Waters with World Bank, 433, 441-442, bilateral issues with, 430-431, 441-442, blame on Indian Border Police for Nekowal incident by, 434, comparison with India of, 10-12, demarcation of frontier along the Radcliffe Line with, 427, 438-439, different outlook of, 10-11, possibility of reunion with India of, 440, relations with, 542-543, US aid to, 11-12; *Panchsheel*, meaning of, 7, 23; Partition, and communal situation, 531, inevitability of, 515-518; *Pather Panchali*, depiction of poverty in, 164, screening at London of, 163-164; petroleum policy, various aspects of, 97, 118-124; planning, 57, 81, 552, for augmenting production, 366, physical and financial aspects of, 94, uncertainties in, 89-90, 92-93; police firing, 521-522; population of India, and family planning work, 529-530; Portuguese possessions in India, history of, 406-408, implications of continuation of, 409-410, 416; PCCs, relations with state governments of, 345-346; PSP, foreign assistance for, 252; Press, freedom of, 524; Preventive Detention Act, role in a democracy of, 523-524; private enterprise, 15, nationalization of, 84-85, role of, 329; privy purses, principles for calculation of, 423-424, utilization of, 424; public sector, 15, 87, administration of, 84-85, 87-89, appointment of government officers to apex position in, 256-257, growth of, 328; Punjab, linguistic controversies in, 266-273, and Maha Punjab people, 266-267, 299, opposition of Arya Samaj to Regional Formula in, 266-267, working of Regional Formula for, 268-273;

Punjab Legislative Council, inappropriate nomination of Surja Ram to, 263-264; Punjab police, allegations of death in custody of, 261-264, 266; Purana Qila, preservation of archaeological remains of, 157, proposed zoological gardens at, 157-158, transfer of refugees from, 157, 160; Pyarelal's book on Gandhiji, 580-581; Railway strike, 130-131, and the Kharagpur incident, 129-130; Ramaswami Naicker, provoking speeches by, 293-294; RSS members', dismissal from government service of, 587-588, 590; Regional Formula for Punjab, 30, agitation against, 572-573, Maha Punjab Samiti's opposition to, 266-267, 299, opposition to, 343-344, 354-355, working of, 268-273; religion, meaning of, 21, wrong use of, 399-401, 418-419; religious and charitable trusts, proper administration of, 593; Roshan Ara, arrangement for education of, 231, 238, restoration to her maternal uncle from Pakistan, 229, 238-239, restoration of her property in Jind to, 229-232, 237-238; Sahitya Akademi, issue of inclusion of distinguished writers in, 160; Santokh Singh, expertise in agriculture of, 112-113; satyagraha, concept of, 530, 533, twisting the meaning of, 356; Saudi Arabian King, gift for AMU Medical College by, 168, 498-499, visit to India of, 599; Second Plan, and barriers of underdevelopment, 13-14, and export policy, 83, and land reforms, 45-46, and regional development, 73, 87, 103-104, and socialist structure of society, 62, 79-80, 93-94, and unemployment problem, 41, 80, approach to, 41, 56, 334-337,

foodgrain/ agricultural production under, 41-46, 82-84, 98-99, 112, growth of public sector under, 328, national income during, 77, objectives of, 63, 73, 78-79, perspective planning in, 42, policies of, 56, 71-72, 74-75, power resources for, 97, preparation of, 39-40, 57-61, priorities in, 22, proposed growth rate under, 77, rapid industrialization through heavy industries under, 41, 96-97, resources for, 61-62, 92, 94, role of private sector in, 329, targets for, 327-329, time table for discussion on, 61-67; secret documents, prevention from leakage of, 246-247; self-reliance, through democratic methods, 533; service rules, special privileges under, 250-251; Shaikh Abdullah, harassment at Kud by security officers of, 379-381, Subbaroyan's meeting with, 387-388, 391; Singapore, David Marshall's role in constitutional future of, 490-491; Sino-US relations, 348, India's role in, 467-474, and repatriation of their nationals, 467-477; small savings, as resources for development projects, 139-141; social justice, 14-16; socialism, 364; socialist pattern of society, 14-16, 62, 79-80, 93-94; Social Welfare Board, activities of, 49-50, usefulness of journals of, 207, working of, 206-208; Spain, establishing diplomatic relations with, 574; speaker, desirability of avoiding controversial politics by, 313; Sri Lanka, elections in, 452, foreign funding of parties in, 251-252; states reorganization, 25-26, 28, 549, and the future of Bombay city, 26-28, reactions to, 559-560, in Bombay, 567, in Punjab on, 28-30, 567, principles of, 25, 29-30; States Reorganization Bill (1956),

schedule for, 560-561; SRC report, unreasonable objections to, 354-356; Sucksdorffs, filming of Bastar tribal life by, 202-203; Syed Mujtaba Ali, utilization of services of, 253; technology, advance of, 75-76; Tibbia College, Government support to, 156; Tibet, building of roads and airports by the Chinese in, 477-478 and India's concern, 477-478, uprising against the Chinese in, 477; trade unions, growth under Gandhiji of, 132-133, role of, 126-137; United Press of India, working of, 275-276; U Nu, retirement from premiership of, 449-451, 553; UK, his meetings in, 455-456, immigration problems for Indians going to, 453, prospects of sending cultural delegations to, 454; USA, economy of, 14, 95, his proposed visit to, 456-458, 460, issues for discussions with Eisenhower in, 458-460, purchase of rice from, 457; USSR, changes in, 568, denunciation of Stalin in, 463, economic & technical help to India by, 7-8, internal changes, 347, planning in, 4, reduction in the army of, 347, trade dealings with, 249-250, trade relations with, 462-463; Vigyan Bhavan, mural themes for, 166-167; violence, as a technique of social action, 521-522, combating of, 323-324, 330-333, 357, CPI's criticism of AICC resolution on, 567-568, condemnation of, 567-568, increasing tendency towards, 31; wages & salaries, regulation of, 368-369; water harvesting, methods of, 150-151; William Ricketts, 578-579; women's status in India, 217-218, 572; world organization, possibilities of formation in the long run of, 538; Yusuf Ali, appointment as Adviser

- to Military Commander in Assam of, 194-197
- , Motilal, (*Vol. I, p. 2*), 509-511
- , Rameshwari, 230 & fn-231
- , R.K., (*Vol. I, p. 336*), 451 fn, 468 & fn-469 & fn, 471 fn-472 & fn, 477, 479 fn
- Nehru: A Political Biography* (Michael Brecher), 512 fn
- Nehru-Liaquat Pact (1950), 428 & fn
- Nehru: The First Sixty Years* (Dorothy Norman), 456 fn
- Nehrus: Motilal and Jawaharlal, The* (B.R. Nanda), 514 fn
- Nekowal (Jammu and Kashmir), 434-436
- Neogy, K.C., (*Vol. 13, p. 219*), 44 & fn
- Nepal, 444-445, 446 & fn; Cabinet of, 445 & fn; Government of, 446; Kings of, *see* Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah and Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah
- Netaji Enquiry Committee (April 1956), 586 & fn-587 fn
- Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 466 & fn, 467, 474
- New Delhi, 17 fn, 34 fn, 45, 69, 112 fn, 130, 157, 161, 176 & fn, 184 fn-185, 186 fn, 187, 191, 227, 229, 233, 235-236, 239, 248, 252, 278, 280 fn, 337 fn, 344 fn, 381, 383 & fn, 387, 396 & fn, 415 fn, 417, 432, 436, 440-441, 443, 448-449, 459 & fn, 461 fn-462 fn, 463 fn, 473 fn, 476 fn, 482 fn, 487 fn, 492 fn, 495, 497, 499 fn, 513 fn, 542, 574 fn, 580, 582 fn, 584, 586, *see also* Delhi
- New York, 4, 247, 401, 436, 457, 460, 480 fn, 484, 486
- Nigam, Savitri, (*VOL. 22, P. 265*), 337 fn
- Nigeria, 496 & fn, 497
- Nilang, 476 fn
- Nizami, Zamir, 164 & fn
- Norman, Dorothy, 456 & fn
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 409-410, 412, 416
- North East Frontier Agency, 104, 176 fn, 181 fn, 190, 194, 203
- North West Frontier Province, 382 & fn, 517
- Nu, U, (*VOL. 4, P. 452*), 176 & fn, 251 fn, 447, 449 & fn, 451 & fn, 553-554, 565
- Nuclear Explosions and Their Effects* (Publication of Defence Services Organization), 34 & fn, 152 & fn
- Official Language Commission (June 1955), 170 & fn, 387-388 fn, report (6 August 1956) of, 170 fn
- Oil Forum, The* (USA), 123 & fn
- Orissa, 99 fn, 102; Government of, 116
- Pacific Ocean, 35 & fn
- Pai, A.V., (*Vol. 10, p. 44*), 243 & fn, 424
- Pakhtunistan, 382 fn
- Pakistan, 9-12, 17-18, 19 & fn, 33, 113, 121, 172, 229, 231, 237 & fn, 240, 248, 289 & fn-290, 294, 313 & fn, 319, 352-354, 377-379, 382 & fn-383 & fn, 384, 389 fn, 427-428 & fn, 429, 431 & fn-432 & fn, 433 & fn, 435, 437 & fn-438, 439 & fn-440, 441 fn-442, 443, 458 & fn-459, 485 fn, 501-502, 531-532, 540-542, 543 & fn, 545 fn, 564, 568 fn, 573-574, 581-582 & fn, 584 & fn; Assembly of, 429 & fn; Government of, 17 fn, 237, 382 fn, 427, 429, 431, 435-436, 439, 442 fn
- , East, 11-12, 180, 428 fn-429 & fn, 430, 543, 573, 582 fn
- Pakistan Border Police, 434 & fn
- Palestine, 322 fn, 348-349 fn
- Palika Bazar (New Delhi), 227 fn
- Pan Tzu-li, 473 & fn
- Panchatantra* (Syed Mujtaba Ali), 253 fn

- Panchsheel*, 7, 23, 446 & fn, 527, 592
- Pande, G., 337 fn
- Pandit, Vijayalakshmi, (*Vol. 1, p. 1*), 202 & fn, 331 fn, 454 & fn-455 & fn, 491 fn, 492 fn, 503-504 & fn
- Panditji: A Portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru* (Marie Seton), 163 fn
- Panikkar, K.M., (*Vol. 1, p. 384*), 160 fn
- Panmunjom (South Korea), 466 fn
- Pant Award (July 1953), 283 fn-284 fn
- Pant, Apa B., (*VOL. 8, P. 412*), 478 & fn
 —, G.B., (*Vol. 3, p. 106*), 119 & fn, 149 & fn, 169 & fn-170 fn, 171, 173 fn, 181-184, 186 fn, 235, 245, 249-250 & fn, 251 fn, 255, 261-262, 264, 267 fn, 271-272 & fn, 277, 283 fn-284, 289 fn, 297, 300 & fn, 379, 400 & fn, 523-524 fn, 567 fn
- Paramasivan, R.S., 196 & fn
- Paris, 395 fn-396 & fn, 401, 409 fn, 487 & fn-488 & fn, 489, 544
- Parliament (India), 9, 17 & fn, 26 & fn, 32, 39 & fn-40, 55, 61-62, 64, 78, 87, 89, 105, 108, 123, 149 fn, 152, 175, 181 fn-182, 183 & fn, 211, 222, 238, 247 fn-248, 256 fn, 307-308, 315, 323, 327, 334, 337, 341 fn, 367, 371, 380, 386, 423, 475 & fn, 484-485, 497, 523, 534, 539, 561 & fn, 562, 571-572, 574; Joint Committee on Salaries and Allowances (1956) of, 314 fn-315 fn; Public Accounts Committee of, 108-109
- Parliament House (New Delhi), 22 fn, 167, 283
- Parmanand, 263 & fn
- Pataskar, H.V., 214 & fn, 217 fn
- Patel, H.M., (*VOL. 5, P. 236*), 257 fn
 —, Parmanand, 337 fn
 —, Vallabhbhai, (*VOL. 26, P. 7*), 274, 407, 518 fn, 581 & fn-582 & fn, 583 & fn-584, 585 & fn
- Path to Nigerian Freedom* (Obafemi Awolowo), 496 fn
- Pathak, G.S., (*VOL. 31, P. 370*), 388 & fn-389
 —, Jnanda Sarma, 196 & fn
- Pather Panchali* (a film), 163 & fn
- Patiala, 269
- Patil, G.D., 298 & fn
 —, R.K., (*VOL. 12, P. 43*), 111 fn
 —, S.K., (*Vol. 12, p. 503*), 139 & fn
- Patna, 304
- Paul Robeson* (Marie Seton), 163 fn
- Pauri (Uttaranchal), 577
- Peking *see* Beijing
- People's Action Party (Singapore), 491 fn
- People's Liberation Army (Malaya), 172 fn
- People's United Front (Sri Lanka), 452 fn, 565 fn
- Pepsu, 99 fn, 265 fn, 269 fn, 299 fn, 343 fn, 567 fn, 572 fn; Assembly of, 362 fn; Government of, 424
- Persian Gulf, 121 fn
- Peshawar, 577 & fn, 589
- Pillai, K. Shankar, (*Vol. 8, p. 846*), 226 & fn-227 fn, 228
 —, N.R., (*VOL. 1, P. 598*), 120 & fn, 399 fn, 461-462 & fn, 487 fn-488 fn
- Pham Van Dong, (*VOL. 26, P. 408*), 465 & fn-466
- Philippines, the, 145 & fn-146, 147
- Phizo, A.Z., (*VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 181*), 171 fn, 176 & fn-177 & fn, 179, 183-184, 185 fn-186, 187 fn, 191-192, 193 fn
- Pineau, Christian Paul Francis, (*VOL. 32, P. 335*), 395-396 & fn, 482 fn, 487-488 & fn-489 & fn
- Planning Commission, 22 fn, 39 fn, 44 & fn-45, 50-52, 55-58, 60, 64-66, 68, 71-72, 77-78, 89, 92, 100, 111 fn-112, 115 fn, 117, 143, 209 & fn, 244, 328, 335,

- 338, 362, 367, 390, 479, 562; report on Second Five Year Plan of, 51, 55 & fn-56, 64, 68, 72, 74, 77-78, 85, 89-90, 98, 100, 104, 362, 552
- Plebiscite Front (Jammu and Kashmir), 377 fn
- Poland, 102, 564 fn, 568
- Political Leadership in India* (Michael Brecher), 512 fn
- Pondicherry, 351, 402 & fn-403, 404 & fn, 408-409, 411, 415 fn
- Poona *see* Pune
- Poonch, 354
- Pope Pius XII, (VOL. 5, P. 544), 419 & fn
- Portrait of A Director: Satyajit Ray* (Marie Seton), 163 fn
- Portugal, 8, 405 fn, 408-410, 412-413, 415 & fn, 418, 420, 568 fn, 582 fn; Government of, 10, 326, 406, 408-410, 413, 415-418
- Prague, 467 fn
- Praja Parishad Party (Nepal), 446 fn
- Praja Socialist Party, 252, 265, 333, 365 & fn, 572 fn
- Prasad, Brajeshwar, (VOL. 13 Pt. II, P. 436), 382
- , Rajendra, (Vol. 3, p. 4), 23 fn, 158 fn, 169 fn, 183 fn, 560 fn, 562 fn, 565
- , Tanka, 445 & fn-446 & fn
- Pratap*, 270 fn, 462 fn
- Press (Objectionable Matters) Act (6 October 1952), 524 & fn
- Preventive Detention Act (1950), 522-523
- Protection and Management of the Environment* (Jack Jordan Beale), 150 fn
- Public Works Department, 144
- Pula (Yugoslavia), 498
- Pune, 400 & fn, 402
- Punial (Pakistan), 382-383
- Punjab, 19, 25, 28-30, 32-33, 99 fn, 131, 170, 214 fn, 263, 265 & fn-266, 268 & fn-269 & fn, 270-273, 299 & fn-300 fn, 331 & fn-332, 343 & fn-344, 354-355, 361 fn, 371, 382 & fn, 438, 453, 461 fn, 567 & fn, 569, 572 & fn-573, 588; Government of, 262, 269, 273, 573; Regional Formula for, 265 fn-266 fn, 270 fn, 299 fn-300 fn, 343 & fn-344 & fn, 355, 572-573
- Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee, 263, 332, 343 & fn-344
- Purana Qila (Delhi), 157-158 & fn, 160
- Purwar, Triloki Nath, 179 & fn-180
- Pyarelal, (Vol. 1, p. 261), 580 & fn
- Quit India Movement (1942), 516
- Radcliffe Award (1947), 439
- Radcliffe Line, 427
- Radhakrishnan, S., (Vol. 4, p. 564), 55, 89 & fn, 159-160, 167, 227 fn, 315 fn, 445 fn, 565
- Rahman, Muhammad Hifzur, 233 & fn
- Rajagopalachari, C. (Vol. 1, p. 350), 148 & fn, 293 fn, 359-360 fn, 518 fn
- Rajah, H.D., 102
- Rajasthan, 114 fn, 277 & fn-278, 287, 290; Government of, 114 fn, 283 fn-284 & fn, 285, 287-288, 289 fn
- Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (1952), 283 fn-284 fn
- Rajya Sabha, 55 & fn, 60, 67, 86, 89-90, 93, 96, 99-101, 105, 108, 110, 214 fn, 300 fn, 430 fn, 560 fn-561 & fn, 572 fn
- Ralla Ram, (Vol. 1, p. 131), 268 fn
- Ram Dhan, 278
- Ram, Jagjivan, (Vol. 15, p. 208), 138 & fn, 315
- Ram Kishen, 265 fn
- Ramlila Grounds (Delhi), 350, 352, 384

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Rann of Kutch, 45 fn
- Rao, B. Ramakrishna, (VOL. 26, P. 153), 45 & fn, 86 fn, 274 & fn, 341
- , V.K.R.V., (*Vol. 11, p. 306*), 244 & fn, 437 & fn, 456
- Rarewala, Gian Singh, (VOL. 24, p. 299), 360-361 & fn
- Ras Tanura (Saudi Arabia), 121 fn
- Raschid, M.A., (VOL. 25, P. 471), 114 fn, 448 & fn, 457
- Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 32-33, 265 & fn-266, 273, 331 fn, 353-354, 569, 587-588 & fn, 590 & fn
- Ratnagiri (Maharashtra), 308, 340
- Ratnam, P., 463 fn
- Rau, B.N., (*Vol. 14, p. 559*), 217 & fn
- , Dhanvanthi Rama, (VOL. 30, P. 230), 49 & fn
- Ravi river, 440, 441 fn
- Ray, Satyajit, 163 fn
- Red Fort (Delhi), 161
- Red Star*, 463 & fn
- Reddy, K.C., (*Vol. 8, p. 566*), 119 & fn
- Reserve Bank of India, 256 fn
- Ricketts, William, 578 & fn
- Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), 168 fn
- Rohtak, 33 & fn, 461 fn
- Roshan Ara, 229 & fn, 230-232, 238-239
- Roy, B.C., (*Vol. 4, p. 230*), 117 fn, 253 & fn, 275-276, 277 fn, 301 fn, 305 & fn, 428 fn
- Roy Kapoor, Jaspat, 102
- Ruhr (Germany), 102
- Runit island (Pacific Ocean), 35 fn
- Russell, Bertrand, (*Vol. 1, p. 141*), 503
- Russia *see* USSR
- Russian Trade Agreement (6 April 1956), 462 & fn
- Sadiq, G.M., (VOL. 2, P. 271), 388
- Sahay, Bhagwan, (VOL. 28, P. 264), 445 & fn-446
- , Vishnu, (VOL. 11, P. 142), 381
- Sahitya Akademi, 160, 163, 371
- St. Laurent, Louis, (VOL. 12, P. 413), 112
- Saiyidain, K.G., (*Vol. 15, p. 295*), 228 & fn, 509-511
- Sakhrie, T., (VOL. 31, P. 142), 199 fn
- Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira, (VOL. 2, P. 563), 405 & fn-406, 412-413, 416, 418
- Salih bin Bahlah, 211 fn
- Samaj Kalyan*, 207 fn
- Sampurnanand, (*Vol. 2, p. 143*), 344 & fn-345 fn, 346 fn
- Samyukta Maharashtra, 309 fn
- Sanawar (Himachal Pradesh), 231
- Sandburg, Carl, 579 & fn
- Sarabhai, Mridula, (*Vol. 5, p. 316*), 231 & fn, 381 & fn
- Sargot, Narain Singh, 286 fn
- Saudi Arabia, 499; King of, *see* Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz Bin
- Saurashtra, 342, 400-401 & fn
- S.M.S. Medical College (Jaipur), 379 fn
- Sen, B.R., (*Vol. 15, p. 526*), 586 & fn-587 fn
- Sen Gupta, B., (VOL. 19, P. 610), 275 fn
- Sergei Esenistein* (Marie Seton), 163 fn
- Sesha Kabita* (Surendra Mohanty), 430 fn
- Setalvad, M.C., (*Vol. 15, p. 86*), 388 & fn-389
- Sethi, Dev Raj, 268 fn
- Sethupathi, S.R. (Raja of Ramnad), 292 fn
- Seton, Marie, 163 & fn
- Sevagram, 205
- Shabnam* (Syed Mujtaba Ali), 253 fn
- Shamshere, Hari, 446 & fn
- Sharma, Mouli Chandra, (VOL. 23, P. 293), 440 & fn, 441 fn

- ____, Nand Lal, 216 & fn, 220-221
- ____, Shankar Dayal, (VOL. 20, P. 281), 243 fn
- ____, Shriram, 261 & fn
- Shastri, Lal Bahadur, (*Vol. 5, p. 164*), 128 fn, 130, 137 & fn
- Sheth, Shantilal, 209 & fn
- Shillong, 182, 187 fn, 193-194, 197, 203
- Shimla, 234, 499 fn
- Shiv Ram, 270 fn
- Shri Ram, 114 & *fn*-115 fn
- Shrikant, L.M., (VOL. 16 Pt. II, P. 430), 190 & fn
- Shrimali, K.L., 206 & fn-207 & fn
- Shriman Narayan, (VOL. 19, P. 485), 342 & fn-343 fn
- Sikh Light Infantry, 184 fn
- Silesia (Austria), 101
- Simla *see* Shimla
- Sind, 382 fn, 517-518
- Sindri Fertilizer Plant, 143
- Singapore, 121-122, 145 & fn, 459 & fn, 491 fn-492 & fn, 493 & fn; Legislative Assembly of, 491
- Singh, Anirudh Prasad, 445 fn
- ____, C.P.N., (VOL. 11, P. 279), 262 & fn-263 fn, 264 & fn, 266-267 fn, 268 fn, 272 & fn-273 fn, 427
- ____, Gunjaman, 445 & fn-446
- ____, Gurcharan, 262 fn
- ____, Hari, (*Vol. 5, p. 467*), 386
- ____, Hukam, (VOL. 16 Pt. II, P. 531), 64 & fn, 71, 453 & fn
- ____, Iwan, 286 fn
- ____, Jaipal, (VOL. 10, P. 345), 190 & fn
- ____, Jang Bahadur, 160 & *fn*
- ____, K.I., (VOL. 15 Pt. II, P. 402), 446 & fn
- ____, Kewal, (VOL. 21, P. 561), 404 & fn
- ____, Mohan, 262 fn
- ____, Sant, (VOL. 7, P. 263), 200 & fn
- ____, Santokh, 112-113
- ____, Sawai Man (Rajpramukh of Rajasthan), (VOL. 8, P. 358), 287 & fn
- ____, Sawant, 286 fn
- ____, Swaran, (VOL. 4, P. 41), 118 & fn-119, 120, 123, 156, 166, 254
- ____, Tan, 286 fn
- ____, Tara, (*Vol. 4, p. 572*), 261 & fn-262 & fn, 264 fn, 266-267 & fn
- ____, Yadavendra (Maharaja of Patiala), (VOL. 3, P. 263), 424 & fn
- Sinha, Awadheshwar Prasad, (VOL. 15 Pt. I, P. 99), 304 & fn
- ____, Satya Narayan, (VOL. 2, P. 17) 315 & fn
- ____, S.K., (*Vol. 3, p. 420*), 304 & fn
- Sita Devi, 268 fn
- Socialist Party, 365 & fn, 532
- Social Welfare*, 207 fn
- Soekarno, Ahmed, (*Vol. 14, p. 452*), 450 & fn
- South Africa, Union of, 17, 319, 514
- South America, 167
- SEATO, 17, 320, 322 & fn, 352, 383 fn; meeting at Karachi (6-8 March 1956) of, 322 & fn
- Soviet Union *see* USSR
- Spain, 574; Government of, 574 & fn
- Sri Lanka, 145-146, 148, 251 & fn-252, 452 & fn, 455 fn, 461 & fn, 485 fn-486 fn, 545 fn, 550, 564-565 fn, 569 & fn; General Elections (5-10 April 1956) in, 565 fn; Government of, 565; Official Language Bill (June 1956) of, 569 fn
- Sri Prakasa, (*Vol. 2, p. 203*), 291 & fn-292 fn
- Srinagar, 19 & fn, 387-388 fn, 441 fn
- Srinagesh, S.M., (VOL. 9, P. 206), 171 & fn, 198-199
- Stalin, Josef, (*Vol. 2, p. 397*), 31, 364

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

- Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 118-119 fn
- Standstill Agreement (between India and Hyderabad State), (29 November 1947), 585 fn
- State Bank of India, 256 & fn-257 & fn
- States Reorganization Commission, 293 fn, 297 fn, 301 fn-302, 321, 338-339, 343 fn, 353, 355, 370, 404, 497 fn, 572 fn-573, report of, 29, 338, 370, 573; Draft Bill on Reorganization of States (March 1956), 26 & fn, 298 fn, 300 & fn, 302-303 fn, 307-308, 338 & fn, 404, 497 fn, 560 & fn-561
- Stone, Richard, 40 & fn
- Strachey, John, (*Vol. 5, p. 476*), 40 & fn
- Straits Times*, 492 fn
- Struggle for Kashmir, The* (Michael Brecher), 512 fn
- Subbaroyan, P., (*Vol. 8, p. 359*), 387-388 & fn, 391
- Subramaniam, C., (*VOL. 17, P. 350*), 44 & fn, 292 & fn-293 fn
- Succession in India* (Michael Brecher), 512 fn
- Sucksdorff, Arne Edvard, 202 & fn-203 & fn
- ____, Mrs., 202 & fn-203 & fn
- Sudan, 494, 501
- Sukhadia, Mohanlal, 285 & fn-286 fn, 287-288
- Sukthankar, Y.N., (*VOL. 21, P. 264*), 45 fn, 120 & fn, 142, 234, 236, 246 & fn, 593
- Sulaiman, Shah Muhammad, 210 & fn
- Suman-Smriti-Granth* (Bhakt Darshan), 577 fn
- Sundaram, Lanka, (*VOL. 2, P. 485*), 64 & fn
- Sun-tzu, 537 fn
- Supreme Court of India, 284 fn
- Supreme Court of Nepal, 445 fn
- Suraj Bhan, 270 fn
- Surja Ram, 263 & fn-264
- Swat (Pakistan), 382 & fn
- Syed Mir Qasim, 390 fn
- Syed Mujtaba Ali, 253 & fn
- Symon, Alexander, 391 & fn
- Syria, 502
- Tagore, Rabindranath, (*Vol. 11, p. 672*), 510
- Tahar Bin Ammar, 495 & fn
- Taiwan, 16, 348, 467 fn, 472 fn-473, 475 fn, 586 & fn-587; Government of, 586
- Taj Mahal, 157
- Talpur, Mir Ghulam Ali, 429 fn
- Tandon, P.D., (*Vol. 8, p. 231*), 214 & fn, 217 & fn
- ____, R.K., 492 fn-493 fn
- Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (Mumbai), 146 fn
- Tatas, 249 fn
- Tawna, L., 204
- Tehran, 322 & fn
- Telengana, 29-30, 341-342
- Tennessee Valley Authority (USA), 108
- Tezpur (Assam), 176 fn
- Thailand, 146
- Thana District, 308, 340
- Tharparkar district (Pakistan), 439 fn
- Theory and Practice of Environmental Management* (Jack Jordan Beale), 150 fn
- Thomas, A.M., 220 & fn
- Thoreau, Henry David, (*Vol. 12, p. 379*), 530 & fn
- Tibbia College (Delhi), 156 & fn
- Tiberias Lake (Syria), 348 fn
- Tibet, 475 & fn-476 & fn, 477 & fn
- Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, (*Vol. 1, p. 41*), 512 & fn

- Times of India, The*, 173, 175, 177 & fn, 197, 201
- Tipaimukh (Manipur), 204 fn
- Tito, Josip Broz, (VOL. 22, P. 414), 365 & fn, 450 & fn, 498 & fn, 568
- , Jovanka Broz, 498
- Travancore-Cochin, 28, 102, 104
- Treaty of Cession of the French Settlements in India (28 May 1956), 323 & fn, 402 & fn, 403, 411
- Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah, (VOL. 2, P. 478), 446 fn
- Tribune, The*, 313 fn
- Tripitaka*, 23 fn
- Tripura, 173 fn, 204 fn
- Trivedi, U.M., 587 & fn, 590
- Trombay, 119 fn, 142
- Tsang Chokla pass, 476 fn
- Tuensang Frontier Division (NEFA), 171 fn, 178-180, 181 fn, 183 fn, 192, 194, 196
- Tunisia, 16 & fn, 320, 350, 481, 482 & fn, 495 fn; Government of, 16 fn, 495
- Tunku, Abdul Rahman, 172 fn, 493 fn
- Turkman Gate (Delhi), 227 fn
- Tyabji, B.F.H.B., (VOL. 8, P. 352), 147 & fn
- Tyagi, Mahavir, (*Vol. 5, p. 211*), 502 & fn, 589 & fn
- U Aung Soe, 449 & fn
- Umargaon taluk, 302 & fn
- Union Public Service Commission, 204
- USSR, 3-7 & fn, 8 & fn-9, 13-14, 16-17, 31-32, 34-36, 46, 59 fn, 77, 97, 107-108, 138 fn, 249, 250 fn, 335, 346-347, 349 & fn, 364 & fn-365 fn, 368, 371, 459, 462 fn, 463 fn-464 & fn, 466, 474, 476 fn, 500 fn, 503, 535, 538, 564, 568; First Five Year Plan of, 4 & fn; Government of, 4, 474, 478; Second Five Year Plan of, 4
- United Arab Republic *see* Egypt
- UK, 3-6, 8, 10, 12-13, 18, 35, 71, 102, 125, 152-153, 168, 250-251, 292 & fn, 349 fn, 369, 371, 395 fn, 412-414, 418-419, 422, 450 & fn, 453-454, 455 fn, 456, 464 & fn, 466, 474, 491 & fn, 503-504, 512-513, 547-548, 564, 574, 582 fn; Cabinet of, 455 fn; Government of, 247, 406-407, 453, 459, 464 & fn, 467, 492 fn
- United National Party (Sri Lanka), 251 fn, 452 fn, 565 fn
- United Nations Charter, 443-444, 483, 486 fn, 564 fn
- United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, 379 & fn; resolution (13 August 1948) of, 379 fn
- UNESCO, 8 & fn, 390, 437 fn
- United Nations Organization, 36, 148 & fn, 179, 248, 326, 349 fn-350, 351-352, 379 fn, 390, 460, 466 & fn-467 fn, 480 fn, 482 & fn, 484 & fn-485, 487, 495 & fn, 500 & fn, 531, 545-546, 574; Economic and Social Council of, 142 & fn, 145; General Assembly of, 148 fn-149, 480, 484 fn, resolution (December 1946) of, 574 fn; Security Council of, 18-19, 348 fn-349 fn, 379 fn, 384, 386-387, 389 & fn, 391, 430 & fn-431 & fn, 432, 460, 480 fn, 484 fn-485 & fn, 486 & fn-487, 489 & fn, 500 fn, 564, 574; Technical Assistance Programme of, 8 fn; Trusteeship Council of, 460
- UNICEF, 212 fn
- United Nations Statistical Year Book* (1964), 43 fn, 59 fn
- United Press of India, 275 & fn-276
- United States Information Service, 461 & fn-462
- USA, 3-9, 11-14, 18, 34, 35 & fn-36, 46, 95, 97, 107-108, 123 fn, 145 & fn, 152-153, 210, 251 & fn, 294, 335, 348, 368,

- 383 fn, 386, 389, 395 fn, 412-414, 437 fn, 450 & fn, 454, 456-459, 460 fn-461 fn, 462, 467 & fn-468, 469, 471 & fn-472, 473 fn-474 & fn, 504, 532, 535, 538, 568 fn, 571, 574; Government of, 146-147, 352, 458 fn-459 fn, 462 fn, 467 fn-468, 469, 471, 473 & fn, 474, 570 fn; States Department of, 458
- US International Cooperation Administration, 145 fn
- US-Pakistan Agreement (1954), 458 fn
- University of Taxila, 211
- Upadhyaya, Haribhau, (VOL. 30, P. 312), 277 & fn-278 & fn, 279 fn
- , Munishwar Dutt, 337 fn, 345 fn
- Uttar Pradesh, 29, 99 fn, 102, 113, 189, 291 fn, 371, 475; Government of, 345 fn, 577
- Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee, 345 fn
- Vagal, Damodar M., 308 & fn
- Vallatharas, K. Muthuswamy, 186 fn, 188
- Vatican, The, 399 & fn-400, 401
- Veeraswamy, V., 132 fn
- Velayudhan, R., 88
- Vellodi, M.K., (VOL. 2, P. 55), 199, 458
- Verman, Lal C., 149 fn
- Vicker's-Babcock & Wilcox, 125 fn
- Vidarbha, 27, 297 fn, 339, 342
- Vietnam, 16 fn, 459, 464 & fn-465 fn, 466, 472, 474, 483 fn
- , North (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), 465 & fn, 467
- , South (Republic of Vietnam), 464 & fn-465 & fn, 467
- Vigyan Bhavan (New Delhi), 166 & fn
- Vilhume (a Naga), 185 & fn, 187 & fn, 191
- Vindhya Pradesh, 342
- Virendra, 270 fn
- Vishakhapatnam, 119 fn
- Vishyepu (Nagaland), 186
- Vizol (a Naga), 184 & fn, 187 fn
- Wang Ping-nan, 467 & fn, 469, 473
- Warsaw, 467 fn
- Warrior, N.V. Krishna, 160 fn
- Washington, 147, 431, 450 & fn, 456 & fn-457, 458 fn, 460, 467 & fn-468, 472-473 fn, 566
- Washington Post*, 452 fn
- West Bengal, 28, 99 fn, 102, 104, 117, 301 fn, 304 fn, 305 & fn, 338, 561; Government of, 116, 164
- West Pakistan Act (1955), 382
- Wiener, Nobert, 40 & fn
- Wilson, 205
- Wilson, I.H.R., (VOL. 32, P. 424), 427 & fn
- Win, U, 484 fn
- WHO, 212 fn, 495
- World War (First), 3-5, 129, 139, 513
- World War (Second), 4-6, 527
- Yamuna river, 20
- Yanam (Andhra Pradesh), 402 fn, 404 & fn, 409
- Yash, 268 fn
- Yates, Frank, 40 & fn
- Yoshizawa, Sejiro, 499 & fn-500
- Yugoslavia, 365 fn, 450 & fn, 497 fn-498 fn, 535, 566
- Yunus, Mohammad, 389 fn-390 fn
- Yusuf Ali, Rashid, 192 & fn, 194-196, 200
- Zaheer, Syed Ali, (VOL. 3, P. 26), 390 fn
- , Syed Husain, (VOL. 21, P. 512), 124 & fn
- Zaidi, Syed Bashir Husain, 156 & fn, 168 & fn
- Zashie Huire (a Naga), 184 fn, 187 & fn
- Zinkin, Taya, (VOL. 15 Pt. I, P. 202), 574 fn

During the period from 1 May to 20 June 1956, covered by this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru devoted a great deal of attention to India's relations with its neighbours, especially Pakistan...he supported the aspirations of the peoples of Asia and Africa for self-determination.

Nehru addressed issues of India's progress and prosperity with his usual vigour and earnest commitment. Hence, his close and active interest in the formulation and implementation of the Second Five Year Plan which laid emphasis on much higher production targets...that would lead to an increase in employment opportunities. He laid stress on the importance of science and technology in all his major public utterances...made strenuous efforts to reform and revitalize the existing administrative structures...Nehru engaged with the Union Minister for Food and Agriculture to study China's agrarian cooperatives so as to raise India's food production targets... wanted a reconsideration of the question of exploration, mining, refining, pricing and distribution of oil in India...He desired a long term political approach to resolve the Naga problem without disturbing their traditions and customs... justified military intervention only because some Naga leaders adopted a violent course.

National reconciliation was the cornerstone of his domestic policy. In consequence, he expressed his anxiety whenever ethnic, religious, caste, regional and linguistic tensions threatened to undermine his vision of a strong and united India

In May 1956, the Railway employees in Kharagpur and Kalka went on strike...Nehru detailed his views on labour-management relations...Nehru discussed scientific, cultural and educational matters with utmost clarity...he is open-minded, liberal and eclectic in his approach.

Nehru described the Hindu Succession Act, passed in this period, as a first step towards the economic freedom for women of India.

On Kashmir, Nehru reiterated his suggestion for a settlement along the ceasefire line, made originally in May 1955.

Documents in the volume also indicate Nehru's concern with the 'underlying unity' of India. He made strenuous efforts to preserve that unity by invoking both the historical and contemporary symbols of composite culture.

As in other volumes, there are examples of Nehru intervening in cases where he felt that justice had not been done.

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